Territorial logic of the Islamic State: an interdisciplinary approach

ABSTRACT

While scholars and experts unanimously identify the group also known as Islamic State (ISIS) as a ‘territorial’ organization, there is little systematic analysis in International Relations (IR) research on the subject. This paper deals with two specific questions: How can we conceptualize ISIS’ territoriality, that is, the ways in which the group envisions the relationship between space and society; and How has its particular territoriality affected its military and political strategy? In order to address these questions, this study draws upon the relevant literature in political geography and introduces an interdisciplinary analytical framework that helps identify different ‘territorial orders’. An analysis of ISIS through the lenses of the theoretical framework suggests that while ISIS’ territoriality partially resembles that of an historical Islamic state, it is much closer to a revolutionary state. The framework introduced in this study and examination of ISIS’ territoriality have implications for questions over the group’s ‘statehood’, geographical assumptions of IR theory, and the future of interaction between IR and political geography.

KEYWORDS:

• Islamic State (ISIS)
• territorial orders
• territorial conflict
• International Relations theory
• terrorism
• geopolitics of jihad

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author thanks John Agnew, Sinem Arslan, Michael Dennis, Robert Krivacs, Adam Moore, Craig Whiteside, Rita Konaev, Monica Toft, Thomas Cavanna, Karim Elkady, Polina Beliakova as well as the workshop participants in the Department of Geography at UCLA, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Department of Political Science at Ohio State University, School of International Service at the American University, Center for Strategic Studies at Tufts University's Fletcher School, and Department of Political Science at the University of Central Florida for their exceptionally detailed and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 For a rare unpublished manuscript, see Can (2017).

2 On reterritorialization, see Edney (2009) and Adelman and Aron (1999).

3 See also Dabiq (5, p. 3).

4 Lia (2015) counts about 20 jihadi proto-states, but also recognizes that very few survived more than a year and controlled territory in any meaningful sense

5 For example, Dabiq (1, p. 35; 5, p. 47).

6 Dabiq (13, pp. 40, 49).

7 Pérouse de Montclos (2016) makes a similar case for Boko Haram’s provinciality.

8 Frontiers can be defined as ‘broad bands of territory or zones where large-scale movements of populations differing in ethnic, linguistic, and religious composition have been jumbled together with no clear lines of demarcation separating them’ (Rieber, 2015, pp. 952–953).

9 On territoriality and nationalism, see Murphy (2013).

10 Of course, reality may contradict the territorial vision adapted by the state elites. On a German–Italian comparison, see Ziblatt (2006).

11 Hybrid warfare brings together conventional capabilities and unconventional methods as well as regular and irregular forces (Murray, 2012).

12 Guilmartin (1988, p. 726) refers to this process as ‘the perpetual war of raid and counter-raid’. Note that modern-day Salafi jihadism adheres to a similar understanding with respect to perpetual conflict (Celso, 2016).

13 On similarities and differences between jihad and ghaza, see Kafadar (1995, pp. 79–80).

14 This understanding is also associated with Islamic philosophy, which ‘recognized no boundaries for [the Islamic] kingdom’ (Parvin & Sommer, 1980, p. 3; see also Khadduri, 1955, p. 46).

15 ISIS specifically invokes the term ribat, which can be interpreted as frontier outpost (e.g., Dabiq, 5, p. 11; 9, pp. 8–13). On AQ’s use of the concept, see Long (2009).

16 On ‘portability’ of state territory in the so-called ‘Muslim territoriality’, see Parvin and Sommer (1980, p. 2).

17 For example, Dabiq (13, pp. 49–54).

18 On how Salafi jihadist groups ‘reterritorialize’ areas they control, see Campion (2017) and Doboš (2016). See also Dabiq (2, p. 15; 11, pp. 32–33).

19 For example, Dabiq (3).

20 As Kennedy (2007, p. 48) highlights, Hijrah ‘marks the beginning of the Islamic era’.

21 In fact, numerous ISIS experts expected the group to make a grand stand for Dabiq (e.g., Wood, 2015; McCants, 2015).

22 For example, Dabiq (1, p. 10).

23 Dabiq (7, p. 62).

24 For example, Dabiq (2, pp. 12–13; 4, p. 9; 10, pp. 30–34).

25 This is not to say that political geographers dismiss the study of war. Their emphasis in this context has been more on the imperial and neo-imperial modes of domination (e.g., Flint, 2004).