ABSTRACT
This article interrogates the use of biometric ID technology to facilitate political mobilisation of migrants for election purposes in West Africa. We contribute to the migration instrumentalisation (MI) debate by fishing out four structures that facilitate MI for election purposes, namely: regional migration regimes; state identity politics/policies; monetary inducement; and biometric ID technology. Based on a qualitative in-depth study of migrants from Chad, Niger, Benin, Cameroon and Togo in Nigeria, we reveal how biometric ID technology has been instrumentalised to delegitimise the state; and how migrants’ strategies/demand for political belonging – via ‘biometric nationality’ – intersect with elite manipulations.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 Sections 47(2) and 41 of the Electoral Act, 2022.
2 Section 50(2) of the Electoral Act 2022.
3 Telephone interview with an INEC resident electoral officer (REC), 21 May 2022.
4 ‘Biometric nationality’ is used here to refer to the claim of nationality by enrolling in the biometrics ID system. Non-Nigerians who enrolled in the biometric ID system were issued NIN and e-ID cards as evidence of nationality.
5 This is contained in the testimony of the Nigerian Comptroller General of Immigration (Channels TV, Citation2015).
6 A claim of Nigeria’s nationality is only essentially tied to citizenship by birth, registration and naturalisation, as provided in sections 25, 26 and 27 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, respectively.
7 These bordering states are also found within the top 10 states in NIN enrolment in Nigeria (NIMC, 2022).
8 Telephone interview with two senior NCC officials in Benin, Edo state, 22 April 2022.
9 Interview with one mid-career NCC official in Enugu, Enugu state, 20 April 2022.
10 Interview with two CBN officials at the office headquarters, in Garki, Abuja, 8 June 2022.
11 Interview with two INEC officials at a mobile registration centre, Nsukka, Enugu state, 2 May 2022.
12 Interview with two INEC officials, Aba city, 15 March 2022.
13 Telephone interview with an NCC official, Benin city, 21 April 2022.
14 Telephone interview with an NCC official, NCC Headquarters, Maitama, Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT), 24 March 2022.
15 A FGD with five migrants from Niger, Lokpanta migrant settlement, Abia state, 4 February 2022.
16 A FGD with five migrants from Niger, Lokpanta migrant settlement, Abia state, 4 February 2022.
17 A FGD with a mix of one LTM and three VRMs from Chad, at Obollo Afor, Nsukka, Enugu state, 5 February 2022.
18 Interview with an LTM from Chad, at Ojo/Badagry, Lagos, 14 March 2022.
19 Interview with an LTM from Niger, at Gwagwalada, Abuja, 14 March 2022.
20 Teledensity is defined as the percentage of active telephone connections per 100 inhabitants living within an area.
21 This refers to mainly Nigerian politicians of Fulani ethnic extraction who have direct family relatives in Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Benin (Mohammed, Citation2019).
22 An FGD with a group of five Nigerien migrants in Zuba central park, Abuja, 17 April 2022.
23 This was an opinion shared by the majority of migrants in the FGDs across the study areas.
24 Interviews with three Abuja-based politicians in the National Assembly, 14 December 2021.
25 Interviews with two politicians in Enugu state, 5 December 2021.
26 Interviews with two politicians in Enugu state, 5 December 2021.
27 See sections 25–27 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.