Criminal accumulation by dispossession: the exploitation of property development in peripheral areas by organised crime

ABSTRACT

The paper discusses the infiltration of mafia-type organised crime groups (OCGs) in property development, with a particular focus on peripheral areas. It has two main aims. First, to shed light on the fact that mafia-type OCGs often become active players in this industry. Second, to identify those place-bound aspects that foster their infiltration. To this end, the article reviews recent cases of infiltration in the sphere of urban development with regard to the non-traditional mafia area of northern Italy. By investigating two peripheral municipalities, Brescello and Desio, it offers an insight into two main factors that make peripheral areas an attractive property market for place-embedded OCGs such as mafia groups: first, the structural weaknesses of peripheral municipalities with regard to their political–administrative spheres which, in turn, amplify the shortcomings of the planning process; and second, the fact that peripheral property markets present some features that make them more likely to be affected by the economic input of OCGs and thus create an ideal scenario for a process of criminal accumulation by dispossession.

KEYWORDS:

• organised crime
• mafia
• corruption
• urban development
• real estate
• urban governance

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper is the result of the joint and balanced work of the two authors. The empirical work on Brescello was done by Massimo Bertolin, that on Desio by Francesco Chiodelli. The writing and revision of the paper is the result of the joint work of the two authors. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 The organisation of the ‘Ndrangheta revolves around ‘ndrine (families) and locali (cells). ‘Ndrine are the basic cell units, whereas a locale comprises, in most cases, no more than two ‘ndrine. Each locale tends to operate exclusively in its own constituency, so that there is no competition in the same area (Sergi & Lavorgna, 2016).

2 The resource exchange can by described through the following ideal-type: businessmen would provide financial resources; politicians would provide authority-related ones; professionals and public officials would provide technical, normative and regulatory resources. It is also worth stressing how members of mafia groups do not necessarily occupy a dominant position within this resource exchange (Sciarrone, 2019c).

3 These relations seem to be particularly recurrent in segments of the cement cycle and earth-moving activities, which are dominated by small and individual companies that can be strictly controlled through extortive practices (Ferrante et al., 2021; Transcrime, 2009).

4 The research participants gave their explicit consent to use their interview statements for research purposes. In case they asked to remain anonymous, their name does not appear in the present article.

5 According to Italian legislation, the receivership procedure is an extraordinary prevention measure that is applied when there is a real danger that the activity of a municipality is bent to the interests of the mafia clans. In order to ascertain the influence of OCGs on the local authority, the Minister of the Interior appoints a special prefectural investigation commission. The prefect then transmits the conclusions of this work to the Minister of the Interior, who decides whether to submit the proposal for dissolution to the Council of Ministers, which decides on the merits. The subsequent dissolution decree is signed by the President of the Republic.

6 During the discussion on the master plan by the city council (Comune di Desio, 2009a, 2009b) there were numerous accusations that several decisions were made ‘on the basis of one’s surname’.