Civil society and social movements: conceptual insights and challenges in African contexts

Abstract

The debate on different forms of political mobilization and self-organization in Africa refers to the established concepts of civil society and social movements. Knowing that the majority of studies on civil society and social movements focus on the Global North, we ask whether these concepts may be applied to Africa. We need to consider different forms of self-organization and the potential limits of the concepts. At the same time, ‘unusual cases’ from Africa may help us to sharpen our understanding of the concepts and to explore their analytical range and borders. This applies particularly to the observation that the terms civil society and social movement are often used interchangeably, which ignores the existing differences between the concepts. Therefore, we first consider their different perspectives: A study of civil society analyses the features of associations in a public sphere or arena and their role in politics and society. A study of social movements looks at processes of mobilization and action. Second, we point out the normative implications of the two concepts, especially with regard to liberal democracy, degree of politicization and relation to violence.

Le débat sur différentes formes de mobilisation politique et d’auto-organisation en Afrique se réfère aux concepts établis de société civile et de mouvements sociaux. Sachant que la majorité des études sur la société civile et les mouvements sociaux se concentrent sur le Nord global, nous demandons si ces concepts peuvent s’appliquer à l’Afrique. Nous devons considérer différentes formes d’auto-organisation et les limites potentielles des concepts. Dans le même temps, des ‘cas inhabituels’ d’Afrique peuvent nous aider à raffiner la compréhension que nous avons des concepts et explorer leur fourchette analytique et leurs limites. Cela vaut en particulier pour l’observation que les termes de société civile et de mouvement social sont souvent employés de façon interchangeable, faisant fi des différentes qui existent entre les concepts. Par conséquent, nous commençons par étudier leurs différentes perspectives: Une étude de la société civile analyse les caractéristiques d’associations dans une sphère publique et leur rôle en politique et dans la société. Une étude des mouvements sociaux se penche sur les processus de mobilisation et d’action. En second lieu, nous montrons les implications normatives des deux concepts, en particulier en ce qui concerne la démocratie libérale, le degré de politisation et la relation avec la violence.

Keywords:

• social movements
• protest
• civil society
• association
• Global South
• Africa
• epistemology

Mots-clés:

• mouvements sociaux
• contestation
• société civile
• association
• Sud Global
• Afrique
• épistémologie

1. Introduction

Phenomena such as the Arab Spring, protests against the government in Zimbabwe or Togo, critical actions and protests in the field of housing in South Africa, or protests during elections in Kenya, have attracted interest in the international media and among scholars, particularly in political science and political sociology. In studies of these activities in African contexts, two conceptual terms occur prominently: ‘social movement’ and ‘civil society’. The debate on social movements and civil society in Africa faces two challenges; first, the limitations of these concepts for understanding social phenomena in Africa, and, second, the unreflecting and interchangeable use of these concepts. The aim of this article is to provide new insights and deepen our understanding of how these concepts can be applied in an African context, and of the challenges this involves. This offers at the same time a new perspective on the concepts themselves.

If we look at current discussions of political protest, popular political debates or relations between society and state in Africa, we see that the concepts ‘social movement’ and ‘civil society’ seem to be taken for granted, despite some critical questions. We need to be aware that the majority of studies that use the concepts of civil society and social movement derive from the so-called Global North, especially North America and Europe. These concepts were developed against the backdrop of particular social and political conditions in Europe and North America, but they have also been applied to social realities in the so-called Global South. This transfer of the concepts to a different social context is a general shortcoming. As Comaroff and Comaroff (2012, 113) argue: ‘Western enlightenment thought has, from the first, posited itself as the wellspring of universal learning.’ Against this backdrop, the question arises whether these concepts are universal, and whether they can be applied to social realities in the so-called Global South, particularly to cases in Africa? Scholars increasingly question the hierarchies in knowledge production, referring to de-colonial debates which perceive such hierarchies as an outcome of colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2018), and to the idea of travelling concepts and their limitations (Robinson and Parnell 2011). This reflection on Northern concepts goes along with a search for new epistemologies, the revival of indigenous knowledge (Denzin, Lincoln, and Smith 1999), and attempts to develop theories based on Southern cases (Connell 2007), sometimes discussed under the heading of ‘global sociology’ (Burawoy 2008).

Africa offers a chance to explore the ambivalence of social protest movements and civil society associations, and the challenges this presents for an analysis of these phenomena in Southern contexts. African civil associations and social movements, and their societal background, are much more diverse than in the Global North, which is usually the basis for the development of social science theories. If we want to develop concepts that apply globally, we also need to analyse cases that do not easily fit our idea of social movements and civil society associations. As we will see, the recent debates on civil society and social movements present a challenge with regard to Africa.¹ We suggest that the analysis of ‘unusual cases’, here drawn from Africa, will allow us to sharpen our concepts and to explore their analytical range and their borders.

This leads us to a problem that is also relevant with regard to the Global North. The terms civil society and social movement are often used for describing the same phenomenon. In a case of collective action, it is often hard to say at first sight whether it is the expression of a civil society association or network of associations, whether these associations are part of a movement, or whether the public protests were organized by a group of individuals. In addition, formal associations refer to themselves as a social movement in order to highlight their dynamic character (see Daniel 2016, 121). Whether strategically or without reflection, the terms civil society and social movement are often used interchangeably. However, among scholars there are extensive conceptual debates with regard to the use of these two terms. Even if there is no agreement over their respective definitions, it is at least possible to identify a difference with regard to perspective. The concept of civil society refers to the features of associations in a public sphere or arena and their role in politics and society. The concept of social movement refers to processes of mobilization and action. In addition, the concepts differ in their normative implications with regard to liberal democratic norms, their degree of politicization and the way they deal with violence. Thus, the terms have several normative implications which influence our understanding of the respective phenomena. This is the reason why reflection is needed.

Three examples can serve to show what we mean. The protests by the Baganda community in Uganda were aimed at claiming autochthonous land rights and recognition of the Baganda monarchy as a regional government in the name of tradition (Kasfir 2016). In northern Ghana, there have been political and to some extent violent conflicts with regard to the succession of chiefs or the right of ethnic groups to install their own chief (Awedoba 2009). In Nigeria, public protest movements accused the government of not caring about the young girls and women kidnapped by Boko Haram; this led to a world-wide solidarity campaign (‘Bring Back Our Girls’). By looking at regions beyond the Global North, this article will contribute to the debate on the chances and challenges we face when we transfer established concepts to the Global South.

For this purpose, we will start with a short history of the controversies over how to define civil society and social movements (sections 2 & 4). We will discuss the normative implications of these concepts, and their relation to the values of liberal democracy. After this, we will consider the extent to which actions are politicized,² and examine their relation to violence. We will then analyse the challenges involved in applying these concepts to the analysis of cases in Africa (sections 3 & 5). Our examples will illustrate what may be included under the concept and what not. The variety of cases we refer to highlight the diversity and complexity of civil society actors and social movements in African contexts. Finally, we sum up and discuss the application of the concepts to cases in Africa and the normative implications (section 6).

2. Civil society: origin and applications

The basic idea of ‘civil society’ goes back to Friedrich Hegel and his concept of ‘bürgerliche Gesellschaft’, first translated as ‘bourgeois society’, in the late 18th century. This referred to a new class of merchants, entrepreneurs and civil servants who claimed freedom from domination by the nobility and individual freedom from traditional bonds. The writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels followed this understanding. As a result of the success of Marx and Engels, the term ‘bourgeois society’ was linked to their theories. Because of this Marxist connotation in the Anglophone discussion, the original idea of Hegel was better expressed by the term ‘civil society’, as used by Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859) (de Tocqueville 1948).

At the height of the civil society debate in the 1990s, a multitude of definitions were offered. Looking back on this discussion, there seem to be three interlinked concepts that describe civil society in different ways (Edwards 2009). One concept goes back to de Tocqueville (1948). According to this understanding, civil society reflects the idea that people organize their affairs by themselves. This includes social services, and of course self-organization and associational life. The rich debate on voluntary associations (e.g. Hudock 1999; Salamon 2004), and Putnam’s (2000) influential study ‘Bowling Alone’, represent this line of thought. Other concepts define civil society as a societal arena. According to Antonio Gramsci, civil society is a space in which social conflicts are carried on with a preparedness to express political interests and to influence politics. This makes civil society the main battlefield for fighting for a democratic, equal and socialist society (Kebir 1991). This understanding paved the way for the concept of civil society as a public sphere. Habermas (1991) underlined the importance of a public sphere between the state, the market and the private sphere, for public discussions where citizens can deliberate in an open and peaceful manner on matters affecting the common good (Benhabib 1991). Jeffrey Alexander’s ‘civil sphere’ builds upon this concept and expands it into a theory of society. Michael Edwards offers a third definition of civil society as ‘the good society’ (2009, 45–62). He refers to ‘social contracts negotiated between government, business and citizens’ (Edwards 2005).

A very recent definition in the ‘International Encyclopedia of Civil Society’ mainly combines the first two notions: ‘Civil society refers to the arena of unconstrained collective action, arranged around shared interests, tasks and values’ (Irish 2010, 166). Examples given in the Encyclopedia (Anheier, Toepler, and List 2010) refer to a wide range of associations, such as charities, non-governmental organizations, community-based groups, women’s groups, faith-based groups, professional and business associations or trade unions, but also social movements. Even though no values are specified in this definition, there are implicit connotations. Like their forefathers – Edwards (2005, 2009) refers to Aristoteles and Hobbes – the large majority of authors link civil society directly with the ideals of political equality, peaceful coexistence, politeness, tolerance, inclusion, trust, truthfulness, and willingness to participate in civic affairs and to support democratic principles. Gramsci’s arena of political struggle includes different values. In his thought, civil society is the space where a socialist revolution can lead to a just and fair system. Thus, the concept of civil society is deeply linked to normative values and aims with reference to justice and equality. These normative connotations are most visible in the writings of liberal authors who connect civil society directly with democracy and liberal rights. The works of Edward Shils and Ralf Dahrendorf look at the societal pre-conditions for the existence of a civil society. Shils describes this precondition as ‘civility’. Civility ‘considers others as fellow-citizens of equal dignity in their rights and obligations’ (Shils 1991, 12). In this understanding, civility can be seen as a mode of political action that ‘postulates that antagonists are also members of the same society’ (Shils 1991, 14; see also Baumgarten, Gosewinkel, and Rucht 2011). According to Shils, this includes willingness to solve conflicts without violence. In a similar way, Dahrendorf (1992) coined the term ‘civic sense’ (Bürgersinn). These references to civility or civic sense underline that the existence of a space for the expression of interests and self-organization is not sufficient to guarantee a civil society. There is a need for a critical mass of people who commit themselves to the idea of civil society and observe the norms of civil society in their everyday life. Against this background, we must conclude that civil society is a special arena of self-organization linked to a normative concept of liberal freedom and democracy.

The discussion on civil society connects civil society with the expression of interests and political action (Gramsci), and with deliberation on political issues (Habermas). In line with Tocqueville and Putnam, civil action is a way of expressing opinions regarding political issues, and everyday solidarity, in a vivid associational life. Civil society also includes classical ‘political voices’ and forms of self-organization and self-help that are not politicized, such as the above-mentioned registered charities, faith-based associations, or self-help groups. Quite a number of associations have a potential ‘political voice’, such as trade unions or business associations, but this option is not always used. With regard to violence, the normative aims expressed by the notion of ‘civility’ rule out the use of violence. Again, Gramsci is an exception. For him, socialism will be attained by political struggle for hegemony and through revolution (Kebir 1991, especially 187–217). Even if he does not refer to violence in his critique of the ‘passive revolution’, he implies that it is needed for a successful struggle (Gramsci 1971, 106–114). Even if this radical position finds only limited support today, the notion of civil disobedience is accepted as legitimate, even including mild forms of non-peaceful action. Despite the ongoing debate on what is civil disobedience and what is uncivil violence, there is overall agreement that ‘significant violence’ must be condemned.

3. Civil society in Africa and conceptual challenges

If we follow the debate on civil society in Africa, we might get the impression that these concepts describe the scene perfectly well. There are numerous publications dealing with this topic (e.g. Harbeson 1994; Hudock 1999; Orvis 2001). Even those who discuss the problems involved in applying this concept would agree that there is a civil society (Lewis 2002; Neubert 2015).

In general, we can identify a variety of civil society associations in African societies. We definitely find a range of typical associations corresponding to the idea of a liberal and democratic self-representation of the citizens. For instance, there are trade unions representing workers’ interests, and not only in South Africa. However, in many African countries the political power of the trade unions is limited, and their activities are restricted to questions of labour rights, as in Kenya (Daniel 2016, 165).

In the African context, the term civil society is mostly used to refer to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Sometimes these are seen as ‘the’ civil society. However, most of them are not politicized, but are providers of social services, and therefore may be seen as a form of self-organization according to de Tocqueville’s understanding. These NGOs usually fill gaps where the state is not sufficiently present. For example, women’s NGOs in Kenya offer crucial services for victims of sexual violence (Daniel 2016). Human rights and women’s NGOs have a more visible political profile. It is their activity that creates a link with the understanding of civil society as working for democracy and liberal freedom. These NGOs are important political opponents holding the government accountable for its action.

Some studies argue that in African contexts civil society cannot be clearly distinguished from the family and the economic or political spheres. For instance, there are civil society actors who take on state functions, or who are co-opted by the state, and thus cease to be critical opponents of the state (Kasfir 2004; Makumbe 1998).

This short overview shows that a focus on political protest and social movements cannot capture the variety of (potential) civil society associations (for a more detailed analysis, see Neubert 2015). Especially associations such as NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) cannot be understood as an expression of political unrest or protest; rather, they are carriers of social change or service providers. Together with more politically outspoken NGOs, such as human rights organizations, these associations are a dynamic part of African societies. This holds true even if we consider the critical debate on NGOs, their dependency on foreign donor money, and the influence of foreign donors on their activities (see Edwards and Hulme 1998; Neubert 1997a, 1997b). Despite international pressures on NGOs, they are part of society and their activities influence political and social change. The role of donors in civil society is not unique to African contexts, but in Africa the impact of donors is particularly strong.³ However, those professionalized NGOs that simply implement projects on behalf of donors without a political or social agenda, and without a supporting constituency, act as mere enterprises or consulting firms, despite their possible success. They tend to follow the latest fashions in the development industry in order to get new assignments (Neubert 1997a, 1997b).

Another interesting feature of associations in Africa is ethnicity as the basis of group formation (Daniel and Neubert 2014). Today, in some countries, ethnicity is significant a means of political mobilization during elections, as the Kenyan case shows. Nevertheless, this kind of association no longer corresponds to civil society; rather, it is an element of party politics. A general observation with regard to associations in Africa is the great number of faith-based associations, either Christian or Muslim (Jones and Petersen 2011; Weiss 2002). They usually offer not only regular prayer meetings, but also facilities for education or healthcare; or they offer a space for community development. Some of these professionalized facilities belong to the above-mentioned NGO sector; others are more or less restricted to the members of the religious community. Up to this point, most associations and the forms of protest voiced by these groups, correspond to the notion of civil society, even if the service sector is more important than acting as the backbone of democratic development. However, there are some particular features with regard to relation to donors, ethnicity or religion that are important for understanding civil society associations in African contexts.

The challenge to the established notion of civil society is a large group of associations whose norms and aims do not fit into the democratic agenda of the civil society concept: in all African countries, there are local authorities that exist beside the state (Bellagamba and Klute 2008). These are, for example, local chiefs, kings, committees of elders or sharia courts. In some cases, they are recognized in national law and represented in the constitution, for instance the recognition of chiefly structures in Ghana or South Africa, or of cultural leaders in Uganda (see Logan 2013). They gain their authority not only from formal state laws, but also from their own claims to ‘traditional’ legitimacy.⁴ They are responsible for conflict regulation and land management, and they have ritual tasks, too. Lund (2006) describes them as ‘twilight institutions’. Whether the chiefs have a formal position in the political system or not, they are accepted as the representatives and spokespersons of local groups. This position can be, and is, used for protests and demands at the national level (like the above-mentioned example of the Buganda). Whether such twilight institutions are part of civil society or not depends on their understanding of their own role. If associations that support political or juridical power for (neo-)traditional authorities accept their control under the system of checks and balances of a democracy, and basic democratic values such as freedom and equality, they may be subsumed under civil society. Even where the office of chief or king is hereditary, this position corresponds to the idea of constitutional monarchy as practised in the Global North. If a monarchist group should turn into a monarchist party, it would leave civil society and become a political organization. Certain civil society organizations in Brazil that turned into parties during the transition to democracy have been described by Stepan (1988). In some cases, these local authorities legitimize groups of young men who perform the task of maintaining local order. Especially in cases where the police are not able to guarantee public order, these local groups step into the space left open by the government. Groups such as urban vigilantes gain legitimacy by reference to traditional structures, or simply from their effectiveness and reliability. In some countries, there are even government regulations for vigilante groups (Baker 2006). Sometimes, such groups become a threat, as in the case of the Nigerian ‘Bakassi Boys’ (see Meagher 2007). In situations of civil war, or in so-called weak or failing states, we also witness a form of self-organization of young men as fighters or warriors, in the shape of ‘local defence groups’ (Neubert 2004) that claim to be defending the rights of their group. Striking examples of this are groups in the Eastern Congo, or the Nuer and Dinka in Sudan and South Sudan. They become what we call militias or violent actors, and may even detach themselves from their social bonds and act like warlords (see Neubert 2004, 2015).

All these examples are situated between state and family, and seem to share elements of civil society associations and thus challenge the concept. First, self-organization is based on shared interests, tasks, and values, with the objective of expressing (political) interests. These groups represent the idea of citizens who regulate their affairs autonomously. The actors take over state functions, as in the case of service delivery NGOs, or traditional rulers. However, in these cases the political and societal spheres are not separated, as is usually assumed in the civil society debate.

Secondly, even when local authorities have certain constitutional rights and functions, their legitimacy is gained by reference to tradition and not by an understanding of the social or political contract of a formal constitution.⁵ African (neo-)traditional rulers are not committed to democracy. Even if, in some ethnographies, local councils of elders are interpreted as democratic (e.g. Kenyatta 1938), they represent a different understanding of authority. They are at best a gerontocracy of old men who gain the position of an elder by age, respect and power, but not according to democratic principles or elections. They do not share the basic norms of liberal democracy (not even the norm of a socialist society as promoted by Gramsci) which are part and parcel of the understanding of civil society. Even when they are self-organized and represent local interests, they cannot be seen as part of civil society in its normative sense. Of course, authoritarian governments in Africa do not respect liberal democracy either, but they are not measured against the norms of civil society. This marks a difference between forms of self-organization that represent civil society norms – linked to the concept of civility and liberal democratic values – and forms of local self-organization based on tradition or simply on local power structures.

Thirdly, the reference to local defence groups (local warriors) and vigilantes raises the question of the use of violence. Military leaders such as warlords, or political movements that systematically resort to violence, are forms of self-organization that may be marked as ‘uncivil society’ or ‘bad civil society’ (Chambers and Kopstein 2001). Following Gramsci, the question would be what kind of political aim the groups pursue. Neither warlords, nor local defence groups, nor the vigilantes to be found in Africa, aim at establishing socialism. Even the left-wing liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola or Namibia have turned out to be nationalist liberation movements rather than socialist movements. Once in power, they are criticized because of their human rights violations (Melber 1990). The independent states under their control followed an authoritarian path, as many other African states did (Macamo and Neubert 2005).

Obviously, there are associations, forms of self-organization, and a public sphere that verify the existence of a vivid civil society in African countries. However, we have to admit that, while a large number of associations that are typical of civil society in the North exists, they are in general less politicized and often driven and financed by donors in the North; they are still struggling to build their own constituencies. Conceptually much more important is the fact that we find various forms of self-organization that cannot be covered by the large umbrella of civil society because their values and norms are not compatible with the notion of civil society, and/or they at least potentially use violence in pursuing their (political) aims.

4. Social movements: concept and application

Whereas the concept of civil society is deeply linked to that of liberal democracy, the concept of social movements emerged in the context of the French revolution, when the potential of mass behaviour became apparent. Borrowed from the Newtonian concept of movement and transferred to society, the term social movement was associated with progress. From 1844 onwards, the concept was used in socio-critical writings (Rammstedt 1978, 33 f., 53). The scholarly debate started in the early 19th century with Karl Marx and Gustave Le Bon. Marxism describes class struggles between the productive and non-productive classes as a result of structural tensions. Marx used these ideas to explain the exploitation of the working class and the need for revolution to establish a socialist regime. Le Bon’s theory of mass psychology explains the emergence of movements as resulting from social decay, which is seen as a consequence of the erosion of social ties (Neidhardt and Rucht 1991, 422 ff.). While Marxism describes protest as a rational strategy, mass psychology sees the fears and emotions of activists as irrational.

From the 1970s onwards, the debates on movements in sociology and political sciences intensified. Therefore, the concept (re)emerged in the same historical period as the debate on civil society. These studies often showed an interest in, or sympathy for, the political aims of the social movements they described. Despite this sympathy, studies of social movements are less loaded with normative assumptions and more interested in how social movements emerge, how they organize themselves, and how they impact political change.

Social movement theory has resulted in various approaches with different analytical focuses. The major approaches deal with Political Opportunity Structures (Kitschelt 1999), Resource Mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 2001), Collective Identity (Taylor and Whittier 1992) and Framing (Snow et al. 1986). They focus variously on the impact on protest movements of financial, human or symbolic resources (Resource Mobilization), the framing of discontent and protest demands (Framing), the development of belonging or a common purpose (Collective Identity), or the political environment in which movements operate (Political Opportunity Structures / political processes). The variety of approaches reflects the diversity of protest movements and the complexity of the phenomenon. Recent studies have combined these different approaches in order to develop a broader understanding of protest (Daniel 2016; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).

Corresponding to the variety of approaches, manifold definitions exist which highlight certain aspects of social movements. While some studies use the terms social movement and association equivalently, others investigate associations as the strategic core of social movements, responsible for identifying their goals and mobilizing adherents (McCarthy and Zald 2001). However, Della Porta and Diani (2006, 20 ff.) offer a refinement of earlier definitions. The term ‘social movement’ applies to activities involving:

• collective actors,

• conflicts with clearly identified opponents,

• dense informal networks,

• a distinctive collective identity.

In addition to the definition of structural features, Neidhardt and Rucht (2001, 540) consider a social movement as a ‘Social entity of interlinked persons, groups and organisations […], who express protests via collective actions with the aim to change social or political conditions or to counteract ongoing processes of change.’ Taking these definitions together, social movements can be seen as public protests and as ‘collective action’ which is based on a shared identity and which aims at social change. Thus, protest actions and politicization are the focus of social movement studies. This marks a difference to the civil society concept in a double sense. Without politicized collective action, there is no movement. Civil society associations react to problems of everyday life but they do not automatically qualify as a movement. The focus on protest has a second implication. Even when the particular society and political environment in which a movement acts are of importance, particularly with regard to resources, the focus is on the social movement itself. Civil society is defined as an area between the state, the market and the private sphere. Thus, civil society is a part of the society as a whole.

The study of a social movement usually includes a description of its political aims. For the question whether a collective action is a movement, the particular political aim and the values linked to it are not important. A racist movement aiming to establish an authoritarian fascist state qualifies as a movement in the same way as a democratic movement does. This is a fact that tends to be overlooked, because there are many more studies of movements for democracy, freedom, equal rights and emancipation than of anti-democratic or authoritarian racist movements. Thus, in contrast to the concept of civil society, the concept of social movement is not linked to any particular concept of society or social change. Quite a number of movements in history, and even today, are aimed at moving ‘backwards’ and understand change as restoring a former situation.

As in the civil society debate, the question of violence needs a deeper look. In general, violence can be an element of protest. Thus, we should consider two criteria. First, violent resistance compromises boycotts, occupations or demonstrations. Sometimes there is just a thin line between violent resistance by a social movement and a violent conflict. One important point is the question whether all collective actors may be subsumed under the heading of a social movement. The idea that social movements are linked by dense informal networks and are based on mobilization excludes organized armies acting on central orders (whether national armies or rebel armies) as long as they have strict command and control structures. Guerrilla groups or some militias may be borderline cases as long as they follow a socio-political agenda, act as an informal network, and continually recruit new fighters. If they continually mobilize new adherents for their agenda, they act as a movement. Secondly, in a social movement violence is a means of attaining a political aim. A wide definition says that a political aim is constituted by actors fighting for a cause for the good of society as a whole (Rucht 2016). The burning of cars or the destruction of supermarkets may be violent expressions of protest. Violent collective actions aimed solely at plundering goods for personal consumption lack a political element. Riots aim at shocking and provoking the wider public by means of violence, while free riders (such as trouble makers or thieves) exploit the situation to their own advantage. Obviously, the line between legitimate political violence and other kinds of violence (Jobard and Greif 2016) is not easy to draw and depends on the legitimation of politicized aims.

5. Social movements in Africa and conceptual challenges

The debate on social movements in Africa is mostly based on case studies describing particular protest activities (Ellis and van Kessel 2009; Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995). Recently, a few studies have discussed the application of existing concepts in Western theory to social movements in Africa (Daniel 2016; Engels and Müller 2015).

Interest in social movements in Africa starts with the analysis of colonialism. Lamer (2010) offers a periodization of protest. Thus, the earliest movements identified (in retrospect) are anti-colonial movements, such as the Maji Maji insurgency in the 1890s (Iliffe 1967) in German East Africa (Tanzania). This was followed by later anti-colonial movements like the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya in the 1940s, and the so-called liberation movements of the late colonial period in Mozambique or in Zimbabwe (Lonsdale 1990; Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995). At the time of the second wave of democratization in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, democracy movements emerged in many African countries south of the Sahara, following the protests against authoritarian regimes in Latin America and in socialist parts of Europe. To this day, democracy movements are important agents in the political processes of many African states. For instance, there have been protests against presidents who intend to extend their period of office by constitutional changes, such as in Burundi against a third term for President Nkurunziza (Human Rights Watch 2016), or in Burkina Faso (Frère and Englebert 2015) against undemocratic power changes. Another pattern is protests against election results and complaints of ‘rigged’ elections (as in Kenya in 2017). They might become violent, like the post-election protests in Kenya in 2007 (Lafargue 2009), or they may even cross the line and result in civil war, like the conflict in Ivory Coast. All these movements, from early anti-colonial to current pro-democratic movements, had goals such as liberation, freedom and democracy, and therefore share the overall normative orientation of civil society.

Another pattern is that of so-called bread riots and service delivery protests against deteriorating living conditions and rising food prices. They do not have an overall political agenda, but they draw attention to obvious social problems and inequalities and thus stand for the fundamental values of a civil society, such as in Burkina Faso or South Africa. These protests are an expression of civil society commitment (Engels 2013). In a similar way, quite a number of more recent social movements in Africa do not express a fundamental critique of the political system. They make specific demands to be fulfilled within the existing political system, such as gender, human or labour rights, social services, or the remedying of social problems. Without aiming at a regime change, they may correspond to civil society values. In addition, in the past and in the present, many civil society associations have acted as ‘cores’ of social movements and are responsible for their agenda and their mobilization, such as the trade unions in colonial liberation struggles (e.g. Kenya, South Africa). These civil society associations have often been financially and ideologically supported by international donors. Thus, once again, the influence of the development nexus on collective actions becomes visible (Daniel 2016). Human rights or development associations, and churches, have supported, and sometimes led, democracy movements. As in other parts of the world, this is one reason why the concepts of civil society and social movements seem to be applied interchangeably. However, in studies of the role of civil society and social movements in processes of democratization, the topic and the research question are not the same. It makes a difference whether a study focuses on collective political action or on associational life and the implementation of democratic norms.

However, there are also forms of self-organization and protest that do not fit into the normative frame of civil society. Typical examples are religious or spiritually driven movements. Religious or spiritual norms and values relate to a particular context and go along with certain kinds of mobilization, group formation, claims and strategies. Religious or chiliastic movements are part of African history and they have been studied since early colonial times (for varying interpretations, see Ranger 1986). Even anti-colonial movements like Maji Maji had a strong element of ritual and a religious message. The Maji Maji fighters believed that they would become bullet-proof by the application of special magic water (maji). This pattern of political protest, and the belief in salvation and the power of magic also characterized the Ugandan Holy Spirit Movement led by Alice Lakwena (Behrend 1993). In both cases, political aims and mobilization tactics are mixed with religiosity and magic, and a violent protest strategy. The latter holds true for current Islamic movements, such as Boko Haram or Ansar Dine in the Touareg region. These movements have in common that they fight violently for a vision of society that is opposed to the idea of liberal democracy. They claim that a better future and a better world can be attained by having the right faith. This also applies to some ‘reform schools’ in Islam, to Pentecostal and charismatic churches in Christianity, or to chiliastic movements based on ‘traditional’ African beliefs. In these cases, we have to ask whether the practice is collective action in the sense of the social movement concept. Are they movements or just social phenomena reflecting changing worldviews? In terms of theory, the main point is whether these religious groups want to change the life of their members, for then they can be described as a religious practice that attracts followers. If the group wants to change the society they are living in, as for example in the cases of Mau Mau, Ansar Dine or Boko Haram, then they are social movements in the theoretical sense discussed here.

This short overview shows that social movements are a form of social self-organization that may pursue the ideal of liberal democracy, but that there are also activists with different visions of a good society. They interpret individual freedom and collective freedom in a completely different way, or they pursue visions of an ordered society led by a strong leader representing religious, traditional or specific ideological values. In addition, social movements may, and often do, use violence as a means of protest. These movements cannot be considered as a part of civil society and require a more open definition that does not include a normative orientation or a claim to refrain from violence.

According to our definition, social movements include a variety of protests, such as violent post-election riots, liberation or separatist movements, rebels fighting for a socio-political cause, movements for traditional autochthonous rights or the reinstallation of traditional authorities (e.g. the Baganda Movement), and Islamic movements, including militant and terrorist movements such as Al Shabab, Ansar Dine or Boko Haram (see for instance Marchal 2009; Wing 2013). Social movements are forms of self-organization directed towards political ends with differing value orientations, and they may use violence as a means of protest. But if we look at studies of social movements, not only in Africa but also in general, they seem to be biased in favour of protests seeking to defend liberal freedom, human rights and democracy (Ellis and van Kessel 2009; Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995). It is striking that right-wing, anti-democratic, xenophobic, or racist movements are less represented as examples of social movements. A particular interest in specific borderline cases underlines this focus on liberal democratic orientations. These borderline cases are, for instance, violent protests (post-election protests, bread riots, service delivery protests) that turn into looting riots. Or, as the case of service delivery protests in Phomolong in South Africa shows, the demand for basic services may turn out to be xenophobic. In this case, the high unemployment rate increased the fear that services and jobs were going to foreigners. The protest turned into attacks against migrant workers who were seen as the main threat (Alexander 2010, 30 f.).

The former Ugandan Holy Spirit Movement shows the importance of the way in which violence is organized. As long as it was led by Alice Lakwena it had strong elements of a religious movement. When Joseph Kony reorganized the defeated Holy Spirit Movement under the new name of the Lord’s Resistance Army, he developed clearer command and control structures and acted increasingly like a warlord (Allen and Vlassenroot 2010). Warlords and their ‘armies’ are outside the social movement category because of their control structure, lack of mobilization and lack of a socio-political agenda. From this perspective, a terrorist network organized in autonomous cells may qualify to be understood as a social movement, depending on size and societal embedment. The above-mentioned vigilantes usually lack a socio-political agenda, as in the case of the Bakassi Boys, and therefore cannot be seen as a social movement, even if parts of the local public welcome their activity as an instrument to restore public order.

Compared to the value-based concept of civil society, social movement is a much wider category. Quite a number of forms of collective action are social movements in the strict sense, or at least borderline cases, even when their value orientation or ideology, as well as their use of violence, contradict the expectations of researchers from the Global North. This detachment from a required normative orientation as part of the definition is a strength of the social movement concept. Moreover, with regard to liberal norms, politicization, or the degree of violence, it seems that social movements in Africa do not differ from those in other places. At best, the number of acts of legitimated violence are higher in the African context. For instance, in South Africa the burning of cars, the damaging of property and fights with the police are a daily routine in which the escalation of violence does not only result from activists’ provocations (SERI 2017).⁶

Although the concept of social movement is wider, it shows some limitations, both in itself and in its application to the African context. For instance, Bayat (2013) introduces the notion of ‘non-movements’ to express that the fact that during the Arab Spring resistance was a part of people’s everyday activities. Beyond the publicly visible protests, this form of daily resistance by ordinary people was an important factor in resistance against the regimes. Thus, Bayat draws our attention to forms of resistance that do not fit into the category of social movements; nevertheless, they emerge as a context-specific form of everyday life.

However, social movements are also an expression of the respective context. As the examples show, protests relate to a particular situation of discontentment and recognize cultural norms. Strategies and mobilization tactics reflect particular forms of self-organization, and use certain culturally related symbols, language or songs. The political and social context plays a role, not only with regard to mobilization but also with regard to the claims and aims of the movement (Daniel 2016; Engels and Müller 2015).

6. Re-thinking the debate on civil society and social movements from an African perspective

An obvious conclusion is that the terms civil society and social movement can be applied to Africa. We find both civil society associations and social movements there. But more interesting are those cases where these concepts do not apply or where the phenomena we find in Africa are borderline cases. We have to accept that the variety of forms of self-organization and protest is larger than we would expect based on experience of the Global North. Therefore, we need to develop our conceptual tools further to capture the social realities in a different context. This shows the challenges and the limits of applying concepts developed in the Global North to a different setting, and helps at the same time to understand the concepts themselves more clearly.

In a more practical sense, our findings underline that we should be careful not to overstretch the concepts when describing social realities. When studies of social movements and civil society focus on self-organization, they address the same phenomena from different perspectives. Despite overlaps, the concept of civil society does not include the perspective of social movements, and vice versa. The definitions of social movement and civil society given above describe the different concepts according to particular theories. They are helpful for marking the difference between various types of self-organized collective actors. In addition to these definitions, we have shown three criteria which can help to decide whether civil society or social movement is the more appropriate term to use in any particular case: orientation towards liberal democratic norms, the use of violence, and politicization of the collective actors. Against the background of our African cases, we need to see at least two important restrictions. First, the concept of civil society is normatively loaded and closely linked with notions of liberal democracy and individual rights. Second, it includes associations and actors that use limited forms of violence, such as civil disobedience, as a protest strategy. The use of extreme violence disqualifies any organization from being a part of civil society. With regard to social movements, the core definition applies to Africa. But more important is that the African cases show that we need to take the normative ‘blindness’ of the concept seriously. By doing so, we will be able to make an impartial analysis of movements that do not correspond to our usual normative preferences.

Imprecise use of these concepts tends to blur important distinctions. The African cases discussed here illustrate this problem. On the one hand, these cases from Africa show that the terms civil society and social movement cannot be used interchangeably, and on the other hand they enable us to understand why the respective concepts ignore certain social actors, or describe them insufficiently or with deficient implications. For instance, including neo-traditional authorities as part of civil society is to ignore the fact that their legitimization contradicts liberal democratic values. Their reference to their particular (ethnic) tradition is often linked with claims to ancestral land or claims to power that have a potential for ethnic micro-nationalism. Probably less obvious is the ambivalence of professionalized NGOs that act as consulting firms and implement development projects on behalf of donors. Despite their possible success, these NGOs do not represent civil society but are part of the development industry. We need to make the differences visible between neo-traditional authorities and NGO-consulting firms on the one hand, and civil society on the other hand; only then can we understand the multiplicity of particular societies. We should also be careful not to describe local violent actors in the garb of vigilantes as part of civil society. They may be a threat to other citizens and lack any orientation towards liberal democratic values. Social science concepts are only helpful when they enable researchers to appreciate differences and exclude phenomena to which a concept does not apply. Catch-all terms hide important differences and thus are not useful for analysis.

The concept of social movement is easier to apply to our African cases than the concept of civil society. The strength of the social movement concept is that it is not normatively loaded and restricted to a certain notion of society. If we overcome the expectation that social movements fight for liberal democracy and human rights, we may regard movements such as Boko Haram, Ansa Dine or the Islamic State from a new perspective. With a neutral attitude to moral and political claims, we may be better able to understand how movements mobilize supporters, their strength and their ways of self-organization. Xenophobic violence, as in the case of South Africa, or movements fighting for ‘traditional’ rights, especially in respect of land, which are often led by neo-traditional authorities, may be analysed more clearly than would be the case if we tried to include them in the realm of civil society, or to dismiss them as mere micro-nationalism or vandalism. Thus, an impartial application of the social movement concept can widen our view of protest in Africa. At the same time, not every protest or collective violent action is a social movement. Well-organized independence fighters are not a movement but an army, even when they call themselves a movement. Fighting groups with a weak command and control structure that use violence as a means of enrichment are not social movements, because they lack any political or societal agenda, or ignore it even if they claim to have one. They are warlords or simple violence entrepreneurs. Finally, Bayat reminds us that individual resistance practices do not make a social movement.

Thus, clear definitions of the terms ‘civil society’ and ‘social movement’ can help us to analyse self-organization and protest in Africa. At the same time, we are able to identify phenomena that cannot be captured by the concepts of ‘civil society’ or ‘social movement’. We can learn from the African cases, especially from the ‘unusual ones’, what elements make a civil society or a social movement.

There is one observation that applies to both civil society and social movements in Africa. This is the crucial role of religion and spirituality in processes of societal self-organization. There are many faith-based civil society associations. In contrast to Europe, belonging to a church or a religious group is an important part of the identity of the members, whether it can be considered as a civil society association or a religious movement. Another element of self-organization is ethnicity. The importance of religion and ethnicity illustrates the fact that civil society and social movements are an outcome of the particular social and cultural context. The reasons why these actors organize themselves are related to their social situation and their cultural norms and values. The ways in which they operate reflect the ways in which their society is structured. Although it cannot be argued that religion and ethnicity are important only in African contexts, their great significance there contrasts strongly with the situation in Europe. We also observe that the development nexus, or the degree to which it shapes civil society associations and even social movements (which are based on associations), is useful for describing specific African contexts.

In thinking about the differences between Northern theory and Southern cases, we see a need to enhance the ‘travel’ of concepts from the North to the South, and to develop our theories further against the backdrop of cases in Africa. This goes along with a learning process in the North which puts the reconsideration of theories from Southern perspectives to the front and encourages theory production in the South. Although in recent years scholars have become increasingly aware of the hierarchies in knowledge production, and different epistemologies, we still observe a need to reflect on these cases on a conceptual level, to analyse them precisely (also with regard to their normative implications), and to revisit them from Southern perspectives. We can also learn from the classics. Max Weber and Emil Durkheim referred to examples from different parts of the world in order to develop their theories and make a typological order of societal phenomena. In other words, the classics highlight the importance of cross-regional comparison for developing and revising theories.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 We admit that large parts of Asia and Latin America would also be interesting for our purpose, but beyond the Global North we are most familiar with Africa.

2 According to a generalized view, every action is political. But in the context of this paper it makes a difference whether actors pursue clear political objectives, such as a regime change, the introduction or abolishment of specific laws, respect of human rights or gender equality, or whether they focus on common goods and welfare or providing disaster relief, without any reference to political structures.

3 This was one result of a comparative study of women’s organizations in Brazil and Kenya (Daniel 2016).

4 The term ‘traditional’ may be misleading, because the role of local rulers changed during colonial times and after independence. But for this analysis it is not important whether the traditions are ‘real’ or ‘imagined’, as long as the authorities and their own followers accept the ‘tradition’ as legitimate.

5 This is different from the situation in the USA in the early nineteenth century described by de Tocqueville (de Tocqueville 1948), which might at first sight appear to resemble current arrangements in Africa.

6 However, the level of violence in protests also differs in European countries. For instance, protests in France have a high potential of violence, as the recent ‘gilets jaunes’ (yellow vests) movement shows.