The god-faculty dilemma:challenges for reformed epistemology in the light of cognitive science

ABSTRACT

Reformed epistemology (RE) involves a view of knowledge of God which Kelly James Clark and Justin Barrett have brought cognitive science to bear on. They argue that the cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that we have a ‘god-faculty’, a notion employed by Alvin Plantinga. Plantinga contends that if there is a God, then we have a specialized god-faculty. Clark and Barrett, by contrast, focus on the empirical evidence and point to a different, less specialized faculty. This difference is significant for how RE and CSR relate. The paper argues that a dilemma arises for those who bring RE and CSR together. A choice must be made between two interpretations of the god-faculty. ‘God-faculty 1ʹ is a specialized system for forming theistic beliefs. Findings in CSR indicate that there is no such system. ‘God-faculty 2ʹ is an unrefined tendency to form beliefs in superhuman agents. This thesis has empirical support in CSR. However, this faculty is unable to deliver the epistemic goods needed for the immediate, non-inferential knowledge of God RE describes. This shows that those who combine central contentions in RE with current research in CSR face a dilemma from which it is hard to escape.

KEYWORDS:

• Reformed Epistemology
• cognitive Science
• HADD
• God
• evolution
• debunking

Introduction

Analytical epistemology has in the recent decades seen a turn towards externalism, the thesis that not all the factors which determine the epistemic status of our beliefs are internal, where ‘internal’ usually means that the factor is cognitively accessible or a part of our mental lives in some way¹. This means for example that being in a specific mental state or having a good argument is not necessary to justifiably believe things. A non-conscious process, if reliable, can also justify². The turn to externalism has also been influential in religious epistemology, where reformed epistemology (RE), developed by Alvin Plantinga and Nicolas Wolterstorff, contends that the natural, proper functioning of well-designed, reliable cognitive faculties in an appropriate environment suffices for enabling immediate and non-inferential knowledge. This includes knowledge of God. A central claim is that if God exists, then we have a god-faculty which can trigger the formation of theistic beliefs without the need for inferences, reasoning, or evidence³. RE here offers a particular interpretation of central tenets in reformed theology, and appeals to the notion of a Sensus Divinitatis described by Jean Calvin to show that we can know God in an immediate way, entirely without the need for inference. Such knowledge is seen as analogous to knowledge of other minds or knowledge of self-evident truths⁴. Kelly James Clark and Justin Barrett have appealed to the reformed view of natural knowledge of God as well as Thomas Reid’s critique of scepticism to undermine criticism of religious beliefs. A central example is the ‘evidentialist objection’, according to which the belief in God is unjustified (or even irrational), since there is insufficient evidence for God’s existence. Clark and Barrett argue that one reason this objection fails is that it assumes a very restrictive view of justification. They further point to the externalism of Reid and Plantinga as offering a more plausible view of religious knowledge and knowledge in general⁵.

Externalist epistemology not only offers a response to the evidentialist objection. It also opens up for cognitive science to play a part in epistemic assessments of beliefs, for example, by providing knowledge about belief-forming processes⁶. This will be of interest to the religious externalist. How do religious beliefs arise? The cognitive science of religion (henceforth ‘CSR’) promises to shed light on this. This interdisciplinary field, which developed in the early 1990s, purports to provide an explanation of religion in terms of the cognition that undergirds religious thought and behaviour⁷. Today, this is a burgeoning field where scholars investigate a wide range of issues, including the cultural evolution of religious ideas and the formation of religious beliefs⁸. Since, as we shall see, RE offers a thesis about how beliefs about God arise and puts forward restrictions on what sort of processes can confer immediate warrant, considering CSR is therefore highly relevant to reformed epistemologists and their critics.

In addition to using Plantinga and Reid to undermine the evidentialist objection, Clark and Barrett criticize an externalist argument against the justification of religious beliefs. Clark and Barrett call this the ‘CSR objection’, as it is based on contentions in CSR. It is an attempt to show that naturalistic explanations of religion found in this field tell us that religious beliefs are unjustified or irrational. This is an example of a debunking argument. One version argues from the premise that religious beliefs can be explained as evolutionary by-products to the conclusion that they are not rationally formed and hence not justified⁹. Clark and Barrett’s discussion indicates that such debunking-arguments are beset by various challenges. Explaining religion naturalistically does not in a straightforward fashion lead to a debunking of religion¹⁰.

We shall presently focus on something else, however, namely a thesis Clark and Barrett provide about the existence of a god-faculty, and how cognitive science and reformed epistemology converge in seeing religion as cognitively natural:

Reformed epistemology holds that belief in God is basic – that is, belief in God is a natural, non-inferential belief that is immediately produced by a cognitive faculty. Cognitive science of religion also holds that belief in gods is (often) non-reflectively and instinctively produced – that is, non-inferentially and automatically produced by a cognitive faculty or system¹¹ (My emphasis).

The convergence Clark and Barrett point to concerns the naturalness of forming religious beliefs. By ‘natural’ belief formation the way RE uses this term, we can understand an immediate and non-reflective process that happens in accordance with a divine design-plan. In CSR, ‘natural’ is used for belief-formation which emerges from and is constrained by ‘maturationally natural’ cognition. This cognition occurs automatically and without conscious, explicit deliberation. Moreover, it is universal since it reflects the functioning of the human mind in general¹². Clark and Barrett argue that these somewhat similar views of the naturalness of religious belief indicate that CSR and RE converge in significant ways, and that CSR offers RE empirical support. Furthermore, the former therefore has positive implications for the epistemic status of religious beliefs. A central reason for this view is that CSR seems to indicate that religious beliefs arise in ways RE considers prima facie warranted, making religious beliefs ‘innocent until proven guilty’¹³.

We need to appreciate that the convergence does not, however, concern the specific content of the beliefs whose formation RE and CSR describe. This is something Clark and Barrett indicate by distinguishing between God and gods. The construal of God in RE as the omniscient, omnipotent creator-deity of monotheism differs significantly from Clark and Barrett’s broad characterization of gods as superhuman intentional agents in general, including ghosts, spirits, or elves¹⁴. For reformed epistemologists, the former belief is ‘natural’, and for the cognitive scientists, the latter beliefs are ‘natural’ (in the above-specified senses). Given this divergence concerning the content of what belief is natural and how ‘natural’ is construed, does CSR actually offer RE empirical support? I shall argue that it does not offer such support. In fact, the opposite is the case. By bringing CSR and RE together one ends up facing a serious dilemma. Here is how.

Let us imagine a convinced reformed epistemologist who finds current research in CSR convincing and considers bringing them together to find out whether CSR supports RE¹⁵. Let us call this subject the ‘god-faculty advocate’. This advocate needs to choose between the two naturalness-theses mentioned above. Is belief in God or belief in gods natural? Do we have a god-faculty which produces the former or the latter beliefs? We can distinguish a Plantingian construal of the god-faculty and a construal based on the thesis Clark and Barrett defend. I shall use ‘god-faculty 1ʹ for the former and ‘god-faculty 2ʹ for the latter. The god-faculty 1 is a functionally specialized system for producing beliefs about God. Given this interpretation, a clash with CSR looms. Current research in cognitive science does not indicate that forming belief in God is cognitively natural in this way. In short, we do not immediately, non-inferentially, and without the right cultural input form beliefs about God. By the lights of central contributions to CSR, this is not something our mind is capable of. Our advocate might therefore consider the other main interpretation. God-faculty 2 produces non-reflective beliefs about superhuman agents of many kinds, including ghosts, spirits, and elves. Moreover, this natural cognition contributes together with cultural input and conscious reflection to enabling belief in God¹⁶. The view that additional factors like cultural input is needed is more in line with central contentions in CSR. However, this view fits badly with RE, which denies that factors such as cultural input and reflection are necessary to arrive at that belief. Therefore, another problem arises if the god-faculty advocate opts for the thesis that we have god-faculty 2: there is a clash with RE. In a nutshell then, the dilemma is this: either opt for god-faculty 1 at the cost of a conflict with CSR, or opt for god-faculty 2 at the cost of a conflict with RE. Hence, the god-faculty advocate faces a dilemma from which it is hard to escape, and this shows that the relation of CSR with RE is not a harmonious one. Let us now look in detail at each of the horns of this dilemma and the vicissitudes our imagined advocate faces given that he has embarked on the task of bringing CSR and RE together.

Horn 1: Plantinga’s specialized system in the light of CSR

God has so created us that we have a tendency or disposition to see his hand in the world about us. More precisely, there is in us a disposition to believe propositions of the sort this flower was created by God or this vast and intricate universe was created by God when we contemplate the flower or behold the starry heavens or think about the vast reaches of the universe¹⁷.

In this and similar passages, Plantinga describes how the human mind can form full-blown theistic beliefs in an immediate and non-inferential fashion. These beliefs can have warrant without independent support from evidence. This means a person can believe in a warranted fashion that God created the universe without having first been convinced by arguments. Warranted beliefs about God do not require such evidence. They require that God exists. Plantinga argues that if God exists, then he probably created us with a cognitive faculty that in specific circumstances can suddenly trigger full-blown, warranted theistic beliefs¹⁸. This is god-faculty 1.

Before looking closer at this faculty in light of CSR, let us first briefly look at Plantinga’s epistemological theory, proper functionalism. On this theory, a properly basic belief arises without inference from cognitive faculties that function properly. Such beliefs have warrant when the subject accepts them without basing them on anything. Most of our beliefs arise in this way, including perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, a priori beliefs, and theistic beliefs¹⁹. The warrant of beliefs firstly requires that the responsible faculty functions or operates the way it should, given its function. Second, the faculty must operate in circumstances that are appropriate for it given its design. Beliefs that arise from the proper functioning of a faculty that operates outside of its appropriate domain of circumstances lack warrant²⁰. Plantinga next suggests that the faculty must have a ‘design-plan’, which specifies its function and how it is supposed to operate. The design plans for cognitive faculties specify that these systems respond to and process information and generate beliefs as output. It is necessary for warrant that the belief arises from a faculty that operates in accordance with a design plan that aims at the production of true beliefs rather than something else, such as to comfort us. The final requirement is reliability. There must be a high probability of true belief once the faculty is set in action²¹.

A specialized cognitive system: god-faculty 1

In light of research in CSR, how can we interpret Plantinga’s claims about god-faculty 1? Plantinga describes a cognitive input-output mechanism that responds to a wide range of experiences, thoughts, and feelings, and generates theistic beliefs as output. This happens involuntarily and non-inferentially. The god-faculty 1 does not take beliefs as input and produce new beliefs about God as output. It neither produces beliefs about God through deliberate reasoning from evidence or arguments nor through spontaneous ‘quick and dirty’ inferences²². Instead, immediate beliefs about God, which are not based on other beliefs or underlying inferences are ‘occasioned’ in various circumstances. Such beliefs have warrant in virtue of being properly basic. These circumstances include perceptual experiences of a beautiful mountain or the power of the ocean-waves during a storm. Other examples include feelings of thankfulness, guilt, or fear. Fortunate turns of events, bad behaviour, or that one is in a dangerous situation serve as the relevant occasions, and the ensuing beliefs are about such things as the need to thank God, ask for forgiveness, or how God is a comfort in times of need²³.

The mechanism Plantinga describes meets plausible constraints for being a cognitive faculty (system). Let us appreciate this before asking whether our mind comprises it.

We start with functional specialization. The epistemologist Jack Lyons suggests that a cognitive system is a functionally coherent mechanism, specialized for handling a distinct set of tasks. He further points out that a cognitive system is not the same as a mere capacity. For example, we might have the capacity to recognize faces without having a specialized system for performing this task. A general system that also solves other problems could be responsible. To say that we have a capacity for x is not the same as saying that we have a specialized system that does x. But a specialized system for x gives us a capacity for x²⁴. That the design plan for god-faculty 1 specifies that it aims at producing beliefs about God rather than other things, indicates that it is specialized and not a mere capacity. There are also further indications of this. Functional specialization is tied to solving a restricted range of problems using a restricted set of procedures. Specialized systems exhibit domain-specificity. They do not operate on any kind of informational input or produce beliefs about anything using any procedure. Rather, they are specialized to handle specific types of information using specific procedures and to produce specific outputs as result²⁵. For example, a face-recognizer, if we have any, responds to information relevant to the recognition of faces and produces beliefs about faces and facial expressions. God-faculty 1 seems domain-specific in this sense. It deals with a wide range of inputs and produces beliefs about God as output.

Let us next turn to how God-faculty 1 operates and how it is formed in the subject. It seems to operate below the level of explicit awareness, conscious deliberation, and culturally specific instruction. According to Plantinga, we simply realize that beliefs have arisen in us rather than deliberately choosing to form them. This is true of theistic beliefs as well as many other types of beliefs²⁶. This depiction indicates a faculty whose functioning meets a central requirement for being a cognitive faculty, namely mandatoriness in functioning²⁷. How is it formed in us? God-faculty 1 is not an ability only some of us develop through deliberate effort and as the result of culturally specific instruction. Plantinga indicates something God intended to arise in all of us as the result of proper psychological development in accordance with his design-plan²⁸. In light of these descriptions of its operations and its formation, god-faculty 1 seems roughly to resemble what Robert McCauley calls a ‘maturationally natural’ system. Maturationally natural systems produce thoughts and beliefs automatically, without the need for conscious thought, reflection, training, or specific cultural input. Moreover, they develop as part of normal cognitive development, typically quite early in life²⁹. An example of such a system is Theory of Mind, which allows us to mentalize (think about the mental states of other agents)³⁰.

In conclusion then, based on the descriptions Plantinga offers, we can plausibly think of god-faculty 1 as a functionally specialized, maturationally natural, non-inferential, and reliable cognitive faculty. Let us now explore whether there is evidence in CSR for this system.

The evidence for god-faculty 1

Evidence for functional specialization

We start with functional specialization. Currently, the main theories relevant to this are the by-product theory, the exaptation theory, and the adaptationist theory. Do any of these theories point to the sort of specialization we can expect if our minds comprise god-faculty 1? Let us start with the by-product theory.

A central thesis in CSR since the early days of this field is that religious beliefs and behaviours are by-products of the functioning of systems that evolved to carry out tasks unrelated to religion³¹. As for example Lee Kirkpatrick puts it:

Religious beliefs are constructed, shaped, and maintained by a host of psychological mechanisms and systems – including the attachment system – that all evolved much earlier in the (pre)history of our species for more mundane purposes, but that have been “co-opted” in more recent human history in the service of religion³².

Two examples will illustrate the by-product view. Consider Theory of Mind, our evolved capacity for mentalizing. This system evolved in response to adaptive challenges pertaining to hominid social interactions during the Pleistocene, prior to the existence of religion³³. Scholars in CSR, such as for example Pascal Boyer, Justin Barrett, Lee Kirkpatrick, and Robert McCauley argue that this system presently is deeply involved in religious thought and behaviour³⁴. Experimental evidence supports its involvement³⁵. But given that the adaptive function of this system is related to interactions with conspecifics rather than superhuman agents, the outputs of the latter mentalizing acts are by-products. In other words, the religious beliefs this system helps produce are by-products. Another example concerns a purported agency-detector, often referred to as ‘Hyper-Active Agency Detection Device’ (HADD)³⁶. According to H. C. Barrett, we have an agency-detector that evolved in response to adaptive challenges pertaining to the presence of natural agents, such as predators and prey as well as conspecifics in ancestral environments³⁷. HADD is something roughly like this detector, which by a group of scholars in CSR is seen as a contributing factor in the formation beliefs about the presence of supernatural agents³⁸. If they are correct, then such beliefs are by-products of the functioning of this system. Similar stories can be told about other evolved systems. The central contention the by-product theory makes is that the human propensity to engage in religious behaviours and to form religious beliefs is not the product of one specific adaptation for this sort of task but a feature we nevertheless have given the presence of a range of adaptations for other challenges. As for example Pascal Boyer states:

There is no religious instinct, no specific inclination in the mind, no particular disposition for these concepts, no special religion centre in the brain, and religious people are not different from non-religious ones in essential cognitive functions. Even faith and belief seem to be simple by-products of the way concepts and inferences are doing their work for religion in much the same way as for other domains³⁹.

The by-product theory thus strongly rejects the thesis that there is a specialized, domain-specific system for religion, not to mention specifically theistic belief-production.

Let us instead turn to another possibility which some scholars currently consider, namely an exaptation theory of religion. They might grant that the above systems originally evolved as solutions to the above-specified challenges and that beliefs and behaviours we now associate with religion arose as side-effects over time of their operation. But that does not rule out that religious beliefs and behaviours more recently in the ancestral past have obtained new evolutionary functions. Powell and Clark, for example, explore the possibility that religion consists of a variety of mental traits, behaviours, and culturally propagated elements that originally were by-products, but which gradually were organized into a new functional whole⁴⁰. In that case, religion seems to be an exaptation, a by-product of one or more adaptations, which has obtained an adaptive function in its own right⁴¹. Is it plausible to hold that god-faculty 1 is such an exaptation? A problem with this suggestion is that the complex set of mutually interacting mental, behavioural, and cultural structures Powell and Clark consider differs strongly from god-faculty 1, which is a specialized cognitive system within the mind. Neither the complex whole Powell and Clark describe nor any of its underlying cognitive components resemble god-faculty 1. The suggestion that religion is an exaptation therefore does not, at least in its current form, provide a plausible basis for god-faculty 1.

There is also a third view in the field, which is strongly at odds with the by-product theory. A group of scholars currently argue that religion is a biological adaptation⁴². Dominic Johnson, for example, argues that religion centrally involves fear of supernatural punishment and that this fear is an adaptation for cooperation. There is on this view a rather specialized system which evolved as the result of how fear of supernatural punishment conferred a fitness-advantage to subjects in virtue of making them more honest and less selfish. This had the effect of reducing the risk of retaliation or damage to social reputation as the result of selfishness⁴³. On this view, there is functional specialization for religion, but it is not the kind of specialization god-faculty 1 involves. Johnson’s theory purports to reveal an evolved system whose adaptive function is to help us avoid the costs of punishment (by conspecifics) by making us afraid of supernatural punishment. By contrast, the function of god-faculty 1 is to enable us to know God. Moreover, for us to know God (supposing God exists), we must form beliefs about God rather than something else (such as spirits, demons, or ancestors). But the supernatural punishment system Johnson describes confers fitness by making us afraid of all kinds of supernatural agents, many of which seem unrelated to God⁴⁴. This system can probably contribute to beliefs about God in cultural contexts where that is a common religious idea. But that does not suffice for warrant, since the required design plan is missing. This purported system is about increasing fitness, not enabling immediate knowledge of God. By contrast, god-faculty 1 has a design-plan specifying that its constitutive goal is to produce beliefs about God. Moreover, it is not designed merely to contribute to theistic beliefs but to form such beliefs without support from other factors. In conclusion therefore, the supernatural punishment system of this adaptationist theory does not exhibit the specialization and domain-specificity of god-faculty 1. Hence, none of the main theories relevant to this issue finds evidence for the sort of specialization god-faculty 1 involves.

Evidence for maturational naturalness

We next turn to maturational naturalness. We saw above that maturational naturalness in the formation of beliefs involves involuntary processes that occur without the need for conscious reflection, culturally specific input, or instruction. Furthermore, these processes are grounded in systems that develop early in all normal individuals as part of normal, species-typical cognitive development. An example is mentalizing about another agent. We cannot choose not to do this when interacting with someone. It simply happens. Moreover, this is carried out by Theory of Mind, a part of the human mind which is in place in early childhood in all normal individuals⁴⁵. Is that how CSR-scholars describe the formation of beliefs about God? There is consensus that religious beliefs typically are not the result of deliberate and conscious reflection but intuitive processes we cannot introspectively monitor or control. However, in contrast from entirely maturational processes, religious belief-formation requires that the subjects first must be exposed to culturally specific ideas⁴⁶. Given that such ideas vary across cultures, the outputs of the belief-forming dispositions subjects form also vary. Forming specific beliefs about God is therefore not analogous to a cross-culturally universal process such as mentalizing, which does not rely on specific cultural input. In other words, knowledge of God, if we have any, and knowledge of other minds do not seem to be produced by analogous processes. While Theory of Mind’s attribution of mental states to conspecifics is maturationally natural, the formation of beliefs about God is more complicated. It is merely assisted by such cognition and requires additional factors. In conclusion, in light of this discrepancy between a prototypical maturational process and religious belief-formation, we have failed to find evidence for the maturational naturalness god-faculty 1 involves.

A complication we should note at this point is that Plantinga does not see the cultural context as totally irrelevant. As he for example makes clear, exposure to ‘the wrong kind of nurture’ can hinder the proper functioning of god-faculty 1⁴⁷. An example of such nurture is exposure at a vulnerable age to anti-religious ideas⁴⁸. These statements indicate the view that the absence of some types of input (such as anti-religious ideas) might be necessary for god-faculty 1 to work properly. But given that Plantinga does not highlight any need for the presence of the right cultural input (such as exposure to the idea of God) for god-faculty 1 to work properly, the discrepancy with CSR remains. The strong explanatory relevance of culture maintained in this field applies to subjects in general, including those who believe in God as well as any other superhuman entity. There is no evidence that culture only becomes a relevant factor in explaining lack of religious belief. The conclusion above therefore stands⁴⁹.

Evidence for non-inferential religious cognition

Let us next consider the role of inference. Barrett and Lanman emphasize the role of intuitive thoughts in undergirding and giving rise to explicit, general religious beliefs. Underlying intuitions produced by maturational systems can help bring about belief in explicit religious representations. For example, such intuitions, or ‘non-reflective beliefs’, if consistent with an explicit religious idea, help give rise to an explicit, general belief in that idea⁵⁰. This indicates that a general belief in the existence of God builds on prior non-reflective intuitions and beliefs which help make that belief appear plausible to the subject. Consider also Boyer’s discussion of what he calls ‘inference-systems’, functionally specific systems whose functioning undergirds the production of religious beliefs. An example of such a system is Theory of Mind. The central idea Boyer defends is that religious thoughts and behaviours gradually emerge because of underlying cognitive activities involving intuitive inferences produced by these devices, which make up our minds⁵¹. According to Boyer, belief in the existence of God (or any other superhuman entity) is therefore not immediate. It is the result of ‘aggregate relevance’, that is, frequent activation of a religious concept in a range of practical situations where inference-systems produce intuitions⁵². As a final example, Van Leeuwen and Van Elk emphasize how religious belief-formation is the result of a combination of underlying intuitions and culturally contingent learning-processes. They argue that cultural learning of a concept like ‘God’ helps bring about a general belief that God exists, and that when more specific, situational beliefs about God (such as ‘God is present now’) arise, then that general belief and intuitions about agency are involved⁵³. These examples illustrate the view that theistic beliefs are inferential and that this reflects the nature of the mind. By contrast, god-faculty 1 can produce beliefs without inference. As we saw above, Plantinga excludes both conscious, reflective inferences and spontaneous, ‘quick and dirty’ inferences from properly basic, immediately warranted beliefs. This means that both inference in the sense of explicit reasoning-procedures and in the sense of the intuitive, non-conscious activities Barrett, Lanman, Boyer, Van Leeuwen, and Van Elk describe are excluded from the functioning of god-faculty 1. We therefore have yet another example of conflict between CSR and RE. There is no evidence for the non-inferential religious cognition we have been searching for.

Evidence for religiously reliable cognition

We finally consider reliability. God-faculty 1 gets things right by forming correct beliefs about God. For example, such beliefs attribute properties like omniscience and omnipotence correctly to God. But as studies in CSR have shown, our minds do not spontaneously and when not reflecting carefully get such properties right. Instead, we tend to anthropomorphize God by attributing limited abilities and a spatial location to God⁵⁴. God-faculty 1 also gets things right by not mistaking other agents for God. For example, beliefs about Zeus or spirits are not occasioned when we see a beautiful sunset. Beliefs about God are occasioned. But according to MCI theory, this is not what happens. We are susceptible to belief in a wide range of ‘minimally counter-intuitive’ agents (MCI agents) because of the cognitively attractive structure of such concepts. Among the many MCI concepts, we can include concepts of ghosts, spirits, elves, ancestors, angels, pixies, goblins, witches, trolls, and demons⁵⁵. Our well-documented susceptibility to these kinds of concepts is at odds with what we can expect from god-faculty 1. CSR again fails to provide evidence for this profound system.

A response: the noetic effects of sin

Our imagined advocate might here try to salvage his commitment to RE by arguing that the above unreliability is the result of god-faculty 1 malfunctioning. As Plantinga argues, sin affects this system in ways that yield negative ‘noetic effects.’⁵⁶ Can the unreliability CSR reveals be the result of sin impacting god-faculty 1? A problem with this suggestion is that the reformed doctrine of sin points to a different pattern of unreliability than the one CSR reveals. Calvin distinguishes a propositional and an affective or moral part of natural knowledge of God and argues that for reasons having to do with our accountability before God, the former is largely retained despite sin. By contrast, the latter aspect is impacted greatly, and this has implications for our moral beliefs about and affections towards God⁵⁷. Plantinga has a similar view, arguing that sin primarily affects our relational beliefs. In short, our beliefs about ourselves, other people, and God are affected. Sin leads to pride and pride leads to arrogance and self-centeredness, failure to trust God or the belief that God does not care⁵⁸.

These errors seem like what Jon Elster calls ‘hot mistakes’, mistakes involving motivated cognition whereby desires and motives distort thought⁵⁹. By contrast, anthropomorphization is not motivated, but relates to the way our minds simplify complicated concepts that are hard to process. Furthermore, our susceptibility to belief in superhuman agents relates to the cognitive attractiveness (such as the memorability) of these ideas. There is no evidence in CSR that these phenomena are the results of how motivated cognition distorts thought. To introduce sin to explain the discrepancy we found above between how RE and CSR depict religious cognition therefore introduces a new problem. As this additional element in RE is introduced, the troublesome discrepancy is repeated and deepened rather than plausibly accounted for.

Based on what we have seen then, the current evidence in CSR indicates that we lack god-faculty 1. Opting for this interpretation is therefore not feasible for our imagined god-faculty advocate, given the conflict that arises between RE and CSR. Is there a way out of this troubling situation? Is another plausible construal of the god-faculty at hand, which is in line with the best evidence in CSR, but not at odds with RE?

Horn 2: the unrefined god-faculty of Kelly James Clark and Justin Barrett

In their work on CSR and RE, Kelly James Clark and Justin Barrett, like Plantinga, take inspiration from the theology of Jean Calvin and his central notion of a Sensus Divinitatis. But in contrast to Plantinga, who offers an abstract analysis based on what the existence of God allows us to expect, Clark and Barrett bring research in current cognitive science to bear in a discussion of whether we actually have a god-faculty. Moreover, whilst Plantinga cashes out Calvin’s idea by describing a specific functional device which produces immediate beliefs about God, Clark and Barrett interpret the god-faculty as the cognitive basis for a more general, natural knowledge of the divine, which expresses itself in many different ways in the form of beliefs about gods⁶⁰. This interpretation appears in tune with reformed thought in general. Michael Sudduth for example argues that Calvin’s Sensus Divinitatis is not a specific system but a general knowledge of the divine. He further contends that Calvin did not see natural knowledge of God as entirely non-inferential and immediate the way Plantinga describes this⁶¹.

An emergent by-product of our cognition: god-faculty 2

The central question now is whether construing the god-faculty along these lines will help resolve the problem our imagined advocate faces, given his commitment to RE, a particular version of reformed thought, and his positive view of research in CSR. To find out, we need to look closer at Clark and Barrett’s thesis. They argue for a view which differs substantially from the one discussed above: Our cognitive propensity to form a large variety of intuitive and non-reflective beliefs in the supernatural is something we can view as a god-faculty. Since CSR supports the existence of this propensity, it supports the existence of the god-faculty:

There now seems to be good empirical reason, provided by cognitive scientists studying religious thought, to believe what some philosophers and theologians affirmed on theological grounds: that we have a maturationally natural god-faculty, although “religious faculty” or sensus divinitatis may be more precise and relevant terms⁶².

Clark and Barrett are not here describing what I have called ‘god-faculty 1’ but a rather less specialized system:

By “god-faculty”, we mean that the ordinary arrangement and functioning of cognitive architecture in human minds often produces nonreflective, unreasoned belief in gods. By “gods”, we refer to any supernatural intentional agents whose existence would impinge upon human activity. We are not arguing that this god-faculty is a dedicated functional system, a special add-on to human minds, nor that it is divinely implanted by natural or other means⁶³.

To keep this distinct from Plantinga’s view, we refer to this as god-faculty 2. As a start, let us observe that the present system comprises functionally specialized subsystems, namely HADD, Theory of Mind, as well as systems devoted to producing intuitions about physical objects, biological entities, purposes, and functions. God faculty 2 is possibly an emergent by-product of how these and other systems work together⁶⁴. Clark and Barrett describe god-faculty 2 as a coarse-grained and unrefined ‘sense of divinity’ whose output consists of beliefs about many superhuman agents, including spirits, demons, and elves. Despite the indiscriminate manner in which this system produces beliefs about superhuman agents, it nevertheless is said to contribute to something profound. Clark and Barrett argue that to form these unrefined spiritual hunches represents the beginning of a larger spiritual journey. These hunches can help subjects realize that something sacred, moral, and divine exists⁶⁵. In light of this, god-faculty 2 seems capable of contributing to spiritual growth, but it cannot on its own bring subjects all the way to the ultimate religious truth, which presumably is that God exists.

The evidence for god-faculty 2

One reason the god faculty 2 thesis initially seems a better alternative for our god-faculty advocate is that it has empirical support. For example, in light of the work on MCI theory briefly reviewed above, as well as a range of other theories, human minds are susceptible to cognitively attractive concepts of superhuman agents in general rather than being drawn towards belief in God specifically. To explain the latter, we also must introduce further factors. Furthermore, in light of our discussion of the limits of maturational naturalness and how cognition and culture must interact in order for specific beliefs to arise, the meagreness of the output of god-faculty 2 seems supported by the evidence. We saw how Barrett and Lanman for example argue that general cognitive processes together with specific experiences and activities in the right social and cultural environments can account for how people form religious beliefs. In light of this, subjects situated in a context where the concept of God is promoted culturally are likely to believe in God (rather than the many examples of ‘gods’ Clark and Barrett offer). But if their god faculty 2 is not exposed to the concept of God, then such a doxastic result is unlikely. This seems plausible in the light of CSR. Furthermore, whilst the god-faculty 1 thesis is at odds with the by-product theory, the exaptation theory, and the adaptationist theory, the god-faculty 2 thesis ties in well with the by-product theory, which Clark and Barrett are positive towards⁶⁶. On this thesis, we lack a specialized, functional system for religious beliefs, and there is no cognitive domain for the supernatural. Instead, the way numerous systems work when solving problems unrelated to religion makes us susceptible to form many different religious beliefs. The god-faculty 2 thesis refers to this susceptibility. Given how well supported god-faculty 2 is, our imagined god-faculty advocate can plausibly accept this thesis without violating his commitment to CSR. But can his commitment to RE be retained if he makes this choice?

A new problem arises: god-faculty 2 and properly basic, theistic belief

A problem here arises, since this advocate, qua reformed epistemologist, believes that we can know God without the use of inference, reasoning, and evidence. The problem is that if we have god-faculty 2 (rather than god-faculty 1), then our minds do not seem capable of achieving this. As we have seen earlier, scholars in CSR emphasize the need for additional factors. To obtain the belief in God, the maturational naturalness of god-faculty 2, the right cultural input, and intuitive inference are necessary. Clark and Barrett agree that more than the bare workings of god-faculty 2 is needed, for example arguing that the unrefined hunches or gut-feelings we have a tendency to form might need to be refined and further developed, something that requires religious experiences, reflective activity, and divine revelations⁶⁷. Without the assistance of such factors, we cannot close the gap between our initial coarse religious hunches and the belief in God, to which we ultimately are heading. Here our imagined advocate encounters a serious problem. Since a variety of auxiliary activities must be combined with the workings of god-faculty 2, the possibility of properly basic belief in God is jeopardized. The problem is that if inference as well as the right cultural input turn out to be necessary for our mind to obtain the belief in God, then immediate knowledge of God is not psychologically possible. But as we have seen earlier, the possibility of immediate, non-inferential knowledge of God is the central thesis in RE⁶⁸. The current god-faculty thesis is therefore unacceptable for our imagined god-faculty advocate, who by stipulation accepts RE. In conclusion therefore, the god-faculty 2 thesis does not solve the specific problem this advocate faces, given his dual commitment to RE and CSR.

Let us consider two responses to this argument.

Response 1: neither Calvin nor Plantinga claims that inference is irrelevant to natural knowledge of God

As mentioned above, Clark and Barrett appeal to Calvin in their interpretation of god-faculty 2. Calvin’s view of a natural knowledge of God seems to allow that inferential activities play a part. Importantly, these are not reflective, conscious activities but spontaneous, automatic inferences⁶⁹. Perhaps then one can interpret the activities that must be carried out to close the gap between ‘gods’ and ‘God’ as being related to the inferential activity Calvin allows as part of a natural knowledge of God. Is the presence of such activity compatible with knowledge of God being immediate in the right way? This is especially relevant to ask given that RE, as Sudduth argues, does not see inference as irrelevant to a natural knowledge of God⁷⁰. Let us therefore ask whether our imagined advocate can plausibly appeal to this interpretation of Calvin to avoid having to depart from RE as the result of his willingness to accommodate CSR-research.

One problem with this proposal concerns the difference between the inferential activity Calvin allows as part of natural knowledge of God and the activities necessary to close the gap between ‘gods’ and ‘God’. Calvin argued that humans have been endowed by God with a natural knowledge of God’s existence. In addition to this ‘knowledge of a divinity’, there is also more fine-grained natural knowledge of God that subjects obtain by engaging in spontaneous inferential activities whereby they appreciate various ways in which God manifests himself in creation. In this way, subjects can also obtain knowledge of what God is like (powerful, omniscient, good, and so on)⁷¹. On this model, the starting point is an implanted general idea of God (‘divinity’) which inferential activities triggered during encounters with the created world can expand, elaborate on, and enhance into more full-blown, substantive religious knowledge⁷².

By comparison, and more plausible from the perspective of CSR, Clark and Barrett describe a starting point consisting of a susceptibility to form beliefs in a broad range of superhuman agents. In other words, we do not on Clark and Barrett’s thesis start out the way Calvin describes us, as proto-theists who just need to have our implanted idea of God activated and refined through automatic inferential activity. Instead, our starting point is god-faculty 2, which on its own only brings us to belief in things like ghosts, angels, or demons. The activities needed to take the doxastic leap from there to belief in God seem much more substantive than the spontaneous inferences Calvin believed could expand our innate knowledge of God. From the perspective of CSR, factors like culturally specific input, inference, and religious practice are necessary. From the partly theological perspective of Clark and Barrett, revelation, religious experience, and reflection is required. The most serious issue this raises is that RE denies that such factors are necessary conditions for obtaining knowledge of God. RE contends that immediate knowledge of God is possible without these factors. In fact, even the automatic inferential activity Calvin allows is excluded from this specific category of purported knowledge. We have seen that Plantinga, the central architect behind RE, excludes both (a) conscious and deliberate reasoning and (b) spontaneous and unreasoned inferential activity from the set of necessary conditions for an immediate knowledge of God. That such factors are not necessary does not mean RE denies them other forms of relevance. Inference can be relevant in supporting some forms of knowledge of God or in defending theistic belief from criticism⁷³. But that such factors are not necessary for knowledge of God means that it must be possible for at least some such knowledge to occur entirely without their assistance. In other words, it must be possible for full-blown beliefs about God to be occasioned in various circumstances without inference being involved⁷⁴. This specific view of natural knowledge of God is central to RE and therefore something our imagined advocate, by stipulation, must retain. But given what we have seen above, doing that means departing from central views in CSR. In light of this, the objection we are considering fails. By appealing to the inferential element in Calvin’s view of a natural knowledge of God, one firstly assumes a starting point containing an innate conception of God which lacks support in CSR. Furthermore, one does not in this way show how the human mind can traverse the gap that separates god-faculty 2’s raw religious hunches from beliefs about God in a way compatible with RE’s view of immediate, entirely non-inferential knowledge of God.

Response 2: the possibility of refining god-faculty 2 into god-faculty 1

Before concluding, let us consider a second response, based on a slightly different interpretation of the god-faculty 2 thesis. On this interpretation, our starting point is again god-faculty 2, but the belief in God is not an inferential belief based on the output of this faculty. Instead, by introducing factors like cultural input, inference, and religious practice to god-faculty 2, one can gradually refine and develop this faculty into a system which produces non-inferential theistic beliefs that meet RE’s conditions for warrant. Then, the central thesis in RE about the possibility of an immediate knowledge of God can be retained, albeit in a somewhat different shape. However, this response is problematic because CSR does not lend support to this possibility.

Firstly, we saw above that god-faculty 1 produces beliefs entirely without inference. But the non-conscious, intuitive thought-processes Barrett, Lanman, Boyer, McCauley and other scholars in CSR describe involve inference. Moreover, the use of such inference cannot be consciously overridden, since it is held to be an integral part of the nature of the human mind. Secondly, god-faculty 1 is reliable. But there is no evidence in CSR that through inference, cultural input, or religious practice subjects can overcome ingrained tendencies in intuitive thought which lead to unreliability. Consider the ‘theological incorrectness’ effect. Subjects who explicitly describe God as omnipotent employ a more intuitive and anthropomorphic concept of God when a seemingly unrelated experiment leads them to reason intuitively about God. Studies indicate that this effect is present in Christian and Jewish believers, as well as atheists⁷⁵. Further evidence that having theistic belief and engaging in religious practice does not remove this tendency comes from Tanya Lurhmann’s study of evangelical Christians. These subjects engage in a range of practices to feel God’s presence and to do away with unwanted thoughts and beliefs about God. As Luhrmann’s study reveals, many of these subjects struggle for years to achieve this, and the achievements some eventually make are fragile and in need of further supervision and support⁷⁶. That subjects who are immersed in a friendly religious environment that strongly encourages the right beliefs and who deliberately work hard for years to attune their minds in the right ways face such struggles further indicates that unreliability cannot be overcome through cultural input, inference, or religious practice. In light of this, it is very unlikely that it is possible to form god-faculty 1 based on god-faculty 2. Appealing to this alternative interpretation of the god-faculty 2 thesis to salvage one’s commitment to RE is therefore problematic.

In conclusion, we have seen that by appealing to god-faculty 2, our imagined advocate can accommodate the evidence in CSR but at the cost of entering a conflict with the central element in RE, the thesis that we can know God in an immediate way, without inference, evidence, or argument being involved. In light of this, and in light of the lack of empirical evidence for god-faculty 1, by bringing CSR and RE together one ends up facing a serious dilemma. One must either opt for god-faculty 1 and enter a conflict with CSR or opt for god-faculty 2 and depart from RE.

Conclusion

The present paper has explored challenges for an externalist epistemology of religion in the light of empirical research. In contrast from (central versions of) internalist epistemology, reformed epistemology sees factors such as the reliability of our cognition as normatively relevant. This opens the door to applying cognitive science to such epistemology. We have answered Clark and Barrett’s pertinent call for further discussion of RE and CSR and seen that the prospects for combining central views in RE and current findings in cognitive science are not as promising as they have argued, though both RE and CSR entertain fascinating theses about how religious belief-formation is cognitively natural. As things currently stand, a choice seems needed between retaining the central, radical element in RE, a thesis about how immediate and non-inferential knowledge of God is possible, and an empirically plausible view of religious belief-formation based on CSR.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Halvor Kvandal

Halvor Kvandal holds a PhD in philosophy from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), where he teaches philosophy. His PhD thesis investigates theistic philosophy from the perspective of cognitive science. It is called ‘Prone to Believe in God. The Cognitive Science of Religion and its Normative Implications for Theist Religion’.

Notes

1. Goldman and McGrath, Epistemology, 42. The main alternative is internalism, the view that only internal factors can justify. See Conee and Feldman, Evidentialism.

2. Goldman and McGrath, Epistemology, 34–36.

3. More specifically, the thesis is that if God exists, it is very likely that we have a cognitive faculty that meets requirements for warrant. God loves us and would have wanted us to know him. He therefore would make sure that we have the requisite system to achieve this. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 186–189, and Plantinga and Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality.

4. Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, 60–61.

5. Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 642–648.

6. See Goldman and McGrath, Epistemology, 161–183.

7. E.g. Lawson and McCauley, Rethinking Religion; Boyer, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas; and Atran, In Gods We Trust.

8. See e.g. Norenzayan et al., “The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religion”, for a study of cultural evolution and Van Leeuwen and Van Elk, “Seeking the Supernatural”, for belief-formation.

9. Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 654–667.

10. For further discussion, see Leech and Visala, “The Cognitive Science of Religion”; Barrett, “Is the Spell Really Broken?”; Murray, “Scientific Explanations of Religion”; De Cruz and De Smedt, A Natural History of Natural Theology, 179–200; and Kvandal, Prone to Believe in God.

11. Clark and Barrett, “Reformed Epistemology,” 174.

12. McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not, 145–221; Barrett and Lanman, “The Science of Religious Belief,” 109–124. For an overview of ways in which religion can be natural, see De Cruz and De Smedt, A Natural History of Natural Theology, 19–39.

13. Clark and Barrett, “Reformed Epistemology,” 176.

14. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 3, vii; and Clark and Barrett “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 652.

15. Since this subject is convinced by RE, he accepts Plantinga’s conditional claim that ‘if God exists, then we have a god-faculty’. Logically, evidence against the consequent in that conditional is not the same as evidence against the conditional itself. However, such evidence is relevant to RE for a variety of reasons. For example, if arguments provide strong grounds to accept the antecedent (i.e. theism) and empirical evidence leads us to reject the consequent, then that undermines the conditional. Furthermore, if the conditional is true but good evidence leads us to reject the consequent, then by modus tollens we have grounds to deny the antecedent (theism). Finally, scrutinizing the evidence is relevant to the issue of how science and religion relate and the thesis Clark and Barrett support in this regard.

16. Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 665–666.

17. Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 80.

18. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Beliefs, 188–190.

19. Ibid., 178–179.

20. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 4–7.

21. Ibid., 11–18.

22. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 175–176, see also Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, 60 for the interpretation that Plantinga excludes all inference from proper basicality.

23. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 172–175; and Plantinga and Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality, 80–81.

24. Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs, 88–90, see also Boyer, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas, 18–19.

25. Sperber, Explaining Culture, 136; and Hirschfeld and Gelman, “Toward a Topography of Mind,” 3.

26. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 172–173.

27. Jerry Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, 52–55. For a discussion of Fodorian modularity, see McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is not, 44–52.

28. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 173–175.

29. McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not, 37.

30. Ibid., 76–77.

31. McCauley and Lawson, Rethinking Religion; Boyer, Naturalness of Religious Ideas; Atran, In Gods We Trust; Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?; Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity; Bloom, Descartes’ Baby; Kirkpatrick, Attachment, Evolution, and the Psychology of Religion; McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not; and Pyysiäinen and Hauser, “The Origins of Religion.”

32. Kirkpatrick, Attachment, Evolution, and the Psychology of Religion, 214.

33. Whiten, “Culture and the Evolution of Interconnected Minds.”

34. Boyer, Religion Explained; Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?; Kirkpatrick, Attachment, Evolution, and the Psychology of Religion; and McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not, 182–221.

35. Willard and Norenzayan, “Cognitive Biases Explain Religious Belief.”

36. Barrett, “Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion.”

37. Barrett, “Adaptations to Predators and Prey.”

38. Barrett, Why Would Anyone believe in God? 31–44; and Barrett and Lanman, “The Science of Religious Beliefs”; cf. Van Leeuwen and Van Elk, “Seeking the Supernatural.”

39. Boyer, Religion Explained, 378.

40. Powell and Clark, “A Critique of the Standard Model,” 478–480.

41. Simpson and Campbell, “Methods of Evolutionary Sciences,” 124–126.

42. E.g. Bulbulia and Sosis, “Signalling Theory and The Evolution of Cooperation”; Johnson, God is Watching You.

43. Johnson, God is Watching You, 138–159.

44. Ibid., 92–93.

45. For more, see McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not, 76–82.

46. Boyer, Religion Explained; Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?; Barrett and Lanman, “The Science of Religious Beliefs”; and Van Leeuwen and Van Elk, “Seeking the Supernatural.”

47. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 173.

48. Ibid., 215.

49. There is also another important way in which god-faculty 1 can malfunction, involving the ‘noetic effects of sin’. I deal with this below, when discussing reliability.

50. Barrett and Lanman, “The Science of Religious Beliefs,” 111–114.

51. Boyer, Religion Explained, 20–21.

52. Ibid., 341–367.

53. Van Leeuwen and Van Elk, “Seeking the Supernatural.”

54. Barrett and Keil, “Conceptualizing a Nonnatural Entity,” 219–247; Barrett, “Dumb Gods, Petitionary Prayer,” 93–109.

55. E.g. Barrett and Nyhof, “Spreading Non-natural Concepts”; Boyer and Ramble, “Cognitive Templates for Religious Concepts”; and Banerjee, Haque, and Spelke, “Melting Lizards and Crying Mailboxes.”

56. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 199–240.

57. Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, 111–117.

58. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 213–215.

59. Elster, Explaining Social Behavior, 124–144.

60. Clark and Barrett, “Reformed Epistemology,” 175–176.

61. Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, 60–63.

62. Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 649.

63. Ibid., 652.

64. Clark and Barrett, “Reformed Epistemology,”; Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 651–654.

65. Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 666; Clark and Barrett, “Reformed Epistemology,” 187.

66. Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology,” 652.

67. Ibid., 666.

68. See Sudduth, The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, 82–83.

69. Ibid., 60.

70. Ibid., 85–86.

71. Ibid., 57–65.

72. Ibid., 67–69.

73. Ibid., 82–95.

74. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 175–176.

75. McCauley, Why Religion is Natural and Science is Not, 207–219.

76. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back.