From Ukraine to the Mediterranean: Italy and the governance of migration

ABSTRACT

The Russian military invasion of Ukraine of late February 2022 caused the largest displacement of persons since the end of the Second World War, testing the European Union’s and its member states’ resilience. In an unprecedented move, the European Union adopted an exceptional measure, the Directive on Temporary Protection, a provision to cope with crises as old as the first massive inflow the EU had experienced back in 2001 during the Balkan wars. That measure has provided order to the reception of the millions of arrivals and set aside the usual controversies among member states, originating from an incomplete and unbalanced European migration and asylum system. While aligning with the position and the directions of the EU, and thanks to unprecedented bipartisan support for the reception of the Ukrainians displaced, Italy has taken the opportunity provided by the crisis to reiterate the urgency of a permanent and structured European system to cope with massive inflows. The Mediterranean stood in the background, where the resumption of inflows, partly triggered by the consequences of the conflict, challenged the renewed climate of bipartisanship. The objective of the article is to identify (dis)continuities in Italian migration policy under Mario Draghi as the Government reacted to the conflict in Ukraine, and the possible changes that could characterize the new government of Giorgia Meloni.

KEYWORDS:

• Italy
• European Union
• migration
• refugees
• temporary protection
• Ukraine
• crisis

Aknowledgments

The author wishes to thank Federica Genovese, Stefania Panebianco, Salvatore Vassallo and the participants in the Workshop, ‘Politica in Italia/Italian Politics. Edizione 2023’ held on 12 December 2022 at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University in Bologna, for their valuable comments on a previous version of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. As many scholars have already argued, the use of migration for political purposes is an old blackmailing strategy, one that has recently involved the EU on more than one occasion (Greenhill 2022; Adamson and Tsourapas 2019).

2. On the role of the diaspora in destination countries’ policies, see Epstein and Heizler (2016).

3. Transposition of EU decision 2022/382 activating Directive 2001/55 on Temporary Protection took effect with the DPCM of 28 March.

4. If that were to happen, then Italy would be caught on the front line again, as it is host to a huge Moldovan diaspora.

5. Moreover, because of this scenario, which sees migration as part and parcel of Italy’s future, it is puzzling that Italy has not specifically targeted migration and asylum in its Recovery and Resilience Plan, either with respect to social inclusion or for development purposes. Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza, available at: https://www.italiadomani.gov.it/content/sogei-ng/it/it/il-piano/missioni-pnrr/inclusione-coesione.html.

6. Fratelli d’Italia programme on immigration is available here: https://www.fratelli-italia.it/programmacentrodestra/.

7. The ‘selective disembarkation’ of those considered to be the more vulnerable is portrayed by the new government as a clear sign of humanitarianism. Instead, it has been harshly criticized for its form (a decree and hence a formalization of the practice, Jakob 2022) and for its discriminatory intent, which, for the migrants remaining on board, amounted to a de-facto collective pushback (Amabile 2022; ASGI 2022).

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Michela Ceccorulli

Michela Ceccorulli is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Bologna.