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Research Article

Indigenous peoples and inclusion in the green climate fund

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Pages 233-242 | Received 28 Nov 2021, Accepted 02 Feb 2023, Published online: 11 Feb 2023

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we explore Indigenous peoples’ engagement and inclusion in the Green Climate Fund. We rely on the distinction between simple inclusion and a deeper recognition of Indigenous peoples’ contributions, described as epistemic belonging. We analyse how organizational interdependencies, i.e. the exchange and valuation of resources between actors, and how the potential conflicts between contributions from different actors may influence to what degree Indigenous peoples can achieve epistemic belonging. To illustrate this we have analysed the struggles and tensions around the establishment of the Indigenous People Policy (IPP) of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and the practical use of the IPP in funding proposal discussions and decisions. We conclude that Indigenous peoples’ contributions are valued as long as they do not challenge other important GCF interests. Conflicts between contributions from different actors lead to a prioritization of recourses provided by accredited entities that help the GCF to develop, implement and manage climate projects. Hence, Indigenous peoples’ contributions become subordinated which provides an obstacle to full epistemic belonging.

1. Introduction

To enhance the inclusion and contributions of all concerned in processes of global governance may seem like an indisputable value. However, as there are tensions between inclusion and other values, such as recognition and efficient participation, it is crucial to point to the power dimensions involved in the politics and practices of efforts to enhance the inclusion in global governance settings. The objective of this paper is to explore how these tensions played out during the establishment of the Indigenous People Policy of the Green Climate Fund, and in the subsequent practices when the existing policy initially was implemented.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is a powerful international body in global climate governance. The GCF was established in 2010 by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and became fully operational in 2015. It is the world’s largest fund dedicated to supporting developing countries with reducing their greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing their ability to respond to climate change.

The GCF describes its reliance on an expanding network of diverse partners that in different ways contribute to enable climate projects in the Global South (GCF Citation2020c). However, since its inception, the GCF has been surrounded by intense debate about its relation to civil society groups and the opportunities developing countries have for contributing and influencing the workings of the fund (Bracking Citation2015; Bruun Citation2017). Civil society organisations have demanded improved accredited observer involvement in the GCF. In the early years of the GCF, there were several obstacles that hindered observer inclusion. These included a lack of transparency and resources; delays to information distribution; limited time allotted to the civil society groups at GCF board meetings that are represented as active observers; and a complex process and terminology that obstructed efficient inclusion (CAN Citation2013). Critique led the GCF to react and make efforts to improve inclusiveness.

With this in mind, we turn our focus to a particular observer group: Indigenous peoples. In official documents and policies, the GCF emphasizes the importance of Indigenous peoples’ contributions in climate governance but there is some evidence that the GCF has a rather limited view on what and how Indigenous peoples might contribute to the GCF. The role and status ascribed to various actor categories and knowledges in global environmental governance often reflect dominant perspectives and unequal power relations (Bracking, Citation2015). What is at stake is what actors and perspectives that will influence the evaluation of funding proposals that are presented to the GCF. Matters of concern include inter alia project designs that may cause conflicts around land rights, and limited possibilities for Indigenous peoples to practice environmental management according to their systems of knowledge. GCF funded projects will have real consequences for Indigenous peoples and that is why some Indigenous peoples’ organizations have chosen to engage with the GCF so they can protect their interests. The global level is of course not the only level were Indigenous peoples can influence climate policies but demands for globally coordinated and supported actions on climate change makes it an increasingly important level.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the role of Indigenous peoples in global climate governance by analytically focusing on organizational interdependency. Organizations such as the GCF that we analyse in this article are dependent on several types of resources for which they need contributions from others. However, resources can counteract each other, for example the inclusion of accredited observer groups could increase democratic legitimacy but may impair efficiency, and vice versa. When there are trade-offs between resources, organizations will prioritize certain resources and actors over others, which may reinforce already existing power imbalances. How does the GCF value the contributions from their partners? What prioritizations are made and with what effects for the role of Indigenous peoples?

To investigate the role of Indigenous peoples’ inclusion in global climate governance, this study analyses the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy adopted in 2018. We begin with an overview of previous research on Indigenous peoples and global environmental governance. Thereafter, we present the analytical approach of organizational interdependency together with the distinction between inclusion and epistemic belonging; the former can be rather limited while the latter connotes a far-reaching meaning of recognition and possibilities of participants to influence proceedings. We then place our case in a UN structures and policies context and go on to concentrate on the GCF’s policy. We include analyses of relevant GCF documents, in which the struggles around the policy can be traced, as well as documents from and interviews with people working in organizations that represent Indigenous people in the GCF. We conclude with a summary of our findings and discuss the prerequisites, i.e., the challenges and possibilities of including Indigenous peoples in the GCF.

2. Indigenous peoples and global environmental governance

The changing discourse and practices around Indigenous peoples’ engagement in global environmental governance is visible through the developments within the UN system. In 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN Citation2015). The process leading up to this declaration lasted almost 22 years (Daes Citation2008). The process overlapped with discussions on the role of Indigenous peoples in actions against climate change, exemplified with the Declaration of the First International Forum of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change in 2000. The following year, the Indigenous Peoples Organizations became one of the official observer constituencies in the UNFCCC (now nine constituencies). In 2008, the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) was established, giving Indigenous peoples the right to negotiate as a unified group in the UNFCCC (Belfer et al. Citation2019). The importance of engaging Indigenous peoples was acknowledged in both the UNFCCC Cancun Agreement, 2010 and the 2015 Paris Agreement, which further acknowledged the valuable contribution of Indigenous peoples’ knowledge systems in managing climate change.

From the development within the UN system it is clear that the possibilities for Indigenous peoples to engage in global environmental governance have increased over the years. This can be attributed to several things, such as the participatory turn in global environmental governance, the recognition of Indigenous rights, and the possibilities of using Indigenous knowledge to manage environmental problems (Gustafsson and Schilling-Vacaflor Citation2022; Belfer et al. Citation2019). These changes appear promising, but there are still barriers and constraints to Indigenous peoples involvement in global environmental governance.

One common theme in previous research is the effects of procedural matters. Indigenous peoples are described as lacking influence over the institutional design of environmental governance (Gustafsson and Schilling-Vacaflor Citation2022). Despite that Indigenous right are connected to self-determination within a territory – unlike other observers – Indigenous peoples still participate as non-state actors and hence not entitled to attend meetings. Instead, state delegates in climate meetings decide if the participation of Indigenous peoples is relevant or not (Belfer et al. Citation2019). If Indigenous peoples are invited, they often do not have a say in decision-making (Zurba and Papadopoulos Citation2021) and Indigenous views and concerns are often ignored at meetings (Belfer et al. Citation2019), as in the development of governance instruments such as impact assessments, adaptation policies and strategies (Gustafsson and Schilling-Vacaflor Citation2022). Some explain the contradiction between the formal appreciation of Indigenous peoples and their limited influence as an example of tokenism. Indigenous peoples might be included more often but they are not really respected (Belfer et al. Citation2019).

Knowledge is another common theme in previous research. Many scholars describe how the supremacy of western science perspectives in environmental governance contributes to the devaluation of Indigenous knowledge, despite the formal appraisal of using Indigenous knowledge to manage environmental problems. Indigenous knowledge is ‘invited’ and only gets a supplementary role to western science, if it proves to be useful (Belfer et al. Citation2019; Rashidi and Lyons Citation2021; Tormos-Aponte Citation2021; Zurba and Papadopoulos Citation2021). The dominance of western science and the idea of reaching scientific consensus that guides the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) impose a particular epistemological worldview and exclude the diverse experiences of nature that Indigenous peoples have, which are formally acknowledged as vital to manage climate change (Rashidi and Lyons Citation2021). This is yet another example of a contradiction regarding Indigenous peoples role in environmental governance.

A third theme in previous research is the role of resources. Financial constraints make it hard for Indigenous peoples to participate in global environmental governance (Tormos-Aponte Citation2021). Just travelling to events, conferences and negotiations can be a challenge, e.g. to secure badges (Belfer et al. Citation2019). If they manage to get there, they still often lack people to cover all important meetings and language translations, which limits information access. All this limit their capacity to participate on equal terms with representatives from larger more resourceful organizations and government representatives (Zurba and Papadopoulos Citation2021). Indigenous peoples also need to allot time to seek funding, which limits their time to prepare for meetings (Belfer et al. Citation2019). Some argue that in order to achieve meaningful and beneficial participation from Indigenous peoples, they need to be supported by accessible and dependable sources in global environmental governance (Zurba and Papadopoulos Citation2021).

Some scholars oppose the descriptions of Indigenous peoples as lacking agency due to the constraints or barriers just mentioned. It does not mean that these scholars deny the importance of e.g. resources but the emphasis is more on the opportunities and the capacity of Indigenous peoples to shape environmental governance. According to this view, through capacities to act, actors can stabilize, disrupt or transform roles, identities and relationships through strategic actions and negotiations, and hence change the politics of representation, i.e., how we perceive things (Marion Suiseeya, Zanotti, and Haapala Citation2022).

In the next section, we present our own view on how to analytically approach the role of Indigenous peoples in global environmental governance.

3. Agency, resources and organizational interdependence

Two important dimensions that underpin our analytical framework for understanding the role of Indigenous peoples in global environmental governance are: 1) the acknowledgment of Indigenous peoples’ agency and 2) how this agency is mediated by the role of organizational interdependence in a global governance context.

The inclusion of Indigenous peoples and the formal recognition of their perspectives in global governance – which can refer to official representation or consultations – do not necessarily say anything about Indigenous peoples’ possibilities to exercise their agency. Limited inclusion might only lead to tokenism as described in previous research. In contrast, Montana (Citation2021) argues – in his study of the international expert organization Intergovernmental Science Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) – that it is also important to facilitate epistemic belonging. Besides inclusion and recognition of contributing actors, this is also about the mobilization of socio-material resources within and beyond organizations that would enable for included actors ‘to assert their importance, define their specialist skills and to effectively enact their epistemic practices’ (Montana Citation2021, 305). This could, as Marion Suiseeya, Zanotti, and Haapala (Citation2022) say above, potentially enhance Indigenous people’s agency and capacity to disrupt or transform roles, identities, and relationships and change how we perceive things, e.g., by introducing a more holistic view on environmental management.

We connect epistemic belonging to ideas about organizational interdependency (see Rhodes Citation2007). Actors cannot produce all resources they value themselves but are dependent on resource exchanges to satisfy their experienced needs. Hence, actors may lack resources but they may also provide resources in resource exchanges. Organizations such as the GCF are dependent on several types of resources for which they need contributions from others, both material and immaterial. With GCF’s own words, it ‘ [r]elies on its expanding network of partners to deliver results across the spectrum of climate action to promote low-carbon and climate-resilient paths’ (GCF Citation2020c). Indigenous peoples could bring democratic legitimacy by enhancing representativity, but they may also contribute with experiences of long-term sustainable environmental management. Other actors, such as accredited entities to the GCF that help to develop and implement GCF-funded projects, might bring technical, financial, or organizational capacities to the GCF (GCF Citation2013, Annex XII). The realization of one resource can limit or prevent the realization of another resource, e.g., an extension of observers could increase democratic legitimacy but may impair project implementation efficiency, or vice versa. In such situations, organizations will prioritize the resources and actors they value the most, which may create, or strengthen already existing, power imbalances. Yet, this prioritization is rarely made explicit by the organizations themselves as it could compromise the support of less valued but still important allies.

4. The case and our methodological approach

The case of the GCF is particularly relevant as regards global climate governance. The role of Indigenous peoples within the UN system has been investigated in previous research but their engagement in the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC is very limited, despite the decisive role that climate funds have on decisions about what climate projects will be supported and what role Indigenous peoples might have in these projects. The GCF is, as mentioned, part of the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC and answers to the Conference of the Parties – the main decision body of the UNFCCC. It is a relatively new and potentially powerful actor with the mandate to re-distribute resources, and perhaps even to accomplish structural change, thanks to its central role in global climate governance and the resources it mobilizes.

There is some research on accredited observers in the Green Climate Fund (Bracking Citation2015; Bruun Citation2017), however there is no particular focus on Indigenous peoples. The representation and role of Indigenous peoples in the GCF were discussed in the Transitional Committee that was set up in 2011 by the UNFCCC to design the GCF. At that time, 80 civil society organizations, both from the Global North and the Global South, made a joint statement urging the Transitional Committee to include climate-affected communities in board meetings, ‘With special preference given to a representative from a women’s or Indigenous Peoples group’ (ActionAid et al. Citation2011, 3). However, the arrangement for accredited observer representation in the GCF diverged from the nine-constituency representation model established by the UNFCCC and there are only two constituencies for accredited observers – the private sector and civil society (GCF Citation2016b), with Indigenous peoples being part of the civil society group.

In the following analysis of the struggles and establishment of the IPP, we rely on relevant policy documents and reports, as well as interviews with key actors. This enable us to focus on what issues Indigenous peoples are engaged in and try to influence, and how the GCF respond to such efforts while balancing between what it sometimes perceived as counteractive resources. Interviews were mainly conducted to get a better orientation to the case and the documents. For example, from some of the interviews we got examples of issues that had engaged Indigenous peoples, that we followed up through document analysis. The interviews were also important to get an understanding of the process when the IPP was drafted. Of the 296 civil society organizations (CSO) that are accredited observers of the GCF, eight explicitly represent Indigenous peoples. Of these eight we have conducted five interviews with four representatives. The study has not been subject to an ethical review by third party, but all interviewees have been informed prior to the interviews about the research aim, that participation can be ended at any time, confidentiality, and how use of the research material will be used. All interviewees have given informed consent Interviews were transcribed and anonymized and are stored through our universities’ systems for safe storage.

In addition, we draw on documentation from respective organizations’ opinion papers and reports. In our analysis of the policy’s role in assessments of funding proposals, we reviewed the GCF Board meeting reports and affiliated documents that discuss and decide on the funding proposals. From the perspective of the Indigenous peoples, it is essential that projects approved by the GCF correspond with Indigenous peoples’ needs, so the relevance of these documents is high. We look at the report from the 20th GCF Board meeting that took place following the adoption of the IPP in 2018. There are 17 funding proposals referred to in eight meeting reports that include discussions about Indigenous peoples.Footnote1 Affiliated documents consist of assessments of the same funding proposals evaluated by the GCF Secretariat and the Independent Technical Advisory Panel (ITAP).

We do not analyse funding proposals per se, rather the responses to them. We are interested in how the IPP is used in GCF discussions evaluating funding proposals relating to Indigenous peoples’ issues, which the GCF declares to be one of the prime functions of the IPP. When we present the emergence of the policy and the struggles around it, we rely on both interviews and documents throughout the analysis. Explicit references to these materials are only made when we recount the specific details.

5. The making of the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy

Before the analysis, we provide a background that describes the process how the IPP came into being, from the initial mobilization of Indigenous peoples to the drafting of the policy, and its final content.

5.1. Initiating and drafting the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy

The policy-drafting initiative was preceded by years of bottom-up mobilization by Indigenous peoples’ groups trying to push for a formal IPP in the GCF. The context and infrastructure around global climate institutions, particularly the UNFCCC, seems to have created fertile ground for planting the idea of a formal IPP in the GCF. Indigenous peoples developed advocacy teams who sought to make the GCF board and secretariat aware of the importance of having a formal IPP (interview 2 and 4). The GCF was also pushed by the UNFCCC to enhance Indigenous peoples’ participation and contributions in GCF funded climate adaptation actions (UNFCCC Citation2014). Later, in December 2016, the GCF Board requested that the GCF Secretariat would develop an Indigenous Peoples Policy (GCF Citation2016a, Annex 1 Paragraph a). The work of drafting the policy was led by a GCF commissioned consultant and was subject to two rounds of formal consultations. The two consultations took place in the spring and summer of 2017, and drafts of the policy were made available for input and comments from different actors (the GCF Secretariat had invited members and alternate members of the Board, and observer organizations). The possibility to comment on the drafts lasted for one month, for each consultation round (GCF Citation2017a). The second consultation round resulted in 45 submissions, including several joint submissions (GCF Citation2017b). Actors who contributed were civil society organizations; development banks; UN organs such as the UNDP; government agencies from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom, and policy institutes. Indigenous peoples representatives engaged in the drafting of the report differ in their view of the process. Some thought the process was rich, entailing important opportunities for mobilization and learning (Interview 4). Others saw it more as a ‘box-ticking’ consultation (interview 1), and that the drafting and formulation privilege belonged to the GCF secretariat and its consultants. In the following subsection we discuss the final outcome and the challenges of implementing the IPP.

Common themes became apparent in the comments submitted; one being the principle of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), i.e., consent must be obtained from Indigenous peoples before any GCF-funded project activity may commence. Several submissions argue that it is unlikely that full consent can be achieved since Indigenous peoples are not homogenous actors. Additionally, there is a lack of clarification on exit strategies if Indigenous peoples withhold consent. To avoid taking consent for granted and turning it into a mechanical procedural matter, many of the submitted comments emphasized the need for more inclusive and meaningful participation on all levels, that is culturally appropriate, and contains accessible information in Indigenous peoples’ own languages, as this will ensure an understanding of affected Indigenous peoples. It is further emphasized, that it is the responsibility of the GCF that projects comply with the IPP, and that Indigenous peoples should be more included in project development and management, not simply informed.

Concerns were raised by several CSO’s representing Indigenous peoples about the structural prerequisites for inclusion, and lack of measures that could ensure Indigenous peoples direct access and control over GCF funding. Moreover, subgroups among Indigenous peoples, especially women, were described as being particularly vulnerable and in need of support. In addition, there were also discussions about not only avoiding harm by respecting Indigenous peoples’ rights (as mentioned in the draft) but also how to enhance Indigenous peoples’ rights.

5.2. The outcome: content of the policy and its implementation

In 2018, the GCF adopted the Indigenous Peoples Policy (IPP) (GCF Citation2018). The policy is not optimal in the eyes of everyone who participated in its development. One of our interviewees says that ‘the policy is quite ok, not as strong or as good as we want but, but the policy is ok’ (interview 1). Another interviewee argues that ‘the good part is we have an IPP that talks about our issues and concerns’ (interview 2). One interviewee describes the IPP as ‘progressive’ and that it includes a lot of elements such as rights connected to Indigenous peoples in isolation and matters about relocation (Interview 4). Some also think that the IPP can help to evaluate funding proposals and hold the GCF and actors connected to the GCF accountable (interview 2 and 4). Despite not being optimal, Indigenous peoples seem to attribute a potential value and leverage to the IPP, but it is important to emphasize, that these statements are Indigenous peoples organization’s assessments about the IPP as a document and an expressions of hope that it will come to mean these things, not expressions of the view that it already is successfully practiced and implemented. It is also worth noticing that the interests driving the Indigenous peoples’ representatives to participate in the GCF does not necessarily reflect the interests of other Indigenous peoples’ groups. Some do not believe it is worthwhile to engage in the GCF and that Indigenous peoples participation will only have a superficial impact (GCF Citation2017b).

Some of the adopted formulations in the final policy were revised directly following suggestions made in the consultation round. In addition, several clarifications in relation to the principles of free, prior, and informed consent, were made in line with the comments. However, some critical comments were of fundamentally unsolvable nature, such as the fact that consent will not always be unanimous.

The real test of the IPP is how it is operationalized and implemented. One challenge is to make actors aware of the IPP. Our interviewees pointed out that it is important ‘that knowledge and ownership’ is created about the policy (Interview 4) and that ‘operationalization is possible only when the Indigenous peoples themselves are aware of the policy, and also the state parties and the concerned authorities and also the bodies are aware about the policy’ (Interview 2). This is also admitted in documentation by the GCF, that emphasizes the need to ‘promote engagement with Indigenous peoples and local communities’ (GCF Citation2017b, 161).

The operational guidelines are aimed at entities involved in the planning and implementation of projects, directly or indirectly, and that are accredited by the GCF as intermediate actors between projects on the ground and the GCF (GCF Citation2019b). Project proposals should state how accredited entities have secured meaningful consultation with Indigenous peoples, based on the principle of free, prior, and informed consent. The guidelines define a meaningful consultation as one that is free from manipulation or coercion, assures that Indigenous peoples have access to information in a timely and culturally appropriate manner and uses mutually acceptable procedures for negotiation, including community-established protocols for consultation and consent.

The operational guidelines state that accredited entities need to include capacity building into the costs of projects. This may include Indigenous peoples’ access to legal and technical advice or other activities prioritized by Indigenous peoples. Government entities may also need capacity building for interacting with Indigenous peoples, e.g., by increasing their understanding about the situation for Indigenous peoples (GCF Citation2019b). This latter reference to resources and capacity building aligns well with the challenges that CSO submissions pointed to in the initial policy drafting, and it remains to be seen how these aspects are taken care of in the actual proposals and how these are assessed.

6. Inclusion or epistemic belonging: practicing the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy

In the analysis we show how the GCF values and prioritises different actors and their contributions, and how it will affect Indigenous peoples agency, and hence the possibilities for Indigenous peoples to reach epistemic belonging, i.e., the recognition and resources needed to exert real influence, not only to be symbolically included (cf. Montana Citation2021).

6.1. The connection between resource valuation and role attribution

Becoming a truly valued contributor in the management of different governance challenges increases ones’ chances not only to be formally included but also being able to shape the governance area, which proves your epistemic belonging. However, the impression from the views expressed by our interviewees as well as documentation from GCF is that Indigenous peoples are ascribed a rather narrow role in the GCF based on the analysis of how the GCF values Indigenous peoples resource contributions.

The IPP and its operational guidelines make numerous mentions of ‘traditional knowledge,’ ‘cultural heritage,’ ‘Indigenous knowledge’ or the ‘traditional practices’ of Indigenous peoples. The repeated message is the importance of ‘recognizing,’ ‘respecting,’ ‘protecting,’ ‘supporting,’ ‘promoting,’ and ‘integrating’ traditional knowledge and practices in GCF-financed activities (GCF Citation2018). This language is not without problems, as it risks reducing Indigenous peoples and their knowledge to a fixed entity – something to be preserved – rather than an element in dynamic and mutually transformative processes. One of our interviewees prefers the term ‘the knowledge of Indigenous peoples’ rather than traditional knowledge and he talks about the potential for bringing innovation to governance by using Indigenous perspectives. However, the dominance of western perspectives is prevalent in global organizations according to the interviewee (interview 1). Another interviewee argues that ‘the active participation is possible only when there is an equal status of knowledge’ but to often western science has undermined Indigenous knowledge and manipulated it to suit certain interests (interview 2).

Another obstacle that is more connected to formal inclusion is the accredited observer arrangement in the GCF that only recognises two accredited observer constituencies, the civil society group and the private sector group. This makes it very hard for Indigenous peoples to put forward their particular perspectives on different issues. One interviewee argues that the GCF should ‘recognize Indigenous peoples as one of the distinct constituencies so that [the GCF] can also harvest the contribution of Indigenous peoples […] distinct knowledge, distinct way of contributing to climate, that really enriches the discussion in the GCF’ (interview 1). As it is now, the interviewee continues, some civil society organizations mobilize around interests that ‘contradict with the realities of Indigenous peoples’ and sometimes ‘violate the collective rights of Indigenous peoples’, e.g., around forest protection, which may challenge Indigenous peoples’ rights to traditional forest resource management practices (Interview 1). Despite these obvious conflicts, the civil society group is required to form consensus on different issues in order to present ‘its view’ to the GCF. It can be noted that the private sector is the only accredited observerer constituency in the GCF that is preserved from the original nine-constituency model established by the UNFCCC. We believe this is an indication of how the GCF values different accredited observer contributions. Contributions from the private sector are described by the GCF as crucial to close the funding gap caused by supposedly limited public funding (GCF Citation2019e). The subordination of Indigenous peoples into a large civil society group on the other hand suggests that Indigenous perspectives are not prioritized.

6.2. IPP at work in the GCF

In this section, we begin with an analytical conclusion on the IPP at work in the GCF. A mentioned, the IPP was established in 2018 and could potentially be a resource for both the GCF and Indigenous peoples. The IPP provides legitimacy to the GCF and Indigenous peoples can use the IPP as a leverage to demand more recognition and more actions related to Indigenous issues and ‘to assert their importance, define their specialist skills and to effectively enact their epistemic practices’ (Montana Citation2021, 305), e.g., in evaluations regarding the operationalization of free, prior and informed consent in funding proposals.

The analysis shows that use of the IPP has yet to meet the expectations of Indigenous peoples’ representatives in the GCF and some GCF Board members. Considering the time and energy invested in collecting and developing the contributions of all the participants involved in making of the IPP – the GCF, Indigenous peoples’ representatives and other organisations – the limited use of the IPP in the evaluations of funding proposals is a bit of a conundrum. We interpret these contradicting occurrences in the light of organizational interdependencies and the prioritizations made by the GCF.

Partners to the GCF, called accredited entities, that take part in the planning, development and implementation of funding proposals, such as the UNDP, UNEP, the World Bank etc., often use their own Indigenous peoples policies, often referred to as safeguards, when assessing the potential effects on Indigenous peoples in their funding proposals. Indigenous peoples representatives in the GCF, some of them involved in the development of the IPP, argue that many of the safeguards developed and applied by accredited entities do not reach the higher standard of the IPP. The GCF, however, argues that other safeguards are to a greater extent equal to the IPP and therefore it is not relevant to apply GCFs own policy.

If the GCF were to apply the IPP strictly to its assessments of funding proposals that use other safeguards, there is risk that accredited entities would need to re-assess the funding proposals according to the IPP. This would likely be aggravating and costly, and funding proposals could potentially be rejected if they did not meet the standards of the IPP. We argue, based on resource interdependencies, that there are few incentives for the GCF to challenge accredited entities that are vital for the planning, implementation, and management of GCF funded projects. Hence, the GCF tends to portray other safeguards as basically the same as the IPP, even when Indigenous Peoples representatives in the GCF disagree and demand that the IPP should be used instead.

It is clear that the contributions from the different actors come in conflict with each other and that the GCF needs to prioritize what contributions, resources and actors they value the most. By prioritizing accredited entities, the GCF gets crucial support for project planning, implementation, and management, and according to the GCF, still legitimate safeguards in the evaluation of funding proposals. If the GCF prioritizes Indigenous peoples’ contributions, the GCF gets epistemic expertise regarding Indigenous peoples but nothing on the crucial aspects of planning, developing and manage funded projects. It is obvious that the GCF prioritizes accredited entities in the empirical examples below. The circumstances around organizational interdependencies and resource exchanges identified in this analysis reflect existing power relations in global governance and are also reproduced in the GCF. As a result of this, an epistemic belonging for Indigenous peoples in the GCF seems rather far away and if Indigenous peoples are to move beyond symbolic inclusion in the GCF, their contributions need to be truly valued and recognized. However, by ignoring its own policy, the GCF devalues the contribution from Indigenous peoples and disarms the Indigenous peoples’ representatives in the GCF. If the IPP does not really count or matter, it becomes hard to use the IPP as leverage for indigenous concerns in the GCF.

6.3. IPP in funding proposal discussions

The following three examples of funding proposals – on reducing deforestation, climate resilience of vulnerable communities and renewable energy – all provide examples of issues of concern for Indigenous peoples and the use of indigenous policies in the evaluation of the funding proposals. The three examples are analysed from the perspective of how the GCF discusses these proposals in the light of organizational interdependency.

Funding proposal assessment and discussions at GCF Board meetings are structured as follows: the Secretariat and ITAP conduct a written assessment of the funding proposals, which together with the funding proposal itself constitute the decision basis for the GCF Board. These documents are discussed at board meetings where also civil society (CSO) and private sector (PSO) representatives participate as accredited observers. Observers can also comment on funding proposals – if the co-chairs find it suitable. Representatives from the Secretariat, the ITAP and the accredited entity that has developed the project proposal also attend the meetings. The accredited entity answers questions from the board and the observers regarding the proposal.

Reducing deforestation and forest degradation

Funding proposal FP100 entitled ‘REDD-PLUS results-based payments for results achieved by Brazil in the Amazon biome in 2014 and 2015’ was discussed and approved at the 22nd GCF Board meeting in February 2019 (GCF Citation2019d). This was GCFs first REDD+ project.Footnote2 REDD+ projects aim to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, whilst simultaneously contributing to climate mitigation. Since REDD+ projects include matters concerning forest management and ownership, they are relevant to Indigenous peoples living in these areas.

The Secretariat’s use of IPP in assessing the funding proposal in this case lacked transparency. The Secretariat simply stated that there was ‘sufficient information’ on how the proposed activities would meet the requirements of the IPP (GCF Citation2019c, 136). The reader is left without any details about this ‘sufficient information’. The ITAP discussed the long history of broad stakeholder engagement in Brazil but made no reference to the IPP in its discussion (GCF Citation2019c, Paragraph 21).

Some board members were more concerned about the application of the IPP. One member wanted more focus on Indigenous peoples, since ‘This was an instance where an Indigenous peoples’ planning framework would be warranted and where the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy was relevant.’ Similar concerns were reflected earlier at the board meeting where two members made a general comment on the full set of funding proposals discussed at the meeting. They argued that:

Even though the Indigenous Peoples Policy had been adopted a year earlier, it was difficult to identify it in some funding proposals. They urged the Secretariat and the independent ITAP to help ensure that […] GCF policies were adhered to in the funding proposals, and that the funding proposals be negatively assessed if these policies were not followed (GCF Citation2019d, Paragraph 299).

Likewise, one CSO argued that the proposal ‘Needed to better articulate the use of proceeds in accordance with the Cancun Safeguards and the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy’ (GCF Citation2019d, Paragraph 342c). In addition, CSOs expanded on the critique of the project through a joint statement from Indigenous peoples and environmental CSOs (Interview 4). The statement challenged both the claims being made about the climate benefits and the respect of Indigenous peoples’ right to land and natural resources – of the most contentious issues within governments, including Brazil’s government (GCF Citation2019a).

The UNDP that represented the funding proposal responded to some of the critique but did not comment on the critique of not using the IPP (GCF Citation2019d). After a break, the Secretariat updated the Board that there had been productive consultation with the concerned board members. However, the concerns of the CSOs were not addressed and since CSOs do not have voting power, the project was approved. The fact that the concerns of CSOs are not considered is obviously problematic, and if the IPP is not used, its potential value for Indigenous peoples as a tool to protect their interests and concerns becomes limited.

Climate resilience of vulnerable communities and ecosystems

At the 26th GCF Board meeting in August 2020, the GCF discussed and approved funding proposal FP131, titled ‘Improving Climate Resilience of Vulnerable Communities and Ecosystems in the Gandaki River Basin, Nepal’ (GCF Citation2020b). The aim of the project was to ‘Increase the productivity and climate resilience of communities by establishing climate-resilient agroforestry practices’ (GCF Citation2020b, Paragraph 446). The project had identified Indigenous peoples and other disadvantaged groups that could be affected in the geographical areas being addressed.

The Secretariat made ambiguous statements regarding the status of the IPP and other safeguards. The Secretariat recommended that the accredited entity should adopt the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy (GCF Citation2020a, Paragraph 32) but at the same time argued that the safeguard framework used by the accredited entity ‘almost comprehensively addresses the relevant GCF standards’ (GCF Citation2020a, Paragraph 32). The ITAP did not mention Indigenous peoples in its assessment of the proposal.

At the board meeting, none of the board members commented on Indigenous peoples and after a brief discussion the Board took the decision to approve the project (GCF Citation2020b). After the decision was taken, CSOs were invited to comment on the proposal. This practice of sometimes inviting CSOs after decisions have already been made, has been documented before (Bruun, Citation2017) and heavily criticized by CSOs (GCF Citation2016b). Although the CSO was pleased that the project was approved, they also expressed concerns ‘regarding its compliance with the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy’ (GCF Citation2020b, Paragraph 456). The safeguard standard used by the accredited entity did not, according to the CSO, define Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in a satisfactory way, as it confined FPIC of Indigenous peoples to ‘consultation’ only. The CSO argued that the accredited entity should ‘follow the definition in the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy in all phases of the project’ (GCF Citation2020b, Paragraph 458). The accredited entity did not respond to the critique. Again, CSOs’ concerns seem to be of less value for the GCF and CSOs’ chances to make the IPP matter are restricted through their exclusion from decision-making discussions. If inclusion is reduced to a presence only, then there are no chances of reaching epistemic belonging where actors can learn from each other.

Renewable energy

The funding proposal FP163 entitled ‘Sustainable Renewables Risk Mitigation Initiative (SRMI) Facility’ was discussed and approved at the 28th GCF Board meeting in March Citation2021a. The aim of the project was to enhance the use of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind in seven countries. The project description stated that large amounts of private capital is needed to be able to finance this work. The CSOs suggested that the project and sub-projects constituted a risk of land acquisition and involuntary resettlement of Indigenous peoples (GCF Citation2021b).

The Secretariat argued that the World Bank’s safeguard used in the project ‘fully covers the GCF environmental and social safeguard standards’ [emphasis added], (GCF Citation2021c, Paragraph 49). The ITAP had no comments related to Indigenous peoples, nor did the ITAP make any reference to the IPP. This lack of interest from the ITAP towards the IPP caused irritation among Indigenous peoples’ representatives in the GCF. One of our interviewees confirmed that ITAP ‘who assesses the funding proposals, does not include Indigenous peoples’ experts, neither assessing the funding proposals against the Indigenous peoples’ policy’ (Interview 1).

At the Board meeting, none of the board members commented on Indigenous peoples’ issues in the project (GCF Citation2021b). The CSO representative was invited to take the floor, this time before the decision was taken. The CSO criticized the World Bank’s application of the FPIC principle, which according to the CSO was not equal to the GCF IPP definition:

While the World Bank had assured them that the criteria for recognition of indigenous peoples on paper were the same for the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy and environmental and social safeguards, the procedure which the World Bank had described made it sound uncertain as to whether free, prior, and informed consent was going to be followed. In this respect it was important to point out that “may consult,” the formulation in the World Bank’s provision, was not substantially equal to seeking the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples. The AE [accredited entity] must use the GCF Indigenous Peoples Policy as the standard in identifying and screening indigenous peoples [emphasis added] (GCF Citation2021b, Paragraph 704)

The World Bank did not respond to the critique from the CSO. No further objections were made by the board members and the project was approved. This neglect of CSOs’ views and the IPP is once again repeated. We sense a frustration among CSOs, especially in later board meeting reports. Indigenous peoples involved in GCF seem disappointed that the IPP they fought for and participated in developing is not used. CSOs believe that it brings the important dimension around Free, Prior and Informed Consent to the fore, in a way that other safeguards do not. This frustration is also confirmed in CSO comments outside of the GCF (Mamo Citation2021, 782)

7. Conclusion and discussion

Indigenous peoples engaged in the GCF had hopes that the Indigenous peoples policy (IPP) they helped develop could become a useful resource in assessing funding proposals and to hold the GCF and other involved actors accountable to the IPP. However, the GCF downplayed its own policy in favour of other policies used by accredited entities, despite that Indigenous peoples argued they did not meet the standard of GCF’s own IPP. If the GCF was to demand that the accredited entities would need to use the IPP instead of their own policies, accredited entities would need to re-assess their funding proposals, which would be bothersome and costly, and their funding proposals might even be rejected. This is a conflict the GCF does not want. Accredited entities are crucial for the GCF as they help to plan, implement and manage climate projects, hence the need to make the policies used by the accredited entities equal to the IPP.

Indigenous peoples’ contributions to the GCF are valued but as long as they do not challenge other important GCF interests. It is clear from the analysis of Indigenous peoples’ engagement in the GCF that the valuation of Indigenous peoples’ contributions is subordinated to other seemingly more important resources. We argue that the exchange and valuation of resources between actors involved in global climate finance governance is a basic mechanism that shapes the power relations between actors. These power relations are present in the GCF as well and they limit the ability for Indigenous peoples to exercise their epistemic expertise and to influence climate finance governance in a meaningful way that would not only protect their interest but also introduce new perspectives on environmental governance. Right now, the attributed role for Indigenous peoples in the GCF is more about being included in a symbolic way rather than moving towards epistemic belonging.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

Notes on contributors

Jonas Bertilsson

Jonas Bertilsson, PhD, is a lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Work Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.

Linda Soneryd

Linda Soneryd is a professor in sociology and a lecturer at the School of Humanities, Education and Social Sciences, Örebro University, Sweden.

Notes

1. There are nine meeting reports in total, but the 20th board meeting does not contain any funding proposal discussions including Indigenous peoples.

2. REDD+ stands for Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.

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