Power and interests in environmental policy processes: the Svalbard case

ABSTRACT

Climate and environmental changes pose tremendous challenges to ecosystems worldwide. While this underscores the need for more significant conservation efforts, these measures often clash with human activities. Participation and transparency may be key to reducing conflict and ensuring high-quality decisions, but facilitating such processes has proven difficult with many interests and stakeholders involved. This often leads to disputes over environmental policies but may also reflect a more profound debate about the definition of wilderness and who it is for. This article, therefore, explores what interests prevail and why in environmental policy processes and how this relates to perceptions of wilderness. Drawing on Lukes’ (2021) three-dimensional view of power and the case of the political process of new environmental regulations in the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard, Norway, the author examines how the power to frame the public discourse about wilderness influences the issues and actors included in the discussion (see also McConnell and Hart 2019, 647). The insights provided are relevant not only to local stakeholders on Svalbard navigating the policy process but also to practitioners and academics elsewhere working in environmental governance, protected areas, and environmental policy and legislation.

KEYWORDS:

• Environmental governance
• environmental policy
• protected areas
• environmental regulations
• tourism
• Svalbard
• Arctic

Introduction

Rapid climatic and environmental changes challenge ecosystems and cause species losses across the globe (IUCN n.d.). While this calls for a greater commitment to environmental and wilderness protection, conservation measures often conflict with human activities (Redpath et al. 2013, 100). Participation and transparency in environmental policy processes are widely regarded as key factors to ensure high-quality, durable decisions, but with many actors and interests involved, such processes may be complicated and, for some parties, maybe even not desirable to facilitate (Newig et al. 2023; Reed 2008; Reed et al. 2018). Moreover, while the many interests involved often lead to conflict over environmental policies, they may also reflect an underlying debate on what wilderness is and for whom (see Callicott and Michael 1998; Nelson and Baird Callicott 2008; Vannini and Vannini 2016). Therefore, wilderness may be viewed as ‘an ideological battleground’ where ‘political struggle occurs in and through the concepts and images we use to describe the world’ (Braun 2002, 17).

Against this backdrop, this article explores the battle of interests in environmental policy processes and how this relates to perceptions of wilderness. More specifically, I ask what interests prevail and why in introducing stricter environmental regulations in the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard, Norway. Drawing on Lukes (2021) three-dimensional view of power, attention is directed to how power plays out in the political process, including how the discourse on wilderness is framed (see also McConnell and Hart 2019, 647). In the fall of 2021, the Norwegian government suggested several changes to the environmental framework to protect the wilderness against climate change and the increased pressure from the tourism industry (Norwegian Environment Agency 2021). These proposals and the related process were criticised by various actors, not only because they contrasted with their respective views on how the wilderness should be governed but also because of its low levels of participation and transparency. Therefore, the case raises interesting questions about agenda-setting and wilderness perceptions.

The article contributes insights relevant to the Norwegian government and local stakeholders navigating environmental management issues in Svalbard. However, opaque government decisions around environmental policies are not exclusive to the Svalbard context. Therefore, the article will be relevant to practitioners and participants in similar processes and academics interested in environmental governance, protected areas, and environmental policy and legislation.

The article’s structure is as follows: first, the development of Svalbard and its environmental framework are introduced. Then, the three-dimensional view of power is presented, as is the methodology and research design. Following this, the analysis proceeds, in which the process of what interests prevail and why in environmental policy processes and how this relates to perceptions of wilderness is richly illustrated and discussed with the three dimensions of power and the Svalbard case.

Svalbard and its environmental governance

Svalbard is an Arctic Archipelago located halfway between Norway and the North Pole. The group of islands was discovered already in 1596. Still, it remained a no man’s land in terms of international law until the establishment of the Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen of 1920 (hereafter the Svalbard Treaty) (Arlov 2019; Jensen 2020, 82). Before the Treaty, the archipelago had been subject to interest from hunters and fishermen, explorers, and mining companies (Arlov 2019, 273). ‘The coal rush’ at the beginning of the 20th century actualised the sovereignty question and initiated several rounds of negotiations for a management regime between the interested states (246–300).

A solution was reached with the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, which gave Norway the ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ over Svalbard (article 1). Nationals to the contracting parties were also ensured rights to fish, hunt and conduct commercial operations ‘on a footing of absolute equality’ (Svalbard Treaty 1920, article 3). Interestingly, the Treaty (1920, article 2) further proclaimed that ‘Norway shall be free to maintain, take or decree suitable measures to ensure the preservation (…) of the fauna and flora,’ making it one of the first international environmental agreements in the world, and the foundation of the Svalbard environmental governance (Jensen 2020, 83; Kaltenborn, Østreng, and Hovelsrud 2020, 32).

However, the key rationale for establishing the Treaty was facilitating the mining industry, which became the cornerstone of Norway’s Svalbard policies and the basis for the Svalbard communities (Arlov 2019, 273). One of them was Longyearbyen, which, throughout the century, developed from a ‘company town’ to a small town more similar to those on the Norwegian mainland (359–379; 463–465). Local democracy was established in 2002, a broader set of businesses developed, and the town is now described as a ‘highly modern, urban village’ with several shops, restaurants, bars, and rich and diverse culture opportunities (Timlin et al. 2022, 1; Visit Svalbard n.d.).

Environmental regulations emerged in the 1970s following increased international interests in potential petroleum resources and environmental issues (Ministry of Justice 1975, 6; 1999, 5–6). Since the mid-eighties, Norway’s Svalbard policies have included the overriding objective of ‘preservation of the area’s distinctive natural wilderness’ (Ministry of Justice 2024, 5). The Svalbard Environmental Protection Act (2001) is key in supporting this aim, whose stated purpose is ‘to preserve a virtually untouched environment in Svalbard with respect to continuous areas of wilderness, landscape, flora, fauna and cultural heritage.’ Other main goals in Norway’s Svalbard policy include consistent enforcement of sovereignty, control to ensure compliance with the Treaty and maintenance of Norwegian communities in the archipelago (Ministry of Justice 2024, 5).

The Norwegian government describes Svalbard as ‘a large, contiguous wilderness area with no elements of heavy infrastructure development’ (Ministry of Justice 2016, 61). Approximately 65% of the land area and 84% of the territorial waters are protected (13). Svalbard’s nature is distinctly Arctic and unique in a European context, with species such as polar bears, Svalbard reindeer and walrus (Norwegian Environment Agency 2022a). The archipelago is also a key breeding ground for several migratory bird species (Norwegian Environment Agency 2022b). Many of Svalbard’s species are highly adapted to the climate and environment, generally described as a maritime tundra with modest precipitation.

Climate change is, however, hitting Svalbard hard, with temperature increases by 3°C to 5°C the last 40–50 years, heavier rainfall, and severe sea-ice loss (Hanssen-Bauer et al. 2018). This already affects the ecosystem in several ways, not least the ice-dependent species. On top of this, climate change, in combination with a general securitisation of the Arctic region, has renewed geopolitical interest in natural resources (Kaltenborn, Østreng, and Hovelsrud 2020, 31–32). This has also actualised the controversy on Norway’s proclaimed sovereign rights to the resources in the maritime areas surrounding Svalbard (Moe and Jensen 2023, 86).

While preserving Svalbard’s wilderness has remained a key component of Norway’s Svalbard policy, the government has also facilitated industry- and town development (Ministry of Justice 2024, 30). Tourism, research, and education have established a solid footing in Longyearbyen while the coal industry is being phased out (Hansen 2024). The increase in the number of commercial guest nights is illustrative of the growth of the tourism industry, with 20,000 guest nights in 1991 and 140,000 guest nights in 2023 (Ministry of Justice 2016, 81; 2024, 50). Simultaneously, the increasing tourism industry causes environmental problems such as pollution and introducing invasive species (Øian and Kaltenborn 2020). The traffic further disturbs several species directly while also tearing down the vegetation (Øian and Kaltenborn 2020).

In addition to the environmental consequences, some scholars argue that the tourism industry is challenging the ‘Norwegianness’ of Svalbard (Hovelsrud et al. 2023, 100). The sector attracts many international workers, which leads to a decrease in the share of Norwegians living on Svalbard (100; Moe and Jensen 2020, 513). According to Pedersen (2017), this trend will not only reduce the Norwegian presence on the archipelago but is also likely to fuel misperceptions about Norway’s sovereignty on Svalbard. However, environmental regulations may be a novel way to demonstrate Norwegian presence. Ødegaard (2022, 11–12; 2021, 144) argues that this is possible due to a cultural understanding of Norway as a ‘nature nation’ and the specific responsibility to protect the environment stated in the Svalbard Treaty. This allows the state to ‘mark its presence by human absence’ through environmental management – while simultaneously actualising the tensions between using versus protecting nature (Ødegaard 2021, 144; 2022, 11–12).

The three-dimensional view of power

This article investigates how some interests prevail in environmental policy processes and how this relates to perceptions of wilderness. I found Lukes’s (2021) three-dimensional view of power a helpful theoretical framework to discuss the empirical data with because it allowed for a focus on overt and covert ways through which interests prevail and the role of perceptions in these processes. The three dimensions are not to be understood as mutually exclusive power modes. Instead, they are often in play simultaneously, and attention to all three allows for a deeper understanding of how power works (see Lukes 2021, 20).

The first dimension of power involves ‘a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political participation’ (24, original italics). Power is thus expressed in the results of a decision-making process with overtly conflicting interests, where those whose interests are reflected in the outcome have power. Therefore, the first dimension of power can also be called ‘decision-making power’ (63).

The novelty in the second dimension of power is that ‘it incorporates into the analysis of power relations the question of the control over the agenda of politics and of the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process’ (Lukes 2021, 30; see also Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 1963). Power is not only expressed in decision-making but also in nondecision-making, which is ‘the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to “safe” issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and political institutions and procedures’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1963, 632).

However, power can still be exercised in more insidious ways. Lukes (2021, 32) asserted that A may exercise power over B ‘by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.’ This shaping of people’s perceptions constitutes the third dimension of power. This dimension refers to ‘the power to frame the public discourse and thus to stop certain social conditions from being recognised as “problems” that necessitate policy interventions’ (McConnell and Hart 2019, 647).

Since its initial publication in 1974, followed by its second and third editions released 30 and 50 years later, Lukes’s work has inspired a plethora of critiques (e.g. Baldwin 2015, 2021; Bradshaw 1976; Haugaard 2008; Hay 1997; Morriss 2006) and elaborations (e.g. Gaventa 2021; Haugaard 2012, 2021). Critics have argued that Lukes’s framework is overly focused on agents and is too normative (Haugaard 2008; Hay 1997; Hayward in; Hayward and Lukes 2008; Hayward 2018).

However, for Lukes (in Hayward and Lukes 2008, 7, original italics), ‘part of the point of locating power is to fix responsibility for consequences held to flow from the action, or indeed inaction, of specifiable agents.’ Likewise, what actors, issues and interests are included or excluded in environmental decision processes are often intentional. As the introduction points out, participation and transparency may be the key to ensuring quality decisions. Therefore, a deeper understanding of what makes such processes difficult or undesirable to facilitate is warranted, and the three-dimensional view of power can help with this. Moreover, in directing attention to power as the shaping of public discourse, the third dimension of power provides a lens to explore how perceptions of wilderness relate to how some interests prevail over others in environmental policy processes.

Methodology and research design

This article draws upon a case study of the political process concerning new environmental regulations in the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard, Norway. As noted by Ragin (1992, 2), case studies aim to ‘overwhelm the uniqueness inherent in objects and events in the social world,’ and so the Svalbard case was chosen to illuminate how interests prevail in opaque environmental policy processes. The case study is further described as ‘an empirical method that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident’ (Yin 2018, 15). In line with this, I surmise that what interests prevail and why in environmental policy processes cannot be explained without considering historical, political and environmental circumstances, further underlining why the case study design was appropriate for the study.

A multi-site fieldwork design was chosen because it made it possible to ‘study through’ the political process and follow its actors ‘beyond the geographical and organizational boundaries’ (Lo 2021, 30; Rhodes 2017, 48; 2018, 11). Fieldwork was conducted in Longyearbyen (Svalbard), and Tromsø, Trondheim and Oslo (the Norwegian mainland). Svalbard was visited thrice in 2022, one being a whole month stay. Familiarity with the Norwegian political context and language and a specific and proactive research approach ensured the quality of the relatively short-term fieldwork (Bernard 2006, 349–353; Brett, Thomson, and Dainty 2022, 369–370).

The data was generated through various sources, including observation, interviews, newspapers, and official documents. In total, 36 semi-structured interviews were carried out with actors on national and local levels. The former category included key top-level representatives in the Norwegian government from ministries directly relevant to Svalbard politics and national environmental authorities on the mainland and Svalbard. The latter group consisted of representatives from the Longyearbyen Community Council, the tourism industry, research actors, and other Longyearbyen locals. Including locally situated interviewees seemed especially relevant given that much of the social science literature on Svalbard focuses on the national and international level (Grydehøj 2019, 268)

Most interviews were conducted in Norwegian, and quotations were translated into English. All interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. Before the interviews, the participants were given an information letter regarding their rights, and they were asked to sign a consent form in line with the recommendations from the Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research. In addition, a few informal conversations – consultations with potential interviewees who wanted to be ‘off the record’ – were held. Although only written notes were taken during the informal conversations, the information contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of the political process and the diverging views.

The consultation papers related to the Svalbard Environmental Protection Act amendments and the proposed field safety regulations were consulted to provide necessary background information, especially regarding the government’s and environmental authorities’ position (Ministry of Justice 2021; Norwegian Environment Agency 2021). The list of consulted parties and their responses helped identify potential interviewees and provided additional information on their views of the regulations and the related political process. The Svalbard Environmental Protection Act (2001), its preparatory works, and the latest Svalbard white papers also provided valuable context (Ministry of Justice 2016; 2024; Overrein 2001).

Observations in the form Lo (2021, 32) described were also conducted: they entailed ‘a great deal of “hanging around,” engaging in informal conversation with people (…), listening in on conversations and anecdotes and participating in informal meetings.’ ‘Being there’ enabled me to understand better the local actors’ perspectives on national policy actions (Baiocchi and Connor 2008, 141). The observations helped me to ask more sensible questions in the interviews and added depth and richness to the interviewees’ accounts (Bernard 2006, 355; Boswell, Corbett, and Rhodes 2019, 84). My immediate reflections on being in the field were recorded in a hand-written field diary. Together with brief pieces of analytic writing, this contributed to situating and guiding the study’s analysis.

The analysis applied Braun and Clarke’s thematic analysis framework (Braun and Clarke 2006, 2016; 2019, 2021a; 2021b; 2022). This analytic method aims at ‘developing, analysing and interpreting patterns across a qualitative dataset’ (Braun and Clarke 2022, 4). Braun and Clarke (35–36) described thematic analysis as a six-phase process, which includes 1) familiarising yourself with the data; 2) coding; 3) generating initial themes; 4) developing and reviewing themes; 5) refining, defining, and naming themes; and 6) writing up. I found transcribing, keeping a research diary, and doing in-process memos helpful in conducting the first step. The codes were made by carefully reading through the data material and tagging the parts I found relevant in relation to the research aim and the theoretical lens. At this stage and in the following stages (2–5), the software program NVivo proved to be a valuable tool for organising large amounts of data. In developing and refining the themes (4–5), my primary technique was writing out the line of argumentation of the provisional themes.

The Svalbard case

In early fall 2021, the Norwegian government proposed several changes to the Svalbard environmental framework, which were implemented almost three years later (Ministry of Climate and Environment 2024; Norwegian Environment Agency 2021). The explicit purpose of the amendments was to ‘ensure that vulnerable wilderness and cultural remains in Svalbard are protected in line with the environmental objectives of the archipelago’ (Norwegian Environment Agency 2021). The consultation letter explicitly pointed to climate change and increased tourism as factors necessitating changes in the environmental regulations (Norwegian Environment Agency 2021). The proposals, therefore, entailed several new regulations relating to access and passage on Svalbard, including landing sites for cruise vessels, passenger limits of 200 for ships sailing in protected areas, and requirements of maintaining a minimum distance to polar bears, bird cliffs and walrus haul-outs (Norwegian Environment Agency 2021).

Despite their honourable intent, the proposed amendments were met with a storm of critique, with 450 people gathered in a protest march on the day of its presentation in Longyearbyen. As elaborated below, the critique represented not only conflicting interests but were also directed to the process itself, which many experienced as too closed. Moreover, what issues and actors were included in the discussion were also intertwined with the government’s framing of the discourse about wilderness.

The first dimension of power

Conflict between interests, expressed as policy preferences and exhibited in actions, is seen as a prerequisite for exercising the first dimension of power (Lukes 2021, 23–24). Certainly, various actors voiced vocal critiques against the proposed environmental regulations.

For the research community, a key concern was that their access to nature, referred to as ‘the laboratory’ by some researchers, would get restricted or at least made more difficult with a more rigid application system. ‘We, of course, get concerned when the nature protection measures get extended,’ one research administrator stated, ‘because more protection can mean that we are not getting access to the laboratory, or at least that the process of getting access to the laboratory gets very bureaucratic.’ ‘Research projects will most likely get exceptions if they apply for it, but for many, the job of applying can be troublesome,’ another research administrator explained, ‘the application processing time is already long, and if, for example, challenging weather conditions forces us to delay the field operation, we have to apply again and wait for several more weeks.’

For some Longyearbyen locals, the conflict around the environmental regulations centred around the ‘bolyst,’ the desire to live and stay in the community, which many saw as tightly connected to using nature for recreational activities. ‘When people come here, they come to experience Svalbard. Nature, hiking, expeditions, and using their leisure time out in nature,’ a local working in the tourism industry explained, ‘when these things are restricted, you take away a good portion of the living quality for those who move here.’ Whereas protecting nature was essential for many locals, some expressed that the best way to do so was through using nature rather than restricting access to it. ‘I believe one goes very far in protection here,’ one local politician supporting the tourism industry stated, ‘I am a typical supporter of protection through use. Through using nature and seeing what happens there, one gets a bigger ownership of it and wants to take care of it.’

Despite these concerns, neither the researchers nor the locals seemed to be the main target of the regulations. ‘The Governor [the Norwegian government’s highest-ranking representative in the archipelago and the regional state environmental authority] has told us several times that we should not worry too much about the consequences for research because it is not the purpose to target the research,’ one research administrator said, ‘the purpose is to target those who for example fly drones straight into a bird mountain just to film and have fun, not serious research, which will be able to get exceptions from the regulations anyway.’ ‘I have to say that I was a bit surprised by the reactions I saw coming from the local community,’ a former state secretary who had been working with Svalbard politics for a long time commented, ‘because the changes were not as big as the reactions implied.’ Some locals shared this view: ‘The regulations are about what we can or cannot do in our backyard, but that backyard is relatively big, so I don’t see the problem.’

Therefore, the key conflict of interest concerning the environmental regulations seemed to be not between the research community or the locals and the environmental authorities. Indeed, the most vocal critic of the environmental regulations was the tourism industry. Several interviewed tourism industry representatives expressed fears that the new environmental regulations would, in effect, ‘rule out tourism’ and thereby ruin their business and livelihood. As one tourism industry representative stated, ‘These regulations will affect us tremendously, to the extent that it is about operating or not.’ ‘I risk ending up on social welfare if the rules get as bad as it looks,’ another tourism industry employee echoed.

However, the tourism industry was not against protection measures per se, as the pristine wilderness was part of their product. ‘As a tourism company, we want to see wildlife in the most unspoiled way. This is how we make our money and do everything we can to ensure it stays that way. So, it is good to have some regulations,’ one tourism industry representative explained. Several tourism industry employees and supporters did, however, express a different view compared to the environmental authorities on how to care for the wilderness best. Key to this, they argued, was to be able to see and experience nature because ‘when you get to see this with your own eyes, the impact is much bigger.’ In line with this, another tourism industry representative stated that

the main reason why I started doing this [the tourism industry] is because I believe it is good for the environment. It has some negative impacts, but the positives are much more significant. It creates awareness. Being close to nature is the only way to take care of nature.

In sum, there were several conflicting interests involved in the issue of environmental regulations. However, the key dispute among these overtly contradictory interests was that of environmental considerations as represented by the environmental authorities versus the commercial interests of the tourism industry. Considering that the environmental regulations were decided on in February 2024, this points to environmental considerations as the prevailing interest in this process. The fact that the regulations were pushed through despite several conflicting interests indicates the conclusive decision-making power of the government in Svalbard policy processes. This can be seen as an example of how the first dimension of power can be exercised in environmental policy processes.

The second dimension of power

As Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 948) noted, ‘Of course, power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B.’ However, they further underlined that ‘power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948). As illustrated in the following, answering what interests prevail and why in the political process of new environmental regulations in Svalbard demands a closer look at the more covert aspects of power, including potentially limiting institutional practices.

Many interviewed locals and tourism industry representatives argued that the process was flawed. One thing was that the language of the proposals was too complicated. One of the locals said, ‘It was this kind of law-like language that normal people are not used to reading. It is a bit exhausting to respond when the language is so cumbersome.’ Further, not all official documents were translated into English. A research organisation representative stated, ‘For our members, this is nonsense. If you want consultation responses from affected parties on such an international place as Svalbard, an English version should be available.’

Moreover, several interviewees were ‘shocked over how bad the timing was,’ as a local politician said, relating it to the fact that the proposals were presented in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. ‘You have to remember that we came straight out of a pandemic where all the involved from the industry had struggled big time,’ one interviewee from a tourism industry organisation said, ‘people were exhausted, and we had no spare resources. And then they just throw out these proposals.’

In addition, many felt that the process had been challenging to follow as several proposals were being processed simultaneously. ‘It is not just the one process [the process of the proposed environmental regulations], but also processes about the election rules, special education and conservation plans at the same time,’ a local politician explained. The changed election rules meant that Longyearbyen inhabitants without Norwegian citizenship must have lived three years on the Norwegian mainland to have voting rights and be eligible for election to the community council (Ministry of Justice 2022). As it, in practice, removed democratic rights from foreigners living in Longyearbyen, this proposal too spurred protests in the local community (Andreassen 2022; P. Hansen et al. 2023; Wilhems and Amundsen 2022).

Several interviewees believed that the level of inclusion and participation in the environmental decision-making process had been too low. ‘It feels like the local community is not listened to’ was an often-heard phrase. ‘There should have been more involvement before the proposal was formulated and sent out,’ a local politician said. A tourist organisation representative said that while he did not oppose regulations as such, they had to be developed bottom-up: ‘That is the criticism, really, lack of local anchoring. Not just local, but with the industry too’. In sum, many local actors were worried that the process was ‘just a joke and a play to the gallery,’ as a local business owner put it. ‘The way it is supposed to be is that you have a real influence on your everyday life, and that is not happening here,’ a tourism industry organisation representative stated, ‘they pretend that it is because it is a consultation process, but we know that is just a mock trial.’

The frustrations related to the language barrier and COVID-19 were, to some extent, met with sympathy from the interviewed authorities’ representatives. They, however, strongly opposed the impression that the process had been nothing but a ‘mock trial.’ ‘It is completely normal in a democracy that it is in the consultation process that you get to share your opinions,’ an employee at the Governor’s office stated, ‘this truth that is established here about being a part of making the proposal, it is not really a common management practice.’ Thus, according to the government representatives, ‘this was a completely normal process.’

However, from the viewpoint of the tourism industry and the locals, there were clearly barriers to accessing the decision-making arena. This suggests that what interests prevailed in the environmental policy process was not just a result of the government’s conclusive decision-making power but was also linked to their utilisation of institutional procedures that made participation more difficult. This illustrates one potential expression of the second dimension of power in environmental policy processes.

Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 918) further argued that ‘power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively “safe” issues.’ All the suspicions of the process not being fair led some locals, including tourism industry representatives, to ask whether there was ‘some hidden agenda’ behind the proposed environmental regulations.

First, there was a feeling that people living in Svalbard were overruled by someone who did not know how things were on the archipelago. As one Longyearbyen resident put it, ‘The impression is that this comes from the Ministry and that it is made by people who do not know enough about how it is to live here.’ The demonstration organised in protest of the proposals referred to above is illustrative. In the media, the protest march was characterised as a demonstration against ‘everything that makes them angry’ (Sæbbe 2021). ‘This case was the last drop for the local community, and the protest march became a symbol for everything wrong,’ a tourism industry organisation representative agreed.

The interviewed government representatives seemed to be aware of this issue. ‘What separates Svalbard somewhat from the mainland is the strong and not unjustified feeling that they are being centrally controlled from Oslo,’ a former Minister said, ‘it is partly true because a lot of what happens on Svalbard is the responsibility of the Ministries.’ However, ‘it is not given that what the local community on Svalbard wants is what is best for Norwegian Svalbard policy,’ as stated by a former Minister, ‘sorry to those who live there, but Svalbard is different from the rest of Norway.’ Although never explicitly stated in any official way, the process of the environmental regulations clearly entailed tensions between the local and the national levels.

Second, several of the interviewed Longyearbyen residents believed that the environmental regulations were not really directed at protecting environmental interests but rather were linked to geopolitical objectives. As put by one Longyearbyen local, ‘The new environmental regulations obviously have to do with the enforcement of sovereignty and to ensure Norway’s status on Svalbard.’ An often-heard argument was that the new environmental regulations were meant to deny access to foreign parties. As explained by a local politician, ‘Environmental principles are, of course, grounded in the Svalbard Treaty, but it can be tempting to speculate in whether they [the government] has used the environmental aspect to make it more difficult for others to operate businesses here.’ ‘They use the environmental management on Svalbard to deny access,’ a local businessman asserted in similar ways, ‘that is the only reason. It is not because of the environment.’

A local businessman suggested that the new environmental regulations were proposed for Svalbard because the Norwegianness of Svalbard was questioned. ‘Do they make new environmental regulations for Jan Mayen,¹ which is 100% Norwegian?’ he asked rhetorically, ‘no, because there is no discussion about who owns Jan Mayen; it is Norwegian soil. Svalbard, however, is complicated.’ One of the things that could be seen as challenging the Norwegianness of Svalbard was the increased share of foreigners living in Longyearbyen, to which the tourism industry contributed. ‘The tourism industry provides jobs Norwegians do not want,’ one local politician who was in favour of the new regulations explained, ‘this is a challenge for the Svalbard policy, as one wants a good presence of Norwegians here.’

Interestingly, while the government officials were not too keen to discuss issues related to sovereignty directly, they did not deny that geopolitical considerations played a role in environmental policy issues. As put by a former minister, ‘What you are to investigate, but I cannot say so much about, is that because it is international and geopolitically interesting, everything has another dimension – whether it is about tourism, research or mining.’ The government representatives moreover confirmed that maintaining a Norwegian population on Svalbard was an important consideration and that the increasing foreign share following the growing tourism industry was a concern to them. ‘We probably underestimated the consequences the increased tourism would have on the population composition, assessed as a key element for Norwegian sovereignty. Thus, we had to tighten up a bit afterwards,’ one former minister adhered to. ‘Environmental perspectives are the basis,’ another former minister stated, ‘but in a bigger picture, it is, of course, important for Norway that Norwegians live on Svalbard. Svalbard is Norwegian, so we want as many Norwegians as possible to live there.’

As elaborated above, tensions between the local and the national level and geopolitical considerations were relevant issues concerning the process of environmental regulations. However, neither of them was explicitly addressed by the government in the decision-making process, which stressed that this, first and foremost, was a conflict between environmental interests and the commercial interests of the tourism industry. This suggests that the government sought to keep the discussion within the limits of the relatively innocuous debate of nature use versus protection rather than inviting to an open debate on more geopolitical aspects. This demonstrates another way the second dimension of power may influence what interests prevail and why in environmental policy processes.

The third dimension of power and perceptions of wilderness

Directing the attention to the third dimension of power allows a focus on how the ‘power to frame the public discourse’ on wilderness influenced what interests prevailed and why in the Svalbard case (McConnell and Hart 2019, 647). Viewed in this perspective, the empirical data suggests that the government framed the Svalbard wilderness as pristine, vulnerable, and in need of protection against human pressure. Not only is this reflected in the proposal aim (‘ensure that vulnerable wilderness … in Svalbard are protected’ against climate change and increased tourism) but also the environmental policies this built on, in which Svalbard was described as ‘a large, contiguous wilderness area with no elements of heavy infrastructure development’ and the overriding objective was ‘to preserve a virtually untouched environment in Svalbard with respect to continuous areas of wilderness’ (Ministry of Justice 2016, 6; Norwegian Environment Agency 2021; Svalbard Environmental Protection Act 2001).

Leaning on a framing of the wilderness as vulnerable and with only limited human presence, the government’s position was seemingly siding with nature against the other actors’ interests. As stated by an employee at the Governor’s office:

Nature does not speak, so no two conflicting interests are shouting at each other. On the one hand, there is a strong and growing tourism industry and the local community, which, of course, want to be able to roam in nature. Nature is on the other side, and it needs us to be its advocates.

In this perspective, while the barriers to the decision process may seem to be more of a wilderness management issue than directly connected to the concept of wilderness, the Svalbard case indicate that how wilderness is perceived has consequences for who is considered legitimate stakeholders in such processes.

Moreover, this framing allowed Norway to pursue its geopolitical interests through environmental regulations while avoiding being explicitly recognised as such. To be clear, climate change and increased human pressure are real threats to the Svalbard wilderness. However, it is also possible to use environmental regulations to achieve other objectives. As previously described, the increasing tourism industry and the related decrease in the share of Norwegian presence may contribute to misapprehensions about Norway’s sovereignty on Svalbard (Pedersen 2017). As suggested by Ødegaard (2021, 2022), however, environmental regulations may be a solution for Norway to reaffirm its presence while simultaneously denying foreign parties’ access.

First, it is a direct way to show that Norwegian legislative measures apply to Svalbard. This substantiates and maintains the enforcement of Norwegian sovereignty on the archipelago. Second, it may help in increasing the number of Norwegian inhabitants. If the fears of the tourism industry are realized and the new environmental regulations make it more difficult for the businesses to continue, this may have a consequence for the demographic composition. Simply put, fewer workers in the tourism industry may indicate fewer foreigners living in Longyearbyen. Simultaneously, a more comprehensive environmental regulatory framework may indicate that the Governor’s office will be strengthened with more positions. This could for example be legal professionals working with reviewing applications from researchers, locals or tourism operators seeking to gain access to the nature areas. Or it could be field inspectors, making sure that the new regulations are complied with. A stricter environmental framework can therefore be understood to protect not only the nature on Svalbard but also its Norwegianness, against the increasing foreign presence. The changed election rules removing democratic rights from foreigners living in Longyearbyen supports the argument that the Norwegian government is trying to fortify the Norwegianness of Svalbard.

The Norwegian government essentially capitalised on framing the environmental regulations in line with a perception of wilderness as vulnerable and in need of protection to limit the stakeholders and issues involved, which enabled the government to advance its geopolitical interests through environmental regulations without having these actions explicitly recognised as such. This illustrates not only the workings of the third dimension of power in environmental policy processes, but also that how it affects which issues and actors are included in the discussions intertwines with perceptions of wilderness.

Concluding discussion

This article has explored what interests prevail and why in the political process of new environmental regulations in the Arctic Archipelago of Svalbard. Drawing on Lukes’ three-dimensional view of power has helped to deepen my understanding of how power is exercised in this process. First, I find that there were several and to some extent conflicting interests involved in the policy process, all relating to the various actors’ wish to maintain their access to nature. These interests in turn related to different views on how to govern the wilderness, and specifically whether the wilderness is best managed through protection or use. In proposing the new environmental regulations, the government asserted that they acted to protect environmental interests. When they used their conclusive decision-making power to push through the proposal, it was thus seemingly the environmental interests that prevailed.

Second, I identify several barriers to participation, at least as experienced from the stakeholders’ point of view. These include that the proposals were written in a complicated language and not always translated to English, bad timing in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and several other policy amendments, and a low level of inclusion and participation. Thus, the government won through not only because of their decision-making power, but also through limiting institutional practices. Further, I argue that the environmental policy process was not just about protecting nature, but also entailed tensions between the local and the national level as well as geopolitical interests related to Norway’s aim to maintain sovereignty on Svalbard. Neither of these issues were up for discussion in the policy process, however. This confinement of the scope of issues openly discussed further influenced what interests prevailed and why.

Third, I argue that the government’s portrayal of the environmental policy shift as a measure to protect a vulnerable wilderness with minimal human interference impacted the recognition of legitimate stakeholders in the political process. Moreover, this framing enabled Norway to advance its geopolitical interests through environmental regulations without these motives being explicitly recognized. In not openly addressing national interests in a matter that strongly affects the local community, the government contributed to the widespread perception of the policy process being opaque. However, in a time characterized by increased geopolitical tension, Norway may be right in avoiding an open discussion about its sovereignty on Svalbard.

The Norwegian government effectively leveraged the framing of environmental regulations around the vulnerable perception of wilderness in need of protection to narrow down stakeholders and issues involved. This strategy enabled the government to pursue its geopolitical interests through environmental regulations discreetly, without overt recognition of these motives. This highlights the operation of the third dimension of power in environmental policy processes, demonstrating how it influences the inclusion of issues and actors in discussions, and how it relates to perceptions of wilderness.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to acknowledge Johans T. Sandvin and Grete K. Hovelsrud, both Professors at Nord University, Faculty of Social Sciences, for critically reviewing the article. Thank you as well to Ingrid A. Medby at Newcastle University, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, and Andreas Østhagen at Fridtjof Nansen Institute, for constructive feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

The fieldwork on Svalbard was supported by The Research Council of Norway under Svalbard Science Forum Arctic Field Grant [Grant number 333203].

Notes on contributors

Tiril Vold Hansen

Tiril Vold Hansen is a PhD student in sociology at Nord University. Her project is about power and interests in Norwegian Svalbard politics. Her research interests include sociological theory on power and interests, environmental and resource issues, and Arctic politics.

Notes

1. A Norwegian polar island located at the boarder of the Norwegian Sea and the Greenland Sea, that has been subjected to Norwegian sovereignty since 1930.