Lebanon’s consociational model, Christian parties and the struggle for political power in post-2005 period

ABSTRACT

In contrast to the expectations of the Christian parties in Lebanon, the Syrian military withdrawal from the country in 2005 did not mark a turning point to strengthen their political roles after several years of marginalization. Instead, their clash of interests left adverse implications for their behaviour, which undermined their ability to advance their interests and the interests of their community in the consociational system. This article argues that three main factors impacted upon their political behaviour: (1) intra sectarian conflicts; (2) inter sectarian conflicts; and (3) external factors (external alliances and regional developments). The impact of those three factors on their behaviour weakened their ability to reach compromises over, for instance, the formulation of a new electoral law that improves the Christian voters’ influence on election results, and the presidential elections. The article employs the consociational model as an analytical framework to explain the factors that influence the behaviour of Lebanon’s political parties.

KEYWORDS:

• Lebanon
• Syria
• Consociationalism
• ethnic conflict
• ethnic parties
• plural societies

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Portions of this article have been published in Assi (2016) and in Assi and Worrall (2015).

2. For an in-depth discussion about the Lebanese domestic politics during the Syrian period see: El-Husseini (2012).

3. Aoun was forced into exile because of his military confrontation with the Syrian forces in 1989, while Geagea was imprisoned because he was convicted of assassinating the former PM Rashid Karami in 1987 and bombing a church in Beirut in 1994.

4. Resolution 1559 called on the Syrian military forces to withdraw from Lebanon and disarm armed militias, which implicitly meant Hizbullah’s armed wing.

5. The FPM left the March 14 Coalition in 2005 because of its conflict with the Future Movement over the state socioeconomic policies and the distribution of cabinet posts. The FPM joined the March 8 Coalition in February 2006 after it signed an agreement with Hizbullah.

6. The focus on the Maronite Christian parties was mainly because of their significant influence on the domestic politics. Although there are many non-Maronite politicians and religious figures, their influence is limited compared to the Maronite parties. The Maronite parties are often considered the leaders of the Christians and able to impose their views and policies in state institutions, such as parliament and cabinet, regardless of the position of other Christian sects and the Maronite church.

7. The focus on the post-2005 period is because it was a turning point for the Christian parties in Lebanon. During the Syrian period (1990–2005), the main representatives of the Christian community in Lebanon were either imprisoned or exiled. The post-2005 period witnessed their return to the political life in the country.

8. Although defining the interests of the Christian community is a debatable issue between the Christian parties, there is a common agreement that the Christian representation in the state institutions should be improved since the state administrative employees are overwhelming Muslims. They also agree on the need of taking the Christian MPs out of the Muslim parties’ sphere of influence by formulating a new electoral law that allows the Christian voters to elect their representatives. This is because the current electoral law allows the Christian candidates to win elections by Muslim votes. This point will be discussed later in the article.

9. Ethnic identity is a concept that is widely interpreted and discussed by the scholars. Anthony Smith (1985, 128), for instance, defines an ethnic community as a ‘named collectivity sharing a common myth of origins and descent, a common history, one or more elements of distinctive culture, a common territorial association and a sense of group solidarity’. Donald Horowitz’s definition in turn focuses primarily on kinship as the main determinant of the ethnic group. He (1985, 52) states that ‘[e]thnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are inseparable from the concept of ethnicity’. However, Gilley provides a wider definition. He (2004, 1158) defines ethnicity ‘as that part of a person’s identity which is drawn from one or more “markers” like race, religion, shared history, region, social symbols or language. It is distinct from that part of a person’s identity that comes from, say, personal moral doctrine, economic status, civic affiliations or personal history’. Gilley’s definition is more applicable to the Lebanese case, since Horowitz’s and Smith’s definitions exclude religious communities and focus mainly on the role of kinship to define the ethnic community.

10. The external players also sometimes provide financial and military support for their domestic allies to compete with their opponents (Baydoun 2012, 100).

11. The Taif Agreement reached at the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1989 clearly spelled out the steps that should be implemented to successfully complete the democratization process and reach a full-fledged democracy. It stated that the Lebanese parliament should form the National Body for the Elimination of Confessionalism, with the aim of developing the steps that are necessary to eliminate confessionalism, and should form the senate (to include representatives of the sectarian groups). It also stated that parliament should formulate a new electoral law based on large districts (Muḥāfaẓa) as electoral districts, election of parliament on a non-sectarian basis and the expansion of administrative decentralization at the level of the smaller administrative units (district and smaller units) through the election of local councils.

12. For an overview of the Lebanese political system and domestic politics, see: Salamey (2014) . For a discussion of the factors that sparked the Civil War in Lebanon, see: El-Khazen (2000).

13. After Lebanon gained its independence from French colonial rule in 1943, the two main Lebanese sects, Maronite and Sunni, represented by President Bechara al-Khoury and PM Riad al-Solh, respectively, concluded an unwritten agreement called the ‘National Pact’ (al-Mīthāq al-Waṭanī). According to this agreement, the Lebanese consociational model distributes key positions, the presidency, speakership of parliament and PM, on a permanent basis according to religious sect, between Maronite Christians, Shiʿas and Sunnis, respectively.

14. The last official consensus conducted in Lebanon was in 1932. Since then, the figures given for the numerical size of each sect have been estimations.

15. For a discussion of the origins of sectarianism in Lebanon, see: Makdisi (2000).

16. The Taif Agreement legitimized the Syrian military presence in the country on the pretext of preventing the eruption of sectarian violence.

17. Interviewed on 9 December 2014, Beirut, Lebanon.

18. For a further discussion about the Lebanese parties, see: Suleiman (1967); El-Husseini (2004).

19. The scholar and MP Farid el-Khazen (interviewed on 9 December 2014, Beirut, Lebanon) argues that the Future Movement sought to limit the representation of the FPM in the cabinet, although it had the largest Christian parliamentary bloc in the 2005 parliamentary elections. This had led the FPM to reject the participation in the cabinet that was headed and dominated by the Future Movement and its March 14 Coalition allies.

20. Interviewed on 9 December 2014, Beirut, Lebanon.

21. The alliance between the two parties was broken in 2015 after the Future Movement nominated Frangieh for the presidential elections against the presidential candidate and the leader of FPM, Michel Aoun.

22. The conflict erupted on 7 May 2008 between the two coalitions (March 8 and March 14) after the then government took a decision on 6 May 2008 to dismantle Hizbullah’s private telecommunications network. Hizbullah established the network for the sake of protecting its members from Israeli espionage, and it is not controlled or monitored by the Lebanese Government. The government justified its decision by stating that Hizbullah’s telephone network is ‘illegal and unconstitutional’ (Blanford 2008). The conflict between the two blocs culminated in an outbreak of violence in Beirut and Mountain of Lebanon, causing the death of at least 81 people and wounded 250 in 4 days of fighting in May 2008 (Macleod and Aysha 2008). Subsequently, the government decision to dismantle Hizbullah’s telecommunications network never materialised. It revoked its decisions after the eruption of the violence.

23. The 2005 electoral law was not debated between the Lebanese parties because of the short time frame to formulate a new electoral law between the Syrian military withdrawal in April and the specified deadline of the polls in June 2005. This led the Lebanese political parties to adopt the electoral law of the previous 2000 elections.

24. Interviewed on 27 November 2014, Hazmieh, Lebanon.

25. Ibid.

26. Interviewed on 9 December 2014, Beirut, Lebanon. During the Syrian period, Damascus’ domestic allies used to formulate electoral laws that suited their electoral strategies and marginalised the main representatives of the Christian community.

27. The LFP and its March 14 Coalition allies did not attend the parliament meeting on 15 May 2013, which led to its failure to convene due to lack of quorum.

28. Interviewed on 27 November 2014, Hazmieh, Lebanon.

29. Ibid.

30. The Lebanese parties postponed twice the parliamentary elections that were supposed to take place in June 2013. The first postponement was until November 2014 with the pretext that they were not able to agree on a new electoral law. The second postponement was until 2017 with the pretext that the election centres might be targeted by terrorists. The only party that rejected the postponement was the FPM because it considered the postponement as unconstitutional.

31. Hizbullah and the FPM rejected to attend the parliament meetings to elect a new president because the election of Aoun was not secured, leading to its failure to convene due to lack of quorum (2/3 of MPs) until November 2016, when the Lebanese parties agreed on Aoun.

32. The Future Movement changed its position and supported Frangieh in 2015 after its failure to secure the victory of its candidate, Geagea, in the presidential elections and to cause a split within the March 8 Coalition, especially as Hizbullah fiercely supported Aoun for presidency. It changed its position once again in 2016 and supported Aoun. This has led the Lebanese parties to agree on the presidential candidate, Michel Aoun, in November 2016. Aoun gained the votes of the Future Movement, Hizbullah, FPM, LFP, and PSP leading to its victory in the presidential elections against his former ally, Slieman Frangieh.

33. For a discussion about the history of Hizbullah and its political ideology, see: Saad-Ghorayeb (2002)

34. Interviewed on 21 April 2012, Beirut, Lebanon.

35. Interviewed on 9 December 2014, Beirut, Lebanon.

36. Interview with the media figure and journalist, Khaled Saghieh, 21 April 2012, Beirut, Lebanon.

37. Ibid. Rafic Hariri is considered one of the founders of the Taif Agreement.

38. This research was submitted for publication before the reshuffling of the political alliances in Summer 2016, especially before the FPM and the Future Movement agreed on Aoun’s nomination for the position of president.

39. Interview with the scholar and MP in the FPM parliamentary bloc, Farid el-Khazen, 9 December 2014, Beirut, Lebanon.

40. What is noticeable in the behaviour of Hizbullah and the Future Movement is that Hizbullah was more flexible with its Christian ally, while the Future Movement was more intransigent. The FPM was Hizbullah’s main ally from outside the Shiite community. It is ‘Hizbollah’s most important non-Shiite ally – and the key to its efforts to avoid a sectarian label’ (ICG 2007, 10). On the other hand, the Future Movement’s intransigence towards its Christian ally can be explained first by its alliance with a major inter sectarian Druze party, the PSP, which represents the majority of its community and had a large parliamentary bloc. Second, none of the March 14 Christian parties represent the majority of their sects, and therefore had only small parliamentary blocs.

41. The MP from the Future Movement, Ammar Houri (interviewed on 12 December 2014, Beirut, Lebanon), justifies his party rejection of the Orthodox Gathering electoral law with the pretext that it violates the Taif Agreement, which emphasised the confessional coexistence between the Lebanese communal groups. He argues that this law will spark intra sectarian conflicts between the political parties to mobilise the popular support of their respective sects.

42. Interviewed on 27 November 2014, Hazmieh, Lebanon.

43. Interview with the media figure and journalist, Khaled Saghieh, 21 April 2012, Beirut, Lebanon.

44. Ibid.

45. Qusayr, a Syrian city located next to the Syrian–Lebanese border, was a stronghold for the Syrian armed opposition. Hizbullah’s pretext for its military intervention in Syria was to prevent its spillover into Lebanon.

46. Interviewed on 4 May 2012, Beirut, Lebanon.

47. Ibid.