ABSTRACT
Although previous research has explored broadly the determinants of public service motivation (PSM), little is known about how it is affected by formal institutional variations. This article examines the presence of PSM in the bureaucracies of democratic and autocratic political regimes. Merging data from the four waves of the International Social Survey Programme with a recent classification of regime types, this study confirms that autocracies seem neither to diminish public servants’ levels of PSM, nor hinder its cultivation. In fact, we find indications that PSM is likely to be higher in autocracies, where the positive effect of relatedness on PSM is also stronger than in democracies, albeit the latter is partially non-significant. Future research and practical implications of the findings are further discussed.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. The study of the dark-side of PSM can be classified into two different sets of outcomes (Perry, Citation2021). First, PSM may lead to negative attitudinal outcomes, such as employee health and well-being, due to employees not fulfiling their societal impact potential. Second, PSM may also be related to negative decision-making and unethical behaviour due to differing interpretations of the public interest. This article converses with the second sub-stream of research.
2. Autocracy and authoritarian are used as synonyms. For example, an autocratic regime is a synonym of an authoritarian regime.
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Notes on contributors
Guillem Ripoll
Guillem Ripoll is an Assistant Professor at the University of Navarra, Spain. His research revolves around the expansion of the concept of public service motivation; specifically, he investigates the relationship between motivation and ethics. email: [email protected]
Martin Rode
Martin Rode is an Associate Professor at the University of Navarra, Spain. His research focuses on studying how politics and economic reform processes are conditioned by the underlying institutional environments in which they are conducted. email: [email protected]