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Abstract
The critiques of special operations forces after the Second World War are applicable to the current quest to produce a theory of special operations today. A specific theory may be unwarranted as other, existing military theories may already prove necessary and sufficient for special operations. There are a number of individual and institutional impediments to overcome in the writing of special operations theory. Individual impediments include access to sufficient evidence, the credibility of the author and the type of theory they write, and sufficient time to produce theory. Institutional impediments are a reflection of large bureaucracies and the special operations community is not immune to their negative influence. Although special operations have a strategic value and can generate strategic effects, this does not necessarily translate into a need for theory. Institutional imperatives are likely to favor pragmatic over pure theory and co-opt such theory in the pursuit of bureaucratic agendas. In the worst possible case such coopted theory can become dogma, or a substitute for deep, critical thinking—the very raison d’être of theory.
Notes
1. I owe the insight on joint doctrine to discussions with Richard Basehart and Tom Miller.