Special Operations and Design Thinking: Through the Looking Glass of Organizational Knowledge Production

Abstract

The U.S. military over the past decade has developed various forms of “design thinking” for complex problem solving in military conflicts. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has recently developed two operational design and design practitioners courses in an effort to integrate design thinking across all levels of USSOCOM. While the conventional Army uses one form of design, the organizational composition, mission, and high level of tacit knowledge production requires special operations to pursue other design concepts, design education options, and organizational improvements. This article outlines how and why special operations needs a different organizing philosophy for design in context, where the unique qualities of special operation missions require designing differently than conventional approaches.

Keywords:

• design
• tacit knowledge
• explicit knowledge
• sociology
• complexity
• organizational theory
• special operations
• paradigms
• ontology

Notes

^1. Both documents implicitly make major ontological choices on the nature of complexity and the promise of increased technological and institutional overmatch against all potential adversaries.

^2. This author was a primary design consultant for the formation of these advanced design programs at JSOU. USSOCOM also invited this author to be the primary instructor on the design theory class for the advanced program in 2015. This author is now the course director for design programs at USSOCOM Joint Special Operations University as of 2016.

^3. This position deviates from U.S. Army current design doctrine where design is a subcomponent of planning. However, USSOCOM decided in February 2015 to focus the JSOU design programs on joint doctrine (operational design) that does not explicitly define design as a subcomponent and methodology within overarching planning. Joint doctrine somewhat confusingly distinguishes between “operational design” and “Army design” concepts.

^4. For three subsequent School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) directors and faculty, a vast difference of opinion is expressed in three distinct design articles in Military Review issues from 2009 to 2013. The significant variation and paradox among the article content provides insight into the institutional well as political disagreement within the U.S. Army on design.

^5. PMESII is understood in joint and U.S. Army doctrine as “the state of the situation,” whereas DIME represents the various reductionist elements of national power that a nation can apply to a conflict.

^6. This citation provides an example of the small footprint, length of commitment, and dissimilar strategies for special operations warfare.

^7. Tip of the hat to Dr. Christopher Paparone. Upon reading an early draft of this article, he noted that the Alice in Wonderland raven metaphor had yet another connection: John Rambo, perhaps the most famous Hollywood special forces character in cinema, used the call sign “Raven” during his exploits.