Conceptualizing Terrorism with the Complications of Unconventional Warfare in Mind

Abstract

Conceptualizing terrorism, even defining the term, has been highly contentious. The lack of an agreed-upon definition or even an agreed-upon set of concepts that every definition should encompass creates rifts between scholars and potential confusion among practitioners. This article attempts to examine the difficulty of conceptualizing terrorism juxtaposed against the practice of unconventional warfare. Because Special Operations Forces help foment insurgencies when conducting unconventional warfare and because insurgencies often resort to terrorism, it is important for practitioners of unconventional warfare to understand what terrorism is, how to detect it, and, perhaps, how to steer insurgents away from this tactic. This article explores these concepts as well as the potentiality that the intersection of terrorism and unconventional warfare produces a new type of collateral damage not fully covered in the existing international law of warfare.

Keywords:

• terrorism
• unconventional warfare
• special operations
• counterinsugency

Acknowledgments

The author first conceived of this research after a conversation with some School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) students in Seminar 4 in the 2014 Summer session. The author thanks seminar 4 and Major Barbara Honig, Canadian Army and Major Matt Schifrin, U.S. Army for challenging him to rethink his position on the definition of terrorism. The author also specifically thanks Lieutenant Colonel Justin Ticknor and Lieutenant Colonel Pete Sittenauer for constructive feedback on drafts of this article.

Notes

1. The only possible counterexample that comes easily to mind is Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. This group participated in several high-profile terrorism plots and attacks with the express purpose of initiating the end of the world.