More socio-technical assessments of synthetic biology to inform security deliberations

Abstract

This paper discusses the problems with relying on a biotech revolution framework to understand the development and diffusion of synthetic biology. The paper then suggests an alternative framework that involves a more evolutionary understanding of how biotechnologies develop and suggests new micro- and macro-level case studies for further inquiry. This proposed research agenda will better elucidate the socio-technical factors that can shape whether/how state or non-state actors may acquire, develop, and deploy synthetic biology for harm.

Keywords:

• synthetic biology
• socio-technical
• biotech revolution

Many are concerned that synthetic biology may prove to be a cheaper and easier way to conduct bioterrorism. Over the past 10 years, there have been a number of different government and non-government reports and articles emphasizing the growing security threats from synthetic biology, stemming from the assumptions that as science advances in this field, synthetic biology tools and techniques will be more accessible to those wishing to do harm. Typically, these writings focus on the availability of commercial DNA pieces, DNA synthesizers, and open scientific journals, and the fact that different kinds of synthetic genomes have been constructed. These writings and policy discussions, however, rarely interrogate what people, infrastructures, and contexts are required to conduct and replicate synthetic biology work. These are critical factors if we are concerned about malevolent actors (state or non-state) developing and using synthetic biology for harm.

Most current government and non-governments efforts that try to assess synthetic biology and other kinds of emerging technology threats are based on a ‘Revolutions’ framework for thinking about science and technology, based on assumptions about a Biotechnology Revolution and/or an Information Technology Revolution. This ‘Revolutions’ framework typically focuses on material and technical aspects in synthetic biology (Vogel 2008, 2013, 2014). For example, it focuses on codified knowledge (i.e. information found in journal articles, scientific textbooks, websites, databases, software, or other written sources), the accessibility of biological materials (e.g. pathogens, oligonucleotides), biological supplies (e.g. reagents, prep kits), infrastructure (e.g. DNA synthesizers, laboratory benches, and other kinds of commercially available biotech equipment). Along with this material focus, there follow assumptions about the presumed ease of globalization, diffusion, and technology transfer of synthetic biology end-products. Furthermore, this framework tends to focus on cutting-edge developments in synthetic biology and assumptions that these will pose greater security dangers. Finally, those using this Revolutions framework assume technological and threat trajectories that are linear or exponential. However, this ‘Revolutions’ framework provides little exploration of the more complex non-technical factors that can shape and modulate scientific and technological innovation and diffusion. This omission leads to particular kinds of policy conclusions and interventions for synthetic biology that are flawed because they do not consider the broader set of social factors that can shape S&T development.

This position paper argues that a new analytic framework and research agenda is needed that takes the social dimensions of synthetic biology work seriously in security assessments of synthetic biology. We need more in-depth analyses of what is shaping the development, diffusion, and adoption of new synthetic biology techniques and technologies by different actors (including possibly malevolent ones). If we do not do a more comprehensive assessment, we are bound to come up with erroneous assessments that lead to policies that are ineffective and can hinder innovation (Vogel 2013; Endy 2014).

A new framework and research agenda for synthetic biology would be based on social science studies of scientific and technological diffusion. These analyses would go beyond gathering up the material and written information properties of synthetic biology work, and would also incorporate in-depth, longitudinal, and multi-disciplinary qualitative research of the field's developments. It would focus on the socio-technical dimensions of technological development, diffusion, and adoption of synthetic biology techniques and tools that would involve important micro- and macro-level studies of synthetic biology. A two-tiered set of studies that focus both of the micro- and macro-level would better capture how synthetic biology knowledge and work are changing and being transferred over time. Although there are some social science studies that have begun to tackle this terrain (Tait 2009; Cockerton 2011; Fye 2011; Balmer and Bulpin 2013; Frow and Calvert 2013), more work needs to be done.

For micro-level studies: There is a need to better elucidate the role of tacit knowledge (know-how) and training practices in synthetic biology and how/to what extent this is changing over time. Through qualitative social science inquiry, this would involve conducting additional case studies of individual published synthetic biology experiments, commercial/applied synthetic biology developments, and International Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) and DIYbio (Do-it-Yourself Biologist) teams (national and transnational). All of this information can then be used to discern what implications this has for technological diffusion and adoption that can better inform the development of security policies.

For macro-level national and transnational studies: This would involve answering the questions of who, what, when, where, and how for the development and diffusion of new synthetic biology technologies and progress in the larger synthetic biology field. This would involve social science inquiry into the various actors (scientists, engineers, technicians, regulators, citizens, policy-makers, etc.) involved in synthetic biology work. In addition, further social science studies of the institutions (corporations, governments), infrastructures (social, legal), public policies, and funding streams would be valuable for understanding what is involved in turning a basic research synthetic biology experiment into a marketplace application. Finally, it would also be important to examine the different cultural and social conditions, and national and international circumstances, shaping synthetic biology developments and diffusion across countries and regions around the world.

In sum, we need more complex assessments that take into account the socio-technical context of synthetic biology. This would involve examining factors such as tacit knowledge, the role of interactional knowledge and knowledge networks, organizational components and dynamics, as well as the larger socio-political-economic-legal context in which synthetic biology activities are situated. Having this depth of knowledge and a more nuanced understanding of various synthetic biology approaches and how they are (or are not) able to travel easily to new settings, would enable the creation of a more refined spectrum of factors shaping threats from state and non-state actors to inform intelligence analysts, policy-makers, and the public. This is opportune moment to gather historical and contemporary studies of synthetic biology as the field is developing.

Notes on contributor

Kathleen M. Vogel is an associate professor at North Carolina State University in the Department of Political Science. She also serves as Director of the Science, Technology, and Society Program. Vogel holds a PhD in biological chemistry from Princeton University. Prior to joining the NC State faculty, Vogel was an associate professor at Cornell University with a joint appointment in the Department of Science and Technology Studies and in the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. Previously, she has been appointed as a William C. Foster Fellow in the U.S. Department of State's Office of Proliferation Threat Reduction in the Bureau of Nonproliferation. Vogel has also spent time as a visiting scholar at the Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. Her research focuses on studying the social and technical dimensions of bioweapons threats and the production of knowledge in intelligence assessments on WMD issues.