Vision as make-believe: how narratives and models represent sociotechnical futures

ABSTRACT

When prominent experiments, simulations, and prototypes fail, sociotechnical futures become contested. This paper discusses the negotiation of visions as make-believe to give the considered feasibility of future narratives a more significant account in explaining innovation dynamics. Following Kendall Walton's theory of representational arts, I propose that imagined futures depend on both material and socio-cultural constraints. On the one hand, the considered data, models, and artifacts give make-believe futures a veto right and a certain kind of objectivity. On the other hand, sociotechnical imaginaries prompt promissory considerations and implications. The contingency of employed objects allows accounting responsibility for fictional truths to imagining subjects. Drawing from a scenario workshop on microalgae nutrition, I demonstrate how stakeholders use uncertain props and imaginaries to negotiate the ambiguous boundaries for the assessment of the unproven technology. I argue that the non-fixity of both authorized sources and promissory narratives explains the uncertainty of innovation dynamics.

KEYWORDS:

• Make-believe
• science and technology studies
• sociotechnical imaginaries
• microalgae
• technology assessment

Introduction

Imagined futures are the driving force of the present as they represent promissory pathways for action. Although the future is uncertain, stakeholders disclose details in various economic, political, and scientific contexts to justify the present actions accordingly. As such, the boundaries of what is considered sociotechnically debatable, feasible, and desirable emerge at different sites and phases of technology development. However, people differentiate between realistic future projections, such as climate change or prognoses regarding the current Covid-19 pandemic, and less realistic imagined futures and give them different relevance in politics, economy, and their aspired life course and actions. Likewise, considered feasibility according to models, simulations, and prototypes makes a difference for the assessment and motivational power of sociotechnical futures. In this paper, I argue that the consideration of such representational objects can alter imagined futures and affect their motivational power and dissemination.

The concept of ‘present [imagined] futures,’ a concept coined by Luhmann (1976), became a hot topic in sociology and science and technology studies (STS). In particular, the prominent critique of the linear innovation model incites to disclose the social construction of conditionalities in the co-production and design of technologies (MacKenzie and Wajcman 2010). Emerging technology does not merely follow disinterested studies and material constraints, which automatically leads to social benefits. Instead, sociotechnical imaginaries and networks of politicians, investors, and researchers alike shape research and development as well as attainable values, even at early stages (Brown, Rappert, and Webster 2016; Jasanoff and Kim 2013). The theoretical approaches, however, assign different importance to the sociotechnical practices and imaginaries explaining the constraints of emerging technologies. Within this gap of the discursive realm and the situational/material realm of actors, I consider the generation of futures as make-believe. Therefore, I introduce Kendall Walton's make-believe theory of representational arts into the analysis of imagined futures and illustrate the concept at the example of a stakeholder workshop about the futures of microalgae nutrition. Finally, I discuss how this concept explains the dynamics of imagined futures and opens novel perspectives for empirical research.

Social imagination between the material and the social realm

In sociology, there are not only theories that give priority to objects and actor networks in practice, but also theories that give priority to discourse to explain the emergence and impact of imagined futures. In the course of the linguistic turn, social sciences focused on the semantical conditions to form accepted propositions about the future. Of central importance is Charles Taylor's concept of social imaginaries, or ‘the way ordinary people “imagine” their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, it is carried in images, stories, legends, etc. [, to make] possible common practices, and a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (Taylor 2007, 171–172). Since social imaginaries are ‘a-theoretical’ (Binder 2019, 21), they reach a broad public beyond specific debates in economics, science, or politics. In STS, Jasanoff and Kim (2009, 123) derived the now well-established concept of sociotechnical imaginaries ‘in the reservoir of norms and discourses, metaphors and cultural meanings.’ Sociotechnical imaginaries are ‘collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, 120). Examples of sociotechnical imaginaries are ‘Containing the (American) Atom [for peace]’ vs. ‘Atoms for [South Korean] National Development’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, 126–132), ‘The USA is a technical powerhouse’ (Hilgartner 2015, 36), ‘sustainable growth’ (Strand et al. 2018, 1851), ‘digitization as the driver for a new industrial revolution,’ or ‘unbounded benefits while risks are limited and manageable’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2013, 190). In the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, one could narrow down ‘almost anything’ to the available cultural frames. The concept of sociotechnical imaginaries explains how semantic structures shape the social construction of technology.

However, if one acknowledges that social imagination and the constitution of a group are performative efforts with uncertain success, social imaginaries hardly explain motivation or collective action (Hilgartner 2015, 35). In the course of the new materialism and the practical turn, social sciences opened up to study the co-production of meaning in actor networks and the situated condition of knowledge (see Haraway 1988; Jasanoff 2010; Latour 1996). In particular, the Actor-Network Theory (ANT) opened up the study of sociotechnical conditionalities of knowledge and technology in constellations. Karin Knorr-Cetina (2001, 182) argues that objects do not only stand for something else, but enable meaning-generating practices. Her laboratory studies show that the generation of scientific evidence and meaning involves material confrontation. Therefore, the situational and phenomenological experience in practical constellations is another potential source of imagined futures, besides the discourses about the future. However, these perspectives consider the socio-historical dimension, power constellations, and functional differentiation with symbols to distinguish, for example, economic and scientific communication from a science fiction story as secondary.

A symmetrical account of the social and material realms finds the present meaning and meaning generation of objects being given by both discourse and local practices with the resistant characteristics of material objects. Sheila Jasanoff (2010, 3) sees ‘co-production […] as a critique of the realist ideology that persistently separates the domains of nature, facts, objectivity, reason and policy from those of culture, values, subjectivity, emotion and politics.’ However, abandoning this predominant distinction of a considered ‘real world’ would mean a loss of analytical rigor regarding social power structures and assigned feasibility of imagined futures. If no characteristics of the object play a role, then drinking something very bitter would equally suit to represent enjoyment or healing. It might be conceivable if someone does not believe that it tastes bitter, but this is practically difficult to bear in the long run when the future projection motivates drinking it. The material realm, i.e. what imagining subjects believe about their factual environment, influences how people imagine and act concerning the future. This practice allows them to learn about their environment, e.g. that the drink is bitter or drinking it is not suitable to represent pleasure. A comparison of history and imagined futures aims to illustrate this relationship.

Hayden White stated that narrated history is more than a list of historical data and follows socio-cultural narrative structures and present needs of their narrators (White 1980). Reinhard Koselleck (Koselleck 2007, 71) observes the prevalence of realism in forms of a ‘veto right of the sources’ against the potential arbitrariness of narrated history. However, contesting or abandoning historical sources alters not only the immediate surroundings, but also the structure of narrated history (Weberman 1997). Armin Grunwald (2013) makes a similar distinction with regard to the scientific validity of non-arbitrary future projections. Imagining the future based on conditional sources, for example, an official weather forecast or local data about the progression of a pandemic, makes it more plausible. When such models or parameters change, the imagined future is contested. Other authors distinguish, for example, more or less realistic scenarios or a realistic range in the scenario funnel to indicate the deviation of an assumed trend line (Kahn 1965; Kosow et al. 2008; Reibnitz 1991). The materially ascribed ‘realism’ of future projections also has a half-life until new data replaces them. Therefore, I propose that considered prototypes, simulations, models, and data practically have a similar ‘veto right’ to enforce and contest imagined futures. Both present past and imagined futures build on a ‘non-fixity’ of considered material sources, i.e. ‘ingredients’ or ‘skeleton,’ and socio-cultural templates for their ‘composition’ (Grunwald 2013; Weberman 1997). On the one hand, the ‘veto right of the sources’ makes future narratives more plausible than mere daydreaming. On the other hand, the authorization, situation, and availability of these sources are uncertain, as prominent experiments, simulations, and prototypes can fail or be ousted. Therefore, this paper suggests an approach to research uncertain futures that is not only based on the study of socio-cultural frames, discourse, and imaginaries, but also on the material situation. In this pursuit, I suggest using Kendall Walton's concept of the games of make-believe.

Visions as make-believe

With ‘Mimesis as Make-Believe,’ Kendall Walton (1990) developed a theory of representative arts widely recognized in philosophy. To explain how fictional works such as novels, paintings, and plays represent and evoke emotions or even motivate action, Walton compares them with props in children's games of make-believe. The discourse about scientific representation applied the concept in different accounts outside the analytical aesthetics and philosophy of imagination (Currie 2016; Frigg 2010; Toon 2014). Jens Beckert (2016, 66–68) was the first to introduce this approach to the social science discourse on imagined futures to explain the role of props, such as a lottery ticket or business plan, ‘to stimulate the imagination of fictional worlds.’ The person holding the lottery ticket makes believe becoming a millionaire. However, the date printed on it makes the imagination materially/situationally dependent if the rules for generating the game consider them. Make-believe is a suitable concept for the co-production of powerful futures because it defines fiction, not ontologically, but generated in a practice that symmetrically includes characteristics of the material and social realm. As long as people use objects as props in promissory games of make-believe, these objects are of particular interest for economic valuation, political consideration, and the epistemic assessment of situated knowledge.

Make-believe is best explained using the analogy of a children's game in the forest (Walton 1990, 23). The game of make-believe is based on the shared rule that tree stumps are bears (principle of generation). As the children stroll through the forest, they expect, according to their rule, that bears are lurking. Just as tree stumps, the bears are of different sizes and sometimes appear in groups. This follows as an indirect fictional truth from the situational phenomena in the forest and the applied game rules. The children know from stories that bears are dangerous. In the game, they experience fear and fright when an overlooked bear suddenly appears beside them, and they are relieved when a supposed bear turns out to be a ‘false alarm’ (Walton 1990, 37). They gain fictional beliefs about where bears are and how they react when faced with a group of large bears. They experience situations by interacting with their environment and following the common principles of generating the game.

Make-believe is not a solitary practice because it is not the individual actor who decides what a bear is, but the joint application of rules. The generation of meaning results from both social conventions and situational/material characteristics of the environment. The practice has consequences not only for the bodies or objects, but also for the social actors involved. The actors share experiences and memories about themselves as individuals and as a collective in the game of make-believe. In this symmetrical relationship of the sociotechnical constitution and the feedback of make-believe practices (Figure 1), I find the emergence of social facts and the dynamics of imagined futures.

Figure 1. The children's game of make-believe according to the principle ‘tree stumps are bears’ is exemplified in its condition and feedback to the social and material realm.

Representations as props in games of make-believe

Make-believe is not a solitary practice like daydreaming, but a social practice of generating a game in which other things are considered true than outside the game.¹ Truth-according-to-the-representation follows the principle of generation by instructing what is to be imagined under which circumstances (Walton 1990, 40). Representations are things with the function of serving as props in games of make-believe (Walton 1990, 105). Neither the properties of an object nor the intentions of speakers generate a make-believe game. Instead, objects become representations by being treated as such in practice (Walton 1990, 70–105). Books, music, and pictures are not only regarded as individual delights, but invite people to talk and pursue the fictional worlds in the form of make-believe. What is written in a book counts as true-according-to-the-book,² just as a narrated story is considered true-according-to-the-narrator. In the subsequent communication and practices, certain things are considered set, just as children use dolls or toy cars in games that enable them to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate actions. The objects are part of the world, but how the truth according-to-a-representation relates to claims without make-believe reference is unmarked and can even accidentally turn out to be true or false. Herein lies a crucial point: The principle of generation instructs what the props instruct in the imaginative activities so that one can distinguish between truth-according-to-given-instructions-for-the-imagination and truth-according-to-someone's-individual-imagination (Walton 1990, 67). Imagining futures likewise involves prototypes, studies, data, and expertise to reinforce the sociotechnical feasibility. However, they base imagined futures on uncertain facts in the material and social realm.

The generated worlds only according to the props would be relatively ‘empty’ if they were based only on direct principles of generation. In the example given at the beginning, it must be clear that, according to the knowledge of the children, bears have certain characteristics and so one has to be afraid of them. To make clear what is obviously to be represented, Walton distinguishes the direct principle of generation and the indirect principle of generation, or rather, the principle of implication (Walton 1990, 144). Direct principles, such as ‘stumps are bears,’ ensure that participants consider the same props to the extent that they play the same game together. The indirect principles depend on other fictional truths in the game, following the direct principles (Walton 1990, 143). Indirect principles are further instructions for the imagination resulting from the direct principles, such as that, for example, bears in the forest have large teeth, claws, and are hungry. That bears appear in groups could even be a discovery of the children. Walton attributes a ‘complicated and shifting and often competing array of understandings, precedents, local conventions, saliences’ to the second principle of generation (Walton 1990, 169). Therefore, I locate the indirect principle in the social realm. What follows implicitly for the imagination is materially and socially determined. In the STS, this perspective coincides with the concept of ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway 1988) and the sociotechnical emergence of visions (Schneider and Lösch 2018; Schneider, Roßmann, and Lösch 2020) (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Make-believe of primary truth and implicit truth in fiction according to props and the principle of implication

The principle of implication is of major interest because ‘imaginings induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject’ (Schellenberg 2013, 497). Walton distinguishes between the reality principle (RP) and the mutual belief principle (MBP) (Walton 1990, 164). For the former (RP), unless otherwise stated, the same applies to the game as to common sense and perceived reality so that, for example, historical novels of fictional futures can represent old stories in the world of a present future. For example, the old vision of feeding on the unexplored wealth of the oceans then meets high-tech and science in the context of present ideas of reality. For the latter (MBP), you consider possible outdated beliefs and the intentions of the author's society as the basis for the imagination (Walton 1990, 158). In such a game, one would, for example, draw on beliefs about the historical state of research to learn not about the current techno-economic possibilities of microalgae nutrition, but about historical possibilities. However, you can only build any game according to the MBP on the basis of your best knowledge about the perspective, or, respectively, the present discourse about the author's society. Besides, Walton points out that you cannot break down the diversity of known myths and legends that give further implications. Many official games presuppose ‘familiarity with the medium, genre, and representational tradition,’ which are not covered by either MBP or RP (Walton 1990, 184). Thus, Walton emphasizes that fictionality is not defined by the principles of generation, but rather consists of prescriptions to imagine (Walton 1990, 166–185). This clearly defines make-believe as socio-culturally embedded practice (Friend 2008; Walton 1990, 104). For the social sciences, this means that they can empirically study, for example, the disciplinary or transdisciplinary implications considered adequate by the participants, or, respectively, their socio-cultural backgrounds, by keeping the direct principle of generation invariant.

Limitation of make-believe: matching, suiting, and authorized games

A key factor in the social embedding of make-believe games is their authorization. A game is authorized when it generates acknowledged features of an imagined object. A doll obviously represents a baby in children's games and novels represent certain adventures. However, the aforementioned unofficial game with the tree stumps requires explicit instruction, although it might be easy to understand (Walton 1990, 406–407). By distinguishing between authorized and unofficial games, Walton finds the cultural-related recognition of representations (Walton 1990, 104, 406). He gives the example of a weather map, where the position of the sun indicates where to imagine sunshine at what time (Walton 1990, 331). The imagination does not visually depict the weather map and yet it is clear how the game works and how it appeals to phenomenological experiences with sunny or rainy weather. Of course, you can also make believe about the future using historical weather charts or unauthorized forecasting models. However, these games would require further instructions for projecting a future target system, and people would not ascribe the same ‘ontological force’ or ‘veto right of the sources’ as to an official game. The distinction between authorized representations makes it possible to analyze socio-cultural scopes of contested futures. At different sites, different objects represent imagined futures, and in some sites, as I propose, imagined futures are unspecific sociotechnical imaginaries without official representation.

Models that fall in line with public narratives or sociotechnical imaginaries are more likely to count as props in authorized games. However, in our society, science is an institution that, in many cases, decides on the authorization and validity of future representations (see Grunwald 2013). Authorization of a game does not imply that the imagined object perfectly matches beliefs of the imagining subjects (Figure 3). A work may represent something it does not match in detail, or match something it does not represent (Walton 1990, 108). A painting, for example, can represent Napoleon, but it can be wrong in matching or ‘misrepresent’ his body size (ibid.). This fact becomes obvious when beliefs about Napoleon, for example, based on another source, do not correspond to the actual prop-based instructions for the imagination. A novel about Napoleon, on the other hand, might match the life path of someone else, but officially, it does not represent it (Walton 1990, 128). One could, however, propose a game of make-believe, in which the novel counts as a representation of another person and determine how well it matches. In the same way, one could propose a historical weather chart to represent future weather. Whether they match or not, both objects would not be official representations of another person or of tomorrow's weather, unless the games are authorized. Nevertheless, one can learn from them by drawing inferences from projected beliefs in the model-world comparison (see Salis 2016; Schellenberg 2013).

Figure 3. Authorized games officially generate beliefs about the imagined object. Make-believe can incorporate beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject, namely about the imagined object and suitability of objects or action to act out the imagined (see Schellenberg 2013).

In practical contexts, a game of make-believe has an evaluative element regarding suitability. One could claim that the aforementioned book or model does not only misrepresent, but is even unsuitable to represent the person or weather, respectively. Walton explains suitability using the example of a pirate game, in which not climbing a tree is supposed to fictionally count as climbing a mast, but crawling through a tunnel or eating watermelon (Walton 1990, 238–239). He notes that these props are not equally suitable, if at all. He later concludes that narratives are not suitable for visual games (Walton 1990, 301). Similarly, both visual models and functional models only suit their particular application purposes. It depends on the contextual requirement whether eating melon suits fictionally climbing the mast or crumbling sand cake suits fictionally eating a cake. People believe or find out whether an object or action suits to act out the imagined (Figure 3). From a pragmatist perspective, one can observe that a model is suitable when it makes a move in the practical context, for example, in conversation about the feasibility of a project or by assigning a new value to the prop. As with William Labov’s (1972, 366) evaluative element of narratives, a narration is worth telling, and similarly, employed props are suitable, when the audience does not merely respond ‘so what?’ but rather ‘he did?’ (ibid.) or any other evaluative statement indicating immersive inference with pre-existing beliefs and desires.

As mentioned above, Walton's theory is applied in philosophical aesthetics and philosophy of science. However, examples from the existing literature are rather distant from empirical studies on imagined futures. Therefore, the following sections examine a stakeholder workshop from the perspective of make-believe and discuss the concept's suitability for empirical studies and implications for subsequent research.

Stakeholder workshop on key-narratives of microalgae nutrition

This section of the paper gives an insight into the contested futures of microalgae nutrition. It applies the make-believe concept to a stakeholder workshop to illustrate the understanding of communication about the future. It should emphasize that the motivational power of visions fosters fictional concretization of their feasibility using different representations that generate beliefs about both the imagined future technology and suitability of representations. The history of technology development for microalgae nutrition goes back to the 1950s. There are many studies about the potentials of microalgae, but the actual benefits of microalgae remain obscure (Böhm and Dörge 1959; Meffert and Stratmann 1953; Ploeger 2011; Rösch and Posten 2012). Kean Birch prominently criticized that bioeconomy research, which, among others, includes microalgae research, is strongly driven by uncertain future projections (Birch 2017). The value of present research builds on practices that turn expertise, simulations, and prototypes into assets. Stimulation of future expectations and ‘management of sentiments’ thus became the central goal of various actors within and outside of science. Nevertheless, research agendas at the European, national, and regional levels and various stakeholders strive to research and develop technologies for microalgae nutrition (Enzing et al. 2014; Lewandowski et al. 2019). The research goals formulated therein are optimistic and multifaceted.

The workshop about ‘Key-narratives on microalgae as food’ took place on 5 September, 2018 at the Food 2030 Conference in Hohenheim. It is the second part of a TA study on nutrition with microalgae, which first analyzed public perception and then asked experts to evaluate these visions. Four scientists from engineering, natural, and social sciences, two students, and three stakeholders from the public and industry participated in the workshop. The workshop applied the classic scenario method to analyze and assess technical limitations, knowledge gaps, or exaggerated public expectations to give recommendations to decision-makers in science, economy, and politics (University of Hohenheim 2018). By definition, scenarios are stories that draw attention to present options for decision making: ‘[Scenarios] are hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision points’ (Kahn and Wiener 1967, 6). Thus, scenarios differ from forecasts and explicitly do not claim to be true, but to be useful for different purposes.

Since reference to fiction presupposes its generation, I asked participants of the workshop to imagine nutrition with microalgae according to four key-narratives³ that distinguish visions as coherent wholes. The narratives drew the participants’ attention to connecting distant and heterogeneous elements and contextualized an imagined technology as salvation by making their characteristics appear necessary to achieve social value. Each of the narratives (55–65 words, see Annex) represents a crucial and valuable food challenge that microalgae technology is supposed to overcome, described in different scenarios: ‘Sustainability,’ ‘Do-it-yourself (DIY),’ ‘Cheap and inconspicuous,’ and ‘Health and wellness.’ At the same time, precise details, such as price, scale, or process, are left open. In the next step, I asked the nine workshop participants to discuss the feasibility of each visionary narrative based on their technical know-how, market knowledge, and insights into current political and legal discussions to foster the shared imagination. The entire discussion lasted 77 minutes and was recorded and transcribed by a third party. In terms of make-believe, the workshop aimed to generate and explore games of make-believe based on four key-narratives to reveal how the future narratives translate into contested games of make-believe (Figure 4). Since theoretical conceptions of visions as make-believe were completed after the workshop, the transcripts do not intend to validate, but to illustrate the application of make-believe to study imaginary futures. The subsequent discussion elaborates on limits and further empirical and theoretical perspectives.

Figure 4. Stakeholder workshop on visions of microalgae nutrition in terms of make-believe.

Concretization and representation of microalgae and technology

The participants shared their expertise and associated it with the narratives to identify challenges and assess their feasibility. Research objects were selected from various alternatives and found to be suitable for the imagination. For the sustainability vision, for example, ‘no heterotrophic microalgae’ (Scientist 2) and ‘a simple open pond’ (Scientist 4) were considered as the biological and technical objects that can be imagined because they are simple and require the least material. Based on objects considered suitable, the participants further explored how the technology matches the sociotechnical vision according to the narrative. Below you will find excerpts from the workshop on how the participants discussed concretizations and major challenges of the narratives for the fictional realization. With these remarks, the participants further instructed themselves to follow a joint imagination. They represent socio-cultural implications for the game that were not directly represented by instructing key-narratives (see Annex):

Cheap and inconspicuous

So, if I get it right, the end-use product, we actually don't say it's algae. So, we just add it because of some property we want the food to have. (Scientist 1)

I think that's the biggest question: if we can compete with soy and corn. (Student 2)

Health and wellness

You cannot talk about the health benefits because this is on the regulation of EFSA, so it will be hard to transport the message. (Industry 1)

Do-it-yourself

So, everyone has their own little bio-reactor in their garden and frequently just gets a liter of microalgae soup, and then you just dry it … , and then that's it. (Scientist 2)

Or maybe an old vision, it's like the old village bakery house where everyone in the village comes together. (Scientist 4)

I would say it's quite risky …  (Scientist 2)

Sustainably feed the world

I think it's the carbon dioxide storage, we’re always looking for. (Student 2)

We have to produce very cheap to feed everyone … when we have a great investor […], then the price is not the focus. (Scientist 4)

Using diluted hydrogen peroxide … you don't need antibiotics or pesticides or whatever. (Industry 1)

Although the key-narratives mentioned neither the color nor the taste of algae, the participants considered these attributes important for deriving further implications. The participants imagined about microalgae and derived characteristics from their experiments and insights. Interestingly, the characteristics of microalgae were considered differently depending on the framework of each narrative: Extractions, heterotrophic stems, or masking make microalgae feasible convenience products, while the troublesome green color counted as a positive feature for a health product:

[You can make] use of additives to mask the taste … but then you have maybe even more ingredients as you had before. (Industry 2)

Right now only heterotrophic culture can be neutral in taste. (Scientist 2)

People maybe also accept the taste maybe if you say it's healthy. (Student 1)

And green now is a color attuned to the health. This was different also 15 years ago. (Industry 1)

 … the color could be a benefit […], and we can also sell the product with a higher price because the consumers are in a higher class. (Scientist 4)

The following two cases show how the participants ambiguously resort to different objects to meet the imagined challenges.

Case 1: animal feed to mask the taste or to use cheaper feedstocks

The feeding of microalgae seems to be a process that is suitable for different games of make-believe, as it matches the required characteristics according to the narratives in different ways. The participants imagined feeding algae in the first instance as a way to ‘mask’ the bitter and fishy taste of unprocessed microalgae for cheap convenience products. Interestingly, they also considered feeding microalgae in other visions; however, for different reasons. In the sustainability vision, the feeding should enable the use of wastewater, in the do-it-yourself vision to dispense with complex downstream processes at home and to better integrate into food and cooking habits:

If you use your wastewater from your community to grow microalgae to feed it to … fish or whatever, chicken, then it could work in a sustainable way. (Industry 1)

I was also thinking about just kind of the integrated production systems for aquaponics … And the fish taste better than algae. (Student 2)

The participants exemplified the imagined features to reinforce the feasibility of masking algae taste for the do-it-yourself visions or using purified wastewater as a cheap nutrient supplier in the sustainability vision. What is more, fictionally valuable properties were found, as the social imagination turns closer to feeding mice and chickens with algae:

I know that mice are doing fine on 25. I would even guess that if you gave them 50%, it would be okay because they have all they need in the algae. (Scientist 2)

There was a study with chickens where they showed that the yellow of the egg gets more color if you feed algae, and I think they did 5% or 10%. It was quite high, so it was not like we pull in like 0.1 g/kilo. (Scientist 4)

But that's not only because of the coloring in eggs; it's also because you can increase the content of nutrients and for fatty acids. (Industry 1)

And then you can say omega-3 rich eggs. (Scientist 2)

That's already on the market in some cities. (Industry 1)

Case 2: prototyping against contamination claims reveals new lifeworld visions

The openness to incorporate props into the game of make-believe became particularly visible when the do-it-yourself vision was first considered as too risky, until ‘surprisingly’ a prototype was mentioned that represented ways to solve the challenge of contamination:

I would think that's quite risky. Whatever you cultivate, maybe then you get one of either cyanobacteria or [?], and [kaput sound]. (Scientist 2)

Or just lower bacteria. (Scientist 1)

But the funny thing is we are working exactly on this right now, and a prototype is ready. […] It's just a few liters. It looks not like a microwave, more like a coffee or espresso machine. (Industry 1)

The participants showed tremendous enthusiasm, since they had not expected a prototype. We had a break from the schedule to look at the photos and discuss further details, such as the aging of algae cultures, experiences with algae harvesting, and quality control. Although the existence of a prototype does not count as a scientific report or proof of function, the representation was suitable to imagine the system's integration into a household:

You could also use this to lighten your TV, so you just do an algae course around your TV, and then you just pump it through. (Scientist 2)

In the lounge. (Scientist 1)

And you use the light to grow your algae, but then, of course, it looks also very beautiful. (Scientist 2)

And then the algae grow, and maybe after one week, you can change it.

[…] and dry and press the patty. (Scientist 4)

Gibt es denn schon einen Preis? [transl.: Do you already have a price?] (Public 1).

The participants explored implications, discussed the matching, and faced new challenges in finding solutions. The convincing argument of the prototype, as well as that of the feeding studies, does not merely lie in the characterization of specific process variables, but in the ascribed suitability of photos and narration to supplement imagined process steps of functional models in a vivid and visual game (see theory section, above). However, since the prototype counted as the only prop to represent the feasibility and design ideas of a home-brew microalgae system, a failure of the prototyping process would hardly contest the fictional vision of microalgae nutrition for do-it-yourself purpose. Prototypes that match imagined futures are valuable props and of common interest to vanguards of the DIY vision. In other words, the prototype's authorization to officially represent visions of ‘do-it-yourself’ microalgae nutrition would make it a political and economic asset. However, the more a particular prototype officially represents an imagined future, the more a failure of the prototyping would theoretically contest the imagined future.

Contested futures of microalgae nutrition: how visions evolve at the limits of feasibility

Besides technology, present economic and legal boundaries represented challenges in all four debates. A dynamic of contested representations became visible, since fictional boundary conditions were considered irresolvable. The insistence on the limits of feasibility revealed a mismatch with the given narratives. With regard to the example of cheap and inconspicuous food with microalgae ingredients, the participants found reasons to compete economically with soy products despite a higher price per gram and because of the advantages of the absence of soy:

[The soy market is] huge, it's huge. Very huge. (All)

You can sell it for a higher price, because … you just need to add 1% of the extract to get the functionality you want. (Scientist 1)

I would even say it makes sense to substitute soy protein with algae protein because soy is known for having very high levels of phytoestrogens. (Scientist 1)

When people talk about microalgae-based food in public, they imagine higher algae contents and larger quantities. However, the considered representations made the workshop participants conclude that a feasible soy substitute either requires much cheaper production costs or that the phytoestrogens of soy justify a higher price. They diminished the visionary promise of low-cost mass production of microalgae food to a smaller, but still important segment. In this case, make-believe using further objects contested the official understanding and revealed a viable scenario between the ‘health’ and the ‘cheap and inconspicuous’ food narratives.

The considered representations and beliefs also contested and developed the other microalgae narratives. The experts acknowledged that the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) sets the regulatory framework for health benefits. They even subordinated their scientific efforts to promote the success of microalgae to these constraints, according to the present legal framework:

You cannot talk about the health benefits because this is on the regulation of EFSA, so it will be hard to transport the message. That is why […] products in the healthy lifestyle segment [… are] just plain algae. (Industry 1)

We need to work on a substantiation paper to apply for a new claim, but that will take time. (Industry 2)

If you can just label the actual ingredients [… and] the product is high in protein […], that is all you have to say. (Student 2)

I think when you’re focused on the promises on the healthiness of this product, in your company you have to focus on marketing and less on studies. (Scientist 4)

With the proposal to submit a substantiation paper, an alternative representation of the legal framework was proposed, which, however, does not match the time frame. Instead of changing the considered legal or technological framework, the participants imagined consumers to believe in the health benefits of microalgae even without officially authorized health claims. They also consider a market for advertised health products without official labeling of their effectiveness as possible. One could attribute this either to common sense or to a socio-cultural imaginary of successful wellness products lacking scientific evidence. Due to the considered constraints, the vision of microalgae for health benefits tends to develop into a vision of wellness products. The imagined boundaries resisted the call for a substantiation paper to overcome them.

Just like the promised health benefits, also the promised autonomy was understood as a consumer demand to be satisfied. The imagined do-it-yourself plants did not meet the promised independence and self-supply; they only promoted the joy of homemade products:

[…] would you be really self-sufficient with a little tank? (Student 1)

At least they get some homemade vegetables as if you get your jam from your grandmother […] I would like it, especially because it's homemade. (Scientist 4)

The participants abandoned the vision of greater autonomy from leading companies through standalone plants for the visions of producing and sharing homemade products. In both cases, the represented technologies contradict the promises of the narratives. Nevertheless, the participants considered the given narratives to advertise and highlight characteristics of the future microalgae products that imaginary consumers can imagine.

In the sustainability vision, however, the current microalgae technology was successful under fictional market conditions that were different from the actual ones. Hence, societal boundaries differed in fiction in favor of dealing with the challenge of the plot. By locating the vision in a later future, the participants abandoned economic constraints, so that the narrative of sustainable world nutrition seemed plausible:

But then imagine agricultural land going down because of droughts and whatever we see right now … we would reach that point, and then the price doesn't matter because you need something to eat, and you will pay for it. (Scientist 2)

The prices will also change for other products. We are facing, for instance, also peak phosphate. (Industry 1)

However, this is interesting because popular sustainability narratives, such as Silent Spring (1962), Limits to Growth (1972), or Soylent Green (1973), already propose systemic dependencies and threatening catastrophes that need to be averted. Structurally, sustainability narratives are closing future projections that give only limited space to deliberate design and action since preventing the catastrophe is the main goal of the action (Koschorke 2019; Mische 2009, 700). The niche in which the characteristics of future technology prove to be significant is rather restricted. However, participants did not imagine microalgae technology to prevent such a catastrophe early in time, but placed it as a successful technology at a time of advancing, but livable arranged apocalypse. Thus, under the considered circumstances, the technology is not suitable for initiating the desired turning point in the sustainability plot, but finds a niche within a rather post-apocalyptic, capitalist variation.

In summary, the analysis of the workshop shows how the participants, starting from the key-narratives, have made references to models, experiments, prototypes, and studies that seriously challenge an optimistic future of microalgae nutrition. Instead of imagining visions that would present microalgae technology as a safe solution to global challenges, the stakeholders pointed out their challenges and their reasonable doubts about the feasibility of the visionary promises. The participants engaged in a game of make-believe that projected practical limitations instead of just selling a promising story. They are, nevertheless, aware of the importance of public imaginaries when sociotechnical limits stand in the way of the realization of unspecified visions.

Discussion

The study cannot test the make-believe concept, but it illustrates the make-believe perspective on anticipatory practices in technology development and assessment. This paper emphasizes that the generation of imagined futures equally depend on social and material constraints. Following Kendall Walton's make-believe theory, I compared the generation of present futures with the generation of the present past. I maintain that the generation and success of imagined futures equally depend on the material and social realm (Figure 5). Visionaries invoke sociotechnical imaginaries and mobilize props to reinforce, contest, and shape imagined futures. Studies on experiments, prototypes, and recognized institutions are given the same ‘veto right’ regarding future narratives as ruins or historical certificates in present narrated histories. A changing situation of sources, for example, due to new measuring instruments, influences not only the immediate environment, but also but also the narrative. Thus, from limitations of make-believe in both the material/situational and socio-cultural realm results a non-fixity of present futures and present pasts, explaining their dynamics and uncertain motivational power.

Figure 5. Fictional truth in a game of make-believe is based on the material situation and socio-cultural background. The power and significance of imagined feasibility are generated in practice.

Make-believe does not only depict facts, but is ‘doing something with a proposition one has in mind’ (Walton 1990, 20). This theoretical notion of following socially instructed imagination, for example, according to key-narratives and further employed objects, qualifies make-believe as propositional imagination and distinguishes it from daydreaming (also see Salis and Frigg 2020). Participants found suitable representations to make believe viable futures, i.e. the fictional-technology-according-to-considered-objects matched participants’ beliefs about the world. Thereby, the follow-up communication about a mismatch or further considerations stabilized the imagined pathway. The advice to follow instructions for imagination in scenario workshops could improve stakeholder and lay participation because it justifies propositions about the future. The workshop shows how employed props, such as scientific studies and the prototype, guide attention and reveal the feasibility constraints of imagined futures to which other considerations are supposed to respond. This gives new attention to ‘boundary objects’ between the contexts of research, economy, and politics (see Ewenstein and Whyte 2009; Star and Griesemer 1989).

As a moderator of the workshop, I structured the make-believe with key-narratives and left the further shaping to the participants through secondary instructions for the imagination. In the game, further consideration and discussion of the (mis)matching of employed props then revealed constraints and the resulting dynamics of imagined pathways. Both the authorization of additional sources and the invocation of imaginaries followed a socially embedded process. The workshop shows that the selection of objects considered suitable for future representation is not restricted to academic studies, but also included, for example, photos of a prototype. On this basis, participants imagined different features of future algae technology. As a moderator, I did not assess the scientific validity of projected futures based on the quality of models, data, and estimates (see Grunwald 2013). However, the experts did not draw a sharp line or make explicit what kind of objects, for example, scientific studies, are authorized to make a difference. Not only statements about the future, but also the examination of fictional propositions based on considered props serve to criticize projected futures. In that way, imagining about the prototype leads to the rejection of the vision of self-sufficiency, not because of contamination risks, but because of the small production quantity. However, the extent to which authorized props help to overcome the social hierarchy to make-believe and contest imagined futures (this objection came from a student) must be further investigated.

The workshop exemplified the ambiguity of present evidence within sociotechnical futures. The imagination about the same factual object highlighted different characteristics and related challenges according to the narrative frameworks. Instead of merely charging words like ‘microalgae’ with new meaning, the participants discovered characteristics and hypothesized meaning about factual technologies, actors, and studies to assess current pathways for action. The participants imagined removing and covering the green color and bitter taste of microalgae as a significant task for down-stream processing because participants believed that microalgae are green and taste bitter. As part of the health vision, they even identified these characteristics as potentially valuable. The studies on feeding microalgae were suitable props, on the one hand, to make believe the use of wastewater in the sustainability vision and, on the other hand, to transform microalgae into something edible without the need for extensive downstream processes. The key-narratives helped to distinguish the visions and to consider ambiguous prop characteristics accordingly.

The desired matching and the uncertain authorization of studies, data models, and prototypes are key ingredients for contested futures’ dynamics. Visions foster practices that challenge the premises of their generation in addition to the underlying challenge of uncertain political, economic, or legal assumptions. Stories that play in the past do not stimulate the disappearance or ‘de-authorization’ of historical sources in the same way, despite similar political relevance. The prototype of a home-brew system, mentioned by one participant, gives an excellent example of how an object reinforces the imagined feasibility. Public visions of microalgae nutrition inspire the development of the mentioned prototype or strive for the substantiation process as a health product. Signs of success give the promissory vision the ‘ontological force’ to foster technology development, revealing more details – without any academic motivation to acquire knowledge. However, the new material situation of considered props might also be disappointing and contest the vision in the event of a major failure. In this case, stakeholders can either drop the visionary narrative in favor of a new story promising a different social benefit due to the technology. An alignment with sociotechnical imaginaries then helps to reframe the technology's value. Alternatively, they can doubt the authorization of the failed prototype or substantiation trial to represent the vision and keep the visionary narrative. Then, introducing novel props can help to keep the vision seem plausible.

The long history of promising microalgae futures speaks against an overly intense contestation due to disappointing experiences. According to the confirmation bias, people are more likely to report results in line with their desires and routine (Nickerson 1998). Nevertheless, there are journalistic reports and scientific studies about projects that failed due to high prices, space requirements, contamination, and other problems also mentioned by the workshop participants. I propose that the visions of microalgae nutrition persist since stories of both failure and hope transport the link between value and technology. Albrecht Koschorke (2013, 32) describes a inverted Chinese whispers effect, wherein it is not the craziest but most compliant narrative that disseminates. Considering the fact that shifting the attributions of errors can turn setbacks back into hopeful stories, technology visions propagate, in principle, regardless of what is considered feasible. Even if attempts to realize grand visions fail, utopian ambitions remain worth telling so long as societal problems prevail.

However, when it comes to the feasibility of the vision and possible action, people employ beliefs about their environment and engage with fictional propositions. Therefore, besides the familiarity of sociotechnical imaginaries, the availability and authorization of props are also crucial for the vision's motivational power. In games of make-believe, people employ and learn both beliefs about the (maybe desirable and utopian) object imagined and how to use props and act out what is imagined. Susanna Schellenberg argues that both beliefs are a prerequisite for imaginings to induce action (Schellenberg 2013, 497, 505). In the workshop, the participants imagined about feeding algae to animals because they believe microalgae to be too bitter for humans to enjoy in larger quantities. They did not believe but imagined feeding algae to animals to learn about viable pathways of microalgae nutrition. However, due to the game, participants also learned about the value and suitability of particular feeding studies, data, and models to represent the feasibility of microalgae nutrition. The crucial point is that new belief about suitable props and how to act out what is imagined already motivates new actions. Therefore, on the one hand, the desire to develop and own models, devices, or data arises to learn about the imagined. On the other hand, in competition for research funds, scientists and technology assessors gain means and motives to publicly make believe futures for increasing the value of their assets, such as laboratory equipment or expertise (see Birch 2017). This indicates that the availability, provision, and ownership of material objects mutually influence the dissemination of promissory stories and gives empirical studies on imagined futures a new interest and means to study relationships between power, truth, and ownership of representational objects.

The workshop's announcement to officially advise microalgae innovators from a scientific conference and the presence of industry stakeholders added a certain seriousness to the game. Authorized models and data sources represented cost assessments and viable options for action. The setting of a more entertaining or creative future game might have led to a different consideration of props. The debate indicated that participants anticipate which representations are suitable for the negotiation of relevant aspects and feasible scenarios. Instead of, for example, building on novel or unknown algae species, the conventional green color and bitter taste remained an imagined challenge for the coming years. The marketing proposal indicated the participants’ awareness to distinguish between sites for making a profit using public desires and health-benefit imaginaries and sites of critical examination. Therefore, I propose that both beliefs about the suitability of props and imagined futures are relevant socio-cultural factors for studying imagined futures.

The empirical design did not allow any statements on long-term effects. However, the prospect of reminders of the game, such as an official report or stories of a collaborative network, enforces the anticipation of rather conservative or progressive make-believe cultures. After all, the participants’ make-believe attitude also contributes to their characterization as charismatic vanguards, experts, skeptics, or unorthodox thinkers in social networks. The participants learned, for example, that some participants make believe little success of the substantiation process. This allows for orientation to the expectations of others and gives rise to the stabilization of networks and semantical institutions, such as imaginaries, which as unrepresented stories make sense of the social and sociotechnical order. However, studying the co-production of imaginaries, future knowledge, and social order requires empirical methods that cover temporal and spatial distance, such as ethnography or longitudinal surveys (Jasanoff 2010; Mische 2014, 438).

The distinction of make-believe practice from both the socio-cultural realm and the material realm, allows the accounting of responsibility for imagined futures. Indeed, sociological studies revealed how imaginaries and conventions about suitable models constrain imagined futures shaping the present. One can nevertheless attribute the selection of models and narratives representing sociotechnical futures to people's imagination. From this perspective, the irritation of imagined futures due to changes in the material world gives employed objects not the same agency as the imagining subjects. For example, imagining the future using a model of the gross domestic product (GDP), CO₂ emissions, or utopian narratives makes a crucial difference because selected props bring up different constraints, uncertainties, and implications (see Oomen et al. forthcoming). When engaging with fictional propositions using props is a prerequisite for imagined futures’ motivational power, the deliberation a future narratives and suitable props becomes an ethical question of responsible research and innovation. Policymakers, technology assessors, and scientists should be aware of conventions and habits about the contingent selection of models and data employed to make future statements. Besides, responsible research should reflect the intended application of published studies as powerful props with respect to contingent future narratives and their use in present power constellations (Roßmann et al. 2020; Saltelli and Di Fiore 2020). However, since imagining the future, reflecting on considered beliefs, and practical action are materially and socially embedded, iterative practices, the rational deliberation about the future must not be overemphasized (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 963).

Conclusion

For imagined futures to be the driving force of the present, they must relate to beliefs about the imagining subjects’ environment. For this to happen, people need to believe, not in imagined futures but rather in contestations, for instance, relating to their feasibility, desirability, or usefulness. In other words, it is not the science fiction narrative that motivates action but rather the examination of implications. Kendall Walton defines the examination of ‘a proposition one has in mind’ as a game of make-believe (Walton 1990, 20) and presents an analytical framework. I situate my theoretical inquiry within this framework to focus on the concepts of generating and authorizing a game, the suitability of objects involved, matching of beliefs and fictional truth, and describing future imagination as a social practice. In this paper, I have argued that people use objects as props for different reasons, such as exploring, conveying, and reinforcing the feasibility and details of uncertain technology or increasing their assets’ value. In comparison with narrated history, I claim that props, such as models, simulations, and prototypes, have a similar veto right for statements about the future as historical sources do about the past. It is for this reason that imagined futures become contested when prototypes, experiments, or simulations fail.

This paper illustrates how actors engage with fictional propositions by drawing on a scenario workshop about the key-narratives of microalgae nutrition. An analysis of the workshop showed how different narratives reveal actual technology ambiguities and how imagined futures change due to constraints of representational objects such as data, models, illustrations, and prototypes. Furthermore, by understanding representations, such as narratives or models, as instructions for imagination, participants distinguished, assessed, and criticized the suitability of objects for representing an imagined future and the extent the imagined matches implications of a narrative. These implications became explicit as participants openly thought about obstacles to the realization of visions. Therefore, the workshop showed how actors integrate beliefs about their environment into a game of make-believe, i.e. beliefs about an imagined object and beliefs about props’ suitability. However, the empirical study design does not allow any insight into learning effects and motivational power because it did not document the difference before and after the workshop. Further research is needed for a more thorough investigation of the motivational power and the dissemination of representations and authorization across temporal and cultural contexts.

In order to examine to what degree imagined futures become contested, I also discussed in this paper how make-believe relates to other concepts about the future in STS and sociology. I point out that Kendall Walton's theory of make-believe aligns with conceptional insights of ‘situated knowledges’ and ‘co-production,’ as the situation and alteration of objects in the imagining subject's environment have a crucial role in constraining and irritating fictional truth. The distinction between the imagining subjects and the included objects allows one to attribute responsibility and distinguish make-believe from actor-network-theory. Besides, the authorization of games points to socio-cultural structures beyond the current interaction, such as the scientific and economic valuation of representations to assess the scientific validity of future projections and the price of an asset with consequences on subsequent action. On a cultural level, social and sociotechnical imaginaries facilitate the generation of make-believe games and direct implications by sketching out what can be expected. Imaginaries have no fixed or authorized material representation to which they could be pinned. However, they become more specific in examining whether a game of make-believe matches collective expectations, for example, concerning technical obstacles to overcome or the desirability of the overall picture. This allows games of make-believe to actualize, transform, and disseminate imaginaries but never fully grasp or overcome them. Therefore, when models, simulations, or prototypes fail to match expectations, only beliefs about the suitability of these props and the feasibility or credibility of the imagined future are contested. However, imaginaries prevail and disseminate so long as people find a reason to engage with their fictional propositions.

Acknowledgements

I thank Christine Rösch for leading the microalgae study and making the workshop possible. I thank Armin Grunwald, Andreas Lösch, and the ITAS team of Vision Assessment for the valuable discussions about the concept. I thank Jeroen Oomen, Anitra Baliga and my three reviewers for their constructive and comprehensive feedback on the later versions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Ministerium für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kunst Baden-Württemberg; [Grant Number 7533-10-5-148].

Notes on contributors

Maximilian Roßmann

Maximilian Roßmann is a Ph.D. candidate and researcher at the Institute for Technology Assessment (ITAS) in the research group on Sociotechnical Visions and Policies. Disappointed with the implementation of sustainability policies, he dropped out of a master's program in chemical engineering and instead studied philosophy. His technical background and interest in narratives and models now distinguish his work across interdisciplinary projects. He works on futures of bioeconomy, 3D printing, and nuclear waste management.

Notes

1 According to Suits (2005, 41), to play a game is to engage in ‘the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’ – you voluntarily follow the (often implicit) instructions for the game instead of simply moving towards a ‘target.’

2 The hyphens emphasize that make-believe does not necessarily question the truth-according-to-an-unspecified-reality-without-reference. Gregory Currie (2016) uses the hyphens in a similar way arguing that there is no general place to call ‘truth in fiction’ but only truth-according-to-a-representation.

3 For the empirical and theoretical backgrounds to the design of key-narratives, see Roßmann and Rösch (2019).

Annex

Key-narratives of microalgae nutrition

Sustainability

There are currently over 7.5 billion people living on Earth. Either we are cutting our global resource consumption today, or tomorrow we will be forced to do so by the impact of a devastated environment. Microalgae could be the solution: they store CO₂ and can be produced without arable land and the use of pesticides. Microalgae will be an important pillar of sustainable nutrition in the future.

Health and wellness

In an accelerated society, there is a growing need and desire for a balanced and healthy diet. Thus, microalgae are rediscovered as a part of Far Eastern teachings. The ingredients and variety of microalgae promise health and an individual feeling of fitness and satisfaction. Microalgae will contribute to a healthy and enjoyable future.

Cheap and inconspicuous

People have their habits and new foods have a hard time. However, microalgae inconspicuously and reliably meet the requirements of established food production. Their neutral taste makes them a cheap substitute for soy and animal protein in many products. As a consumer, you will not notice a difference.

Do-it-yourself

A handful of industrial giants control almost the entire food production – only those who produce themselves are safe from empty promises and synthetic additives. In the future, small, modular algae plants will enable independent, regional self-sufficiency. We feed ourselves and share knowledge, recipes, and ideas – microalgae mean a bit more freedom.