Reassessing China’s Soft Power in Indonesia: A Critical Overview on China’s Cultural Soft Power

Abstract

The increasing cooperation between Indonesia and China within the last two decades is the gradual evolvement of reconciliation since the resumption of the relationship between these two countries in August 1990. During the course of reconciliation, China has been trying to enhance its positive image in Indonesia as an effort in eliminating suspicion and negative perception towards China in Indonesian public discourse. This article tries to scrutinize and problematize China’s efforts in increasing its positive image abroad using cultural resources it has within the soft power conceptual framework. We argue that China has been eagerly balancing its soft p\ower strategy by focusing on cultural rapprochement to gradually eliminate suspicion and negative perception that still live in Indonesia public discourse. Assuming that the Chinese government is aware that its relations with Indonesia has not been fully resumed caused by the negative perceptions by Indonesians, it must use cultural rapprochement as a substitutive element within its foreign policy. This is a systematic literature review study that focusing its inquiry on Chinese diplomacy in education and Muslim community, Confucius Institute, and Chinese-Indonesian business community as a case to enhance our conceptual framework of China’s cultural soft power. It concludes that the instrumentalization of cultural diplomacy as a substitution of China’s economic agenda in Indonesia was partly successful in changing Indonesia’s policy making process, as can we have seen in alignment of Indonesia regulations in favour of China’s BRI in many infrastructure projects but ineffective in shifting the suspicious and sensitive Indonesian public perception.

Keywords:

• Chinese soft power
• cultural rapprochement
• Confucius Institute
• Chinese public diplomacy
• Indonesia-China relations

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

This study examines the rapprochement concept using cultural resources in the context of two countries reconciliation process. It scrutinizes and problematizes China’s efforts in increasing its positive image abroad using cultural resources it has within the rapprochement theoretical framework. Assuming that the Chinese government is aware that its relations with Indonesia has not been fully resumed caused by the negative perceptions by Indonesians, it must use cultural rapprochement as a substitutive element within its foreign policy. By using Indonesia as a case study where China invested much of its financial aid in infrastructure to help Indonesia boost trade and economic capabilities, we argue that China has been eagerly balancing its soft power strategy by focusing on cultural rapprochement to gradually eliminate suspicion and negative perception that still live in Indonesia public discourse. This article uses a case study on Chinese diplomacy in education and Muslim community, Confucius Institute, and Chinese-Indonesian business community as a case to enhance our conceptual framework of cultural rapprochement. It concludes that the instrumentalization of cultural diplomacy as a substitution of China’s economic agenda in Indonesia was partly succeed in changing Indonesia’s policy making process, as can we have seen in alignment of Indonesia regulations in favour of China’s Belt and Road Initiatives in many infrastructure projects but ineffective in shifting the suspicious and sensitive Indonesian public perception.

1. Background

China has been trying to enhance it positive image in Indonesia since the resumption of the relationship between Indonesia and China in August 1990, marked by official visit paid by Li Peng, People’s Republic of China (PRC) then Prime Minister, to Jakarta. Indonesia severed its diplomatic ties with China following 30 September 1965 abortive coup blamed on the Indonesian Communist Party. Indonesian authority accused China for subtly supporting Indonesian Communist Party and the coup, which China denied. After this incident, in the period 1967–1990, the bilateral relations between the two countries were practically frozen. Efforts to restore relations that have been frozen since the 1970s have experienced ups and downs and the negotiation process has not been easy. The process of rapprochement began to get a defined framework after President Suharto’s meeting with the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen on 23 February 1989. Although the talks had stalled for about six months, finally a Memorandum of Understanding on restoring relations between the two countries could be signed in Jakarta on 8 August 1990 (Muas, 2015).

The restoration of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China does not necessarily increase cooperation between the two parties. This is mainly because President Soeharto tends to show restraint. After the events of May 1998 riot that led to the collapse of Soeharto’s power in Indonesia, it was only then that efforts to improve relations between the two countries became clear, especially during the reign of President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur). In October 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid visited Beijing as the destination of official business trip after being elected president. Megawati Soekarnoputri took the same step in March 2002, visiting Beijing as the destination of her first official foreign trip after being elected president. Megawati’s visit was followed by the expansion of bilateral cooperation in the fields of energy and agriculture. During the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia and China signed a strategic partnership agreement on 25 April 2005 and expanded bilateral cooperation to include the fields of energy, security, and defence (R. Sukma, 2009). The partnership was later upgraded to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” in 2013.

In an effort to enhance bilateral cooperation, the two countries appeared to adjust a number of policies that seemed to be hampering. For example, since 1998, the Indonesian and Chinese governments have been serious about removing immigration barriers for visiting officials and civilians. Rizal Sukma (1999, 148) states: As an exchange of visits among government officials, businessmen, and even private citizens have become more frequent, a more positive image of China began to emerge. Most Indonesians no longer see China as an ideologically-threatening state. Although there is optimism about the increasingly positive image of China as a result of the higher frequency of interaction between government officials, businessmen, and civilians, R. Sukma (2009) notes that there is still suspicion and sensitivity in the character of bilateral relations between Indonesia and China, which stems from historical trauma. Indonesia’s doubts about the increasing role of the Chinese military in the East Asia Region, as well as the stigma and stereotypes still attached to the Chinese ethnic minority in Indonesia.

In 2013 President Xi Jinping offered BRI as a means to improve connectivity in the East Asia region and the world. Joko Widodo (Jokowi) who was elected president of the Republic of Indonesia in 2014 established the World Maritime Axis (Poros Maritim Dunia) as his quintessential development program. The policies of the two leaders turned out to be a node for improving Indonesia-China relations, especially in the fields of investment and trade. In 2020 China has become Indonesia’s main trading partner for nine consecutive years. The total trade volume between Indonesia and China was US$ 79.4 billion in 2019, a tenfold increase since 2000. A number of joint projects have also been realized, such as the Suramadu Bridge, Jatigede reservoir, as well as the Morowali industrial area in Sulawesi (Rahman, 2020). The rapid development of Chinese investment in Indonesia did not necessarily cause the PRC to be favored by all Indonesians. A survey on public perceptions of threats from abroad conducted by the National Survey Media Institute (Median) in 2017, stated that China was the country that most threatened Indonesia (Desnikia, 2017). Meanwhile, the survey results from the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) in July 2019 revealed that, although 66 percent of respondents acknowledged that China’s influence was quite large in Indonesia, it was not followed by an increase in its positive image in the eyes of the Indonesian people (Lembaga Survey Lembaga Survey Indonesia, 2019).

The Chinese government has realized the need for systematic policies to change the foreign public’s perception of China, although global interest in China’s economic growth is undeniable. This awareness began to grow when the concept of soft power became popularly used by policy makers, scholars, journalists, and political pundits in many countries in the world since it was formulated in 1990 by Joseph Nye. Soft power discourse began to be seriously discussed by Chinese scholars since 1992, two years after Nye published the book Bound to Lead and in 1993 published the first scientific article discussing the concept of soft power in Chinese (Edney et al., 2020). At the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2007, the General Secretary of the CCP, Hu Jintao emphasized the importance of increasing the promotion of Chinese culture. Hu Jintao’s statement has an impact on increasing attention to the soft power discourse in Chinese mass media (Edney et al., 2020). To achieve the goal of promoting Chinese culture globally, the Chinese government uses the Confucius Institute as an instrument of cultural dissemination through teaching Mandarin. Until 2021, in Indonesia, eight Confucius Institutes have been established in collaboration with various universities in Indonesia. However, there is no research that specifically examines whether the promotion of Chinese culture and its penetration using the Confucius Institute abroad, especially in Indonesia, has succeeded in influencing the behavior of the public in favor of China.

This article tries to scrutinize and problematize China’s efforts in increasing its positive image abroad using cultural resources it has within the soft power conceptual framework. By using Indonesia as a case study where China invested much of its financial aid in infrastructure to help Indonesia boost trade and economic capabilities, we argue that China has been eagerly balancing its soft power strategy by focusing on cultural rapprochement to gradually eliminate suspicion and negative perception that still live in Indonesia public discourse. In the next section, we will critically review the literature that discusses Chinese soft power in Indonesia to prove what policy programs are used by China in Indonesia and how these programs are implemented. Next, we will elaborate on the facts which we consider containing a cultural rapprochement motive in China’s soft power strategy. At the end, we will show that cultural rapprochement, as China’s effort in eliminating suspicion and negative perception in Indonesian public discourse, is a strategic step to balance the government-to-government/GtoG diplomatic policy pattern which does not touch the public much and affects the Indonesian public’s perception of China.

2. China’s Soft Power in Indonesia

Soft power is one of mostly used concepts to understand the power relations phenomenon in the context of the international relations in a regional or global scope. This concept was first formulated by Joseph Nye Jr. in 1990 in his book entitled Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments”. After three decades, Nye published an article in Journal of Political Power to clarify the formulation he created after receiving much criticism in various research reports. Nye (2021) says that soft power is not a simple binary concept to identify resources that are not categorized as hard power. Soft power can only be understood in a context when the resources owned by a country are used to change the behavior of other actors by using attractiveness method.

The country’s attractiveness is generated from the ability of its government to use its power resources to shape the preferences of others. Nye (2004: 11) mentions three types of power resources which are the foundation of a country’s soft power: its culture (in place where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Nye’s emphasis on the three power resources shows that soft power does not arise based on the will of the country that owns power but results from the voluntarism of other actors to accept the culture, political values, or foreign policies of the country that owns power. Nye (2021) refers to this situation as an expression of the relational dimension of soft power, which shows that understanding the concept of soft power is not enough only on the resources and behavioral dimensions, as many politicians and academics have so far misunderstood. By using three soft power resources in a relational context, Bakalov (2019) correctly analyses the practical application of soft power by saying that soft power can function directly and indirectly in changing the attitudes of target audiences in foreign countries. It has a longer operational time horizon than hard power and more suited to general goals, and it can also conduct by civil society, no longer controlled by a county’s government.

Nye (2021) admits that he was very surprised when the concept of soft power was actually adopted by many state leaders after it was formulated. One country that is very enthusiastic about adopting the application of the soft power concept is China. Nye (2020) notes that at the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2007, President Hu Jintao asked his colleagues to invest more in soft power and this trend continued in President Xi Jinping’s leadership. When asked by top Chinese officials to give professional advice on how to make soft power works, Nye (2021) said that China should realize that most of a country’s soft power comes from its civil society rather than from its government. China’s massive economic growth since the 1990s has resulted in a dramatic increase in its hard power resources. In order for hard power resources to be widely accepted, Chinese leaders are thinking about widely adopting the concept of soft power and allocating huge investments to promote China’s soft power so that China’s neighbors are not intimidated by the massive increase in visible hard power.

The study of China’s soft power had been found in many academic journals, journalistic articles, or policy briefs in the last two decades. These works have advanced our understanding on Chinese soft power from different aspects, such as the grand strategy of China’s global ambition using hard and soft power, the causes and popularity of China soft power, the characteristics of Chinese soft power, the expansion of Chinese efforts to project its power to some region globally, and as well as the tools China use to employed it soft power (Edney et al., 2020; Kochhar & Ajit Ulman, 2021; Lai & Lu, 2012). In general, China’s soft power has a top-down character when analyzed from the involvement of actors, the types of resources used, and the modes of dissemination. The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government are the primary actors in planning, implementing, and developing foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Klimeš (2017), stated the CPC leadership uses top-down coordinated systems within PRC bureaucracy so it can easily to control the implementation of government policies. In terms of power resources, China’ government uses cultural and historical resources as a foreign policy instrument to foster China’s international image. Since 2013, the Chinese government has begun to use Belt and Road Initiative investments as a resource to support their diplomatic mission. Meanwhile, to communicate its national interests to foreign audiences, the Chinese government uses state-funded mass media, such as CCTV and Xinhua News Agency. The Chinese government also runs the Confucius Institute as a supporter of its global cultural diplomacy mission . The top-down characteristic of Chinese soft power diplomacy has missed the immense potential power of non-state-actor diplomacy that could be the main upholder of soft power strategy.

In Indonesia case, some scientific and journalistic reports tried to explore and identify China’s soft power since the inception of Belt and Road Initiative/BRI launched in 2013. These reports tend to analyse the diplomatic activities, narratives, and resources that hypothetically relate to China’s soft power. Rakhmat (2019) listed some details of China’s public diplomacy in Indonesia from 2017 to 2019 in sphere of cultural and academic. The activities spanned from cultural performance in Jakarta and Malang, educational and cultural communications workshop for Indonesia art teachers held in Beijing, and the establishment of cultural forum and cultural centre in Bali. Despite the massive efforts conducted by China government to promote its culture, as one of soft power resources, Rahmat expressed his pessimistic conclusion about the impact on changes in Indonesia’s public perceptions about China. The same tone of pessimistic about the impact of China’s soft power diplomacy in Indonesia also stated by Egorova (Egorova, 2021). In her brief analyses, Egorova has mentioned three fields of cooperation that had been used by China government to project it soft power in Indonesia: education, infrastructure, and vaccine. As far as the report had detailed about the success of the program in that three fields, Egorova boldly stated that Indonesia’s public and official perceptions could still more sensitive and tend to be negative toward China when the sovereignty issue raised. She exemplified it using the response of Indonesia government build military base in Natuna in 2016 to counter the intrusive manoeuvre of Chinese fleets into the island since 2013 that Indonesia claimed as its special economic zone.

China’s intention to wield its soft power toward Indonesia’s public could also be seen in narratives construction using historic and cultural resources. Pratisi et.al. (Pratisti et al., 2020) examined the use of Zheng He historic expedition to some parts of Nusantara (geographical domain before Indonesia official declaration of independence in 1945) as the pillar of China’s soft power narratives, particularly in Indonesia. It argued that the multifunction of Zheng He’s historic expedition that later revived symbolically by Zheng He mosques in some cities in Indonesia, could serve as a media to the embodiment of Chinese soft power in Indonesia that operates in the society level. The recall of historical memory of Zheng He expedition as social capital in China’s soft power narratives in Indonesia still could not bear out that China’s soft power worked in changing society’s preference in favour of China.

Apart from the results above, another way to test whether one country had successful in wielding its soft power upon another country is by testing public opinion to examine how the preferences of target audience about issue or topic that related to other country’s power resources. Holyk (2011) studied the impact of increasing China’s attraction in East Asia after US gradually losing its influence because of its negligence and unpopular foreign policy following 11 September 2001. This report started by surveying previous study that use survey method to examine China’s soft power ascent and US descent, such as the 2003 US State Department poll, the 2005 PEW cross-national poll, and the 2004 BBC World Service/Global Scan/PIPA cross-national poll. Those three reports showed that majority of Asian countries were favourable or viewed China’s rise and economic growth as positive. Using five key dimensions (economic, human capital, cultural, diplomatic, and political soft power), Holyk’s report informed slightly different overall result that described China was lag behind US and Japan in soft power based on five countries public opinion (US, Japan, ROK, Indonesia, Vietnam). Additionally, one of the major overall findings that showed interesting pattern, is that China receives much better ratings in Southeast Asia compared to East Asia and the United States.

The State of Southeast Asia 2021 survey (Seah et al., 2021) conducted by the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS at Yusof Ishak, Singapore, captured a shifting perception about China in the last ten years when compared to Holyk’s 2011 survey. The survey represents the views and perspectives of opinion-makers, policymakers, and thought-leaders in ten ASEAN member states. It showed that the majority of respondents (63%) have either “little confidence” (37%), or “no confidence” (26%) in China to “do the right thing” to contribute to global peace, security, prosperity, and governance. The percentage of distrust (“little confidence” and “no confidence”) has increased constantly since the last three years (51.5 % in 2019 and 63% in 2020). In Indonesia’s case, the majority of respondents (60.5%) viewed no distrust in China, decreased dramatically from 70.3 % in 2020. The dimension that felt most threaten by Indonesian about China was economic and military (48.7% in 2021; 30.8% in 2020). It can be seen from the data that Indonesians were put more trust in China in a whole dimension but still cautious about China growing economic and military power.

The literature survey above shows the exploration and identification of Chinese soft power in Indonesia and how Chinese soft power is perceived by the public in Indonesia. Empirically, it can be seen that the Indonesian public’s concern is intensifying towards the increase in China’s economic and military power. This is evidenced by a negative response to the intrusive manoeuvres of the Chinese navy in Natuna Islands (Egorova, 2021) which are considered to have violated the boundaries of Indonesian sovereignty. Meanwhile, the Chinese government looks very vigorous in promoting Chinese culture in Indonesia through many diplomatic activities and cultural exchanges, involving various layers and professions of Indonesian society. The tendency of the Chinese government to prioritize the cultural dimension in its public diplomacy in Indonesia indicates that Beijing is aware that its economic growth has almost lost of attraction and is unable to eliminate historically rooted prejudices in the Indonesian public. In addition, these facts have led us to re-examine the cultural soft power concept using China’s bilateral rapprochement with Indonesia as a part of Chinese government’s strategy to improve its image in Indonesia.

Chinese languages, as well as traditional and popular culture, are the main instruments in disseminating China’s influence abroad to support its economic goals and enhance security in subtle, wide-ranging, and sustainable ways (WU You, 2018). China’s success in spreading its language and culture through cultural diplomacy missions has been widely discussed by research, both bilaterally and regionally. Several reports have found a critical view that these cultural diplomacy missions are not necessarily able to influence the behavior and views of people in foreign countries towards the image of China. In other words, the effectiveness of China’s top-down cultural diplomacy mission is still doubtful to be able to change China’s image in a more positive and friendly manner. On the other hand, the inability of China’s cultural diplomacy mission means the failure of China’s foreign policy strategy to make the cultural diplomacy mission a supporter of economic goals and the creation of a globally harmonious environment. Studies on the impact of cultural diplomacy have shown in several research reports (Li et al., 2021; Liu & Lim, 2019; Shuto, 2018; Wang et al., 2021) which states that the Confucius Institute did not have much effect on the success and sustainability of BRI.

When examining Indonesia-China relations, we tried to review previous reports and gather additional data conscientiously to examine whether China’s foreign policy objective of using cultural exchange in Indonesia was structurally conducted. By doing so, from Indonesia’s point of view, we identify domestic factors that count as an obstacle or the driving force for changing the Indonesian public perception of the negative image of China. Fehrs (2014) declares that the changing perception is caused by democratization or leadership/regime type. In Indonesia’s case, we examine public diplomacy activities by the Chinese government within the framework of cultural exchange. Assuming that the Chinese government is aware that its relations with Indonesia has not been fully recovered due to the negative perceptions of Indonesians, it must use cultural rapprochement as a substitutive element within its foreign policy. Education and the Muslim community, Confucius Institute, and Chinese-Indonesian business community are three entities that we use as a case to enhance our conceptual framework of cultural rapprochement. In the next section, we will examine our theory that education and the Muslim community, Confucius Institute, and the Chinese-Indonesian business community are the arenas where cultural rapprochement is best suited for Chinese soft power diplomacy on a societal level to improve its image in Indonesia.

2.1. Education and Muslim Community

The education sector is one of the areas most targeted by China in implementing its soft power. In addition to providing many scholarships, the Chinese government has also invested heavily in improving the quality of education and its facilities and infrastructure to attract international students from various countries to study in China. Scholarships can be very valuable, offering the tuition fees, accommodation and living expenses worth up to 30,000 USD. There are several types of scholarships offered by the Chinese government, including China Scholarship Council (CSC) Scholarships that is Chinese Government Scholarships, University-Based Scholarships, Confucius Institute Scholarships, and Provincial Government Scholarships (Christine Chiu, 2021). The large quota of scholarships available has made China the second largest overseas education destination for Indonesians with over 14,000 students currently pursuing academic degrees in China. In 2020 China even increased the quota of Indonesian scholarships to 3,000 students, so that according to the Indonesian Cultural Attaché in Beijing, the number of Indonesian students studying in China reached 15,780 peoples (Antaranews, 2020).

The recipients of Chinese scholarships are not only from state schools, a number of Santri (students) from various Islamic boarding schools also take advantage of existing scholarships to continue their education in China. During the last ten years, for example, santris of the Nurul Jadid Islamic Boarding School have studied non-religious subjects in China. Currently, there are around 120–200 santris who continue their education in China (Mulyasari & Lamijo, 2021). In fact, in December 2022 this Islamic boarding school specifically received an additional 40 educational scholarship grants and computer equipment from the PRC General’s Consulate (nuruljadid.net., 28 December 2022). Other Islamic educational institutions that also send many students to study in China are those affiliated with Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. According to (Zuhri, 2021), there are currently around 400 students affiliated with NU who are continuing their education in China. Meanwhile, 32 Muhammadiyah campuses have collaborated with 23 campuses in China. The two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia have also established representatives in China, namely the Chairman of the Special Branch of Muhammadiyah (PCIM) China, which was established in 2016, and the Head of the Special Branch of Nahdatul Ulama (PCINU) China. which was founded in 2017.

The number of scholarships that flow to the Islamic community is closely related to the widespread issue of China’s oppression of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang. The Chinese government’s response to taking “firm measures” to re-educate Uighur Muslims is seen by foreigners as a new genocidal attempt using the internment camp method (CNN Indonesia, 19 November 2019). The scholarship program for Indonesian Muslims demonstrates the Chinese government’s intention to build cross-cultural dialogue to defuse the massive solidarity protests from Indonesian Muslims. The Chinese government must find a way to convince the people and the Indonesian government that Beijing’s repressive measures that restrict the rights of Uighurs are legitimate and that Uighurs do not deserve empathy from Indonesia, and frame them as a terrorist threat to Indonesia (Meyer, 2017). Rakhmat (2020) further revealed that the potential for “hidden goals” of PRC scholarships, for example, can be seen from the many Chinese scholarship alumni students who then write in various media about how “religious freedom” is guaranteed in China.

Socio-political developments in Indonesia have also influenced the shifting of targets in the Chinese government’s educational scholarship program for Indonesian students, which was originally dominated by general education scholarships to more and more scholarships for Santris, Islamic Educational Institution, and the Islamic community in Indonesia. The choice of shift cannot be separated from Indonesia’s domestic structural conditions after two decades of the end of the authoritarian New Order regime which was marked by the increasing role of Muslims in domestic politics. Foreign researchers use several concepts to interpret this phenomenon, such as moderate Islam (Menchik, 2019), civic Islam (Brown, 2019), religious nationalism (Bourchier, 2019), or the battle of conservatism and intolerance within politics of accommodation (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018). The growing narrative of religious tolerance driven by the NU communities to counter the spirit of conservative Islamism during and after the 2015 presidential election has been used by the Chinese government to shift the scholarships’ target audiences into Muslim communities in order to build a positive image about China’s Uighur policy and its foreign policy as a whole.

The phenomenon of shifting targets for Chinese scholarships in Indonesia can be an indication that the diplomatic instruments and soft power resources used and chosen by the Chinese government in Indonesia cannot be separated from the influence of the development of Indonesia’s domestic structure. The extent to which China’s policies in this sector are effective in enhancing China’s positive image in the eyes of the Indonesian people is still not measured with certainty. Nevertheless, the emergence of a number of “Chinese” alumni who tend to voice the China’s excellence and humanist attitude in various academic and non-academic forums, could be an indication of the effectiveness of China’s approach. From an Indonesian perspective, the opening of opportunities for China to provide scholarships for students is possible not only because of the improving relationship between the Indonesian and Chinese governments, but also showing that Indonesian students tend to pragmatically take advantage of the many scholarship opportunities provided by the Chinese government.

The Chinese approach in using scholarship diplomacy through the provision of scholarships to Indonesian Muslim students and students does not explicitly show that there is an inculcation of Chinese cultural values and traditions directly to scholarship recipients as is usually the case with cultural exchange programs that showcase Chinese culture through art performances and exhibitions. This approach indicates the application of long-term cultural rapprochement because China expects that in the future, scholarship recipients will occupy important positions in the decision-making structure of the institution where they work, and the decisions they make will benefit China. In certain situations, in the short term, scholarship recipients may be expected to be people who will voice a positive image of China in scientific seminars, research reports, or personal opinions on digital social media.

2.2. Confucius Institute

Confucius Institute activities in Indonesia officially started in 2010, marked by the signing of an agreement on 28 June 2010, between the Indonesian government which brought representatives from six universities and the Chinese government represented by Hanban as the head office of the Confucius Institute (Calvin, 2018). Formally, the Confucius Institute in Indonesia uses the name of Mandarin Language Center (Pusat Bahasa Mandarin/PBM) and until 2021 there are eight centers spread across eight universities. Recent developments indicate the possibility of increasing the number of CI in Indonesia with the submission of six universities including Gajah Mada University, Pajajaran University, and Yogyakarta State University which will host CI (Biro Kerja Sama Kemdikbudristekdikti, 2022). Historically, the establishment of the Mandarin Language Center was influenced by the new opportunity to learn Mandarin language and culture as well as increasing opportunities for economic and trade cooperation with China since the end of the New Order.

The increasing interest in learning Mandarin is also related to the incessant offers of scholarships from the Chinese government to study Mandarin and even continue their studies to a higher level in China. Henoch Pradana, former Deputy Chair of the East Java Branch of the Coordinating Board for Mandarin Language Education, admitted that the institution he once led had helped distribute scholarships to hundreds of students in Indonesia. He specifically stated: “So many scholarships were given to go there. Not only learning languages, but also various fields, such as business, engineering, and others. The scholarship is quite generous, and the quota is very large. It has been done since 2010” (Budiman, 2020). Several studies have reported the results of research on PBM in Indonesia, where PBM is more often referred to as the Confucius Institute. This relates to the use of the name Confucius Institute globally, which is the Chinese government’s cultural mission dissemination institution. Theo and Leung (2018) found in their research that the Confucius Institute is a soft power instrument used by the Chinese government in the main foreign policy and diplomacy strategy that operates according to the concept of mobility of cross-border education institutions. The Confucius Institute is seen as an entity that is connected through interconnected activities in the concepts of time, power, and society. Based on the study of the two researchers in three cities in Indonesia (Jakarta, Bandung, and Makassar), it was found that the establishment of the Confucius Institute in Indonesia in 2008 did not go smoothly due to structural constraints in local historical, socio-cultural, and political contexts. Specifically, it was also revealed that the biggest obstacle to the establishment of the Confucius Institute lies in “the long prevalent racial and political narratives on China and Chinese-Indonesian in Indonesia“.

In terms of the important role of the Confucius Institute, according to Thung (2017) although the Confucius Institute may have helped in reducing negative impressions and dispelling some of the doubts Indonesians have about China, its influence has only extended to a small number of people closely involved with it. For Indonesians, the Confucius Institute is just one of many forms of “China” in their environment. Thung (2017) also agrees with Kamaravadivelu that most foreign students tend to see Mandarin as a means of communication rather than as a carrier of culture. Their interest in the knowledge of Chinese language appears to be limited to being able to communicate with the Chinese business community, or to living, studying, and working in China. The Confucius Institute provides a channel for knowing, understanding, and perhaps penetrating China. Moreover, Confucius Institutes are only found in big cities with well-known universities—which is to say, in places where anti-Chinese sentiment is likely to be most muted. Thus far, they have largely been unable to penetrate the smaller cities or rural areas where anti-Chinese sentiment is most pervasive (Rakhmat & Pasya, 2020). This is where the role of the Confucius Institute in strengthening friendship and mutual understanding between the two countries still needs to be improved, so that China’s presence—including its investment—is not only seen as a “threat” but also as an opportunity to move forward together.

The existence of CI in Indonesia since 2010 at least shows a change in the Indonesian government’s policy towards creating a more dialogue and constructive relationship with the Chinese government. Various cultural programs managed by CI apart from teaching Mandarin also show that Chinese people-to-people diplomacy in Indonesia is carried out within the framework of a cultural and traditional approach. However, based on observations and literature review, CI’s cultural diplomacy activities in Indonesia seem to be exclusive to certain groups, not yet an exhibition of Chinese traditions and culture that are commonly found in Indonesian public spaces. In the long term, this kind of pattern is not necessarily able to change the negative stigma of Indonesian society towards China that has been attached for years. In addition, news about the suspicion that CI is a propaganda machine for the PRC, causing the closure of CI in a number of universities in the United States, Europe, Japan, and Australia, at some point can also affect the Indonesian public’s assessment of CI’s activities. Jennifer Hubbert said (as cited in Global American),

“ … the CIs work to counter the West’s narrative that China’s rise is a threat to the global community. CIs reveal China’s “true nature” to the world, which can be accomplished by sharing its culture, philosophies, and language with the global community. China’s true nature offers order and progress (albeit backed by a massive police apparatus, AI surveillance, and Internet censorship), presents a successful development model that has pulled millions out of poverty (a state-guided mix of the public and private sector), and is morally strong (as opposed to the decadent, corrupt, and dysfunctional democratic governments of the West; MacDonald, 2022).

Hubbert’s opinion above is a rational conclusion about the role and function of CI for China. It is the obligation of the recipient country of CI’s presence, including Indonesia, to respond carefully in order to carry out mutually beneficial cooperation. Regarding the possibility of increasing the number of CIs, for example, Indonesia should have considered the effectiveness and importance of the presence of CIs in a university or region. Currently in Central Java there is a CI at Sebelas Maret University in Solo. If later it is also established at Gajah Mada University and Yogyakarta State University which are geographically very close together, of course they will tend to overlap both in terms of benefits and supervision. CI itself should be more sensitive in carrying out its programs, among other things, this can be done by juxtaposing Chinese cultural performances with local culture in its cultural activities. Another important thing is to make Mandarin language teaching materials based on Indonesian culture so that it is more beneficial for Indonesian citizens and is more open in choosing figures and topics in the discussion forums it organizes.

2.3. Chinese-Indonesian Community and Business Development

The 1998 Reformation event in Indonesia not only opened up space for political expression to be free from the authoritarian New Order regime, but also opened up new opportunities for business expansion on a large scale. The trend of very rapid Chinese economic growth in the 1990s continued in the early 2000s has become an important factor in the expansion of business opportunities for Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs, whose business reach was hampered during the New Order era. Although during the Suharto era Indonesia had tried to normalize bilateral relations with China in the 1990s, the period after the 1998 Reformation saw a significant improvement in relations between the two countries (Anwar, 2019). Formally, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s move to sign The Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Indonesia and the People’s Republic of China on 25 April 2005, (Anwar, 2019; Kuntjara & Hoon, 2020; Lan, 2017), marked a shift in economic affinity, trade, and the investment of Chinese Indonesian businessmen returned to Mainland China.

Setijadi (2016) observes the trend of “sinification” or “return” to Chinese culture in the Chinese Indonesian community after the abolition of the assimilation policy shortly after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Sinification is not only a process of restructuring the identity of the Chinese community, but also in line with the Chinese government’s strategic efforts to take advantage of the Chinese diaspora (Huaqiao) around the world as a “bridge” for various foreign policies, especially the BRI. It is further said that there were many Chinese socio-political organizations that flourished in the “sinification” period of early 2000ʹs, such as the Chinese Indonesian Association (INTI) and the Indonesian Chinese Social Organization (PSMTI). In addition to forming socio-political organizations as a driving force for the reconstruction and repositioning of the identity of the Chinese community in Indonesia, a number of Chinese business figures also formed business associations to forge business-to-business (B2B) relations between China and Indonesia, such as the Chinese Indonesian Entrepreneur Association (PERPIT), Indonesian Chinese Entrepreneur Community (PERMIT), and Indonesia-China Business Council (ICBC). PERPIT in 2022 demonstrated its success as a business bridge between Indonesia and China by holding the World Chinese Entrepreneur Conference in Bali, in September.

The “sinification” period shows the rapid increase in actors involved in the bridging process of Indonesia-China bilateral relations and the magnitude of the results obtained when viewed from the amount of Chinese investment entering Indonesia. According to the Investment Coordinating Board (BPKM), until April 2021, China was listed as the second largest creditor country in Indonesia (13.6%) with an investment value of USD 1 billion (BKPM). China’s investment in Indonesia is spread across several regions to support infrastructure development within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although Indonesia-China economic, trade and investment relations have shown an increasing trend in the last two decades, the attractiveness of China has not experienced a significant increase in the eyes of the Indonesian people (Anwar, 2019; Kuntjara & Hoon, 2020; Qi & Xue, 2020; Setijadi, 2016). Historical, socio-cultural, and political contexts have always been decisive factors that can be elaborated to explain why China’s appeal in Indonesia has never experienced a significant increase. The Chinese government’s steps to encourage Huaqiao’s role in Indonesia in promoting and disseminating Chinese cultural values, either through people-to-people diplomacy, business-to-business diplomacy, or conventional propaganda instruments based on mass media have not shown significant results. Huaqiao in Indonesia, including Chinese Indonesian, has not been able to demonstrate its catalytic function in converting various resources, policy patterns, values, and the Chinese global outlook into a meaningful soft power within Indonesian public. This can be one indication that most of these entrepreneurs tend to take advantage of opportunities for capacity building for themselves and their own business. The benefits that arise from improving Indonesia-China relations are only side effects, so they are not significant.

3. Some critical insights on Chinese cultural soft power

China has experienced rapprochement with several countries after the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949. Almost all these rapprochements were orchestrated by China in the framework of shifting the regional and global order into favourable arrangement that could help boost afterwar Chinese economy. The launching of Belt and Road Initiatives in 2013, has ascertain the Chinese position in the making closer economic ties with countries that could prospectively serve Chinese economic and trade interests. To ensure foreign governments and societies that its economic and investment expansion and its military build-up are non-threatening, Chinese government has been actively using cultural approach in its diplomatic conduct. This study has found that the main problem within Chinese cultural approach can be identified from the actor and content factors.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government played the ultimate role in planning, implementing, and developing foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As reported by Klimeš (2017), the CPC leadership uses top-down coordinated systems within PRC bureaucracy so it can easily to control the implementation of government policies. In terms of using cultural and historical resources as a foreign policy instrument to foster China’s international image, the CPC leadership’s over-reliance on Chinese history and cultural legacy could undermine other nations cultural values when it is disseminated overwhelmingly during diplomatic mission abroad. The authoritarian characteristic of Chinese soft power diplomacy with top-down approach has missed the immense potential power of non-state-actor diplomacy that could be the main upholder of soft power strategy. The Indonesian case using in this study has shown that Chinese government alone could not change Indonesian people suspicious image over China that concurrently expressed by the Indonesian when it related to border/territorial dispute in Natuna Islands, the problem of Chinese migrant worker in some Chinese industrial plant in Indonesia, and the emergence of communist ideology in Indonesia. Chinese agencies that responsible for conducting some cultural and educational missions in Indonesia prone to pragmatic dimension of soft power implementation of cultural rapprochement with limited significant impact. The State of Southeast Asia 2021 survey conducted by the ASEAN Studies Centre, ISEAS at Yusof Ishak, Singapore was the best way to check the impact of Chinese soft power impact upon Indonesian people. The 63 percent of “little confidence” toward China was explicitly alarming for Chinese leadership because after more than 30 years of resuming relationship between China and Indonesia, it still cannot change Indonesian public perception and suspicious thoughts upon China. Chinese public diplomacy in Indonesia seems deviate from its inclusive character that should give more space and opportunity for Chinese and Indonesian people to communicate, encounter, and share their genuine live experience by which probably could gradually eradicate the hostility and suspicious feeling.

The second problem that we encounter in this study is the substantial dimension of Chinese cultural rapprochement in Indonesia. As Rahmat’s study (2019) stated above, despite the massive efforts from Chinese government to promote its culture using cultural performances, educational and cultural communications during several workshop, and the establishment of cultural forum and cultural centre, the results are still not satisfactory. This study identified the problem could be come from the cultural narratives constructed by the Chinese government. The overburdened use of historical and cultural legacy in Chinese soft power discourses has reiterated that China has been constructing the world it wants to be, not the world it should be. In other words, it could encourage the global public perception that China is co-opting global multicultural society with its cultural homogenization through soft power cultural discourses.

As already mentioned in the previous section, rapprochement between two rival countries can be explained by three causal explanations: shifts in relative power, domestic changes, and leadership types (Fehrs, 2014). In this study, using China-Indonesia cultural rapprochement as a case, we found that China has cultivated it leverage over Indonesia in regional power shifting. The high growth economic model, the sophistication of technological advancement, the open opportunity to study in mainland China were only a pragmatic attraction to Indonesian government and society. It did not change or erase the negative image and suspicious perceptions within Indonesian people’s mind. While the second and third factors have illuminated our understanding that the democratization of Indonesian polity and society has opened the rapprochement between China and Indonesia only within government level, not its people. These findings offer an opportunity to further research to examine whether democratization should be variable in rapprochement explanation.

4. Conclusion

The Chinese government has been actively carrying out cultural diplomacy missions in Indonesia since relations between Indonesia and China improved in the early 2000s. In an effort to carry out this mission, the Chinese government has the goal of increasing its positive image to reduce suspicion and sensitivity in the character of the bilateral relationship between the two countries due to historical trauma factors, Indonesia’s doubts about the increasing role of the Chinese military in the East Asia Region, and the stigma and stereotypes still attached to the Tionghoa (Chinese Indonesians). The normalization of Indonesia-China relations began with the strengthening of economic and trade relations through a strategic partnership agreed in 2005 and increased to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2013. Indonesia’s affinity for China has strengthened after China succeeded in entering its investment into Indonesia through the BRI scheme since 2015.

Along with the strengthening of economic and investment cooperation between Indonesia and China, China feels the need to create a positive image and convince the Indonesian government and especially the Indonesian people through a cultural approach. The cultural diplomacy is commonly used by China to support the reconstruction of China’s positive image as an economically developed country, friendly even though its military is increasingly assertive in the South China Sea region and is strongly committed to creating a harmonious world. The cultural approach taken by China in Indonesia since the 2000s has generally occurred in the form of exhibitions of Chinese traditions and culture in cultural diplomacy missions, the establishment of Confucius Institute (Center for Mandarin as more popular in Indonesia) in cooperation with Indonesian universities since 2010, granting scholarship for Indonesian students, and the most important is maintaining business networking with Indonesia-Chinese business circle.

Although China has invested heavily in normalizing its relations with Indonesia with the aim of enhancing a positive image and neutralizing the bad experiences of the historical trauma of its relations with Indonesia, the rapprochement using cultural diplomacy carried out by China in Indonesia has not shown positive results. China has not been able to convert its cultural resources into effective soft power even though Indonesia has experienced a change in leadership patterns to become more open and constructive. The success of normalizing Indonesia-China relations at the government level (Government-to-Government) did not become the cause of the establishment of a harmonious dialogue between the people of the two nations (people-to-people) and did not accordingly change how Indonesia views China as a non-threatening country. The main source of China’s failure to change the way Indonesians perceive China’s rising at least come from the inability of China’s cultural diplomacy to affect the supra-structural dimension of Indonesia’s people.

The instrumentalization of cultural diplomacy as a substitution of China’s economic agenda in Indonesia was partly successful in changing Indonesia’s policy making process, as we have seen in alignment of Indonesia regulations in favour of China’s Belt and Road Initiatives in many infrastructure projects. Briefly, China’s cultural ideals and values that its exerted through many cultural missions were formulated only to fulfil the needs of China’s top leadership objectives but not for the needs of Indonesia’s people. These findings can be used as policy advice for the Chinese government in evaluating and reformulating its pattern of cultural soft power approach in Indonesia as an effort to increase its positive image to reduce suspicion and sensitivity of the historical trauma of its relations with Indonesia.

Acknowledgements

This work was funded by the Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Indonesia number: ST-1294/UN2.F7.D/PPM.00/2021

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Universitas Indonesia Fakultas Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya [ST-1294/UN2.F7.D/PPM.00/2021].