Defend Islam rally action 212 and their reunion: The failure of forming a New ritual

Abstract

This article examines the 212 Defend Islam Rally Action and the subsequent 212 reunion through the concept of a ritual’s function and meaning. Initiated by action on December 2 (212) in 2016, the rally became a nationwide discourse that was followed by four consecutive 212 reunion rally actions which received mixed public responses. Initially, the 212 action in 2016 was an action demanding legal accountability from Ahok (then incumbent governor of Jakarta), whose statement was considered by some Muslim communities to have insulted the Quran and Islam. The 212 Action in 2016 was the culmination of a series of previous actions with the same goal. There was a desire to remember, preserve, and perform the success of this accumulation of action by the movement agents and their followers in the form of a 212 reunion action, with an objective of maintaining their collective memory and forming a new ritual tradition in some Muslim communities in Indonesia. Based on the background and problems of reading the 212 reunion actions, this article was constructed to examine whether the social agents involved in the 212 reunions successfully formed a new ritual. To provide more insights on the problems of reading 212 reunions, concepts of political memory and collective memory were also utilized. The data for this article were taken from various related references in addition to various news stories in both mass media and social media from 2016 – 2021. As a qualitative work of research, this article also contains observations of various factors which contributed to the failure of the 212 reunion action from a social science perspective.

Keywords:

• 212 action
• ritual
• reunion
• collective memory
• failure

1. Introduction

As a historical and cultural product of its supporting communities, a ritual can be understood from two different aspects, namely its identity and function. The identity aspect of a ritual relates to its historical, social, and cultural ties. Meanwhile, a ritual’s function relates to the ritual’s role and meaning for the life of the supporting community (Deal & Kennedy, 1992; Turner, 1982). To understand Defend Islam Rally Action 212 (2 December 2016), which was an attempt to develop a new ritual in the form of a reunion, the two aforementioned aspects are certainly essential. In examining the ritual’s historical aspect, it is crucial to understand the historical background of the rally and a desire to repeat it in the form of a reunion, which unfolded into an objective of the groups that have participated in these activities. Additionally, the meaning and function of the rally encompass these groups’ enthusiasm to continue participating in and repeating the event as a ritual.

The ritual context is always related to the conception of collective memory and the politics of memory, particularly because collective memory is often used as a tool to record, remember, construct, and even manipulate a version of historical facts (Assmann, 2011, pp. 16–21; Nasrallah, 2005). At the same time, there is a need to establish the ritual’s politics of memory as it serves to perpetuate and maintain. This is precisely what the 212 rally action group did by creating a reunion.

Generally, memory politics is used to fight against forms of violence from the state or from a certain group of people who have been victims of the ferocity of a regime (Alkatiri & de Archelie, 2021). In this relation, the 212 reunion rally action is an effort to reconstruct and reproduce the collective memory of the 212 group, which aims to restore shared memories of their role and success in mobilizing the masses on the 2 December 2016 rally, in pursuance of putting pressure on the central government to punish the Governor of Jakarta, Ahok. However, can their reconstruction and reproduction be successful and maintained? This particular question will be the primary subject of analysis in this article.

The Defend Islam Action Rally Movements (Aksi Bela Islam/ABI) took place three times at the end of 2016. This action has succeeded in mobilizing Muslims not only in Jakarta, but also from different parts of Indonesia. Started with ABI I (14 October 2016), the action was followed by ABI II (4 November 2016), and continued with ABI III (2 December 2016). In particular, ABI II and III were held on Fridays so that a large number of people could participate. This model of action seems to duplicate Islamic movements in Middle Eastern and North African countries (the Arab Spring). In addition to the appearance of charismatic figures, these movements involved mass mobilization before and after Friday prayers, which was then dubbed “Political Friday” (Quintan, 2012).

Some estimate that this action was attended by 7 million participants. Another prediction based on Google Maps approximated more than 2 million. Regardless of the exact number, there has never been a Muslim protest movement involving such a colossal number of people before in a phenomenal act of contestation in the public sphere (Ichwan, 2016, p. 88; Muhyiddin & Nur, 2016; Raharjo, 2016; Rozie, 2016). This action was triggered by the statement of Basuki Tjahya Purnama, popularly known as Ahok, who was alleged to have insulted the verses of the Quran. This statement was an entry point for anti-Ahok parties who were attempting to find his errors and faults.

ABI demanded that Ahok be imprisoned because he was considered to have insulted the holy Qur’an in his speech in the Thousand Islands on 27 September 2016. Initially, the Jakarta Government Office uploaded the speech on YouTube. However, when, a person named Buni Yani posted a clip of Ahok’s speech on his Facebook page on 6 October 2016, the speech clip went viral. Moreover, the same person wrote on his website with provocative words, suggesting that Ahok had committed blasphemy against religion. Immediately, Ahok received a lot of criticism. There were 14 reports of blasphemy lawsuits filed against Ahok (New.liputan6.com, KiniNews., 2016; Rozie, 2016). Ahok had clarified and apologized on 10 October 2016, but that situation was sufficiently heated to be politicized by many groups of aligning interests. Ahok’s position was increasingly well-cornered after the Indonesian Ulema Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) with the pressure of many parties, issued a religious verdict on Ahok’s statement, which was deemed insulting to the Quran and Islamic scholars. On that basis, the MUI Fatwa Guard National Movement (GNPF) was formed and became the pioneer of the ABI I—III movement (Burhani, 2016, pp. 17–19). The GNPF on behalf of MUI asked the police to process a lawsuit against Ahok, which was based on the 1965 of Blasphemy Law.

GNPF was also established to mobilize masses from various local communities and Indonesian Islamic groups. As the name implies, this body oversees fatwa (Islamic rule) issued by the MUI regarding the case against Ahok. GNPF seemingly claimed itself as a representation of Muslims communities throughout Indonesia who were marginalized after the 2014 presidential election was won by pro-Jokowi groups. Therefore, they carried out the ABI movement as a manifestation of resistance against the previously mentioned pro-Jokowi groups, most of whom also supported Ahok assuming duty as the Governor of Jakarta, replacing Jokowi, who had been elected President (Affan, 2016; Hasib, 2016). ABI I—III were anomalous events conveying disappointment towards the government, who was labelled pro-Islamophobia. This triggered Muslims from various circles and groups, both affiliated and independent, to participate in ABI I—III movement.

A wave of demonstrations against Ahok began. Dubbed “Defend Islam Action” (Aksi Bela Islam, abbreviated “ABI”), the demonstration was initially carried out by hundreds of members of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) under the leadership of Rizieq Shihab, and was held for the first time in front of Jakarta City Hall on 14 October 2016. The mass demanded Ahok to be arrested. While law enforcers began investigating Ahok, the investigation process was deemed very slow, and this prompted the Islamic organizations to re-gather their masses in larger numbers. Various messages were distributed through social media channels to invite the public to attend and participate in a demonstration called “Defend Islam Action II” (ABI II), also known as the 4^th November Action or the 411 Peace Action, or “Defend Al-Qur’an Action”. GNPF MUI demanded that Ahok be legally processed and sentenced (Raharjo, 2016, BBC News. 2016 and; Rimanews.com, 2016).

The Indonesian National Police (INP) subsequently responded to GNPF MUI’s demands. On 15 November 2016, they conducted a crime investigation into Ahok’s alleged religious blasphemy. The following day, the Criminal Investigation Department of the INP Headquarters identified Ahok as a suspect. He was charged with Articles 156 and 156a of the Criminal Code, which state that whoever publicly expresses feelings of hostility, hatred, or insult towards one or several groups of the Indonesian people, will be faced with a maximum imprisonment of four years. Two weeks after being identified as a suspect (30/11/2016), the Ahok case file was handed over by CID to the Attorney General’s Office. It was announced that the trial for Ahok’s case would be conducted in North Jakarta District Court. However, based on several considerations, it was decided that Ahok was not detained; instead, only his passport was suspended so he could not travel outside the country. This has provoked anger within the GNPF and pressured the government to arrest and detain Ahok immediately. This condition then triggered a follow-up movement, namely 212 or the Super Peace Action at Monas Square (KiniNews, 2016). The basis of this action was Article 83 of Law Number 23 of 2014, which rules that the Local Government regulates that Head of Local Government who have been identified as a suspect in a lawsuit must be temporarily deactivated. Another article that also incriminated Ahok was Law Number 23 of 2014, which states that Head of Local Government charged with a five-year sentence must be removed from his duty.

GNPF had planned that the action would be held along two interconnected major roads in Jakarta: Jalan MH Thamrin to Jalan Sudiman, with an agenda of Grand Friday Prayer. However, based on a dialogue between Polda Metro Jaya (Jakarta Regional Police Office) and GNPF, they agreed that the peaceful demonstration was carried out at Monas (the National Monument) Square instead, with the groups reciting zikir, istighosah, and Friday prayers altogether. Before the action, there had been a haram (prohibited) and bid’ah (heresy) fatwa from a prominent cleric, accusing INP with treason and boycotting transportation. Several activists were even arrested, suspected of being involved in an attempt of hijacking the 212 Action. However, the action was relatively orderly and peaceful, compared to the previous action on 4 November 2016 in front of the Merdeka Palace, which turned chaotic at the end of the event. (News.okezone.com 2016). The branding slogan #212 then continues to be maintained and seems to become a distinctive symbol for the action’s movement.

A memorial can be a live and a living place, as a meeting room between people to reflect or to remember. Additionally, it can also be a reconstruction effort through mutual awareness. Given that every community group needs to have a certain place for its identity, the 212 action group preserves its collective memory through the use of space and time through events that they wish sacralize and formalize in the form of reunions. Nonetheless, can they successfully build such memorial?

This article was written based on the failure of the 212 group to carry out their reunion action in 2021, as the central government did not issue a permit to carry out such an action. Meanwhile, previously they had been allowed to use the public space of Monas (the National Monument) in carrying out their reunions for 3 times (2017–2019). Both the first 212 action and the 212 action reunions were occurrences with interesting aspects to be studied from various perspectives, especially that of social sciences, in relation to the meaning and function of rituals as well as the community’s need for a collective memory.

The state-of-the-art finding of this article is that the politics of memory for evoking a collective identity is not only used against a regime towards amnesia and trauma from an event that has occurred but is also used for the purpose of raising the spirit of a group’s struggle. In this case, the group was called Rally Action 212. The reunion action was carried out on the basis of always reminding themselves of a victorious moments in the aftermath of a rally on 2 December 2016 (212). In other words, they intended to continuously reconstruct and reproduce the collective memory of their victory in the form of a reunion held every December 2nd.

2. Methodology

The ABI (Defend Islam Action) phenomenon in 2016 has been widely studied in the form of theses and even dissertations. In addition, it can also be found in mass media news and social media, which study the issues pertaining to ABI actions. Several literatures have attempted to explore the ABI phenomenon (Kurnia, 2017; Masduki, 2018; Najib, 2018; Nurrohman, 2018; Setijadi, 2017), most of which come from the point of view of mass communication. The media has played a role in making narrative interpretations of the actions with various news framing (Kurnia, 2017; Nurrohman, 2018). Sentiment between religions is also a problem and a challenge in Indonesia’s process of democratic development, especially when there is a lack of understanding in various phenomena that are considered the conservatism of religious populism (Masduki, 2018; Najib, 2018; Setijadi, 2017). Besides the works of abovementioned researchers, a number of authors also discussed the ABI phenomenon from various perspectives. Their writings were collected in Maarif Journal Vol II, No 2 December 2016. However, the researchers have not studied much about the reunion action itself, let alone its failure.

This article is a qualitative study. The literature review of this article was synthesized from various related references, either in the form of theses, journal articles, or news from various other mass media. This research article examines the actions over the course of 4 years (2016–2020). The data was taken from various documents available on social media, both during after the action took place. At the data collection stage, various valid and in-excessive data sources were selected with the purpose of describing the phenomenon through observation and analysis. In addition, observation of ABI I-III was also carried out using the direct participation observation method with participating members of the action, especially in the actions of 411 and 212 in 2016. This enabled more effective and direct data collection, in which approximately 40 participants were randomly selected for interviews. Free prayer mats and pieces of bread were granted to participants while inquiring their place of origin and their motivation for attending. A reachable location was chosen for the interview, with the reason of inclusive accessibility for participants. Here, each participant’s outfit was observed as a determining signifiers of their respective identity, particularly the group that they belong to (traditional, moderate, and fundamental). To maintain independence and to avoid bias tendencies, the researcher prioritized balance in describing and analyzing the data obtained, as part of the ethics of scientific writing. The subsequent steps, namely analysis and verification, were conducted using several relevant approaches, such as the meaning and function of rituals, as well as the collective memory of a society. It was then concluded that their reunions were a failure at expressing a desire to form a new ritual tradition of the Indonesian Muslim society.

3. Analysis and discussion

The issue of Defend Islam Action has been transformed into the public’s discourse of morality and has a strong social base in diverse Muslim communities. The reproduction of such discourse in both speech and visual forms on social media shows the magnitude of influence of the participating Islamic masses’ power while constructing a form of Muslim solidarity, which is imagined as a marginalized group (Pamungkas & Octaviani, 2017).

Political, economic, legal, social and cultural factors stimulated ABI. Regardless of whether the participants understood the substance of the problem, it was clear that ABI had become a medium for solidarity and concern for the causes of Muslims’ unrealized aspirations (i.e., the injustice felt amongst Muslims) as well as distrust towards the government and Islamic political parties. On that basis, ABI has a political opportunity that is seized by various interests, specifically not only the demand that Ahok be imprisoned, but also a hidden political agenda related to the 2017 DKI Pilkada (Jakarta’s Gubernatorial Election). Instead of disappearing along with the end of the 2017 DKI Pilkada, the actions persisted throughout 2017–2021 as a series of reunions publicly known as “Defend Islam Action”.

Arguably, the emergence of such rally did not occur because Ahok misspoke, but rather because the protesters had a reductionist interpretation of Al-Maidah 51 which stated that non-Muslims should not be leaders in the government. Based on field findings from various data collected, there are at least three causes for the emergence of the GNPF-MUI Islamic Defense Action, namely the context of Ahok being a candidate for the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election (Pilkada), which was met with a growing anti-Ahok sentiments. The refusal was started by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), which from the beginning had been an involved party in the Jakarta Muslim Governor (GMJ) program. Their opposing stance was based on the Quran and Hadith regarding the prohibition of choosing an infidel leader. The refusal towards Ahok’s candidacy was also caused by a reason of nativism, as Ahok is of Chinese descent. Additionally, their opposing stance was made based on a consideration that Ahok had a terrible character to become a proper leader. Finally, Ahok was opposed due to several policies that were considered detrimental to Muslims in Jakarta, such as the prohibition of traveling takbir and the prohibition of remembrance gathering at Monas (Taufiqurrahman, 2016, Merdeka.com, 6 July 2016 and Beritasatu.com, 17 October 2015 in Kusumo 2018: 87–88).

As Greg Fealy observes, the action movement also had other agendas, such as changing the constitution so that it would mandate the implementation of Islamic law, proposing bans on non-Muslim leaders in Muslim-majority communities, greater implementation of sharia provisions, and the nomination of pro-Islamic causes political leaders for executive positions. In other words, getting rid of Ahok was only one part of a greater goal of Islamization (Fealy, 2016).

However, Fealy failed to comprehend the issue in more depth: that it was not merely an Islamic issue. Many Jakarta residents were also not satisfied with Ahok’s policies and disappointed with the government’s work in resolving human rights issues regarding reclamation cases and evictions, among others. In addition, it is also triggered by social inequality and a sense of injustice, where there is no forum for channeling people’s aspirations. The DPR/D, the assembly of people’s representatives where Islamic political parties labeled “Islamic” are stakeholders, does not function as a reservoir for people’s aspirations. Besides, of course, there are also no respected figures for the community to refer and look up to, especially within the mainstream mass organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, which then resulted in Rizieq Shihab’s urge to take the lead. Led by Rizieq Shihab, FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) had been infamous as a group that often used violent means on the road. Previously, their actions had not received massive support, including when they consistently opposed Ahok as governor in Jakarta. However, Rizieq finally received a momentum when Ahok misquoted a verse from the Quran in his speech in the Thousand Islands, North Jakarta, as described earlier.

GNPF and ABI seemed to take over the role of religious authorities from the existing ones. However, according to Latief, ABI was only a temporary bond, when solidarity was built only because of the same sentiment of belief. GNPF was only a temporary, sporadic action unlike existing Islamic organizations that were formally established and managed to persist for longer period of time, such as NU and Muhammadiyah (Latief, 2016, pp. 204–215). Although GNPF and ABI cannot be deemed a representative of Indonesian Muslims, they were able to unify their differences in front of a common enemy. In addition, the action attracted many groups because it provided opportunities for various people to express themselves in a public space; hence, the action was quite similar to a carnival and festival.

After ABI 212, there were four follow-up rally actions: Defend Islam Action 112 on 11 February 2017, Defend Islam Action 212 on 21 February 2017, Defend Islam Action 313 on 31 March 2017, and Defend Islam Action 55 on 5 May 2017. In those four Defend Islam Actions after ABI 212, different circumstances had emerged. Although they still used the name GNPF-MUI, fewer people were involved, as the participants mostly belonged to FPI and the Islamic Community Forum (FUI). Other group masses, such as Muhammadiyah, Hitzbut Tahir Indonesia (HTI) and individuals from outside of DKI Jakarta were no longer found. However, when one of the elements of ABI held a reunion on 2 December 2018, the number of people who returned to join increased and equaled the action of the previous two years (Kusumo & Hurriyah, 2018). The reunion took place despite one of the heads of the GNPF-MUI having stated that there would be no more efforts to mobilize the masses to the streets related to the blasphemy case, after Ahok was sentenced to 2 years in prison (News.liputan6.com, 2017 and Detiknews online, 2017).

4. The function of the reunion of 212 action

From the analysis of structural functionalism, a ritual can be understood as a text that is bound to its context in the form of the social, cultural, and historical environments of a supporting society. The relationship between the text and its context is a mutually supportive interaction, which aims to maintain the balance of the social and cultural systems of a society. Therefore, to analyze a ritual’s function, it is necessary to pay attention to the identity of the ritual itself in the form of context, form, type, means (space and time), and the people involved. Here, the 212 action along with its subsequent reunion functioned as a social and political event. Meanwhile, the form, type, and means were in the form of rally action in public spaces. Meanwhile, the people involved were part of the Muslim community with several reasons to gather.

A ritual is a strategy to form societal traditions and customs that are performed continuously. Tradition becomes established because it is always repeated (Bell, 1992, p. 123 124). According to Peter L. Berger, a ritual in a religious context is a means or media of reminder that is used to repeatedly restore normative values while placing a person in his society and in a historical context (Berger & Luckman, 1990: 36–50). This conception is often borrowed by various groups to repeat and remember normative values in their society, including those carried out by the 212 reunion actions. Furthermore, ritual activities that are performed continuously over time can form a formalized tradition (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1987, pp. 3–12). A ritual’s function can also be changed, a new ritual can even be formed according to the demands of the needs of the supporting community.

There are various classical functions of rituals, including (1) To bind and strengthen awareness among its people and to serve as a venue for social solidarity (Durkheim cited in Bell, 1992, pp. 23–25 and 171–173) and (2) A mechanism for reassessing group solidarity and traditional values (Malinoswki cited in Homans 1979: 57–60). These activities are performed collectively, and their implementation is arranged periodically in accordance with local agreements. Based on these functions, a ritual encourages a group. In this case, the 212 ritual encouraged the community group to re-enact the rally in the form of annual 212 reunions.

A ritual is developed because of the need to continue the legitimacy of dominant values from the past as well as a means of justification for the future. This function was targeted by the 212 action group. Apart from being a didactic socialization event, this reunion also served as legitimacy to remind them about the spirit of togetherness and their role as a group that is capable of giving pressure and standing as an opposition.

Rituals that are part of the institutional system of a society can be developed based on common agreements or through coercion. The later formation is often carried out by authoritarian government models (including communism or militaristic government). According to Malarney and Lane, rituals are needed by a regime to spread its ideological values. However, this forced ritual is unlikely to last long. This fact has been proven by the formal ideological state rituals imposed on communist societies in Vietnam and the Soviet Union, which ultimately failed (Lane, 1990; Malarney, 1996, pp. 540–560).

Looking at the enthusiasm and active participation of the 212 group, it seems that the reunion was not a model imposed from above. The reunion can be understood as a common awareness of a value, that their struggle that need to be preserved in the form of a joint reunion, as they had previously done. This was not done by a coercive regime, but by a group that forced them to repeat events that were regarded meaningful to them. Such act of coercion prompted different responses conveyed through various mass media, not only from other Muslim groups, but also from non-Muslim communities. Groups in opposition to the 212 participants thought that Ahok’s issue was over as he was imprisoned for 2 years, so there was no urgency for similar actions and movements to be carried out, particularly by holding a reunion (News.liputan6.com 2017). These different views in turn triggered internal frictions within GNPF and external frictions within Islamic communities in Indonesia (Obsesionnews.com 2017 and Tempo online 2017).

Moreover, it is known that the 212 reunion movement was a political movement with a religious enshrouding because its aims and objectives were political. In 2016, it was clear that the goal of the 212 action was to tackle Ahok. Meanwhile, in 2018, the reunion had a spirit of opposing Jokowi, and the reunion then became a means of power for consolidating the anti-Jokowi mass. Moreover, on 30 October 2017, GNPF-MUI announced a change of name to the National Movement for the Ulema Guard (GNPF Ulama). Together with the 212 Alumni Brotherhood and the Alumni Presidium, GNPF Ulama facilitated Rizieq Shihab’s to hold an Ijtima Ulama (Ulama Meeting I-II) on 27–29 July 2018 until 16 September 2018, with an aim of determining the ulema’s standpoint for supporting a 2019 Presidential Election candidate. Prabowo Subianto decided to go forward by cooperating with Sandiaga Uno with several conditions. The political stance of PA 212 and the GNPF Ulama has become increasingly clear: it aims for a presidential impeachment. That impression was even stronger when Prabowo Subianto signed a political contract with the National Movement for the Ulema Guard.

This caused partitions within the Presidium Alumni of the 212 movement. Several figures decided to leave PA 212. According to one of the advisors to PA 212, he judged that the PA 212 movement was contaminated with practical politics and had removed its role as a guardian of Islamic law. The narrative of the group that initiated the 212 Action Reunion had transformed into frequent critiques of the ruling government. Previously, the 212 Reunion in 2017 at the Monas Square had only been held to celebrate one year of the 212 Action, and the event ran according to such narrative. However, the 212 reunion in the following years had become the campaign ground for the presidential candidate Prabowo-Sandi and a parade for religious symbol commodification.

5. The meaning of the 212 reunion action for involved participants

The symbolic concept is generally manifested in various forms of text, including oral, written, festival, performance, visual, which can be manifested in a ritual activity (Geertz, 2000, p. 4 and 51–56). In this context, the normative value within the 212 reunion was the normative value of togetherness based on a conceptual struggle to pressurize government policies that were not in line with their aspirations.

The 212 reunion was considered the day of victory against Ahok, then Governor of DKI, who was deemed to have insulted the holy book of the Koran. The 212 reunion was identic with symbols, such as the Monas Square, communal prayers, banners, posters, committees, orations, prayers for a victory, sharing meals, and community gathering. These various images of symbols refer to historical meanings, such as (1) Heroism, which refers to the meaning of struggle by showing the courage of their predecessors in carrying out the 212 action in 2016, (2) Glory, which was shown in the celebration of rally performances in public spaces, (3). Success, which was announced to the public, particularly about the 212 group’s successful pressure to the government to punish then-incumbent governor.

Each group has a certain place to express its identity. For the 212 action group, their sacred place is the Monas Square, which was once a memorial event for their victory against their opponent. Therefore, the Monas Square later became a symbol of identity for them and became an arena of memory contestation for those involved. Based on these complex functions and meanings, it awakens the pioneers (GNPF which later formed the Alumni Association and Presidium Alumni 212) to strengthen, preserve, and demonstrate these various functions and meanings in the form of a reunion every December 2 at the Monas Square with their own community as an effort to remind themselves of identity symbols related to the action movement.

6. Collective memory of the 212 action group in their reunion

Collective memory can be understood as a social reconstruction of the past from the point of view of the present. Interpretation of the past and people’s understanding of history and their collective memory create the collective identity of a community, which can determine the future of the group. Collective memory, then, can also be understood as the collective identity of a society, which functions to preserve and develop its collective identity (Halbwachs and Assmann cited in Watimena 2016: 164–169). In this context, the 212 action alumni group attempted to construct a collective memory through establishing a ritual in the form of a reunion.

Assmann (2011, pp. 17–31) explains that there are six aspects of collective memory, namely reconstruction, identity confirmation, formation, regulation, binding, and reflexivity. All six aspects of collective memory construction were found in the 212 reunion events. The first is reconstruction. In this context, collective memory serves as a tool for reaching an understanding of the past from the point of view of the present. This is shown in the reunion action by showing togetherness in seizing public space as they had done before in the first 212 action, albeit with different interpretations and agendas of interest.

The second aspect is referred to as identity confirmation/strengthening, or, the concept of self-connection with the group. A collective memory strengthens and binds the unity of a community, although it consists of members coming from different backgrounds. Collective memory emphasizes a community’s identity through distinction. In this case, the distinction emerges as the 212 group establishes their identity as a winning group, a large group, a reputable group with a responsibility to defend themselves against other parties perceived to be potential threats to their religious rituals. This goal was stated by the initiators of the 212 reunion events through various messages on their social media (Pamungkas & Octaviani, 2017).

The third aspect is formation. Society is a manifestation of collective memory, which functions to govern the togetherness within. This function will later be passed on to the next generation, forming their identity. In this case, the reunion action directly becomes a means of political education for the group’s younger generation, and this is identified in how the participants actively invite their relatives to join the events.

The fourth aspect is arrangement. In this case, a society can be understood as an organization. For that, the society needs a set of rules to organize coexistence and togetherness. The 212 action itself shows a layered organizational structure, as it was classified to the inner circle and the outer circle, according to their respective interests.

The fifth aspect is binding. Every community group must have a collective self-image. Such collective self-image consists of a collection of values and knowledge. In accordance with its function, this aspect plays a role in the formation of identity, representation, and reconstruction of the identity of the community concerned. Mindfulness of this concept also encourages the organizing of the 212 reunion every year.

The sixth aspect is reflexivity. A collective memory has a reflective aspect that also serves to provide a critical response to all changes that occur. There is always a possibility for the community to reinterpret a collective memory, especially if there are new perspectives or interests that develop within the community. Therefore, it is considered natural for the organizing agents to embed the reunion events with particular purposes, including a political agenda that was different from their previous agenda.

An understanding of the past is also very dependent on various interpretations that exist within a community, as these interpretations shape the reflection of the community’s collective identity (Alkatiri & Archelie, 2021: 9). For the 212 group, their collective consciousness was formed through an understanding of the past, more specifically their victory in pressuring the government and inviting other Muslim communities to gather. However, this awareness gradually faded due to several in-group participants’ awareness, as they thought that their struggle had been successfully completed, and there was no need to hold a gathering in the form of a 212 reunion. Another reason for refusing to participate is that their perceived enemy “no longer existed”, and the 212 reunion events had been infiltrated by other interests beyond the value-related corridors of their previous struggle. With such awareness, 212 reunion action failed to receive a positive response from the followers who participated in the first 212 action in 2016 (News.liputan6.com 2017 and Obsessionnews 2017). Therefore, after ABI III, many participants returned to factions they belonged to. Here, the 212 or 212 reunion was arguably founded on a pseudo-solidarity, which only lasted for a short term.

Aleida Assmann stresses that there are various forms of media which function as a place to preserve collective memory for a longer time, such as writing and pictures (Assmann cited in Wattimena 2013: 164–196). Even various inscriptions in cities, monuments, and museums, and public spaces for festivals are part of attempts to strengthen the collective memory of a local community (Budiawan, 2015; Kusno, 2009; Smith, 2009). In contemporary times, the media for preserving historical events consist of various platforms, such as websites, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube and WhatsApp groups. Using these platforms as a space for memory preservation, the 212 action activists created calendars, videos, and even feature films. These are attempts to fill their space of collective memory, in addition to holding their annual reunion actions four times in the span of four years (2017–2021).

The politics of memory is built because it functions to reconstruct and re-present bitter and sweet past events in the life of a nation or a society. For this reason, the pioneers of the 212 action, who acted as mediating agents, took the initiative. Five years after the 212 action, they need to re-present their identity through the politics of reconstructing their collective memory in the form of a reunion, which was planned to be carried out every December 2. Their action was only suspended for a year due to the COVID-19 (2020) pandemic, as mass gathering in public spaces was prohibited.

The longing for a 212 reunion was a means for the involved group to (1) remind, strengthen, and preserve the sacred symbol of the 212 rally, which contains the normative value of togetherness contained in its activities, (2) fulfill the emotional needs of a group of people through communal interaction, (3) show its success, and (4) accommodate and compromise the plurality of participants from various Islamic factions in Indonesia.

As a product of experience and interpretation, a collective memory is open to be reproduced and reconstructed by various parties according to the level of their needs and interests. In this context, it is important not to neglect preservation of memories, including trauma of a nation or community group (Belah cited in Edy, 2006, p. 11). Arguably, the 212 group’s reunion was also an attempt to preserve memories, as the group had a desire to strengthen their collective identity, create a sense of togetherness, and reproduce their shared memory. The purpose of the reunion itself is the repetition of events in which there are meanings, functions, and values that are beneficial to their interests. This is because political memory does not only evoke memories of the past, but also strengthens the values and identity of a group that once experienced the victorious feeling upon taking over a public space on 2 December 2016. The 212 Action is basically an attempt to seize Jakarta’s public space in a battle between those who support or oppose Ahok’s actions. It was a significant move, given that each group needs to have a certain place for its identity. They need to see and remember the place or memory space as something sacred, because every place has a deep meaning for each group. On that basis, the 212 action group attempted to bring up their memory space through the 212 reunion action at the same place, which is at the Monas Square.

Various facts, sites, and artifacts, are only meaningful if there is a narrative which compiles these into an explanation that can be accepted by other parties. Such effort to compose a story is called the reconstruction and reproduction effort (Munslow, 1997, pp. 30–45 and; Edy, 2006, p. 3). A collective memory is generally taken care of by reciting such narrative from one generation to another, through various means and instruments, either through persuasive actions or coercion. The 212 group carried out narration and socialization of their discourse of success by inviting other participants and even their children to join the 212 reunion action. As they spread their message through various social media, their narrative process was rather persuasive. At the same time, the process is also arguably coercive, as it forced other parties to form opinions to justify their actions.

Some of Jakarta’s citizens experienced social conflicts during Ahok’s reign as their governor. When the conflict ended, many parties considered it necessary to remember the event by holding a reunion 212. Despite such relatively harmless intention, the coercive aspect of the event would change the symbol of their collective memory in the eyes of the community itself as well as those of other communities. At the worst level, it could damage the construction of their own identity and the construction of events that had been previously developed. It is proven that the 212 reunion has become a form of religious commodification in the long journey of politicizing religion, which had occurred since the beginning of the reformation era.

The interpretation of collective memory can be understood as a social reconstruction of the past from the point of view of the present, which can determine a shared identity. Collective memory strengthens the unity of a community as well as binding various people with diverse backgrounds into one community (Halbwachs and Assmann cited in Watimena 2016: 164–169). This awareness has also contributed to the 212 reunion action, so that their collective memory can be preserved. They forget, however, that rituals enforced without conventions and ties from other societies or the consent policy of the authority, will fail. Eventually, the permit they had obtained to use a public space in their previous rallies was not issued in the 2021 reunion action. As a ramification, the essence of space and time from their collective memory could no longer be applied, let alone moved to another place. As a result, the ritual tradition that they wished to develop has failed. Furthermore, the exacerbation of their collective memory formation was prompted by the inexistence of standard and standardized provision for a ritual procession for the 212 reunion action by the initiator.

7. Conclusion

Rituals are often associated or identified with a belief system or religion due to their characteristic as a symbolic activity in a religious system that serves as a model to repeatedly strengthen emotions until the symbolic action becomes pervasive and sustained in a person. However, rituals are not merely the praxis of a religious belief, as they can also be driven by models of social beliefs that are quite similar to religion, functioning as a pseudo-religion. It can be a driving force for a person or a society to take a coercive action against another group, with a narrative of defending the interests of the group.

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that as a symbolic act, a ritual is the result of a convention among people and between the community and a government power. In a pseudo-religious context, a ritual is a means (or a medium) of reminder that is used to repeatedly restore normative values, while at the same time placing a person in their community identity and in a historical context, as part of their collective memory. It was this awareness that prompted the activating agents of the 212 action to hold a reunion of the 212 action at the Monas Square.

The 212 reunion action was based on a desire to gather and, at the same time, show the identity and strength that are still maintained by the 212 group to restore the form of rally action they had carried out from their predecessors in 2016 in urging and pressing the government to punish Ahok. That conception wanted to be constantly reminded, strengthened, and renewed, using ritual means. In this case, the ritual means mentioned is an action reunion at the Monas Square. Having realized the power as a pressure group, involved parties wished to maintain such power to showcase their ability to mobilize the masses to potentially create pressure on other issues. However, these other issues were less prominent and did not bind a sense of togetherness between them, causing the 212 reunions to be less appreciated and responded to by many Muslims.

How long could the ABI reunion have lasted? It depends on the sustenance of alliances and coalitions from various Muslim circles, particularly whether they have a common or different agendas with one another. On the one hand, the reunion action was a place of nostalgia. On the other hand, it also carried an agenda to perpetuate the ABI action movement. However, the weakening and eventual dissolution of the reunion was also caused by the absence of the movement agent (such as a formerly-established, revered GNPF) to carry out the action. In addition, on 30 December 2020, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) as the driving force for the 212 action was banned by the government, and this has directly closed their opportunity to mobilize the masses as they had in the previous year, 2016. Furthermore, on 24 June 2021, Rizieq Shihab as the initiator of ABI was sentenced to 4 years in prison, resulting in the absence of substitute figures who could mobilize the masses to bring people to the streets (Sindonews.com, 2021).

As stated by Assmann (2011), collective memory, which is the construction of the identity of a group, is basically determined by how the group makes a distinction from other groups. Meanwhile, the 212 reunion action group did not have other categories to construct other parties, as established in 2016. In other words, they no longer had a common enemy to bind the unity of the people.

In the context of GNPF-MUI, the participants of the Defend Islam Action came from various classes and sects who had formed a coalition based on a common spirit, namely “[to] defend Islam”. The multi-ummah alliance consisted of moderate Islamic groups, moderate-conservative Islamic groups, hard-liner Islamic groups, the urban poor, and secular groups. However, the multi-ummah alliance has proven not to last long. Apart from the lack of strong ties of multi-class alliances formed, various understandings by each different party contributed to the failed attempt at constructing a collective memory. The slogan that had previously been made by GNPF-MUI, namely “Defend the Quran” or “Defend Islam” was not fully implemented by the participants of the reunion action, as other slogans that appeared were related to the 2018 Presidential Election agenda. This condition proves that the Ummah Action as a shared identity cannot be fully accepted and fully understood by all elements involved in the 212 reunion.

A ritual does not merely serve as a custom, but also plays a role, and it is meaningful as a tradition based on agreed guideline values (Hobsbawn and Ranger, 1987: 3–6). The 212 group carried an aspiration to legitimize and establish a tradition on their rally action in a reunion activity so that a ritual is formed. However, their intention could not be achieved because the reunion does not bind other communities or remind themselves of the value, particularly about what they were fighting for. Thus, the meaning and function of the ritual itself faded away in the reunion, as they had not become a common convention and were unable to mobilize other communities to participate.

In the end, a collective memory is neutral, as it has the potential to unify or separate, depending on how an agent narrates it. The role of the agent here is very important because he can act as a patron that are followed by his clients. Therefore, the power of social capital is necessary for an agent’s process of constructing narratives related to an envisioned collective memory. However, if later the narrator agent changes or disappears, then the desire to make the ritual will also disappear by itself. Such condition resulted in the inability for the 212 reunion to be reproduced and reconstructed, let alone formed into a new ritual.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Supplementary material

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2023.2286069.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Zeffry Alkatiri

Zeffry Alkatiri Associate professor at Department of History Faculty of Humanities Universitas Indonesia. Doctor Degree from Faculty of Humanities Universitas Indonesia (2006). Focus and concentration on issues of social and cultural history. He published books and articles on democratization, human rights, and local politics. Zeffry Alkatiri can be contacted at: [email protected] or [email protected]