The first Indochina war (1946–1954) and the Geneva agreement (1954)

Abstract

After World War II, the situation in Indochina had complicated changes. Japan surrendered to the allies and the situation was favorable for the French army to return to Indochina to continue its colonial rule as before 1945. That sparked a war, mainly between Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and the French colonialists. The war took place across the entire Indochina peninsula and was one of the hot spots of the cold war. Since 1950, Vietnam received support from the Soviet Union and China. The war with greater advantages gradually tilted towards Vietnam. In 1954, despite receiving great support from the United States, the French army still failed at Dien Bien Phu. This led to a military and political settlement at the Geneva conference. During this conference, the plans and plots of major countries fully reflected the complexity that the Cold War brought. The fate of small and weak countries was not taken seriously, which resulted in persistent conflicts, sparking the next large-scale war in Vietnam and the entire Indochina peninsula from 1961 to 1975.

Keywords:

• Vietnam
• France
• Indochina war
• colonialism
• Geneva agreement
• Cold War

REVIEWING EDITOR:

• Samuel Adu-Gyamfi, History and Political Studies, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology College of Arts and Social Science, Kumasi, Ashanti, Ghana

SUBJECTS:

• Security Studies - Military & Strategic
• South East Asian Politics
• International Relations

1. Introduction

In the 19th century, Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) became a French colony. Since then, movements fighting for independence here have developed strongly. Although suppressed and terrorized by the French, the movements still took place fiercely, especially when World Wars I and II broke out. In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh founded the Viet Minh organization, fought for Vietnam’s independence and provided great help to Laos and Cambodia. In September 1945, Vietnam declared independence and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was born. With support from Britain, France reconquered Vietnam. Viet Minh under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh declared war on France at the end of 1954, the first Indochina war broke out (Lacouture, 1970). During this war, step by step, Vietnam received support from the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (a new China founded by communists led by Mao Zedong). In 1954, with the major battle at Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam defeated the French army, forcing France to accept their demands in Geneva. The Geneva Conference on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam was conducted with intense negotiation sessions, its results reflected the problems that the cold war brought. Shows the plans outlined by major countries such as the United States, the Soviet Union, China, England, and France (Tønnesson, 1985). The contents of this conference along with the battlefield realities of the first Indochina war led to one of the largest wars of the twentieth century, the Vietnam War.

2. Literature review

The First Indochina War and the Geneva Agreement are an important historical content of the twentieth century that has received the research attention of many scholars. Asselin (2013) with Hanoi’s road to the Vietnam War, 1954–1965 said without exonerating Washington for its role in the advent of hostilities in 1965, Hanoi’s Road to the Vietnam War demonstrates that those who directed the effort against the United States and its allies in Saigon were at least equally responsible for creating the circumstances that culminated in arguably the most tragic conflict of the Cold War era. Research on the first Indochina war can be mentioned by Livingston (2015) with Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam, McHale (2021) with The First Vietnam War (Currey, 2003; Hupe, 2015; Lacouture, 1970; Miller & Vu, 2009; Pascoe & Army; 2005; Tucker-Jones, 2017). Research on the Geneva agreement, it has been mentioned in prominent research articles by Pieere (2006), Watt (1967), Hannon (1967), and Cable (1986). The authors not only researched the process of the conference but also analyzed analyze international aspects that are dominated by the cold war. In-depth studies analyzing the roles and plans of the Soviet Union and China in the conference can be mentioned as Radchenko, 2021 with The Soviet Union and Asia, 1940s-1960s, Jian (1993), Landon (1966), Lüthi (2006), Randle (2015), Ongsuragz (1980), Shee (1990), or Shao (1986) with Zhou Enlai’s diplomacy and the neutralization of Indo-China, 1954–55, Gaiduk (2003) with Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict. These studies not only provide excellent documents but also contribute to clarifying the content about the first Indochina war and the Geneva Accords. These studies are the documents that we refer to and have the inheritance to carry out our research.

3. Methodology

The paper aims to study The First Indochina War (1946–1954) and Geneva agreement (1954) to accomplish this objective, the paper uses research methods in studying military history and international relations to analyze problems of research paper. In addition to reviewing the studies and evaluations of previous scholars, the authors use a comparative approach to evaluate the practical interaction between theory and data. The authors believe that the data is an important basis for accurately assessing the situation and context of the first Indochina War (1946–1954) and Geneva agreement (1954).

4. The first Indochina war (1946–1954)

After the end of World War II, the situation in Indochina was very complicated when the agreements at Potsdam and Yalta allowed the Army of the Republic of China and the British army to enter Indochina to resolve the issue of the Japanese army. At this time, the French colonialists, Britain’s allies in World War II, quickly took advantage of the situation to plot to reestablish their rule in Indochina, which had been taken away by Japan. The situation in Indochina, mainly in Vietnam, is increasingly tense. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam under the leadership of Viet Minh leader Ho Chi Minh had negotiations with France and the Republic of China to restore peace but quickly came to a deadlock. In mid-1946, President Ho Chi Minh went to France with a diplomatic delegation led by Pham Van Dong, a conference was held at fontainebleau on the issue of Vietnam. At the end of the fontainebleau conference, no political, diplomatic or military solution was adopted. Faced with that situation, President Ho Chi Minh signed a ‘Provisional Agreement’ with the French Government Representative, Minister Moutet, on 14 September 1946, ceding many rights to France in Indochina.

Tensions are increasing because the French side always wants to reestablish its rule in Indochina and Vietnam (Giap, 2015). Therefore, a war is inevitable. On 19 December 1946, war officially broke out, Viet Minh forces and French troops entered a large-scale war, we still call it the first Indochina war.

4.1. Phase 1: 1946–1950

During this period, the French army repeatedly attacked the Viet Minh base in Viet Bac (the northern mountainous region of Vietnam) but failed. The Viet Minh also faced many difficulties because they did not have true allies. Shortages of weapons, food, costs and even people forced Viet Minh to have negotiations with France. However, any negotiations were unsuccessful because of the colonialist intentions of the French government. They always wanted Vietnam in particular and Indochina in general to be their colonies like before 1945. In 1948, France established a new government in Vietnam called the ‘National Government of Vietnam’, this is in fact a ‘puppet government’ of France.

4.2. Phase 2: 1950–1954

During this period, a major international event that had a profound impact on Indochina was that Chinese communist forces led by Mao Zedong defeated the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-shek. In early 1950, Viet Minh quickly made diplomatic contact with the new China (People’s Republic of China). The two sides quickly recognized each other and was soon followed by the Soviet Union’s diplomatic recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Aid from these two countries quickly arrived in Vietnam and at this time the Indochina war truly entered a drastic and dramatic phase. The Viet Minh army under the leadership of General Vo Nguyen Giap quickly launched a series of military campaigns to attack the French army. Although the French Government sent General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, Salan and Henri Navarre to Vietnam and received much support from the United States, it still suffered embarrassing defeats at Route 14, Hoa Binh, Lang Son and especially at Dien Bien Phu (Hupe, 2015).

In March 1954, the Viet Minh army attacked the French army at Dien Bien Phu. After more than 50 days and nights of attack, on 7 May 1954, Dien Bien Phu fell. The French army lost a decisive battle in Vietnam. With this defeat, France’s war in Indochina and their colonial era must also end. France was forced to go to the Geneva Conference as a defeated person and expect the most unfavorable results.

5. Geneva agreement (1954)

On 27 July 1953, at Panmunjom on the Korean peninsula (border between North Korea and South Korea), the signing ceremony of the ‘Armistice Agreement in Korea’ took place, ending the long war. 3 years. This event has promoted the trend of resolving world conflicts through peaceful negotiations.

From the Korean Peninsula issue, China and the Soviet Union also want to soon come to a peaceful solution in Indochina following the solution in Korea. On 19 September 1953, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Georgi Malenkov stated his opinion on the issue of ‘making the armistice in Korea a starting point to ease international tensions everywhere, including Indochina’ On 21 September 1954, Andrei Vishinsky, the Soviet representative to the United Nations, proposed ‘an arms reduction and propaganda to repel the risk of a new war’ (Jian, 1993). Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China Zhou Enlai immediately supported the Soviet Union’s proposal (8 October 1953) and raised the issue of ‘The role of the People’s Democratic Republic of China in the United Nations’ (Jian, 1993). He reiterated Soviet Foreign Minister Malenkov’s argument about reducing international tensions to consolidate peace in Asia. At that time, the Communists in the French National Assembly supported Moscow’s policy and Beijing quickly voiced their request for peace negotiations with Ho Chi Minh (representative of the Viet Minh, president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam).

The World Peace Council passed a resolution in September 1953 calling on the people of all countries to fight for an end to the war in Indochina. In October 1953, the Third World Trade Union Congress met in Vienna (Austria) and decided to make 19 December 1953, the day of world labor solidarity with Vietnam, demanding that the French government end the war. invasion of Vietnam. All of the above situations, along with the Viet Minh’s military victories over the French army in 1953, created the basis for the diplomatic front of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to implement new diplomatic plans.

On 26 November 1953, in an interview with the international press, President Ho Chi Minh declared: ‘If the French colonialists continue their war of aggression, the Vietnamese people are determined to continue their patriotic war’ (Asselin, 2007) to final victory. But if the French Government has learned the lesson of the war in recent years and wants to reach a ceasefire in Vietnam by negotiating and resolving the Vietnamese problem in a peaceful way, then we are ready to negotiate… The basis of the ceasefire in Vietnam is that the French Government sincerely respects the true independence of Vietnam’ (Asselin, 2007). President Ho Chi Minh’s statement clearly demonstrated Vietnam’s goodwill for peace, and at the same time influenced public opinion in France, opening up the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the war in Indochina. The French people, already fed up with the war, pressured the French government to immediately negotiate with the Ho Chi Minh Government. Under pressure from many sides, on 19 November 1953, French Prime Minister Joseph Laniel had to declare: ‘If an honorable solution arises, France will gladly accept a diplomatic solution to the conflict’ (Asselin, 2007).

On 25 January 1954, the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the four countries of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France in Berlin agreed to convene an international conference attended by representatives of the People’s Republic of China in Geneva to discuss a peaceful solution to the Korean problem and restore peace in Indochina.

On 5 March 1954, the French National Assembly opened a special session to discuss the Indochina issue. On 10 March 1954, the French National Assembly passed a resolution supporting the convening of the Geneva Conference to find a solution to end the problem. war, restoring peace in Indochina. Regarding this issue, Commander of the French army in Vietnam, Henri Navarre, wrote: ‘The Viet Minh has achieved its goal. Peace depends only on them. Indeed, the Viet Minh knew that when the meeting was held, with the participation of many diplomats and hundreds of journalists, France would find it difficult to refuse the conditions offered, especially when it included following a crushing French defeat that would be exploited to break French spirit. We were caught in a trap’ (Tucker-Jones, 2017).

On 26 April 1954, the Geneva Conference officially opened, with the participation of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, the United States, Great Britain, France, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. North Korea (South Korea), focusing on discussing the Korean Peninsula issue. However, negotiations on the Korean issue failed, no agreement on the Korean Peninsula issue was passed, which requires a better result on the Indochina issue if the parties do not want the Geneva conference to break up without achieving any results.

The five major countries participating in the conference have not yet agreed on determining the composition of relevant countries participating in the Geneva Conference on Indochina. The French side proposed that only representatives of three pro-French governments, ‘National Government of Vietnam’ (led by Bao Dai), Laos, and Cambodia, attend the Conference along with five major powers. The Soviet side proposed to have a representative of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (led by Ho Chi Minh), but Britain, France, and the United States did not accept this proposal. But when the Viet Minh army launched the final attack on Dien Bien Phu (1 May 1954), knowing clearly that the defeat was irreversible, on 2 May 1954, these three countries notified the Soviet Union. knowing that they accepted the presence of the representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference on Indochina.

On 4 May 1954, at the invitation of the Soviet Government and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, a delegation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Van Dong, arrived in Geneva.

Attending the Conference were representatives of 9 delegations (Watt, 1967): The Soviet delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Molotov, Chinese delegation headed by Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, delegation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Van Dong, French representative delegation headed by Foreign Minister G.Bidault, The US representative delegation was headed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, British representative delegation headed by Foreign Minister Eden, along with three representative delegations from the National Government of Vietnam (led by Nguyen Quoc Dinh), the Kingdom of Laos and the Kingdom of Cambodia. The Soviet Union and Great Britain were co-chairs of the conference.

The Geneva Conference on Indochina lasted 75 days with 31 sessions, including 7 plenary sessions and 24 meetings at the Head of Delegation level. The conference is divided into 3 phases:

5.1. Phase 1 (from 8 May 1954 to 19 June 1954)

In addition to exchanging agendas and discussions, the delegations presented their positions on solutions to the Vietnam and Indochina problems.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam delegation led by Pham Van Dong requested that representatives of the Lao and Cambodian resistance forces attend. On 10 May 1954, Pham Van Dong spoke, giving the stance of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

1. Solve both military and political issues simultaneously.

2. To simultaneously resolve all three issues of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, he emphasized that the French government must recognize the basic national rights of the people of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

3. Foreign troops must withdraw from the three Indochina countries, this is the most important basis for ending the war and restoring peace in Indochina.

Vietnam’s stance is supported by China and the Soviet Union. On 25 May 1954, in a narrow session, Pham Van Dong proposed two principles for the armistice issue:

1. Complete ceasefire throughout Indochina.

2. Adjust the control area according to reality in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

Regarding the Bao Dai government (Vietnam National Government), Nguyen Quoc Dinh took the stance: ‘The National Government of Vietnam is the only state with authority to represent Vietnam, the Viet Minh army can join the common military force, after free general elections “The Nation of Vietnam” will organize to establish a single government under the leadership of Bao Dai’ (Landon, 1966). This proposal by Nguyen Quoc Dinh is considered unreasonable and unrealistic (Watt, 1967).

On 27 May 1954, France agreed to take the proposal of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the basis for discussion in negotiations. China raised 6 points on military issues such as a complete and simultaneous ceasefire in the three Indochina countries, the establishment of an International Control Committee consisting of neutral countries, but did not mention the political aspect of the solution.

On 29 May 1954, after 4 plenary sessions and 8 delegation-level meetings, the Geneva Conference decided (Cable, 1986):

1. Comprehensive and simultaneous ceasefire.

2. Representatives of the Vietnamese and French armies met to have detailed agreements on the control zone and ceasefire.

5.2. Phase 2 (from 20 June 1954 to 10 July 1954)

During this period, most heads of delegations from other countries returned to report, only Pham Van Dong stayed in Geneva. Narrow meetings and Vietnam-France military subcommittee meetings were held. The meetings mainly discussed issues of gathering, moving troops, releasing prisoners of war, and traveling between North and South Vietnam. However, the narrow meetings in Geneva at this time did not make any significant progress.

When discussing the issue of gathering military forces, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam delegation proposed a plan to gather on the spot, without dividing military gathering areas as soon as negotiations began. The French side immediately rejected this plan. France has proposed temporarily dividing the military gathering area and establishing a Coalition government. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam accepted the idea of military boundaries and the General Election and also made proposals on demarcation lines. The two sides negotiated very fiercely, France proposed at the 18th parallel, Vietnam wanted the 13th parallel because of the city of Hue, as well as the strategic locations of Da Nang or Vietnam’s Central Highlands (Pieere, 2006).

Facing the deadlock on the issue of latitude in dividing the control area between France and Vietnam. From July 3 to July 5, 1954, President Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap went to Liuzhou to meet Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (Shao, 1986). Here, Ho Chi Minh emphasized that choosing the 13th parallel was reasonable, the 17th parallel was ‘unacceptable’ and at least the 16th parallel. However, Zhou Enlai had an opinion: ‘if the fight The competition at the conference to determine the temporary boundary encountered difficulties, it was requested to be flexible on the latitude’ (Jian, 1993). Zhou Enlai told President Ho Chi Minh: ‘I will discuss with Molotov and try my best to implement President Ho Chi Minh’s instructions. Because we are far away and there are no conditions for exchange, if the struggle to determine temporary boundaries is difficult, if we have to choose the 17th parallel, I hope President Ho Chi Minh will pay attention to the most important issue, which is to have peace and there are conditions to unify Vietnam’ (Jian, 1993).

On 9 July 1954, the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam proposed lowering the country to the 14th parallel, while France still maintained the 18th parallel. On July 13, the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam lowered its request to the 16th parallel. On July 17, the French delegation firmly suggested that it did not matter which parallel the military border was at as long as it was north of Route 9 in central Vietnam. This is historical data showing that China under Mao Zedong had a huge impact on the Geneva conference.

5.3. Phase 3 (from July 11 to July 21, 1954)

During the last 10 days of the Geneva Conference, many two-way, three-way or multi-party meetings and exchanges took place between the Heads of delegations. The meetings mainly approved documents, including provisions for implementing the Agreement, and finally the plenary session closed the Conference.

On July 15, the Vietnam Labor Party Central Committee held its 6th Conference in Hanoi under the chairmanship of President Ho Chi Minh. Here, the highest leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam agreed with the policy of ‘using negotiation methods to restore peace in Indochina’ (Asselin, 2007). On 19 July 1954, Vietnam and France agreed that the temporary boundary would be at the 17th parallel, about 10 km from Route 9. This is in accordance with the opinions of Britain and the United States as well as with the consent of China and the Soviet Union.

The French side had to make concessions by accepting that they would hold a general election in June 1956. Instead of being ‘ambiguous’ about the time to hold the general election in Vietnam, France had to accept the request to clearly state it in writing: ‘Military lines are temporary and cannot be interpreted in any legal way to become political or territorial borders’ (Landon, 1966).

There is a problem that the French government is afraid that the discussion with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will be broken so they avoided meeting representatives of the ‘National Government of Vietnam’ and only asked the US to inform this delegation about their agreements with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The establishment of two military gathering zones was discussed separately between France, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, China and the United States, but it was only at the end of the Geneva Conference that the ‘National Government of Vietnam’ delegation was announced (France only views the ‘National Government of Vietnam’ as a political ‘puppet’ to maintain French influence and interests in Vietnam) (Buchan, 1975).

At the meeting on the night of 20 July 1954, the five heads of delegations from Britain, France, the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam agreed at the last minute to take the 17th parallel as the military demarcation line and the deadline for general elections in Vietnam was after 2 years.

On 21 July 1954, the Geneva Conference on peace in Indochina ended.

Documents signed at the conference include:

Three Agreements to suspend hostilities in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

A final declaration of the Conference.

Two separate statements by the American Delegation and the French Delegation dated 21 July 1954.

Notes exchanged between Pham Van Dong and Mendes France.

Agreements reached at the conference

General agreement for three countries: Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: Recognize and respect the basic rights of the people of the three Indochina countries: independence, sovereignty, unity and full territorial integrity of each country, non-interference in the internal affairs of each country.

Cessation of hostilities throughout Indochina.

France withdrew its troops from the territory of three Indochina countries. Viet Minh troops left Laos and Cambodia.

In Indochina there are no foreign bases and these countries will not have military alliances with foreign countries.

General elections in each country will be held.

Do not retaliate against those who cooperate with the opponent.

Return prisoners of war and detainees.

Establishment of the Joint Committee for International Control and Supervision of the Geneva Agreement.

Separate agreements with each country, including agreements related to Vietnam

Includes 4 main contents:

The provisions on cessation of hostilities and restoration of peace: ceasefire, regrouping, and troop movements are implemented by both sides within 300 days; transferring areas, returning prisoners of war and detained civilians, changing regions, and the issue of graves of soldiers from both sides participating in the war.

Provisions on maintaining and consolidating peace in Vietnam: Establishing a temporary military boundary line at the 17th parallel and the demilitarized zone (Ben Hai River - Quang Tri province), the 17th parallel is a temporary military boundary line period, not considered a political or territorial boundary, prohibiting the reinforcement of military personnel, soldiers, weapons and other war equipment into Vietnam, prohibiting the construction of new military bases, prohibiting the two regions from joining any military alliance, prohibiting the use of each North and South region of Vietnam to serve any military policy.

Political terms: The general election to unify Vietnam will take place in July 1956, people are free to choose where to live while waiting. The parties shall not persecute, retaliate or discriminate against those who cooperated with the other side during the war.

Provisions regulating the organization of implementation of the Agreement: Joint Control Committee, Neutral International Monitoring Committee.

6. Some comments about the first Indochina war and the Geneva agreement

The signing of the Geneva in 1954 successfully ended the Vietnamese people’s resistance war against the French, marking a victorious step on the path of fighting for independence and national unification. The Geneva Agreement has enhanced Vietnam’s position, from a country that had not been recognized by any country after the August 1945 revolution, to becoming a country recognized by the international community, creating an opportunity to foundation, the driving force for the war with the US army later. Although the conference results were not as Vietnam expected, the victories and lessons this conference brought are valuable experience for Vietnam to implement other international agreements in the future.

With the Geneva Agreement, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam took control of the North of Vietnam (from the 17th parallel) and became a solid support for the revolution to liberate the South and the struggle to unify the country after 1954. The Geneva Agreement ‘was born in such an international context and the correlation of our and the enemy’s forces on the battlefield, but did not achieve all the things we wanted. However, it contributed to the end of the century-long French domination, forcing the invading army to leave, and France to recognize in writing the independence, unity and territorial integrity of the three countries. Indochina, which has no foreign military bases in these three countries, accepts in principle a free general election as the legal basis for our long-term struggle, and an end to the protracted war. nine years long throughout the Indochina peninsula’ (Miller & Vu, 2009).

On 22 July 1954, President Ho Chi Minh commented: ‘For the peace, unity, independence and democracy of the Fatherland, for the past 8 or 9 years, the people, army, officials and Government have We are closely united, united from top to bottom, enduring hardships, overcoming all difficulties, resolutely resisting and have won many glorious victories (…). We have achieved a great victory. The French government has recognized the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of our country, acknowledged that the French army will withdraw from our country, from now on, we must fight hard to consolidate peace, implement unification, complete independence and democracy throughout the country’ (Asselin, 2007)

The victories and limitations of the Geneva solution for Vietnam also reflect the correlation of forces between major countries in the international arena, reflecting the complexity of the strategic intentions of major countries in negotiations.

With China: Since 1950, China has intervened more and more deeply in Vietnam’s affairs. Yang (2002) wrote: ‘Because of its advocacy of using armed struggle to seize power and its belief in internationalism, the CCP, immediately after achieving victory in China, began to display sympathy for and provided support to the Communist parties in Asia that were undergoing revolutions. The decision to provide such aid reflected to some extent the CCP’s geopolitical interests, but ideological considerations were predominant. The desire to promote revolution in Asia was very clear in the PRC’s early period. CCP leaders told other Asian Communist parties that the methods of organizing a united front under the Communist party leadership, creating revolutionary base areas, and seizing power through armed struggle had succeeded in the Chinese revolution and should become “the basic approach for national liberation struggle in all other colonial and semi-colonial countries” with conditions comparable to China’s. It was in line with this tendency to support Asian revolution that the CCP offered assistance to the anti-French war led by the Vietnamese Communists’. Mao Zedong believed that China had a responsibility to develop communism throughout Asia and thereby strengthen its position in international relations. The Geneva Conference witnessed China’s diplomatic calculations on the Korean and Indochina issues. In which, the division in both countries has China’s calculations (Jian, 1993). It can be seen that the results that this conference brings to China are huge, not only the benefits of power in the new world order but also the creation of a safe buffer zone for China in the dispute between the U.S and Soviet Union.

For the United States: The Geneva Agreement and the defeat of France in Indochina brought them a great benefit in the cold war, which was to replace France and turn Indochina into a dependent region. The US government believed that Indochina would become an anti-communist outpost, preventing the Soviet Union and China from spreading communism to Southeast Asia (Lacouture, 1970). This led to the strong military intervention of the United States in Vietnam, leading to the subsequent outbreak of war. Record of the Secretary of State’s Briefing for Members of Congress (Held at the Department of State, 5 May 1954) wrote: ‘The Navarre plan had envisaged few offensive accomplishments during the first year of operation, but by the end of the second year it was hoped that the war would be brought to a stage of guerrilla warfare handled by the native troops. This plan had developed satisfactorily and was still sound, but the French will for offensive action and even their ability to govern themselves have disintegrated. By the time of the Berlin Conference the Laniel Government felt it must seek some means to achieve peace or it would fall; if this should happen, a peace-at-any-price government would probably succeed it. We therefore had agreed at Berlin to go along on a Geneva Conference, but the Secretary had warned Bidault of the strong possibility of Communist military attacks for political purposes. This prediction has come true with the action at Dien Bien Phu and the increased pressure in the rest of the area, with serious consequences for the French position’ (The Department of State, 1954).

To the Soviet Union: Initially, the Soviet Union believed that Indochina was not as important as Eastern European countries. That’s why the Soviet Union almost delegated power to China in Indochina issues (Lüthi, 2006). Radchenko (2012) said: ‘To be sure, there was not much policy planning behind Khrushchev’s dash for the “third world,” to use the controversial but useful term. It began largely as a sideshow in the Soviet power struggle, with Khrushchev seeking to build his credentials in foreign policy and so undermine his rivals in succession. Stalin’s henchman Lavrentii Beria did much the same in the brief interregnum (before he was purged and shot), but he hoped to play the East German card to strengthen his political authority. The difficulty for both Beria and Khrushchev was that foreign policy had been monopolized by Stalin’s former commissar for foreign affairs Viacheslav Molotov, and it was difficult for either of them to score a major success in relations with the U.S. or Western Europe while keeping Molotov out of the picture. Khrushchev could do this only once he had established himself more firmly in authority, i.e. not until 1956. But Molotov did not keep his finger in every pie. With the “third world” being largely off Molotov’s political radar, there was a clear opportunity for Khrushchev to exploit’ (Radchenko, 2012). Later, due to the divisions in the relationship between China and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union became more and more interested in the Indochina region, especially in Vietnam. The seeds for conflicts between China and the Soviet Union also gradually formed after 1954.

Thus, it can be seen that the first Indochina war and the Geneva Accords demonstrated the intentions of major countries. The political calculations of these countries will once again make Indochina hot and it will take a lot of time to resolve the problem. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Bui Thanh Son, in a recent article on the 70th anniversary of the Geneva Conference, wrote: ‘If in the “Preliminary Agreement" of 1946, France only recognized Vietnam as a "free" country within According to the French Union, with the Geneva Agreement, for the first time in our nation’s history, Vietnam’s basic national rights of independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity were officially affirmed in An international treaty and recognized by the countries attending the Geneva Conference, this is a very important political and legal basis for our people to fight on the political and diplomatic front to unify the country in the future’ (Son, 2024).

7. Conclusion

International relations after 1945 contain many complex issues. The conflicting interests of major countries have made the global political situation hot. The Cold War spread worldwide and affected many countries, including those on the Indochina peninsula. It can be seen that the first Indochina war and the Geneva Accords fully reflect the complex aspects of international relations during this period. It is not only a large-scale war but also where large countries such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and China have their political plans to have a dominant role in the world order. Today, looking at this war and the Geneva Accords, we can draw on experiences in international relations so that countries can have truly good foreign policies for their countries. In the case of Vietnam, lessons about diplomacy with China during this period are very important for planning diplomatic strategies in a context where China is rising very strongly.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Pham Duc Thuan

Dr. Pham Duc Thuan, the responsible author and main researcher of the article is a lecturer at Can Tho University (Vietnam). He received a PhD in History in 2018 and is an expert in modern Vietnamese history and Vietnamese diplomatic history. He is currently teaching at the School of Education, Can Tho University, and is the leader of the Department of History Education.

Tran Minh Thuan

Dr. Tran Minh Thuan is also a researcher in Vietnamese history, he has a PhD in History in 2019 and is an expert on the history of the Mekong Delta.