‘Discipline and punishment’: coercive measures used by the rebels against their troops during the Spanish Civil War

ABSTRACT

This article aims to illustrate the measures which were developed by the rebel army in order to maintain control over their troops during the Spanish Civil War. Coercive measures were adopted that became progressively tightened, reaching a peak during the first Francoist government. They were based on integration, propaganda, surveillance and punishment. This article focuses on the idea that surveillance and punishment were applied because troops were not socio-politically homogeneous. Measures were also based on traditional and colonial military ideology, and nationalist in nature, and new tendencies arriving from Europe: such as fascism. This text also serves to portray the context in which the combatants were integrated, as well as how the Francoist ‘New State’ was established during the 1940s and early 1950s.

KEYWORDS:

• Spanish Civil War
• rebel army
• surveillance
• punishment
• soldiers

Acknowledgments

I want to thank the criticism and comments of the reviewers. Also, thank the Santos Juliá Seminar of the Ortega Foundation, the Complutense University of Madrid and the UNED, for being able to present a discussion draft so that they could comment on how the text could be improved. I want to extend my thanks to the members of Research Group HISTAGRA-University of Santiago de Compostela (Spain), especially Lourenzo Fernández Prieto, Aurora Artiaga and Andrés Domínguez. Finally, to Robert Gerwarth, supervisor of my visiting fellow at the Center War Studies-University College Dublin (Ireland)

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Interview of A. P. Gesteira by Antonio Somoza (2010). Proxecto ‘Nomes e Voces’-Soldados. 4006 Fund.

2. Regiment Archive Zamora 29, 2295/38. AIRMNO.

3. Perfectly analysed Alonso Ibarra (2020, 305–335).

4. For other examples of war as a transformative factor of the individual in Bartov (1992) or Browning (2002).

5. Foucault (1986, 175 and ff.).

6. See Jensen (2014), Balfour (2002) or González Calleja (2011).

7. On the Africanism of the Spanish campaigns in North Africa: Macías Fernández (2019). On interwar fascism: Mosse (2005); Mosse (1990); Griffin (1991); Paxton (2019), and Sternhell et al. (2016).

8. Leira-Castiñeira (2020, 45–62).

9. Matthews (2011, 344–363), Kalyvas (2010).

10. Drawing from the theories of Hobsbawn (2014), Scott (2003), Tilly (1997). As Charles Tilly states: ‘The change from reactive to proactive collective action occurred where and when the population had moved en masse to implicate itself in the structures of power, production distribution and association’: (1997, 293). Tarrow (2004, 22).

11. Domínguez Almansa (2009, 227 and ff.), Uría (1996). Santoja Gómez-Agero (2006, 215–230). Cabo (1998), Grandío (2010). Cabo and Veiga Alonso (2014, 51–80), Miguez (2008), Casanova (1997), González Calleja (2011).

12. Example of French mobilization in World War I: Purseigle (2013). On the lack of prominence of fascist militias in the Spanish Civil War: Artiaga Rego (2014, 23–51), Seidman (2012).

13. Ugarte (1998); Aróstegui (2013); Aróstegui, Canal, and González Calleja (2011).

14. Something that had already happened in other fratricidal confrontations: Borreguero (1989, 223–225 and 254–259). Puell (1996, 272–296).

15. Puell (1996, 278–292).

16. Van Gennep (1986, 20 and 30).

17. Goffman (1970, 13).

18. Goffman (1970, 30).

19. Goffman (1970, 44, 22–25- and 50–52).

20. Interview with I. Q. (1991), HISTORGA Fund, reference 287.

21. This happened to General Aranda in actions taken by the Galician Army. This also happened to Martín Alonso. In Armiñán (1939).

22. Quiroga (2008).

23. Anonymous Interviewer (1988), HISTORGA Fund, reference 50.

24. Cañal and Gómez-Imaz (1967, IX-X).

25. Van Gennep (1986, 20).

26. Interview with V. S. R. (1990), HISTORGA Fund, reference 151.

27. Cardona (2008), 36−49.

28. As Manuel López Rouco stated in the interview conducted by Andrés Domínguez (2010). Proxecto ‘Nomes e Voces’-Soldiers. Fund 4003.

29. Heiberg and Ros Agudo (2006).

30. Balfour (2002, 439–578) and Nerin (2005).

31. Heiberg and Ros Agudo (2006, 50).

32. General Military Archives of Ávila (AGMAV), C.1218, cp. 36/02.

33. AGMAV, C.1218, cp. 36/15.

34. 2nd Section. Northern Army. General Instructions for the Information Service. AGMAV, E. N. C. 1217, L. 9.34.

35. Prada (2006).

36. Military Court of Vigo, Archive IV Military Region (AIVRM) Army Law suit file 432/36, Intermediate Archive of the Northwestern Military Region (AIRMNO). Domínguez Almansa (2009, 37–44).

37. A. Domínguez-Almansa, 37–44.

38. Interview with Dolores Rodal Blanco by Andrés Dominguez Almansa (2007). Interuniversity Research Project ‘Nomes e Voces’. Fund 2188. Domínguez Almansa (2009, 37–44).

39. Report from 2 December 1936 for unification of the organisms of control and surveillance. AGMAV, C. 1209, cp. 41.

40. Report from 2 December 1936 for unification of the organisms of control and surveillance. AGMAV, C. 1209, cp. 41.

41. C. T. 339/37, Judicial Fund PCMAYMA. ATIVRM (AIRMNO).

42. Judicial records of the Regiment Mérida 35, 18/37, AIRMNO.

43. Operations Journal Rilat-29, AIRMNO, C. 134.

44. Grandío (2011, 129).

45. Foucault (1986, 175).

46. AGMAV, C.1218, cp. 36/02. AGMAV, C. 1220, L. 12, cp. 35. AGMAV, C. 1220, L. 12, cp. 44.

47. Interrogations of escapees during the month of February, 1937, Documentary Center for Historical Memory (CDMH). Reference: Incorporated 731/83.

48. Interview with A. G. P. (1988), Fund HISTORGA, reference 10.

49. 2nd Section. Police and Public Order Service. AGMAV, E. N. C. 1217, L. 9, 16.

50. Alegre (2018, 145).

51. Something similar to what was defended: Rutherford (2014). On the Italian War: Osti (2009). The Italian role in the Civil war in: Rodrigo (2008).

52. Report on the creation of the Military Police and Information Service. November, 1937.AIRMNO. 05.02522.

53. Heiberg and Ros Agudo (2006, 91–100).

54. Rodrigo (2005, 70−75; 127–141, and 86–117).

55. Heiberg and Ros Agudo (2006, 97).

56. Heiberg and Ros Agudo (2006, 96).

57. Order given by the Headquarters of the Generalísimo dealing with dangerous individuals on 22 October 1937. AIRMNO. 05.02527.

58. Matthews (2013, 96).

59. Bourke (2008, 106–134). Glass (2014, 183–220).

60. Interview with A. G. P. (1988), HISTORGA Fund, Reference 10.

61. SIPM. Communication in January 1938. 05.ANT866.

62. Report from the 83rd Division in August 1938 on the morale of the soldiers: ‘provide the troops with articles that are considered to be non-essential in civilian life and whose lack will contribute to making life on the field more painful, which should be avoided in order to maintain the combatant´s level of morale.’ AIRMNO. 05.ANT216.

63. Order from October 1937. Dangerous individuals. AIRMNO. 05.02527.

64. Rodrigo (2005, 70−75 and 127–141).

65. Rodrigo (2005, 131).

66. Regiment Archive Mérida 35, 284/37, AIRMNO.

67. The Spanish fascist party, but which was controlled by Franco. It was a unique party but because of its ideology it did not come near to the German position, at most the Italian position. It was a fascist party with a strong presence of the Catholic religion and some of its traditions.

68. Instructions SIPM. AIRMNO.05. ANT866.

69. Order of October 1938 on the SIPM reorganization, AGMAV, E. N., C. 2904, 38.

70. Order for Dangerous individuals. AIRMNO. 05.02527.

71. List of suspects to be removed from the front line. AIRMNO.05. ANT216 (2527).

72. Order for the creation of Punishment Units AIRMNO. 05.02527.

73. Orders for destination given by the Division Punishment Unit. AIRMNO. 05. ANT217 (2528).

74. See Gellately (1990).

75. General Headquarters of the Generalissimo. SIPM. Project to create a Special Secret Group.AGMAV, E. N., C. 2913, 2, 1.

76. As was done with Il Duce, Gentile (2007).

77. SIPM demobilization, AIRMNO. 05. ANT678.

78. Foucault (1986).