ABSTRACT
Despite a proclaimed strengthening of international human rights norms on an international level, the fundamental human ‘right to life’ is not always able to act as a barrier against state violence and militarization on national levels. As illustrated by Operation Michoacán, which in retrospective marked the start of the Mexican ‘war’ on drugs, the right to life has been interpreted and implemented by domestic state actors in ambiguous and often very counterproductive ways. Specifically, the argument to protect innocent citizens’ lives against drug criminality served as a major justification for the use of lethal force by the military in Mexico. While norm compliance and so-called norm ‘localisation’ processes have already received considerable scholarly attention, the possibility that state authorities evoke fundamental human rights norms for legitimizing their own violent practices (= norm instrumentalisation) has so far not formed part of the academic debate. This paper bridges this gap by conducting an in-depth discourse analysis of key state actor’s statements surrounding the start of Operation Michoacán.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. For more details on the general interpretation of the ‘right to life’ see: Kälin and Künzli (Citation2009, chapter 9); for a concrete application of the ‘right to life’ in case law see, e.g. IACHR (Citation1988, para. 172).
2. For a detailed historical analysis of the drug business in Mexico see, e.g. Chabat (Citation2010); Froylán (Citation2009) and Pimentel (Citation2000).
3. For more details on an involvement of the United States in the Mexican Drug War see, e.g. Hunt (Citation2019), Mercille (Citation2011), and Toro (Citation1999). Given the space restrictions, this paper focuses on the ‘official story’ in Mexico as analysed in the empirical part of this manuscript as opposed to external pressure exercised by other countries.
4. For more information on political protests after the 2006 elections see, e.g. NBC News 2006 and Tuckman (Citation2006); for more details on how the search for legitimacy by state leaders provides a context in which conflict takes place see, e.g. Khan (Citation2009).
5. For further information on the proposed Internal Security Law see, e.g. Aristegui Noticias (Citation2017), Guzman (Citation2017), and Rodriguez (Citation2017).
6. For more insights on corruption and complicity of state authorities with drug cartels see, e.g. Forbes Mexico (Citation2015), Hernandez (Citation2010), Morales Oyarbide (Citation2011), and Piñeyro (Citation2010).
7. For further details on alternative means of conflict resolution in Mexico see, e.g. Tauchnitz (Citation2018).
8. For an excellent overview of the anti-mafia strategies employed in Italy and a discussion of their effectiveness see La Spina (Citation2014). Notably, La Spina distinguishes between two sets of instruments: Direct policy instruments that address mafia crimes such as criminal offences or money laundering, and indirect instruments that are directed towards civil society and public administration in an aim to diminish the mafia’s support base in the wider society. International collaboration between Mexican and Italian officials to exchange experiences in combatting organized crime could prove to be a fruitful undertaking in this regard.