How to make former aggressors repent through shaming and praising: the case of Sino-Japanese relations

Abstract

The past wrongdoings of states have received increased attention in recent years, resulting in calls for contrition and apologies. Most commentary has provided policy advice primarily on how former aggressors should handle such “history problems”. The present article, by contrast, draws on insights from research on recognition and ontological security to construct a framework for how external actors can use shaming and praising to influence the ways in which former aggressors deal with the past. The framework is illustrated in a brief case study of Sino-Japanese relations. Three main policy prescriptions are presented: (1) denial of the former aggressor's identity should be avoided; (2) shaming should instead take the form of suggesting that the former aggressor's behaviour is not in accordance with its self-identity; and (3) such shaming is likely to be more successful if it is accompanied by praise for the target.

Keywords:

• apologies
• history problems
• ontological security
• recognition
• shaming
• Sino-Japanese relations

Introduction

Problems related to war crimes and other past wrongdoing committed by states have received increased attention in recent years. It has become clear that the ways in which states remember and commemorate the past influence interstate relations in the present (Berger, 2012; Gustafsson, 2014a). Regardless of whether the focus is on western colonialism, the slave trade, the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide or any of the numerous atrocities committed by states in the past, calls for former aggressors to repent properly and apologize have become more frequent since the end of the cold war. Numerous scholarly contributions have emphasized the importance and power of apologies (Lazare, 2005; Marrus, 2007). Several studies argue that contrition and apologies can be a way for former aggressors to redefine their self-identities and thereby signal to former victims that they have changed (Barkan, 2000; Weyeneth, 2001). It has been suggested that high-quality apologies can alter the identities of the victimized, thereby making them view the former aggressor more positively. According to this argument, apologies could function as a security strategy for the former aggressor (Suzuki, 2008). Refusal to apologize often appears to be related to the belief that a contrite stance on a nation's past makes it impossible for the citizens of the former aggressor state to be proud of their nationality (O'Neill, 1999). One scholar therefore advises former aggressors to take pride in other achievements instead of denying past aggression (Lind, 2009).

Much of the policy advice on resolving history problems has thus taken the form of recommendations on what former agressors should do. This advice, however, is not always followed. If former aggressors are unwilling to follow such advice, how can external actors influence former aggressors into adopting a more repentant stance? Suggestions on this topic are considerably less common. One possible strategy that has received much attention in the context of human rights violations is the “naming and shaming” of violators (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Hafner-Burton, 2008). Recent research, however, has cautioned against both expressions of remorse and shaming. Apologies and public shaming strategies, it is argued, can trigger a “backlash” within the apologizing state. This can worsen the situation and might strengthen groups that deny any past wrongdoing (Lind, 2008).

Originally concerned with individual human psychological needs, since the late 1990s theories of recognition and ontological security have been used in International Relations to explain the behaviour of collective actors such as states. Drawing on findings from such research, this article agrees that shaming tactics are often counterproductive. However, such tactics, if used wisely, can be succesful in prompting former aggressors to adopt a more contrite posture. First and foremost, denial of identity, or shaming tactics that deny the former aggressor's self-identity and the efforts it has made, however limited, to repent, is likely to be counterproductive. Former aggressors might refrain from denying their past aggression and instead construct a new identity based on taking pride in other achievements. It will be difficult for this new identity to gain ground domestically, however, if other states do not recognize it – and even harder if they explicitly deny it. Instead, shaming should draw attention to an identity–behaviour disconnect by suggesting that the former aggressor's behaviour is not in accordance with its self-identity. In addition, highlighting an identity–behaviour disconnect is likely to be more successful if accompanied by praise for the former aggressor's identity and the achievements on which that identity is based. Such praise can function as a kind of reinforcement of “good behaviour”.

The next section discusses these tactics for targetting former aggressors. The three approaches are then discussed in the context of the “history problem” in Sino-Japanese relations. The article concludes with specific suggestions on how external actors can influence the Japanese government into adopting a more consistently contrite stance, and discusses how it could influence Japanese foreign policy. It also presents some more general policy recomendations.

Three ways of targeting former aggressors

States, like other agents, create their self-identities by constructing narratives about who they are and how they tend to act (Ringmar, 2012; Steele, 2010). Such self-identity narratives typically emphasize an agent's sources of pride. In addition, these narratives involve the construction of self-identity in relation to difference (e.g. Campbell, 1998). States typically emphasize how they differ from other states, or from their own pasts (Wæver, 1998). This section discusses three ways in which external actors can influence the stances adopted by former aggressors by targeting their self-identity narratives: (1) denial of an identity; (2) identity–behaviour disconnect; and (3) praise.

Denial of an identity

Denial of an identity, that is, of the key stories an actor tells about itself, is sometimes labelled mis-recognition, or denial of thick recognition. A statement such as: “You are not what you claim to be!” would be the most explicit form of such denial. Denial of an identity is not necessarily this explicit. Acts or statements are sometimes interpreted as mis-recognition of a self-identity. Either way, if the targeted state believes it is being mis-recognized, it will reject the way in which it is being represented, possibly through indignant expressions of having been insulted. Strictly speaking, denial of an identity is not a form of shaming because it does not induce shame, but feelings of insult. As Erik Ringmar (2012, p. 7) puts it: “To be denied recognition is a traumatic experience. We feel slighted, insulted, and brought low; our pride is injured, we have lost our status and face.” If used against a former aggressor, denial of an identity will probably fail to produce a remorseful stance in relation to the past.

Identity–behaviour disconnect

External parties can highlight the disparity between the stories a state tells about itself – that is, its self-identity – and its actions. An explicit example might be: “You are not acting in accordance with who you are.” Such a statement does not deny or mis-recognize the target's self-identity. Instead, it involves criticizing it for acting out of character. As such, it implicitly recognizes the former aggressor's identity and related achievements, whereas praise explicitly recognizes it. As mentioned above, denial of an identity typically causes indignation and feelings of having been insulted. Highlighting an identity–behaviour disconnect instead induces shame: “Shame occurs when actors feel anxiety about the ability of their narrative to reflect their behaviour” (Steele, 2005, p. 527). Importantly, states seek to substantiate their self-identities through action. Through their actions they present their self-identities as if they were objective material realities rather than the social constructions they are (Murray, 2012). One way to respond when another actor highlights an identity–behaviour disconnect is thus to react, and prove that one is indeed what one claims to be.

Praise

Praise is the opposite of denial of an identity. The following sentence is a clear example: “What you have done so far is commendable! You really are x (e.g. ‘contrite’).” Praise, as understood here, shares some similarities with “flattery” as discussed by Brent Steele.¹ Praise, like flattery, can be described as a form of recognition. As such, it is in line with and thus praises the target's self-identity and sources of pride (Steele, 2010). In this sense, praise resembles thick recognition, which acknowledges difference or uniqueness, for example, in the form of specific qualities (Wendt, 2003). It recognizes “that upon which a community founds its self-image – the challenges it has overcome in the past, its power to resist authoritarian tendencies, its cultural achievements, and so on” (Honneth, 2012, p. 29). By recognizing a self-identity, praise can encourage and reinforce behaviour that is in line with that identity. Whereas denial of an identity provokes feelings of indignation and having been insulted, praise typically produces pride.

The history problem in Sino-Japanese relations

The legacy of Japan's aggressive war in Asia has long been a source of tension, especially in its relations with China and the Koreas. Domestic struggles over how to remember the past have divided Japanese society into those who support a remorseful stance and those who prefer a depiction of history that eschews accounts of Japanese aggression (Seaton, 2007). The history problem in Sino-Japanese relations is an especially informative case for studying the effects of shaming tactics because both sides have made efforts to resolve it. Despite these efforts and the fact that a resolution seems to be in the economic interests of both sides, it remains a thorny bilateral issue that impedes further cooperation and improvements in relations. That both sides have made efforts to resolve the problem should not be taken to suggest that Chinese and Japanese leaders do not have mixed motivations when it comes to the history problem. For example, during a visit to China in 2001, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō apologized for Japan's aggressive invasion of the country. In April the following year, however, Koizumi paid a visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines 14 convicted Class A war criminals along with almost 2.5 million Japanese war dead. The visit, viewed by many observers as intended to please Japanese conservatives, was interpreted in China as negating the apology (Rose, 2005). Similarly, being able to depict Japan as unrepentant can serve to shore up nationalism, thereby strengthening the legitimacy of the Chinese leadership and diverting attention from domestic grievances. Nonetheless, the Sino-Japanese case still illustrates the framework and provides lessons for those actors that do wish to alter the behaviour of others.

Numerous Japanese prime ministers have made statements of remorse and apology. However, these have often been followed by loud claims that Japan did nothing particularly heinous in the past, or at least that Japan's transgressions were no worse than those committed by other states (Lind, 2008). Japanese right-wingers and conservatives have repeatedly criticized expressions of contrition as “masochistic” and “anti-Japanese”. In their view, such statements make it impossible for Japanese people to be proud of being Japanese. This kind of refusal to repent seems to be related to the belief that “if making an apology would serve our practical ends, but we feel we do not owe one, then honour calls on us to refuse to apologise” (O'Neill, 1999, p. 177). Commenting on this view of national pride, Jennifer Lind (2009, p. 144) suggests that Japan should stop trying to whitewash its history of aggression. Instead, it should take pride in its other achievements:

Japan has much to be proud of. Despite its small size and limited natural resources, Japan was able to rise up from utter devastation and transform itself into one of the wealthiest, most stable, most technologically advanced, and most creative countries in the world. When some leaders and bureaucrats attempted to conceal past atrocities, Japan's pugnacious activists, scholars, and journalists yanked the cover away for the world to see – a victory not only for the victims but also for Japan's vibrant democracy. Just as West German conservatives argued for emphasising their country's remarkable postwar success, Japanese leaders who wish to inculcate patriotism in their people have a great deal they can say.

To emphasize alternative sources of national pride is useful advice to former aggressors. But such guidance tends to neglect the importance of recognition. Unless they are recognized by other states, it can be difficult for self-identities based on such achievements to be recognized domestically and to gain ground in relation to those who instead seek to strengthen national pride by glorifying the past.

In Japanese self-identity narratives, including those constructed by the Japanese government, the memory of the post-war era has become central. In particular, statements by Japanese prime ministers on Japan's aggression in the 1930s and 1940s do not just contain apologies. They also construct a self-identity that stresses Japan's development as a peaceful, contrite and generous state in the post-war period. For example, the “Murayama statement”, issued by Japanese Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi on the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, included a “heartfelt apology” for Japan's “colonial rule and aggression”. It also explicitly stressed Japan's post-war self-identity as a source of national pride:

The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. (Murayama, 1995)

Numerous prime ministers since Murayama have similarly emphasized this identity (e.g. Fukuda, 2007; for additional examples see Gustafsson, 2015). The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has also emphasized this self-identity, for example, in the leaflet “60 years: The path of a nation striving for global peace”. It quotes Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s January 2005 General Policy Speech delivered to the Diet:

In the post-war period, Japan has become the world's second largest economic power. Never turning into a military power and always observing pacifism, Japan has played an active role in achieving world peace and prosperity by contributing financially, such as through Official Development Assistance and contributions to the UN, and by personnel contributions, such as participation in UN peacekeeping operations. (MOFA, 2005)

The leaflet also describes Japan as the “world's leading donor country” (MOFA, 2005). This Japanese self-identity clearly emphasizes sources of pride and depicts post-war Japan as radically different from its wartime past Other.

While Japan has thus constructed its self-identity as peaceful, remorseful and generous, the belief that its record of dealing with its past is particularly dismal nonetheless remains widespread. It is, for example, often claimed that Japan has been unwilling to apologize for its wartime aggression (Benfell, 2006; Lazare, 2005; Zarakol, 2010). The limited knowledge of Japanese apologies demonstrates their lack of success. As mentioned above, some argue that the problem is not the absence of apologies but domestic backlash and Japanese leaders’ sometimes contradictory behaviour. Either way, it is clear that the way in which Japan has dealt with the past has been far from satisfactory. However, it is also clear that the efforts it has made have received scant recognition. Put another way, attempts to reinforce good behaviour have not been common. Statements to the effect that Japan has never shown contrition constitute denial of Japan's self-identity as peaceful and contrite in the post-war period.

Denial of identity and praise in Sino-Japanese relations

Japanese diplomatic missions were attacked during protests in China in the spring of 2005 against Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, among other issues. In response, because the Chinese authorities had failed to intervene, Japan demanded that the Chinese government issue an apology and cover the costs of repairing the buildings. Chinese President Hu Jintao refused to apologize. Instead, he insisted that Japan was to blame due to its mistaken stance on its past war of aggression. An editorial in Yomiuri Shimbun (“Nittchū shunō kaidan”, 2005) criticized Hu's statement, calling the accusation that Japan has not shown regret an “obvious distortion of history”. It added that Japan had made official expressions of regret or apology more than 20 times since bilateral relations were established in 1972. Hu, however, called for “regret to be turned into real actions”. The editorial countered that China should in turn put a stop to its own “behaviour” concerning its “patriotic and anti-Japanese education” (“Nittchū shunō kaidan”, 2005). China's patriotic education is frequently described in Japan as the root cause of violent “anti-Japanese” demonstrations. It depicts in detail the Japanese military's wartime atrocities while not mentioning Japan's post-war development as a peaceful and repentant nation that has provided China with development aid (e.g. “Chūgoku no hōdō”, 2005). Japanese parliamentarian Takebe Tsutomu stated explicitly during a visit to China in 2005 that because “based on regret, post-war Japan has continued to walk the path of a peace state, it deserves some recognition” (“Chūgoku fukushushō kikoku”, 2005).

In 2007–2008, China's senior leadership explicitly recognized Japan's self-identity and praised its post-war achievements. This praise was tremendously well received in Japan. On 13 April 2007, Chinese Prime Minister Wen stated in a speech to the Japanese Diet: “The Japanese government and its leaders have on several occasions expressed its attitude towards the history issue, officially recognised its aggression, expressed deep regret and apologies to the victimised countries” (Wen, 2007).

Asahi Shimbun described China's explicit recognition of Japan's apologies as “epoch-making” (“On shushō enzetsu”, 2007). Wen (2007) also noted that: “China has received support and assistance from the Japanese Government and people in its reform, opening-up and modernisation drive.” Asahi Shimbun commented: “this must be the first time many people in China have heard the truth” about Japan's aid to China (“On shushō enzetsu”, 2007). Yomiuri Shimbun (“On kahō shushō enzetsu”, 2007) similarly expressed appreciation. It added that it was especially important because few Chinese knew about the role that Japanese development assistance had played in China's development (for Japanese development assistance to China see Jerdén and Hagström, 2012, pp. 233–244). This kind of Chinese praise, which explicitly recognized Japan's self-identity, was even inscribed in the 2008 Joint Statement issued by the two governments (MOFA, 2008). The Japanese reaction to this praise was extremely positive and Japan's Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo reciprocated through expressions of contrition (Fukuda, 2007).

However, subsequent events, such as the large-scale demonstrations against Japan in China in 2010 and 2012, have been interpreted in Japan as related to the Chinese government's continued denial of Japan's self-identity in patriotic education. Furthermore, the 2012 bilateral squabble over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands led to protests against Japan in China and ignited an international propaganda battle (Gustafsson, 2014b; Hagström, 2015). The Chinese government actively sought to shame Japan and gain international support by linking the territorial dispute to war history. Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang stated:

Japan's position today on the issue of the Diaoyu Islands is an outright denial of the outcomes of victory in the war against fascism and constitutes a grave challenge to the post-war international order. No nation or people who are peace-loving and justice-upholding will tolerate Japan's stance. (MOFAPRC, 2012)

Arguing that Japan's behaviour denied the post-war order and that “peace-loving” nations would not tolerate it in effect denied Japan's self-identity as a peaceful nation. Japan's Foreign Minister, Gemba Koichirō, retorted in an op-ed that Japan was “absolutely not” denying the post-war international order. He added: “Japan is a peace-loving nation and has greatly and consistently contributed to peace and prosperity throughout Asia in the post-war period. This policy, strongly supported by our citizens, is a hallmark of Japan and will never change.” He also pointed out that China had recognized Japan's self-identity in the 2008 joint statement (Gemba, 2012).

This section has demonstrated how China has targeted Japan's self-identity narrative by implicitly and explicitly denying it. These strategies have arguably been counterproductive, as they appear to have strengthened the approach to the past favoured by Japan's right wing. China has increasingly come to be associated in Japan with “anti-Japanism”. Japan also seems to be moving away from its identity construction in relation to its past aggressive wartime self. Instead, it increasingly emphasizes how it is different from China. This involves, for example, stressing that Japan, unlike China, is democratic and law-abiding (Suzuki, 2015). In addition, large numbers of Japanese now view China's attitude to the past, rather than Japan's, as the main bilateral history problem (Genron NPO, 2006, 2014). At the same time, China's explicit recognition of Japan's self-identity in 2007–2008 was very positively received in Japan. This demonstrates both the promise and the possibilities of praise.

Making former aggressors repent

As mentioned above, the belief is widespread that Japan's record of dealing with its past is particularly poor. The denial of Japan's achievements in this area and of its related self-identity are clearly not limited to Sino-Japanese relations. China, however, has not just used denial of Japan's identity. It has also used praise – a more promising strategy for those seeking to transform a former aggressor's behaviour. China and other states might be able to make Japan more consistently contrite, however, by combining praise with a strategy that highlights identity–behaviour disconnect while avoiding denial of Japan's self-identity.

Denial of an identity and praise cannot be combined successfully because they are opposites. By contrast, praise is logically compatible with a strategy that highlights identity–behaviour disconnect. An explicit example would be something along the lines of: “You have long demonstrated that you are truly contrite, but some of your recent acts are incompatible with who you are.” Such an approach would demonstrate that a contrite stance pays off, and could thereby encourage and function as reinforcement of further contrition. Praise does not necessarily need to be directly included in a statement that highlights an identity–behaviour disconnect. It can be used following the latter in order to smooth out the effects of the initial shaming, making it easier for the target to react (cf. Steele, 2010).

Such a strategy could produce effects beyond the limited context of the history problem in Sino-Japanese relations. It even has the potential to influence Japanese security policy. Among the achievements on which Japan's self-identity as peaceful and repentant is based, such a strategy could recognize the pacifist article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Such praise might make it more difficult for Japanese politicians such as current Prime Minister Abe Shinzō to repeal or amend article 9. If the representation of article 9 as a source of Japanese pride were strengthened in relation to the competing right-wing depiction of it as a symbol of impotency and emasculation, the result might be less conflict in East Asia through the weakening of the remilitarization agenda in Japan. The sources of such strength are not just domestic – they are also to be found in praise from other states and the international community more broadly. In 2014, the Japanese people were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for conserving article 9 (Dudden, 2014). Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to article 9 is just one example of what such recognition might look like.

It might be objected that China and other former victims of Japanese aggression would protest if the international community recognized Japan's post-war achievements. For example, former victims might object if Japan were to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for conserving article 9. However, if China and other states want a remorseful Japan that keeps article 9 intact, it makes sense to recognize Japan's achievements – even if those achievements are far from perfect. Such efforts would increase the likelihood that Japan will construct its self-identity primarily in relation to its own past rather than in relation to a negatively depicted Chinese Other. Denying Japan's achievements and identity by claiming that it has never shown any remorse risks further contributing to the view that those doing the denying are anti-Japanese. In addition, it might further strengthen the agenda of the Japanese right wing, leading to an even less contrite posture. Of course, praising Japan can be risky for Chinese leaders who might be criticized for being soft on Japan (Gustafsson, 2014b). In such situations, efforts by Japanese leaders to act in accordance with the identity being praised by the Chinese side, for example by distancing the government from right-wing voices denying Japan's past aggression, would be helpful.

This article has outlined a framework for how external actors can make former aggressors repent. This framework should be viewed as generally applicable rather than limited to Sino-Japanese relations. Most policy advice on resolving history problems has taken the form of recommendations concerning what former agressors should do. This article, by contrast, has focused on what other actors can do to increase the likelihood that former aggressors will repent. It has also engaged with arguments that caution against shaming as a strategy for influencing former aggressors into repenting, because it can trigger a backlash in the targeted state. This article agrees that shaming tactics often do more harm than good. Such tactics can nonetheless be successful provided that three general recommendations are followed. First, shaming tactics should refrain from denying the self-identity and achievements of the former aggressor. Shaming should instead take the form of suggesting that the former aggressor's behaviour is not in accordance with its self-identity. Finally, shaming is likely to be more successful if it is accompanied by praise for the targeted former aggressor.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Linus Hagström, Ulv Hanssen and Björn Jerdén, Pekka Korhonen and Tine Walravens for useful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Notes on contributor

Karl Gustafsson is a research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. His doctoral dissertation received the Stockholm University Association's award for best dissertation in the Social Sciences in 2011. His article “Memory politics and ontological security in Sino-Japanese relations” won the Wang Gungwu Prize for best article published in Asian Studies Review in 2014. His research interests include alternative approaches to security and issues related to identity and collective memory in international relations. He recently published in Cooperation and Conflict, The Pacific Review and Asian Perspective.

ORCID

Karl Gustafsson http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9897-9891

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Swedish Research Council (grant number 2012-1150).

Notes

1. Steele (2010), however, views flattery as insincere praise on behalf of the less powerful towards the more powerful. The present article takes an agnostic position regarding the sincerity of the praise. In addition, it does not assume a power disparity between the actors involved.