German leadership between change and continuity: reflections on the possible effects of “Brexit”

Abstract

In light of speculations about Germany’s growing influence in Europe post “Brexit”, the article focuses on three features which so far have proved essential for Berlin’s relations with the outside world: a strong engagement in international institutions; close bilateral relations with a wide range of partners, and the use of diplomacy and trade as tools by which to pursue foreign policy objectives. Drawing on decision-makers' assessments, key strategic documents, and recent academic analyses, the article elaborates on these key pillars of German foreign and then reflects on how they may be impacted by the UK’s decision to leave the European Union. It is argued that while “Brexit” is unlikely to significantly alter existing preferences and trends and will therefore not mark a turning point in German foreign, it might serve as a catalyst for ongoing developments and can potentially further increase German leadership in Europe. Whether this will be the case will ultimately depend, however, on member states' willingness to embrace and support a strong role for Berlin.

Keywords:

• Brexit
• civilian power
• culture of restraint
• European Union
• German foreign policy

Notes

1 In setting these priorities, I draw on findings from 28 interviews which I conducted with members of the German foreign policy elite in Berlin and Brussels between 2011 and 2016.

2 The law specifies the far-reaching rights of the Bundestag with regard to the mandating and withdrawing German troops from international operations.

3 In June 2016, Germany announced its candidacy for a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 2019 to 2020, that is, eight years after it last held this position.

4 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was implemented on 16 January 2016 when the EU lifted all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions against Iran (see EEAS, 2016).

5 Dettke (2014) underlines that even “though Germany’s new foreign minister, Frank Walter Steinmeier, virtually never refers to the Gestaltungsmächtekonzept, its basic assumptions do reflect foreign policy thinking close to German business circles”.

6 Decision-makers in Berlin are furthermore discussing the option of committing additional funding to other security-enhancing measures, including those which strengthen EU border management activities in North African countries, such as Libya (Interview with German official, 25 May 2016).

7 In their respective speeches, von der Leyen called for a generally more proactive security policy, and Gauck underlined the need for a more substantial contribution by Germany (Gauck, 2014; von der Leyen, 2014).

8 The abstention was portrayed as a consequence of concerns about the potentially detrimental effects of intervention into a civil war without an adequate follow-up strategy (Interviews with German decision-makers, 04 July 2014, 07 July 2014).

9 The multinational rapid-reaction units were proposed by France and the United Kingdom in 2004 and actively supported by Germany. Unlike the larger NATO Response Force (NRF), they are not envisioned for high intensity warfare, and to be deployed alongside civilian assets and in support of crisis management activities of the United Nations. If given new impetus, they could be used more frequently for military intervention in small-scale crises, especially in Europe's Eastern and Southern neighborhood (Interview with German official, 25.05.2016).