The legitimacy of European Union foreign policy^*

* This article is part of the research project ‘The Legitimacy of EU foreign and security policy in the age of global contestation’ (LEGOF), financed by the Norwegian Research Council. I should like to thank Erik O. Eriksen and Johanne Døhlie Saltnes for comments on an earlier draft of the article.

ABSTRACT

In this article I enquire into the sources of legitimacy of the European Union's (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy. I suggest that as the EU has moved beyond intergovernmentalism in this policy field, it cannot derive its legitimacy solely from the national systems of the member states. It must establish an additional channel of legitimacy, which is derived directly from the EU. Challenging the conventional position on the legitimacy of global governance institutions, I further suggest that EU institutions can only make a reasonable claim to prevail over the member states in this policy field if they contribute to enhance the normative status of the foreign policy. That the co-operative endeavour is mutually beneficial is not a sufficient basis for the legitimacy of EU foreign policy. Drawing on a deliberative perspective, I suggest that we may expect to find two mutually reinforcing sources of legitimacy at the EU level. However, these would mainly contribute to enhance the external legitimacy of the CFPS. Paradoxically, they may at the same time constrain the internal legitimacy of the EU's foreign policy.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
• legitimacy
• democracy
• foreign policy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Helene Sjursen is Research Professor at ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo.

Notes

* This article is part of the research project ‘The Legitimacy of EU foreign and security policy in the age of global contestation’ (LEGOF), financed by the Norwegian Research Council. I should like to thank Erik O. Eriksen and Johanne Døhlie Saltnes for comments on an earlier draft of the article.

1. For an explication of Locke's position on democracy and foreign policy, see Michael W. Doyle Ways of War and Peace (1997), pp. 2019–220.

2. These findings do not prejudge the question of efficiency, or presume that the EU's global influence is on par with states. They do however rest on an acknowledgement of the EU as a relevant actor at the global scene whose foreign policy affects citizens both within and beyond its borders. For this view, see also Risse (2011).

3. With the Lisbon Treaty, this is also a formal obligation (Article 32).

4. This is consistent also with the empirical findings of contributors to Thomas (ed.) (2011). Based on a series of 14 case studies, 9 contributors to this edited collection found that in the case that they examined, the common norms that the EU member states have committed to in foreign policy constrained member state choices.

5. To be sure, EU foreign policy often wavers in its support of such values and principles in its external policies (Saltnes, 2018).

6. For the view that EU foreign policy decision-making is subject to the will of the European “great powers,” see Gegout (2010) and Menon (2013).

7. While norms are not by definition a “good thing” (Sjursen, 2006), the argument here is linked to a particular set of norms that have been positivised by the UN Charter, which is signed by the vast majority of states.

8. For further discussion on the link between public opinion and democracy in foreign policy, see Peters (2014).