Conclusions on contestation of EU foreign policy: diverse causes, various modes and multiple effects?

ABSTRACT

The Special Issue presents an overview of how and why European Union (EU) foreign policy is contested. Particular attention is given to the EU's inside and outside environment in triggering contestation, as well as to the intergovernmental and supranational dynamics at play. This conclusion brings together insights from the seven contributions to this Special Issue focusing on the causes, modes and effects of contestation across the various clusters of EU foreign policy. Several lessons can be drawn from the contributions for future research on contestation dynamics in EU foreign policy: First, that internal and external contestation can arise from diverse actors and that these internal and external dynamics can be interrelated. Second, that despite the various foreign policy areas being influenced by different dynamics, intergovernmental dynamics were particularly dominant in shaping EU foreign policy.

KEYWORDS:

• European Union
• EU foreign policy
• contestation
• external action

This Special Issue aims at contributing to the growing literature on the recent trends of increased contestation of European Union Foreign Policy (EUFP). By investigating diverse EU external policies clustered in four different EU foreign policy areas (Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), external action and internal policies with external dimension) (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014), the contributing authors of this Special Issue present a wide overview of how and why EUFP is contested. This conclusion reflects on the articles of this Special Issue by reviewing the commonalities and differences found in the seven contributions, focusing on (1) the causes of contestation, (2) the modes of contestation, as well as (3) the effects of such contestation on EU foreign policy, in terms of its internal functioning, its external projection and relations. Particular attention is given to the EU’s inside and outside environment in triggering contestation, as well as to the intergovernmental and supranational dynamics at play. Finally, we provide several reflections on cross-case lessons from the different patterns of contestation and avenues for future research.

Causes of contestation

To begin with the articles of this Special Issue bring reflections on the causes of contestation of diverse foreign policy areas. Indeed, both contestation of EUFP formulation and implementation seem to be driven by different factors that can be clustered in two main categories, i.e. the EU’s internal and/or external environment.

The lack of EU internal consensus on contemporary foreign policy issues is presented in several articles as the main factor creating and influencing internal and external contestation dynamics within EU foreign policy. On this point, Terzi (2021) demonstrates that the intra-EU contestation is due to the relative lack of an EU voice in the multi-issue and multi-level governance of the Arctic, which leads to EU interinstitutional disagreements. On a similar note, Herrera (2021) studies the diverging preferences of EU Member States regarding nuclear non-proliferation and makes the case that the absence of a common EU agreement alongside contested EU competences in this policy area represent a challenge to the EU’s negotiation stance and capacity in non-proliferation policy.

The EU’s external environment and external relations with different actors also greatly influence the contestation of EU foreign policy. The external factors shaping EU foreign policy contestation are diverse and range from security challenges, changing economic orders/globalization trends, the emergence of new actors in international politics (e.g. hybrid actors) as well as the behaviour of individual third parties (e.g. former United States President Trump) (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni & Hofmann, 2019; Hill & Hurst, 2020; Ikenberry, 2018; Stephen & Zürn, 2019). The various case studies emphasize how this external dimension and especially the external (local) actors’ dynamics impact contestation of EUFP. Hasić, Džananović and Ramić Mesihović (2021) demonstrate through their focus on EU norm domestication in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia that the lack of consideration for local dynamics by the EU causes increased contestation of the EU’s attempts to diffuse its enlargement policy norms. The external environment is also important in the case of EU trade policy, analysed by Eliasson and Garcia-Duran (2021), in which the concern over lowering European standards in trade agreements leads to increased contestation and further involvement in policy formulation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). According to Lecocq (2021), the increasing importance of hybrid actors in the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region constitutes an external challenge leading to contestation on foreign policy formulation and implementation among EU institutions.

The two categories of internal and external factors leading to contestation are by no means antithetical, and contestation might result from both internal and external stimuli. Indeed, Petri and Biedenkopf (2021) show the impact of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on internal EU climate ambitions. While on the one hand, the external contestation stimulus raised ambitions, on the other hand, it also strengthened the more climate sceptic political parties inside the European Parliament. A similar parallel of external and internal factors leading to contestation of EU foreign policy can be observed in the case of migration governance. Badell (2021) shows how the contestation of the United Nations Global Compact on Migration increased both due to external relations with the fierce criticism from the US President on the Global Compact (somewhat parallel to the Paris Agreement’s contestation), as well as a lack of internal consensus amongst EU Member States on the issue of migration.

Modes of contestation

When considering modes of contestation of EU foreign policy across articles, we find variance on three dimensions – actors of contestation, levels of contestation and the substance of contestation – which together build the various modes of contestation.

Most articles of this Special Issue focus on actors within the EU’s foreign policy-making machinery – namely the European Commission, the Council of the EU (rarely also the European Council), the European Parliament and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Only two article contributions consider actors “outside” to the EU’s political system: Hasić, Džananović and Ramić Mesihović (2021) focus on how Western Balkan local stakeholders perceive and respond to EU foreign policy efforts to diffuse the norms of “good neighbourly relations”; and Eliasson and Garcia-Duran (2021) analyse the impact of CSOs on EU trade agreement politics. The key difference between these two contributions lies in the latter generating insights into within-EU politics, whereas Hasić, Džananović and Ramić Mesihović (2021) follow an outside-in perspective on EU norms (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018; Lecocq & Keukeleire, 2018).

When looking at the various studies of within-EU level actors, what becomes most apparent is the dominance of analyses of configurations of Member States preferences and Council of the EU dynamics (Badell, Herrera, Lecocq, Petri & Biedenkopf, and Terzi). While the relevance of the Council of the EU in foreign policy making is uncontested in the clusters of CFSP and CSDP (Herrera and Lecocq), thereby explaining the choice for focusing the analyses on them, the choice for analysing Member States preferences in areas of internal policies with an external dimension is particularly insightful (Badell, Petri & Biedenkopf, and Terzi). It emphasizes the relevance of Member States consensus on what external engagement on these less traditional and inherently more nuanced areas of foreign policy should look like. In contrast, it comes as a comparative surprise that three of the Special Issue’s contributions dedicate attention to the EU’s parliamentary chamber (Lecocq, Petri & Biedenkopf, and Terzi), which in terms of legal competences has been seen as a less influential actor in EU foreign policy. Yet, this renewed attention speaks to recent trends in academic work on the European Parliament’s emerging roles and pathways of influence in foreign policy (Raube, Müftüler-Bac, & Wouters, 2019; Stavridis & Irrera, 2015).

Analyses of the role of the European Commission and its stances are comparatively fewer among the contributions, yet unsurprisingly are most frequent in the supranational clusters of “external action”, namely trade agreements (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran) and enlargement policies (Hasić, Džananović, & Ramić Mesihović), and “internal policies with an external dimension”, such as multi-level Arctic policies (Terzi) or migration (Badell). Little focus has been on the Lisbon Treaty’s 2009 innovation: the role of the EEAS (only explicitly mentioned in Herrera and Terzi). This observation leads to the question of why the EEAS is not considered more prominently for tracing contestation. One explanation for this could be its interstitial character (Bátora, 2013) depending on foreign policy consensus in the Council and Commission policy instruments, therefore rather being affected by contestation rather than being an actor exercizing contestation or a forum for contestation of its own.

Another relevant dimension of the modes of contestation (next to actors and levels) are the practices of contestation chosen (e.g. discourse, veto votes, etc.) on a specific aspect or substance of EUFP. A first binary distinction can be drawn between contributions in this Special Issue analysing the “object” of what is contested, namely the formulation of a certain foreign policy – for example setting up a strategy on how to deal with non-state actors in the MENA region (Lecocq) – and the actual implementation of a certain foreign policy – for example the EU’s attempt to diffuse the “good neighbourly relations” norm in Western Balkan countries (Hasić, Džananović, & Ramić Mesihović). In most contributions of the Special Issue, the substance of contestation actually lies in the formulation of the policy within the EU and among its various actors (Badell, Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, Herrera, Lecocq, Petri & Biedenkopf, Terzi). Some analyses combine the formulation dimension with its implementation – for example when Badell (2021) analyses how both the internal policy formulation or consensus-building on the EU’s stance of the global compact for migration is contested as well as the EU’s policy stances enacted in the international arena (similar in Terzi/Arctic policy (2021) and Herrera/non-proliferation policy (2021)). This hints at the entangled nature of internal and external contestation practices. Nuances can also be drawn in the chosen mode of how contestation is enacted. While most contributions show how contestation is expressed in discursive disagreement (e.g. between EU institutions in Lecocq (2021)), there are also cases of contestation shown in explicit policy decisions – for example in Badell (2021)’s case of EU Member States not just disagreeing on which position the EU should take in negotiations on the Global Compact for Migration, but also individually choosing to not sign the Compact in contrast to the EU’s stance.

Effects of contestation

Each of the modes as well as causes of contestation produce specific effects on the EUFP areas studied in this Issue. This contribution reviews the subsequent effects of contestation by policy areas and draws an overarching framework of what this increased contestation in different foreign policy clusters means for EU foreign policy, namely for the EU’s capacity to formulate coherent foreign policies, the EU’s international presence, external perceptions and international relations.

The vast majority of articles in this Issue demonstrate a rather deleterious effect of contestation on the EU’s ability to engage in policy-making (formulation and/or implementation) in the global arena. Indeed, the cases of the Global Compact on Migration or nuclear non-proliferation policy – respectively developed in this Special Issues by Badell (2021) and Herrera (2021) – show that the internal disagreement between EU Member States results in a lack of clarity of the EU’s policy position and norm promotion on the international level. Consequently, the absence of cohesion amongst Member States to push forward a common position on the global stage leads to a weakening of norms internationally. If a common position can be found or defended, it is only the lowest common denominator chosen against more ambitious – and thereby open to more potential internal and external contestation – agenda setting. Similar observations can be made regarding the EU’s presence in the Arctic, studied by Terzi (2021), where the EU is lacking power to push its preferences forward in complex multi-level, multi-actor and multi-issue settings.

As regards the EU’s enlargement process (Hasić, Džananović, & Ramić Mesihović, 2021), contestation leads to an unsuccessful norm diffusion and domestication, notably on the account of a weak understanding of local dynamics by EU institutions. The diffusion of EU norms is also important in the case of external trade policy, and one could expect that the increased involvement of CSOs in shaping the process of concluding trade agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in the case studied by Eliasson and Garcia-Duran (2021), can positively impact the transparency process and overall standards of EU trade agreements’ contents and negotiation processes. Lecocq (2021) argues that the policy emerging from intra-EU contestation regarding how to deal with hybrid actors generates difficulties for the EU to engage – and a fortiori influence the situation – in the MENA region.

An exception stands out in the case of climate contestation, as investigated by Petri and Biedenkopf (2021). Responding to the US announcement to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, EU institutions rhetorically strengthened their foreign climate change ambitions containing external contestation, in spite of small, yet strengthened internal contestation forces in the European Parliament.

Cross-case lessons on EU foreign policy contestation

What can we learn from these insights on causes, modes and effects of contestation dynamics in the various areas of EU foreign policy?

To start with the comparison of the EUFP clusters identified in this Special Issue’s introduction, there are a number of lessons that can be drawn from the intergovernmental and supranational dynamics studied. For the intergovernmental foreign policy clusters – the CFSP and CSDP – this Special Issue offered two case studies illustrating how policy-making within the EU and its consequent foreign policy actions are challenged by various and at times diverging perceptions of the EU’s external activities (Herrera (2021) and Lecocq (2021)). With contestation of “what” the EU should do towards certain actors (e.g. hybrid actors) and on certain foreign policy issues (e.g. non-proliferation), the EU effectively stands without basis to move actively in the international arena. Considering the strong role of intergovernmental dynamics in these clusters, it comes as little surprise that intra-EU divergences appear to be a root cause of limited EU CFSP/CSDP capacity (Franke & Varma, 2019; Johansson-Nogués, Vlaskamp, & Barbé, 2020; Toje, 2008).

For the supranational foreign policy clusters – external action and internal policies with an external dimension – this Issue offered five case studies at the heart of long-standing EU external policies, i.e. trade and enlargement, as well as growingly externally important policies of climate action, migration and the multiple issues in the EU’s engagement towards the Arctic. For the external action cluster, the chosen perspectives on the EU’s strong trade and enlargement policies speak to the need to consider “new”, yet relevant actors of potential contestation – namely actors outside the EU’s institutional machinery. While much attention has been paid to the role of the Council, Commission and partly the European Parliament in both cases (Garcia-Duran & Eliasson, 2017; Góra, Styczyńska, & Zubek, 2019; Rosén, 2016), focusing on the role of CSOs and local stakeholders as contesting agents takes into account new democratic (Ruzza, 2011; Thiel & Uçarer, 2014) and decentring (Keukeleire & Lecocq, 2018) demands to EU foreign policy-making and implementation. Regarding lessons on the internal policies with external dimensions, we see how contestation dynamics originating from inside the EU (e.g. new party cleavages) and outside the EU (e.g. challengers to EU status and/or to EU norms) intertwine, thereby reflecting the very nature of this paralleled foreign policy cluster (in foro interno, in foro externo). Seeing how only in the case of climate action, consensus between Member States could overcome these various contestation dynamics, puts a question mark behind the EU’s ambition to act as a relevant foreign policy actor in priority regions (such as the Arctic) and essential policy areas (such as migration).

There are several lessons that can be drawn from the contributions of the Special Issue for future research on contestation dynamics in EU foreign policy. As highlighted before, the effects of contestation on specific areas of foreign policy were also dependent on the various actors, their levels and modes of contestation. First and foremost, analyses benefit from an inclusion of a broad range of actors. It may be noted that contestation of EU foreign policy could arise from several actors, i.e. CSOs (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran 2021), local stakeholders in third countries (Hasić, Džananović, & Ramić Mesihović, 2021) and national and EU institutions with their communication on particular policies (e.g. Council of the EU in Badell, 2021). Above that, several contributions stressed that internal contestation is often linked to populist actors and parties (e.g. Petri & Biedenkopf, 2021). Future research should analyse how the role of these various internal EU and external actors played out in other cases of EUFP and if by analysing them in parallel, alliances between these actors can be identified.

Moreover, we notice a strong presence of intergovernmental actors in the study of contestation dynamics (i.e. within the EU’s Councils and among Member States), whilst the supranational level (European Commission, European Parliament) and interstitial level (the EEAS) are more often excluded from the frame of analysis. This prominence of intergovernmental decision-making in the EU’s external relations is not surprising, however it seems to be leading to a diminishing of the EU’s norm promotion and negotiating power, due to the lack of internal consensus amongst EU Member States’ diverging policy preferences. In other words, the EU’s internal limitations driven by internal (and/or external) contestation engender negative external consequences with difficulties for the EU to engage actively and deliberately on the global stage. Hence, the missing unified EU position or the lack of any position at the EU level has a direct effect on the EU’s negotiation powers at the global level. Researchers interested in contestation should therefore focus more on those situations where the EU aims to enter the international stage as a unified actor but lacks consensus among its members. Examples for such issue areas – not treated in this Special Issue – could be, human rights standards, rule of law promotion, or sanction politics towards certain actors.

At last, contributions demonstrated that inside and outside contestation dynamics are often intertwined. This was especially the case when the decisions of more powerful non-EU actors contradicted the EU’s foreign policy position and resulted in contestation by internal actors. Therefore, the internal and external contestation stimuli should not be analysed separately. It pays off to consider them both since outside contestation can trigger inside contestation and vice versa.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all contributors to this Special Issue. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments as well as the editorial team of Global Affairs for helping to coordinate this Special Issue. We are grateful for reflections and comments at the EWIS conference 2019 and at two COST Action ENTER EU Foreign Policy Facing New Realities (CA17119) workshops on contestation. We would therefore also like to thank the leaders of the Working Group on Contestation, Oriol Costa and Katja Biedenkopf, for convening the productive exchanges which led to this Special Issue.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [grant number 644096/644097]; European Cooperation in Science and Technology [grant number CA17119]; Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek [grant number 11H3120N]; KU Leuven Special Research Fund [C1 Project CONNECTIVITY].

Notes on contributors

Elodie Thevenin

Elodie Thevenin, M.A., is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Doctoral School in the Social Sciences of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. She also works at the JU Institute of European Studies as a research assistant on the EU Horizon 2020 project “EU Differentiation, Dominance and Democracy (EU3D)”. Her academic interests encompass subjects related to migration, parliamentary discourse and identity. Her doctoral research focuses on the discussion on migration in national parliaments and the European Parliament in relation to the development of European integration. She is a fellow of the Europaeum Scholars Programme (2020/2021).

Lina Liedlbauer

Lina Liedlbauer, M.A., is a research assistant and PhD candidate in the project “Politicising European Security? Processes of Politicisation in Counter-terrorism and Border Security” funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) at the University of Osnabrück. She manages research activities, focusing on the topic of counter-terrorism, counter-radicalization as well as data retention and data protection. Her doctoral research links the role of NGOs to politicization processes in the field of EU security.

Franziska Petri

Franziska Petri, M.A., is a FWO doctoral fellow (2019–2023) at the Leuven International and European Studies, KU Leuven. Her doctoral research focuses on the role of EU Delegations in EU climate and energy diplomacy. Her research interests are European foreign policy, EU climate/energy policy, EU inter-institutional relations, and theorizing (norm) contestation. Her work has been published in the Journal of European Integration, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik and the journal “integration”.