ABSTRACT
This article examines the electoral cost of the EU promoted norms over a candidate country where political risks associated with countering terrorism have an impact on the popularity ratings of an incumbent government. It analyses Turkey as an exceptional case that is the only candidate country and developing economy having a systematic terrorism problem among other accession states. The core argument of this article is twofold. First, complying with EU-promoted peaceful solution run the risk of upsetting the dominant nationalist-conservative cluster, and the incumbent government may lose its voter popularity. Second, political risks associated with non-compliance may cause economic instability, which again triggers losing voter popularity. In both choices, neither full compliance nor defiance may backfire to gain the support of the nationalist-conservative electorate. A moderate decision between the two may be the safest option for a candidate country government to diminish the electoral cost of counter-terrorism policy.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 The survey was conducted with 1260 voting adults through face-to-face interview within 11 provinces of Turkey (Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Diyarbakir, Icel, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri, Malatya, Manisa and Trabzon)
2 The survey was conducted with 1,550 adults over 18 by telephone interviews in 81 provinces of Turkey.
3 A roadmap for peace process agreed with government representatives including former Interior Minister Efkan Ala, AKP Deputy Parliamentary Group Chair Mahir Unal, Deputy Prime Minister Yalcın Akdogan and pro-Kurdish party representatives Pervin Buldan, Idris Baluken and Süreyya Sırrı Önder. The meeting was held on 28 February 2015 in Istanbul's Dolmabahce Palace. Therefore, it is defined as Dolmabahce Consensus.
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Ethem Ilbiz
Ethem Ilbiz is a Marie Curie Senior Research Fellow at the University of South Wales