Cyber power and control: a perspective from strategic theory

ABSTRACT

Cyber power has not been sufficiently examined from the perspective of strategic theory. This research aims to fill this gap by closely analysing the connection between cyber power and the concept of control. For this purpose, the authors use the method of theoretical analysis augmented by an examination of particular historical examples. The findings indicate that cyber sabotage and cyber subversion may be able to produce varying levels of control depending on the particular context of each situation. Cyber espionage alone is unable to produce any level of control, but it may enable other instruments to achieve a level of control.

KEYWORDS:

• Cyber power
• strategy
• control
• espionage
• subversion
• sabotage

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Samuel Žilinčík holds a master’s degree in Security and Strategic Studies from Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. In his doctoral research, he focuses on strategic theory and strategic history. He has authored and co-authored several scientific papers examining the character and nature of contemporary warfare.

Michael Myklín is a doctoral student at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic where he also obtained his masteŕs degree in Security and Strategy Studies. His area of interest is Russian nonlinear warfare, particularly its information and cyber aspects. He has a professional background in the field of cyber security analysis.

Lieutenant colonel Petr Kovanda is a leader of the Section for the Examination of the Art of War at the University of Defense. In his research he focuses on cyber operations, information warfare and the changing character of war. He has also directly participated in several missions to Iraq and Kosovo.

Notes

1. The issue of ‘cyber’ semantics is well described by Futter (2018). In his article, he concludes that there is little consensus about the term ‘cyber’ when it comes to the topic of national security usually spearheaded by politicians or academics. The different uses of the term in different contexts often leads to hype and bad policymaking further reinforced by the actions of the media.

2. An example of the lack of knowledge about basic IT and cybersecurity issues in the highest political levels could be seen during the US congressional testimony of Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg. In this case, some of the US senators had very little idea about how Facebook and social media works (Tibken 2018). In Japan, minister Yoshitaka Sakurada in charge of cybersecurity admitted he has never used a computer in his professional life (McCurry 2018).

3. During the last three decades there have emerged several theories about the supposedly changing nature of war (Kaldor 2013; Creveld 1991; Hoffman 2007). For example, we were told that contemporary wars are ‘new’, ‘non-trinitarian’ or ‘hybrid’. All of these ideas have repeatedly failed the tests of empirical accuracy and analytical utility (Kalyvas 2001; Gray 2016; Charap 2015). For this reason, many respected scholars in strategic studies are now suspicious of new concepts, especially those warning about the coming of ‘cyber’ war.

4. For those interested in this fascinating and necessary conceptual debate, the works of Rid (2012), Stone (2013), McGraw (2013) and Valeriano and Maness (2015) provide a decent introduction.

5. Some valuable pieces have been written by Betz (2012), Echevarria (2017), Gray (2013), Henrotin (2016), Jacobsen (2014), Lonsdale (2004) and a few others.

6. For a more detailed discussion of this inspiration, see Eccles (1965), Milevski (2012) and Rosinski (1958, 1977).

7. Wylie hinted here that land power was special among military tools, because it provided the most direct control. He elaborated on this point later, when he made a clear distinction between the capabilities of different instruments of power to produce control. For example, he claimed that control is so strongly associated with land power because to achieve this effect is the primary purpose of the latter. He contrasted this with air power, the main purpose of which is destruction (Wylie 1967, 88).

8. For a much deeper examination of all three of these activities, see Rid (2013, 55–113).

9. A whole spectrum of cyberweapons exists to conduct these operations, ranging from generic weapons with low potential to more sophisticated ones with higher potential (Rid and McBurney 2012, 6). The use made of these weapons will be described to illustrate the theoretical points better, but the weapons themselves will not be examined in greater detail as that would be irrelevant for the purpose of this research.

10. This idea is in line with Milevski’s (2012, 235–239) assertion that cyber power can only ever produce the first level of control. For a possible counterpoint to this perspective, see the discussion of the concept of ‘cumulative deterrence’ by Tor (2017). Tor’s theoretical argumentation seems persuasive but the real-world evidence for the working of this mechanism seems insufficient so far. Another persceptive is provided by Fasana (2018).

11. A good exposition of the mistaken belief in the notion that human will is rooted in the possession of some technological devices can be found in Gray (1990).

12. This is proposed by Milevski (2018, 62) in his treatment of a potential NATO-Russian war.