China’s use of rhetorical adaptation in development of a global cyber order: a case study of the norm of the protection of the public core of the internet

ABSTRACT

How does China shape a global information order, regarding the norms and institutions that manage cyberspace? Cyber norms are the preferred tool to govern cyberspace given the rapidity of technological change. China’s advances ‘cyber sovereignty’ (wangluo zhuquan) norms to reorient internet governance to the United Nations and specialist state-led international fora and emphasise the dominant position of the state regarding information management. The paper uses a critical case study of a foundational cyber norm: the protection of the public core of the internet, which focuses on ‘safeguarding the functionality and integrity of the core logical and physical infrastructure of the internet from unwarranted state interventions’ (Broeders 2017a). Using descriptive research drawing from primary and secondary sources in Chinese and English languages, I highlight China’s use of rhetorical adaptation – a strategy and set of tactics that simultaneously modify norm content while also deflecting and reducing critiques of norm obstructionism to modify cyber norms. China’s use of rhetorical adaptation renovates norm content by centring the state as the public core of the internet that must be protected – in short internet infrastructure security is in service to state security.

KEYWORDS:

• Norms
• China
• rhetorical adaptation
• cyber sovereignty

Acknowledgements

My thanks go to Sara Plana and Fabio Cristiano who commented on earlier versions of the manuscript prepared for the 2022 International Studies Association Annual Meeting and the 2021 Hague Program for Cyber Norms Conference, respectively. I thank Patryk Pawlak and Agnese Olmati for the opportunity to explore additional ideas in my November 2022 blog post on ‘How China Promotes Cyber Sovereignty’ on the EU Institute for Security Studies’ Directions blog. Finally, I am indebted to the five reviewers who gave concise criticism and recommendations to improve my work.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 I assume issue-specific orders versus a singular ‘liberal international order’ or ‘rules-based international order’ (Foot and Waler 2011; Johnston 2019).

2 For a refutation of the internet as a global commons, see Raymond (2013).

3 Hungary, Iran, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Thailand all use cyber sovereignty discourse, for example.

4 First-wave norm literature assumed that norms were fixed in content and meaning, exported for recipients to assume wholesale as a means of socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Second-wave norm literature noted the domestic and regional legal barriers, for example, to explain the variation in norm uptake through institutionalization (Checkel 1999). Third-wave norm literature addresses ‘localization,’ explaining how international-level norms, vectored to the local-level are grafted on to existing local normative orders during institutionalization (Acharya 2004).

5 The full definition of cyber sovereignty is as follows: ‘As a basic norm in contemporary international relations, the principle of sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter covers all aspects of state-to-state relations, which also includes cyberspace. Countries should respect each other’s right to choose their own path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation and Internet public policies, and participate in international cyberspace governance on an equal footing. No country should pursue cyber hegemony, interfere in other countries’ internal affairs or engage in, condone or support cyber activities that undermine other countries’ national security. Upholding sovereignty in cyberspace not only reflects governments’ responsibility and right to administer cyberspace in accordance with law, but also enables countries to build platforms for sound interactions among governments, businesses and social groups. This will foster a healthy environment for the advancement of information technology and international exchange and cooperation. National governments are entitled to administer cyberspace in accordance with law. They exercise jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure, resources and activities within their territories, and are entitled to protect their ICT systems and resources from threat, disruption, attack and destruction so as to safeguard citizens’ legitimate rights and interests in cyberspace. National governments are entitled to enact public policies, laws and regulations with no foreign interference. Countries should exercise their rights based on the principle of sovereign equality and also perform their due duties. No country should use ICT to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs or leverage its advantage to undermine the security of other countries’ ICT product and service supply chain.’ (2017 International Strategy on Cooperation in Cyberspace).

6 The 2014 Wuzhen Internet Conference slogan.

7 For example, PRC proposals in the Open-Ended Working Group include that states should be supported to draft ‘ICT-related public policies consistent with national circumstances’ and that ‘states should refrain from using ICTs to interfere in internal affairs of other states and undermine their political, economic and social stability.’ See Open-Ended Working Group (2021).

8 The complications of including the organization infrastructure (e.g. Internet Exchanges, CERTs) are discussed in Broeders (2017a, 2017b).

9 After land, sea, air, and space.

10 I thank the editor for prompting this point.

11 Buzan (2016) uses the term ‘autistic rising powers’.’ See Christian 2017 critique of ‘ableism’ in International Relations.

12 See Russian Federation (2021a, 2021b).

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Courtney J. Fung

Courtney J. Fung is Associate Professor in the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University. Her research focuses on how rising powers address the norms and provisions for global governance and international security, with an empirical focus on China. She is the author of China and Intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling Status (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). Her research is published in peer-reviewed journals like The China Quarterly, Cooperation and Conflict, Global Governance, International Affairs, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, International Peacekeeping, Journal of Global Security Studies, amongst others.