Notes
1 Of course, there is some debate over whether the US is actually in meaningful decline. See Robert J. Lieber, “Can the US Retain Primacy?” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, V: 3 (2011), 23–36.
2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Book 2, Chapter 8, http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/detoc/ch2_08.htm.
3 Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy (Chicago, 1998).
4 The divide goes back to the founding of the republic and the divisions between Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians. See Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York, 2002).
5 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton, 2006), p. 26.
6 Mead, op. cit.
7 Henry R. Nau, At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy (Ithaca, 2002), p. 43.
8 Mead, op. cit.
9 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, 1998).
10 This rare consensus in US politics replaced a longstanding schism over whether to support activist foreign policies or not. See Jeff Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940,” International Organization, XLII: 1 (1988), 59–90; and Fred Block, “Economic Instability and Military Strength: The Paradoxes of the 1950 Rearmament Decision,” Politics & Society, X: 1 (1980), 35–58.
11 Joanne Gowa and Soo Yeon Kim, “An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950–1994,” World Politics, LVII: 4 (2005), 435–78.
12 Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952 (Cambridge, 1987).
13 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (Oxford, 2005 [1982]), p. 10.
14 Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of US National Security Policy, 1949–51 (Ann Arbor, 1998); Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino–American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, 1996).
15 The phrase belongs to Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, LXX: 1 (1990), 23–33.
16 Eric A. Miller and Steve A. Yetiv, “The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration's Worldview in Transition,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, XXXI: 1 (2001), 56–68.
17 G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” Foreign Affairs, XC: 3 (2011), 56–68.
18 Kevin Narizny, “Anglo–American Primacy and the Global Spread of Democracy: An International Genealogy,” World Politics, LXIV: 2 (2012), 341–73; Patrick J. McDonald, “Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace,” International Organization, LXIX: 3 (2015), 557–88.
19 McDonald, op. cit.
20 Ewan Harrison and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, The Triumph of Democracy and the Eclipse of the West (New York, 2013).
21 Daniel Wirls, Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense from Reagan to Obama (Baltimore, 2010).
22 Walter C. Ladwig, “A Neo-Nixon Doctrine for the Indian Ocean: Helping States Help Themselves,” Strategic Analysis, XXXVI: 3 (2012), 384–99.
23 A weaker form of this strategy would be to foster the economic growth of friendly nations but to insist on continuing to take care of the defense of those nations, thus allowing the United States to satisfy both its domestic desire for wealthy trading partners and its impulse for militarism abroad.
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Peter Harris
Peter Harris is an assistant professor of political science at Colorado State University, where his research focuses on international security, international relations theory, and US foreign policy.