![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Notes
1 See undated memorandum on the negotiations between North Korea and Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, henceforth “Undated Memorandum.” See Ze'ev Schiff, “Sibot Le'daber im Tsfon Korea,” Haaretz, January 15, 2003 and Yossi Melman,“Yeshagru o Lo Yeshagru,” Haaretz, June, 27, 2006. Some of my findings are based on interviews with Moshe Yegar, January 5, 2015; Abi Setton, June, 21, 2006; Eytan Bentsur, June 26, 2006; and Efraim Halevy, June 15, 2015 and March 22, 2016.
2 It should be noted that most of the official records on this issue have not been released.
3 Moshe Yegar, The Long Journey to Asia, (Haifa, 2004), p. 328.
4 Dario Leone, “Israeli F-4s Actually Fought North Korean MiGs during the Yom Kippur War,” The Aviationist, June 25, 2013.
5 Yegar, op. cit., p. 328.
6 Ibid., p. 322.
7 See, for example, Young Sam Ma, “Israel's role in the UN during the Korean War,” The Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, IV: 3 (2010), 82.
8 For more on these developments see Michael Brecher, Israel, the Korean War and China (Jerusalem, 1974), pp. 31, 46–49.
9 UN files, S/1501.
10 Brecher, op. cit., p. 31.
11 See, for example, Young Sam Ma, op. cit., 81–88.
12 See Yegar, op. cit., pp. 322–27. An embarrassing development occurred in 1978 when Israel unilaterally closed its embassy in Seoul due to budgetary constraints, and its ambassador in Tokyo was accredited to South Korea.
13 Yegar, op. cit., pp. 329–34.
14 Interview with Moshe Yegar, January 5, 2015.
15 This section is based on the Undated Memorandum, Schiff, op. cit., and Melman, op. cit.
16 There are different versions of this matter. See also Abi Setton, Ha-saga Le-beit Setton, (Jerusalem, 2014), p. 73 and my interview with him on June 21, 2006.
17 Undated Memorandum; Abi Setton, “Ha-Maga'im im Tsfon Korea Le'havi Le'hafsakat Aspakat Ha-Tilim Le'oyveinu,” and Time Magazine, June 7, 1993. North Korea is naturally abundant in metals such as magnesite, zinc, tungsten, iron, and gold. However, these could often not be mined due to a shortage of electricity and the lack of proper tools and knowhow. Joint mining ventures exist with other countries, and China is the country's leading trade partner for minerals.
18 According to Setton, who participated in all the relevant meetings with the North Koreans, the delegation had received the foreign minister's blessing. Peres himself had spoken to Prime Minister Rabin, who had concurred. See Setton, Ha-Saga, op. cit. pp. 73–74.
19 Efraim Halevy, Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led the Mossad (New York, 2008), p. 58 and interviews with Halevy on June 15, 2015 and March 22, 2016 (the names of the members of the delegation were not disclosed, nor were any other details related to the conversations); Eytan Bentsur, “Mits’ad Ha-ivelet,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, February 20, 2007. Halevy's initial contact was made through an Italian who had been in touch with both Israel and North Korea.
20 Melman, op. cit. and Schiff, op. cit. The report was submitted on November 12, 1992. See Amos Bein to Eytan Bentsur, MFA files.
21 According to Halevy, they met on the airplane. Interview, March 22, 2016.
22 Amos Bein and Moshe Shirav, “Report on a Visit to the Unsan Gold Mines—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” Jerusalem, November 1992, MFA files. The report dealt with the geology of the area in which the mines were located and included an analysis of the minerals to be found there. Reference was made to the alluvial deposits, and it emphasized the need for more updated information. No capital investment seemed advisable without further extensive evaluation of the potential reserves and a feasibility study proving that they could be economically exploited. The total cost of an initial assessment leading to a more precise picture was estimated at $4–5 million.
23 Undated Memorandum. See also Melman, op. cit., and Schiff, op. cit.
24 Undated Memorandum.
25 Aron Shai, The Evolution of Israeli–Chinese Friendship (Tel Aviv, 2014), pp. 18–19.
26 I would like to thank Prof. Stuart Cohen for this observation.
27 Undated Memorandum.
28 Undated Memorandum; See Yossi Melman, op. cit. and Setton to Gil, May 9, 1993, MFA files, 595706.
29 The sums noted should not be taken too seriously. At various times different amounts were mentioned. No one seems to have taken them at face value.
30 Setton argued that no decision had been taken to cease contact with the North Koreans following the meeting of the two ministers. On the whole, the State Department was interested in pursuing the talks. Interview with Abi Setton, June 21, 2006.
31 Interview with Eytan Bentsur, June 26, 2006.
32 Israeli companies such as M.I.C. and U.D.I. were involved.
33 The New York Times, August 15; Haaretz, August 17, 1993.
34 Interview with Halevy, June 15, 2015.
35 Bentsur, “Mits’ad Ha-ivelet,” op. cit. Undated Memorandum and Melman, op. cit. Setton argued that not only did Halevy and the Mossad officers sabotage the diplomatic maneuvers; they also strongly influenced Rabin. Therefore, Rabin reversed his original stance, going so far as to refuse to meet a delegation of high-ranking MFA officials. Setton, Ha-Saga, op. cit. p. 77.
36 Shai, op. cit., pp. 47–48.
37 Halevy, op. cit., p. 56.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Aron Shai
Aron Shai is Shoul N. Eisenberg Professor of East Asian Affairs and pro-rector at Tel Aviv University. He is an internationally recognized authority on East Asia and the author of more than ten books. His latest is China and Israel: Equivocal Ties: Jews, Chinese, Jerusalem, and Beijing [Hebrew]. Prof. Shai served as the chair of the History Curriculum Committee of the Ministry of Education and the chair of the History and East Asian Studies Departments of Tel Aviv University. He has lectured at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and was a visiting professor at CERI and Sciences Po, Paris.