Preparing The Armed Conflict Survey 2020 has served, once again, as a reminder of the complexity of conflict in the twenty-first century. With each edition, we observe the consolidation of trends highlighted earlier, including the substantial internationalisation of many conflicts, which increasingly often involve regional and international actors that use the battleground to pursue their rivalries. In so doing, stakes often grow higher and the strategic repercussions of events can reverberate much further afield.
For each of the 33 conflicts covered, the book provides an overview of the key developments in 2019; the events that led to the current situation; data on the conflict parties involved; the drivers of the conflict; political and military developments; and analysis of the significance of the conflict. Specifically, we delve into the consequences of the major political and military developments for human rights and the humanitarian situation, the social and economic impact of the conflict, and how it has affected relations with neighbouring and international partners. We assess the state of the conflict at the end of 2019, albeit without making predictions, and identify the trends and trajectories that will be most relevant for 2020, including prospects for conflict resolution, risks of conflict intensification or spillover, and scenarios for reconstruction. Each conflict chapter concludes with the strategic implications of the conflict locally and internationally. Complementing the analysis are conflict-specific maps and graphics to illustrate patterns and structures such as violent hotspots, armed-group networks, transitional-government structures and human-displacement data.
Snapshots for each of the six geographical regions into which conflicts are organised outline key trends, strategic implications and prospects. We endeavour to underline geopolitical and geostrategic relations and how they intersect with conflict. Examples include what Turkey’s involvement in Syria means for its relationship with NATO; the impact of attacks by Baloch insurgents against Chinese interests on Islamabad–Beijing relations; or how diminishing Western engagement with the Burmese government might create room for China to expand its political influence in Myanmar.
The number of situations around the world meeting our definition of armed conflict decreased from 40 in 2015, when the Armed Conflict Survey was first published, to 33 in 2019. This might seem like a marked improvement, but notwithstanding the removal of some conflicts such as Kosovo and the Niger Delta, the current line-up of conflicts also reflects multiple transformations. Since 2015, we have recorded how, owing to changes in the drivers of conflicts and the relationships among armed groups, various conflicts had to be merged – as was the case for India’s northeastern conflicts in the previous edition – while others were split, such as Central America’s Northern Triangle. In addition to these changes, some conflicts have ended, and therefore were removed from the survey, and new ones have begun, such as in Cameroon in 2017.
Observing the morphing of some of the conflicts and the trajectory of many others brings the centrality of non-state armed groups into clear focus. We have highlighted this in three ways. Firstly, chapters include expanded profiles of conflict parties, a large proportion of which are non-state actors. Secondly, all four thematic essays are centred on aspects of the activities and nature of armed groups and the responses required to limit their pernicious effects. Finally, the 2020 Chart of Armed Conflict that accompanies the book compares the number of state and non-state parties in each conflict theatre. Notably, in 21 of 33 conflicts the number of non-state armed groups exceeds the number of state groups.Footnote1
Armed groups in focus
As in previous editions, we have invited experts to open the survey with thematic essays analysing emerging or evolving trends in conflict. Acknowledging that trends evolve and linger for longer than our 12-month time frame, we believe the selected topics are particularly relevant for the year at hand and will have an enduring relevance as they cover potentially growing threats and policy challenges.
This year’s essays aim to provide an understanding of the changing nature of armed groups and the emerging trends that characterise their operations. In ‘Armed-Group Proliferation: Origins and Consequences’, Brian McQuinn warns that despite the emergence of a large number of groups in recent decades, it is the proliferation of horizontally structured groups that is likely to influence the direction of many conflicts. In the context of peace processes, for instance, a decentralised chain of command and involvement of multiple group leaders is likely to impede negotiations, owing to the multiplicity of voices and agendas. This challenge is well known in the context of the conflict in Mali and the wider Sahel.
Alongside the adoption of a horizontal rather than a vertical structure, adaptability and flexibility are contributing factors to groups’ longevity. Experimenting with technology is a way of adapting to changing circumstances to surprise and undermine opponents. In this regard, Eleanor Beevor and Dhia Muhsin examine an area of growing concern among policymakers and security experts: the threat of armed groups using uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones). The broader international community became acutely aware of this threat in the wake of the attack carried out by Yemen’s Houthi movement (Ansarullah) in Saudi Arabia in September 2019. Despite the hype, evidence discussed in ‘Non-state Armed Groups and UAVs: Uptake and Effectiveness’ points to less alarming conclusions in the short term. Non-state armed groups are not currently in a position to weaponise non-military UAVs quickly or easily. Yet technological change coupled with growing experience and know-how will introduce new possibilities for armed groups and as such this remains an area of non-state activity to be monitored, especially in the case of groups receiving state backing.
Adaptability comes in many forms. In ‘ISIS Foreign Fighters after the Fall of the Caliphate’, Francesco Milan underlines how in the post-caliphate era, the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, remains able to mobilise foreign fighters and exploit the networks once used to guarantee the flow of fighters to Syria and Iraq to facilitate their movement into other conflict zones. Indeed, the relocation of veteran fighters to regions such as Southeast Asia and Africa underscores ISIS’s resilience at a time when Western governments face the challenge of dealing with four categories of foreign fighters, each presenting its own conundrum, while ISIS in Syria is showing signs of resurgence.
Armed groups, either ideologically or criminally driven (or both), are infamous for quickly exploiting the business opportunities presented by conflict, often for economic gain. ‘Human Trafficking in Conflict’ focuses on the link between the two phenomena, stressing how the increasingly prevalent protracted conflicts that displace large numbers of people create optimal conditions for human trafficking. Tuesday Reitano lists many capacity shortcomings at the local and international levels, as well as within state institutions, international organisations and NGOs. Ending the plight of trafficking victims, which warranted greater concern throughout the 2010s, appears to remain unachievable in the short and medium term.
The Chart of Armed Conflict, conflict duration and prospects for peace
In addition to presenting data on the number of parties engaged in the 33 active conflicts, this year’s Chart of Armed Conflict has two other purposes. Firstly, it lists multinational missions to conflict and post-conflict countries, indicating the start date and current strength of operations and missions deployed under the aegis of the European Union, NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the UN and a number of ad hoc groupings such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Secondly, the Chart puts a spotlight on conflict duration. The concept of prolonged conflict and the resulting implications such as large-scale displacement have been recurrent themes in policy and conflict-analyst circles in recent years, particularly in the aftermath of the migration crisis that started in 2015. Twelve of the active conflicts started in 2009–19, while more than 60% of conflicts have been ongoing for ten years or longer. This raises questions about the prospects for conflict resolution in 2020.
Analysis in this year’s Armed Conflict Survey suggests some glimpses of hope. Violence and hostilities have started to ease in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, and in Colombia, despite the presence and actions of FARC dissidents, the peace agreement between the government and the left-wing guerrilla group is likely to remain in place. Elsewhere, the insurgency targeting Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula is losing fighting power, and violence in several African conflicts – the Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan and Nigeria’s Farmer–Pastoralist – decreased compared to the previous year. In Pakistan, violence by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan declined, and 2019 marked the first year since 2003 without Pakistani or US airstrikes.
Most significant, however, was the lead-up to the historic deal the Taliban and the US government reached in February 2020. Following 18 months of negotiations, the agreement appeared to bring hope for the resolution of Afghanistan’s nearly two-decade-long conflict (and American withdrawal) but also served as a reminder of the fragility and complexities of peace deals. Violence resumed only a few days later and there are significant hurdles to overcome regarding the role the Taliban will play in Afghan politics and society. Indeed, the challenge of implementing peace agreements remained a very tangible one in 2019, as evidence from Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali clearly indicates. The fragmentation of negotiating parties representing different factions, economic interests and agendas, often backed by different international actors, and capacity shortcomings, such as limited ability to reintegrate former armed groups into society, have proved serious obstacles to the implementation of many agreements.
Notes
1 Brazil (Rio de Janeiro & Ceará), Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia (BACRIMs), Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Ethiopia (Communal Violence), Honduras, Iraq, Israel–Palestine, Mexico (Cartels), Myanmar, Nigeria (Farmer–Pastoralist), Pakistan, Philippines (ASG & Moro), South Sudan, Southern Thailand, Sudan (Darfur, Blue Nile & South Kordofan), Syria, Turkey (PKK) and Yemen.