ABSTRACT
The article highlights that the traditional conflict/cooperation dichotomy which characterised the dynamic of European Union (EU)–Russia relation during the post-Cold War period has remained stable throughout the Ukraine crisis. It identifies a pattern of continuity rather than change in the main characteristics of the traditional conflict/cooperation dichotomy: the post-Cold War order on the European continent, values and worldviews, perceptions of self and other, and policies towards each other and post-Soviet space. Secondly, in tune with neoclassical realism the article aims to account for the relative persistence of the conflict/cooperation dichotomy. It argues that the dynamic of EU–Russia relations remained rather stable due to the fact that neither the EU nor Russian foreign policy has undergone major transformations (of both power, scope and organisation) that would provide incentive or constrains for a complete overhaul of the conflict/cooperation dichotomy. Moreover, the article claims that the relative stability of world politics since the start of the Ukraine crisis has not given any the EU and Russia incentives – or constrained them – to seek to change the overall dynamic of their relationship.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. Similarly, to neoclassical realism, the article locates change and continuity in EU–Russia both at the systemic and actor levels, while focusing not only material power, but also the role of ideas, institutions, perceptions, or beliefs (Becker et al., Citation2016; Kropatcheva, Citation2012). Nevertheless, contrary to neoclassical realism which focuses on states, it assumes that international organisations such as the EU can be considered fully fledged international actors, and thus construct distinguishable foreign policy. While space constraints do not permit a full discussion of the debate on the international actorness of the EU (Smith, Citation2005), the focus on the EU is justified by the fact that the role of individual member states is broadly understood in the scholarship as merely one aspect among others of the EU’s foreign policy towards Russia (Diesen, Citation2015; Haukkala, Citation2010; Medvedev, Citation2008).