Assessing the effect of the European elections’ Spitzenkandidaten procedure on the constitution of the European Commission

ABSTRACT

In 2014, Commission President Juncker was elected because he was Spitzenkandidat of the winning party in the European elections. Observers agree that the procedure’s impact on the turnout was low, but that it had an effect on the inter-institutional power play. This paper investigates whether the more legitimised Commission President and the European Parliament (EP) had a greater influence on the constitution of the Commission, understood as the selection of Commissioners and the internal organisation. It is based on the classic debate between supranational and intergovernmental approaches. The paper analyses data on Commissioners, press reports and official documents. It concludes that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure had mixed effects. The selection of Commissioners still follows national logics. Member states aim to maximise their interest by sending loyal politicians, who might secure an important portfolio. The selection of Commissioners follows national, rather than European party-politics. Juncker exerted a limited influence on the selection of Commissioners regarding his quest for more female candidates. The President’s power is limited to the influence prescribed by the Treaty, namely the organisation of the Commission and the allocation of portfolios. Here, his close relation to the EP and his legitimacy derived from his role as Spitzenkandidat played a significant role.

KEYWORDS:

• European commission
• Spitzenkandidaten
• European Parliament elections 2014
• parliamentarisation
• supranationalism
• intergovernmentalism

Acknowledgements

I thank Sebastian Fietkau, Till Gierlich, Lea Hokenmaier, Torsten J. Selck and an anonymous reviewer for their comments.

Notes

1. Note that the numbers are calculated based on all members of a Commission throughout the term. In 2014, three men and one woman replaced the early leavers in the Barroso Commission. Hence, of 32 Commissioners, ten were female. Therefore, the share of women in the initial team of the Juncker Commission is higher than in Barroso’s second term.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Heinrich Böll Foundation.