Governors and local elites in Russia: patterns of interaction

ABSTRACT

Empirical research conducted in 5 Russian local communities in 2011–2015 discovered asymmetric principal-agent relations between regional and municipal authorities in which regional authorities have all the necessary resources for effective control over the urban elites and interference in the local political process. However, despite the increasing centralization, the regional-local government relationships remain variable. The active presence or absence of the governor and his team in urban politics largely depends on personal relations between the heads of regional and municipal administrations, the resource base of the territory, the severity of conflicts and/or problems that threaten its stable development. Spectrum of relations between the regional and local elites varies from quite constructive and relatively conflict-free, to rather tense and open confrontation, while the interference of the regional authorities in the activities of the local government bodies differs from episodic to permanent.

KEYWORDS:

• Local politics
• urban communities
• governors
• Russian politics

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to anonymous referees for comments and valuable suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 To explain the nature of control of the regional authorities over the local government Turovsky uses the term ‘filialization’. He distinguishes several forms of filialization. First, it is procedural filialization, when the governor controls the process of choosing a city-manager through a competitive commission. Second, financial filialization takes place, since in many local communities more than a half of the local budgets is formed by transfers from the regional level. Third, party filialization: top local and regional officials are members of the ‘party of power’ (United Russia) and are responsible for providing favorable electoral results. Fourth, it is important for local leaders to enter the client networks of the governors. This is clearly illustrated by the practice of appointing city-managers from the regional executives and blocking the possibilities of undesirable persons to come to power (Gel'man, 2013; Turovskiy, 2015).

2 The Perm region (‘Permskiy Krai’) is a developed industrial center, indicators of its economic and social development are above average in Russia. Ivanovo and Tambov regions (‘Ivanovskaya oblast’ and ‘Tambovskaya oblast’) are typical medium-weak regions from an economic and financial point of view. Communities are of comparable size (40,000–88,000 citizens); just one of the towns (Chusovoy) is a mono-industrial company town with a city-forming enterprise while others are quite typical from the economic point of view.

3 Interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2015. Unfortunately, due to limited resources, we were not able to conduct interviews simultaneously in all towns. However, we believe that this did not lead to serious distortions, since institutional changes and the transition from competitive to hegemonic authoritarianism, which took place during this period more affected the actors at the federal level.

4 The head of the town and his team tried to realize the idea of an ‘urban district’ that would lead to the virtual elimination of the district level of government while district leaders insisted on the ‘Leningrad variation’ in which the district administration became the most powerful local institution.

5 Conflicts between the regional and district authorities continued even further, but the issue of the institutional structure of the local government in Chusovoy was finally closed.

6 Shuya is a large industrial center with solid historical and cultural traditions; for the former governor, culture and historical heritage were of great importance.

7 The declared autonomy in relations with the governor does not mean that the city-manager did not try to establish close personal ties with the regional authorities at all. But she relied more not on the governor, but on the other regional public officials, especially on those who controlled budget money; thereby she expected to increase her chances to get money for new projects. Among them are the Deputy Chairman of the regional government for Social Affairs and the Deputy Governor for Economic Affairs. ‘These two people are very important for the town. Financing depends on them’, the city-manager explains.

8 The vice-governor himself was arrested a few months later on charges of illegal use of public funds. In two years, the governor left his post, and was replaced by a new appointee from Moscow. The official explanation was: corruption in the team and the inability to stop the conflict between the elites in the region. The most surprising thing in this story is that the new governor again invited the former city-manager to take the same post.

9 Of course, not only the governor and his entourage are involved in interaction with the local elite; but they, as the study showed, play the most important role in it.