The Sum of All Friends: Improving Cross-border Intelligence Sharing in Europe - the Case of the Benelux

ABSTRACT

In battling organized crime and terrorism, the sharing of intelligence is of crucial importance. This is especially true in Europe, where suspects can easily travel between the different ‘Schengen’ jurisdictions, which allows free movement of persons. It is crucial for EU member states to pool resources and share intelligence if they want to gain the upper hand in crime-fighting and counter-terrorism operations.

Due to the highly sensitive nature of intelligence and the fact that being secretive is a tool of the trade, sharing does not come naturally to policing and intelligence agencies, especially not with foreign partners. However, there is a need to re-envision the relationships of these agencies with their foreign counterparts vis-à-vis intelligence sharing. This article will shed light on how cross-border intelligence sharing is currently undertaken by focusing on international police cooperation in the EU. By identifying the practices that have shaped the 2018 Benelux police cooperation treaty, this article will demonstrate how the EU can strengthen its intelligence-sharing mechanisms. In doing so, it aims to highlight the obstacles to overcome in order to level the playing field between criminals and terrorists on the one hand and policing and intelligence agencies on the other.

RESUMEN

En la lucha contra el crimen organizado y el terrorismo, el intercambio de inteligencia es de crucial importancia. Esto es especialmente cierto en Europa, donde los sospechosos pueden viajar fácilmente entre las diferentes jurisdicciones “Schengen”, que permite la libre circulación de personas. Es crucial que los estados miembros de la UE junten recursos y compartan inteligencia si quieren ganar ventaja en la lucha contra el crimen y en las operaciones antiterroristas. Debido a la naturaleza altamente sensible de la inteligencia y al hecho de que el secreto es una herramienta del oficio, compartir no es algo natural para las agencias de policía e inteligencia, especialmente no con socios extranjeros. Sin embargo, es necesario re-imaginar las relaciones de estas agencias con sus contrapartes extranjeras con respecto a compartir inteligencia. Este artículo arrojará luz sobre cómo se comparte actualmente la inteligencia transfronteriza centrándose en la cooperación policial internacional en la UE. Al identificar las prácticas que han dado forma al tratado de cooperación policial del Benelux 2018, este artículo demostrará cómo la UE puede fortalecer sus mecanismos de intercambio de inteligencia. Al hacerlo, su objetivo es resaltar los obstáculos a superar para nivelar el campo de juego entre delincuentes y terroristas, por un lado, y las agencias de policía e inteligencia, por el otro.

KEYWORDS:

• Benelux
• cooperation
• European Union
• intelligence
• policing

Palabras clave:

• Benelux
• Cooperación
• Unión Europea
• Inteligencia
• vigilancia policial

Introduction

Terrorism is increasingly becoming more international (Gruszczak, 2016, p. 13; Lander, 2004, p. 482). The European Union (EU), with its Schengen open borders system, is vulnerable to a particular tactic of criminals and terrorists: they knowingly try to use the method of frequently crossing borders because they are aware that law enforcement can only operate within the borders of a national state or in a formally agreed upon partnership, such as those under the auspices of an organization such at Europol. The latter can be a time-consuming exercise, which does not benefit investigations that are time-sensitive, such as tracking down a terrorist suspect. While some cross-border police cooperation can function very well, to the point where car chases can be continued by the partner organization as soon as a criminal or terrorist crosses a border, this is not universally the case. Furthermore, the increase in speeding cameras and toll roads makes getting away undetected by road difficult. Therefore, public transportation, such as trains and buses, is gaining popularity as means of transportation, as they do not – unlike flights – require (prior) registration of passenger data and automatic exchange thereof.

That terrorists are actively using this tactic becomes clear from the following examples of terrorist attacks within the EU over the past two decades. Anis Amri, the man held responsible for the attack on the Berlin Christmas market on 19 December 2016, initially escaped by traveling through Europe by public transport. After his attack, he most likely traveled from Berlin, to Nijmegen, the Netherlands, where he is believed to have taken a bus to Lyon, France. There he most likely took a train via Turin to Milan, Italy, where he was shot and killed by the Italian police on 23 December 2016.

Similarly, the terrorist cell that planned and executed the attack on the Bataclan club and other locations in Paris in November 2015 was based in Belgium. Subsequent investigation leads to arrests made in Belgium in connection to the attack which took place at various locations in Paris. Belgium announced in the wake of the terrorist attacks that hit Belgium and France that it would create a smart camera shield of some 3000 Automatic Number Plate Recognition cameras (ANPR-cameras) on the highways, capable of following suspicious vehicles (Dobbelaere-Welvaert, 2018). This was introduced as a means of surveillance in case of suspects trying to flee the country by car.

The perpetrator who was held responsible for the shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels on 24 May 2014 had a similar travel pattern. The perpetrator had French nationality and was arrested at a railway station in Marseille, France following the shooting. Another incident, the 2018 Amsterdam stabbing attack, where a man of Afghan origin stabbed two people, was in a similar vein. The perpetrator had a German residency permit and resided there, but traveled by train to Amsterdam central station to execute his attack, where the police shot and apprehended him.

At times public transportation itself becomes a target, as was the case with the Thalys, the high-speed train connection between Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and Paris, France. On 21 August 2015, a man opened fire in the train, injuring four people, before he could be overpowered by passengers. Similarly, the Dutch prosecution charged a man with “murder with terrorist intent” (Koop & Tieleman, 2019) for firing shots, killing four, in a tram in Utrecht, the Netherlands on 18 March 2019.

Of course not every terrorist or criminal flees abroad to avoid identification, capture, or prosecution. It is interesting to note that the most recent attacks on the British Isles were executed by residents or citizens of Britain. The Manchester Arena bombing of May 2017, for example, was perpetrated by a man born in Manchester. The perpetrators of the 2017 London Bridge attack claimed different nationalities, but were known to have grown up, or were permanently residing in Britain. The same goes for the four suicide bombers who attacked London public transportation on 7 July 2005: three of them lived in Leeds, one in Aylesbury, and three of them were born in Britain and one in Jamaica.

A partial explanation for why very few foreigners have executed attacks there is the geographical nature of the islands, the fact that it is not party to the Schengen agreement, and the few (fast) transportation options to and from the islands. While quick escape routes are not the primary concern for those planning a suicide attack, getting the resources needed for such an attack, however, is, and border controls between the Schengen and non-Schengen areas can make this more difficult.

Cooperation in practice

Before assessing the practical application of intelligence cooperation and sharing, the key concept of intelligence requires defining. Intelligence is described as a set of organizations within a governmental structure, as a process, and a product (Herman, 1996, p. 2). Given the scope of this article, the government structures that are concerned with military intelligence are disregarded. Furthermore, given that the remit of the case study is limited to police cooperation, this article’s focus is predominantly on policing entities. Nevertheless, it bears keeping in mind that, especially in the realm of counter-terrorism, “the practices of policing and security and intelligence services have become increasingly intertwined” (Sheptycki, 2014, p. 106). This also follows from some examples referred to in the preceding section, where police were often a first responder, or confronted with a suspected terrorist fugitive.

In as far as intelligence can be considered a process, a detailed description of the merits of the various models of the intelligence cycle falls outside the scope of this article.¹ However, it is worth noting that when intelligence sharing becomes a routine option, part of the intelligence cycle – collection and, depending on the product, analysis – will be executed by a foreign entity. As will be discussed later in this article, this can have both advantages and disadvantages.

Lastly, when considering intelligence as a product, it serves to distinguish between information and intelligence. While Vandepeer (2014, p. 7) referred to military intelligence, the distinction he makes can help clarify the difference: “information is thought of as unanalyzed data with intelligence being information that has been analyzed.” As the case study will demonstrate, often times the cooperation is described in terms of information exchanges, rather than a direct reference to intelligence. Ultimately, the treaty can cover both types of products, but the broader term of information provides less restrictions in terms of requiring to know the value within the analysis of the piece of information that is exchanged under the treaty. Given the context of police-to-police exchange of information, it is worth noting that it is highly likely that at least some of the information exchanged can be classified as intelligence.

The examples in the preceding section make the need for cooperation clear, not only in the aftermath of an attack but especially in the preparation state, if the goal is to prevent attacks. That requires therefore not only operational or tactical intelligence cooperation but also a common strategy if the goal is to undermine international terrorist cells and criminal enterprises that operate cross-border. However, national security and intelligence are subject to a very high degree of sovereignty, which makes sharing difficult, both operationally and politically. In fact, Fägersten (2015, p. 102) argues that if states are capable of handling a situation by themselves, they will prefer to do so, rather than to cooperate.

Cooperation does, however, happen in practice. There are numerous formal and informal intelligence sharing networks of which EU member states are part of. Some are exclusively set up to share intelligence, others have it as a function of a wider mandate. To name a few examples: the Five Eyes (Svendsen, 2008, p. 131), NATO Civilian Intelligence Committee (Fägersten, 2015, p. 100), Club of Berne (Walsh, 2006, p. 631) (now officially tasked to provide Europol with counterterrorism guidance) (Rudner, 2004, p. 210), and The Egmont Group (Rudner, 2004, p. 211).

These networks are important, especially if considered as a confidence-building measure, but the power of bilateral cooperation should not be underestimated. Bilateral or minilateral cooperation can also take a fluid form. To name one example, the Five Eyes, who have worked together on signals intelligence (SIGINT) for decades, organized a '24-hour’ challenge with the Dutch FIOD (Financial Crime Intelligence Agency) in November 2018 to learn about each other’s strengths and methods (Wouters, 2018). A month later, Operation Pollino saw the FIOD work together with colleagues from Belgium, Italy, and Germany, working under the auspices of Eurojust (2018), to financially cripple the ‘Ndrangheta (Italian mafia), by arresting those running money laundering operations throughout Europe.

But cooperation extends beyond the domain of financial crime. In October 2018, the Dutch and British governments announced that their intelligence services had worked closely together to prevent Russian interference with the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at their headquarters in The Hague following the Skripal poisoning (Government of the Netherlands, 2018). Dutch Minister of Defense Ank Bijleveld underscored the need for intelligence cooperation in her statement during the 4 October 2018 press conference (NPO 1, 2018) in which she announced that Russian intelligence officers had been intercepted in the Netherlands and expelled.

Opportunities

When partners already know one another and have a close relationship, trust is what drives cooperation and diminishes the chances of a negative outcome when conflicts arise (Gill & Thompson, 2017, p. 85). One of the elements that can make a difference in the decision on whether or not to cooperate can be the trust in the person in charge, both in terms of overall leadership and those people charged with liaison duties (Gill & Thompson, 2017, p. 92). Lefebvre (2003, p. 527) reiterates the importance of liaisons and adds that both parties to the relationship need to feel they can trust one another. Alternatively, bilateral relationships may be built on a give-and-take basis, but those relationships can sour quickly when one side does not uphold their end of the bargain. This point is further developed by Sir Stephen Lander (2004, p. 484), who argues that collaboration is ultimately driven by utility – the perceived need for the relationship and whether it delivers what it needs to deliver – not by political or ideological motivations. Furthermore, trust-based relationships are easier to establish with a small group or bilaterally, than multilaterally (Gill & Thompson, 2017, p. 87).

However, when speaking about collaborations, relationships, and intelligence sharing, it is important to define what exactly is meant by intelligence sharing and what it might look like in practice. As far as the sharing of strategic intelligence in Europe goes, the willingness to cooperate is noticeable (Gruszczak, 2016, p. 89), but more effort needs to be put in on all sides. Sir Stephen Lander (2004, p. 492) made the following observations in 2004:

So far as the sharing of assessments (as opposed to other forms of collaboration) in Europe is concerned, it is early days and there is much room for further development.

Second comes the sharing of assessed but single-source reporting. […] It is a product not universally available internationally.

Third comes raw product. This is seldom exchanged routinely, but is particularly valuable because it enables recipients to visit and revisit the material in the light of developing understanding of the target.

Finally comes operational collaboration. This involves agency personnel from different countries working together against a common target and may involve surveillance, joint agent handling, sharing of linguists, exchanges of technical know-how and equipment, common training, sharing of analytical staff, etc. It happens where there is a pressing shared need that goes beyond the capacity or capability of one country to address.

What we see most often discussed, as the recent examples illustrate, is the operational collaboration – much of the intelligence sharing in the first three phases is done far away from the public eye. While it is worthwhile noting that some progress in intelligence sharing was made since Lander’s observations, Gruszczak (2016, p. 89) notes that EU member states put restrictions on the transmission of raw material, hampering the exchange of credible intelligence products by EU agencies. Another persistent barrier to effective intelligence sharing is the lack of support by practitioners for intelligence sharing, even when the policy goals are aligned (Fägersten, 2015, pp. 103–104). This could be an explanation as to why the most successful intelligence sharing within the multilateral EUROPOL framework has taken place in “areas that do not critically impinge upon member states’ authority” (Fägersten, 2015, p. 95), given that the majority of information shared, as per a report from 2012, was shared bilaterally (Disley, Irving, Hughes, & Patruni, 2012, pp. 48–49). The preference for bilateral cooperation is also confirmed by Den Boer (2017, p. 211), who references this predisposition in relation to counter-terrorism.

But what, if any, advantages does intelligence sharing have beyond being able to ‘look over the border’? Clough (2004, p. 605) makes the point that intelligence sharing is a form of burden sharing. The benefit is ultimately financial, but often takes another form, such as “subject matter specialization” which one agency may have over another (Clough, 2004, p. 605). Or as Herman (1996, p. 204) puts it: “One basic reason for cooperation is that there is always more information potentially available than any agency can collect by itself.” And indeed, sometimes a country is the only one with a certain capability. France, for example, is the only EU member state that controls a military satellite imagery system (Clough, 2004, p. 604). And while it falls outside of the scope of this article, such burden sharing is happening within the EU on the military level already. Consider, for example, that Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands surveil and protect one another’s airspace. This particular arrangement is extraordinary in and of itself, but is even more unique as Luxembourg does not have a military air force to contribute and will therefore ‘just’ open up its airspace to fighter jets of the other two partners (Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg concerning the integration of air security to respond to threats posed by non-military (renegade) aircraft, 2015).

Obstacles

While there are obstacles in the political will to share intelligence, the practice itself is also fraught with difficulties. The trust deficit is an obvious obstacle, which Gruszczak (2016, p. 230) argues is one of the reasons why intelligence sharing and closer cooperation within the EU in this area is “paralyzed.” Another argument against intelligence sharing is one that relates to Lander’s utility argument, which raises the question as to whether intelligence agencies are still inclined to cooperate when they perceive their cooperation is on an uneven footing in which they give more than they receive. If it is perceived that a relationship is not producing the results that one expected from the onset, the choice to be made is whether to invest more or to walk away. Indeed, it is not always obvious to EU member states that joint action will deliver more results than individual action or even bilateral cooperation (Monar, 2017, p. 149).

Additionally, intelligence sharing and cooperation can lead to over-reliance, which became an issue of public debate in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. It was the conclusion of the United States Senate’s and House of Representatives’ Joint Inquiry Staff that the United States intelligence community had systemically “depended heavily” on the cooperation of foreign intelligence agencies (U.S. Senate Select Committee On Intelligence And U.S. House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, 2002, p. xviii),² which resulted in an “excessive reliance on foreign liaison services” (9/11 Report, 2002, p. xvii). The report also concluded that the intelligence community did not invest in developing their own human intelligence (HUMINT) assets, which resulted in a lack of actionable intelligence (9/11 Report, 2002, p. xvii). In addition, the report opined that the failure to adequately coordinate the relationships with foreign services exacerbated these problems (9/11 Report, 2002, p. xviii). Lefebvre (2003, p. 529), while acknowledging that there is merit in the 9/11 Report, points out that the Joint Inquiry Staff underestimated the time it takes to develop useful HUMINT sources, leaving the U.S. with no choice but to cooperate with partners in the region. Nevertheless, such a damning critique, as the 9/11 Report contains, can lead to the pendulum swinging the other way, seeing intelligence agencies increasingly develop their own sources in order not to be accused of overreliance on the intelligence of counterparts.

Such dependency is not only an issue of complacency, Clough (2004, p. 605) argues, but it also risks exposing the weaknesses of the intelligence community in a particular country. Once an intelligence community knows its foreign counterpart is dependent on them for certain intelligence, they may seek to exploit that weakness to their advantage, or use it as a bargaining chip to get a better deal, especially if there are few options of getting the intelligence from a different partner.

Sometimes intelligence sharing can increase issues that already exist within intelligence communities. Circular reporting, the confirmation of intelligence by another source which relied upon the assessment of the agency doing the confirming, is one issue which can be problematic when sharing intelligence, especially when measures have been taken to protect sources and methods (Clough, 2004, p. 606). Besides circular reporting, the deliberate misleading of an intelligence partner is also a risk that those who rely on intelligence sharing must consider (Clough, 2004, p. 607).

A specific issue for nations with a smaller intelligence community is that intelligence sharing can become more of a burden than an opportunity. Intelligence overload is a risk when these countries share intelligence with countries with a large community, which produces and shares quantities of intelligence far larger than what the domestic intelligence community can process (Herman, 1996, p. 212). While this is not a new issue, nor one solely confined to the domain of intelligence sharing, the international sharing of intelligence can aggravate this issue for an already stretched intelligence community.

Lastly, while little research has been done on the causality of this argument, oversight concerns might make policymakers weary of giving their intelligence community more leeway to establish intelligence sharing structures. Different classification systems and levels of access make it difficult to establish what can be shared and if policymakers have no trust in the oversight mechanisms of the proposed partner countries, the political will to establish such relationships will be low (Clough, 2004, p. 607). A “mixed oversight regime” can be a way forward (Den Boer, 2017, p. 211) and indeed intelligence oversight bodies within the EU are increasingly starting to work together (Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (CTIVD), 2018), though it is too early to speak of an established mixed system.

Nothing is impossible: a cooperation case study

One example of far-reaching cooperation in the EU teaches a few valuable lessons for potential improvement in the area of intelligence cooperation. The Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg) signed a treaty³ on 23 July 2018 which strengthens not only police cooperation but also allows for the sharing of policing information. While strictly speaking the treaty does not mention intelligence, it does elaborate on the type of information product that can be exchanged between policing authorities. Not all information can automatically be regarded as intelligence. However, as previously mentioned, within the context of police-to-police cooperation and the sharing of information within that context, it is highly likely that at least some of that information, be it raw data or a finalized product, can indeed be considered intelligence. It is therefore still a valuable example to evaluate in order to assess how to improve intelligence sharing and cooperation.

The new treaty builds upon the prior cross-border police cooperation experience of the Benelux countries as laid down in the Treaty of Senningen.⁴ The new Benelux police cooperation treaty – which at the time of writing has not yet been ratified – envisages to take the cross-border policing a few steps further in comparison to the Treaty of Senningen, which it will replace. The following elements of the treaty are of specific interest from an intelligence-sharing perspective.

First of all, part 2 of the new treaty establishes mechanisms to increase the exchange of information. Notably, section 4.2 foresees the capability of each authorized party to “spontaneously and without prior request” provide personal data if there is a reasonable belief that it will assist in the prevention, investigation, or detection of criminal acts, or the maintenance of public order and safety (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 4.2). What is unique is the provision that the parties to the treaty can query one another’s police databases on a hit/no hit basis, provided their national legislation does not explicitly prohibit this practice (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 14). Knowing whether a suspect or person of interest is present in another states’ police database can not only provide valuable information, it may also help build a case for reasonable suspicion, allowing the police to intervene. This changes the focus of prior agreements, which did allow for cross-border action under the umbrella of the maintenance of public order, to “exchange of information and on actions in the context of monitoring and enforcement” (Nimwegen, 2017, p. 328).

As Lander (2004, p. 492) points out, it is rare for this type of raw information to be shared on a routine basis. In fact, a number of multilateral intelligence sharing networks, such as the EU Intelligence Analysis Center (INTCEN), do not even handle raw intelligence (Gruszczak, 2016, p. 157). Yet, the current treaty foresees and enables such frequent sharing. The perceived utility of intelligence cooperation between these partners has not only become apparent through the conclusion of such a far-reaching treaty but governments also officially reiterated it as a policy, for example, in the Netherlands (Grapperhaus, 2019).

Going one step further, in joint police posts, officers can be granted full access to one another’s police database, provided the ‘foreign’ officer is provided with a clearance or authorization to do so within the scope of the responsibilities the join police post is tasked with (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 15). Similar provisions are foreseen for police officers who are on joint patrols or inspections (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 16). The treaty also allows for citizen’s records or other governmental records, such as municipal or tax records, to be consulted, provided national legislation does not explicitly prohibit this (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 17). In addition, ANPR data may be used and exchanged under the provisions of this treaty (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 13).

These are all examples of sharing of raw information which can increase the effectiveness of the operational cooperation foreseen in this treaty. Once implemented, these provisions are envisaged to streamline criminal investigations more than previous treaties have been able to, in an attempt to address the critique that the mechanisms implemented up till now fail to allow for investigative queries to be responded to “quickly and adequately” (Nimwegen, 2017, p. 331). With such increased efficiency, the arguments for burden sharing and strictly financial arguments may also apply. However, the exact extent to which the above-mentioned theories apply and drove the creation of these sections within the treaty is difficult to determine.

On the operational side, this treaty makes cross-border police action (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 19), including high-speed chases (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 21), easier to execute. This provides an operational advantage in ad-hoc settings, in the sense that crossing a border within the Benelux area will no longer mean that one police force must cease their activity and hand it over to the neighboring force. Instead, the treaty foresees communication channels which must be kept open and protocols which need to be adhered to while allowing for the action to continue. Tactically, it means that joint operations which foresee a certain degree of cross-border action may be easier to plan and execute.

Lastly, the treaty builds upon the already existing cooperation and allows for joint patrols as a method for cooperation (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 20), while also foreseeing joint training in order to increase the interoperability and effectiveness with which the treaty parties can assist one another (Benelux police cooperation treaty, n.d., sec. 56). These provisions are a direct reflection of a perceived need and therefore fit the utility argument as advanced by Lander (2004, p. 484).

Trust but verify

One of the key reasons for why this treaty came to fruition is trust. Trust, according to Walsh (2010, p. 13), “is the expectation by one state that the other state will not exploit its cooperation to secure immediate gains.” Trust, however, takes time to build and the Benelux as an organization has had 60 years to do so. In addition, the relative cultural closeness of the three countries mitigates cultural differences in establishing cooperation relationships. A shared history – Luxembourg was under Dutch personal union until 1890 – and partially shared languages also help in overcoming communication problems. That does not, however, mean that cultural differences are negligible, as they do influence the policing philosophy and approaches to crime reduction, which can hamper cooperation (Nimwegen, 2017, p. 329). For example, they can lead to different decision-making structures, which “play a determinative role in prioritization and capacity allocation” (Nimwegen, 2017, p. 330).

Furthermore, the utility argument, previously defined by Lander as a perceived need, is strong with these three countries. As often the case with small countries, all three Benelux countries experience a lot of legitimate cross-border traffic on a daily basis. But having such a small jurisdiction comparative to the ability of citizens to move across borders increases the perceived need for cooperation. Past experience showed that it is impractical for police units to have to rely on informing their colleagues across the border to continue the action they have started. For example, in 2017 Dutch media reported that the Dutch police, which continued a car chase on behalf of Belgium, was unaware of the reasons as to why the car was chased, even though shots were fired during the arrest (NOS, 2017). As such, the perceived need for cooperation is not merely relegated to the practical domain, but can also apply to the realm of operational safety. If cooperation, as laid down in the Benelux police cooperation treaty, improves the operational safety for the officers involved by knowing the background of the suspects and risking less of that vital information being lost in case of a cross-border hand-over, the utility argument holds up.

In addition, the impracticality of having to hand over a case when crossing the border is compounded by the fact that some of the borders can be quite confusing; the town of Baarle (Baarle-Nassau in the Netherlands and Baarle-Hertog in Belgium) is partially Dutch territory and partially Belgian, which arguably laid the foundations for closer cooperation, starting with joint patrols.

Pooling resources is another argument for closer cooperation, especially where specialized knowledge is required and coordinated policing is desirable in order to apprehend an entire criminal enterprise. For example, the majority of synthetic drug laboratories in the Netherlands are considered to be operating in the provinces Noord-Brabant and Limburg (Tops, Van Valkenhoef, Van der Torre, & Van Spijk, 2018, p. 49), which directly border Belgium. In light of this, recommendations were made for future cooperation to include joint analyses on issues of mutual interest, such as the illicit production and trade of drugs, as well as terrorism (Nimwegen, 2017, p. 333). By allowing for closer cooperation, resources can be pooled, specialists can exchange information, and intelligence can be shared to uncover, for example, illicit drug laboratories, as well as the local and international networks operating behind them (Tops et al., 2018, p. 23). This type of burden sharing is not only relevant for small countries, such as the Benelux countries, which may have limited potential to develop expertise, it is also a way of mitigating the effect of decreasing policing budgets across Europe (European Confederation of Police (EuroCOP), 2015).

The case of the new Benelux police cooperation treaty is most certainly a very unusual one when it comes to intelligence sharing and cooperation. Nevertheless, lessons can be extrapolated from it on how to move forward with intelligence sharing in Europe. Time is a key element in order to build trust. However, a word of caution is necessary. Just because a number of member states have long been part of the EU, does not mean they will automatically trust one another. Trust, like a house, requires care and maintenance. If that trust is broken, or if intelligence agencies are otherwise considered to be compromised, the wider intelligence community will be very reluctant to share intelligence or cooperate. The point in case was Austria’s far-right party which ordered a raid on its own intelligence service in March 2018 (Deutsche Welle, 2018). For some countries, the raid was a sign on the wall of larger trust issues they have with Austria, given that its previously elected government under the guidance of Sebastian Kurz strengthened ties with Russia. Indeed, German officials went on record to openly voice this concern, while other EU member states, as well as the U.S., are said to have shared the same ambivalence over cooperation with the Austrian intelligence community (Bennhold, 2019).

Conclusion

Open borders, such as those within the EU’s Schengen area can both be a blessing and a curse. It can complicate matters for law enforcement and intelligence agencies that have to deal with cross-border organized crime or terrorism. Being unable to quickly follow up on leads beyond the national borders is a restriction that criminals and terrorists alike are keen on exploiting to escape the long arm of the law.

The Benelux model, however, demonstrates that there is cause for careful optimism. Where the circumstances for building trust are in place and the necessity for cooperation is felt by all partners, a strong case can be made for formalizing a cooperation agreement. Such agreements are easier to formalize where there is mutual understanding and a shared culture, than when such conditions are not present. That does not mean the absence of these elements rules out any type of cooperation; many informal intelligence sharing structures exist with various levels of convention and explicit commitment, yet still benefit their participants. But what goes for informal networks goes twice over for formal networks: a cooperative relationship requires maintenance. Once trust has been built, it needs to be maintained. A formalized relationship can withstand a few errors in judgment, but beyond that the relationship is fragile and once the trust is gone it will take a long time to build it back up again.

What the earlier described various terrorist attacks illustrate is that without proper police cooperation – at both the operational and the strategic level – it will be difficult, if not impossible, to quickly apprehend a terrorist suspect or prevent a terrorist attack. The same goes for the dismantling of criminal enterprises that operate beyond the borders of one EU nation. While a far-reaching cooperation agreement such as that of the Benelux countries may not be the most suitable solution for every EU member state, or indeed every region in the world dealing with cross-border crime or terrorism, it warrants further investigation and discussion to see what elements may work for other regions. Sharing lessons learned from the implementation of this agreement, once it is ratified, can also help other regions to better design their own cooperation agreements suitable for their specific needs.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 722482.

Notes on contributors

Agnes E. Venema

Agnes E. Venema Is a Marie Curie Early Stage Researcher on the European Joint Doctorate Grant “Evolving Security SciencE through Networked Technologies, Information Policy and Law” (ESSENTIAL). Her research area is Intelligence and National Security, and specifically focuses on the intersection between Intelligence, Technology, and Law. Her main institution is the “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy in Bucharest, Romania. As part of her doctoral studies, Agnes Venema guest lectured at the Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences (FSPAC) of the Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania and presented her research internationally. Furthermore, she supported research for various projects at the “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, including for the Security in the Black Sea Region (SBSR) initiative, for a Hybrid Threats project, and for the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE-Europe) 2019 conference, where she also served as a panel chair. Prior to moving to Romania, Agnes Venema worked on various issues related to international security, at the University of Essex and for various NGOs. She also worked on Security Sector Reform at the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and participated in election monitoring for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Notes

1. For a detailed discussion on the various models of the intelligence process see Phythian (2014).

2. The report will hereinafter be referenced as the 9/11 Report.

3. Known as the Treaty between the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on police cooperation, signed on 23 July 2018 in Brussels, Belgium, not yet ratified at the time of writing. The treaty will hereinafter be referred to as the Benelux police cooperation treaty.

4. TheTreaty of Senningen was signed in 2004 and entered into force in 2006 once it was ratified by all parliaments.