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Abstract
Oil and cocoa represent strategic export commodities for the Ghanaian economy, prioritised within the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda. This article examines these sectors in the context of Ghana’s relations with the European Union (EU). Notably, the EU constitutes the most important market for Ghanaian exports. The European Commission, moreover, has pledged to tangibly assist private sector development in Ghana, with particular reference to the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Through its focus on oil and cocoa, the article problematises certain aspects of EU aid and trade interventions with respect to normative SDG development pledges.
Notes
1. Government of Ghana, GSGDA, xvi.
2. Ibid., 22–25.
3. Ghana’s Statistical Service, Digest, 6.
4. Ibid., 15.
5. Ibid., 20.
6. Ministry of Trade, Medium Term, 34.
7. European Commission, NIP, 7.
8. Ibid., 10.
9. European Commission, How Can, 2.
10. European Commission, West African.
11. European Commission, Trade – Countries – West Africa.
12. Ibid.
13. European Parliament, Resolution.
14. See note 9 above.
15. For example, see Hilson and Garforth, “Everyone”; Hope and Kwarteng, “CSR”; Okoh, “Grievance.”
16. Lawson, Foreign Aid, 5.
17. Government of Ghana, GSGDA, 74.
18. Ibid., 80.
19. See note 18 above.
20. EITI, What the EITI.
21. It is not within the scope of our current discussion to provide a detailed review of the literature on the resource curse. See Van der Ploeg, “Natural Resources,” for an extensive introduction and overview. It is useful to note here, however, that recent contributions to the resource curse debate have emphasised that there is no element of ‘predestination’ or inevitability with regards to the curse unfolding in states blessed with large quantities of natural resource wealth. In particular recent examinations by the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) network have explored the political economy of oil extraction in Uganda. They have found that the authoritarian, centralised negotiating style of President Yoweri Museveni has in fact helped to secure better revenue sharing arrangements than has occurred in states such as Ghana (see for instance Asante and Mohan, “Transnational Capital”; and Hickey et al., “The Political Settlement”). This focus on institutional setups is also found in Brunnschweiler and Bulte, “The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised,” who argue that the concept of the ‘resource curse’ itself might be misguided, given the potentiality for African governments to positively utilise resource abundance for national growth strategies. This focus on the institutional setup of African regimes ties into the broader debates about the potential linkage between authoritarianism and developmental states (for instance in Rwanda, as explored by Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, “Developmental patrimonialism?”). It is important to note, therefore, that while European oil companies do push to maximise their own profits (often with the assistance of EU institutions, and the acquiescence of governments such as found in Ghana) nevertheless there is emerging debate in the literature as to how African regime structure and elite agency might overcome, or avoid altogether, the ‘resource curse’.
22. EITI, Ghana.
23. European Commission, NIP, 15, 26.
24. Ibid., 16.
25. Oxford Policy Management, Ghana.
26. Bazilian et al., “Oil,” 51.
27. Maconachie and Hilson, “Editorial,” 54.
28. Lungu, This Mahama.
29. Segbefia, Petroleum.
30. Mohammed, “Oil Find”; Lungu, This Mahama.
31. Ibid.
32. Olanya, “Will Uganda,” 50.
33. Dennys, Tullow Oil.
34. Ibid.
35. Phillips et al., “Sovereignty,” 30–3.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network, Oil Industries in Ghana.
39. Sowah, Ghana-EU, 13.
40. See note 11 above.
41. World Cocoa Foundation, “cocoa Market.”
42. See note 44 above.
43. Kolavalli and Vigneri, Cocoa, 1.
44. Ghana Cocoa Board, Cocoa.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. UNCTAD, Cocoa.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Cocoa Processing Company LTD, “Financial.”
51. African Development Bank, Republic.
52. See note 44 above.
53. Ibid.
54. Please see Langan and Price (forthcoming) for more detail on this consternation within the Ghanaian cocoa sector with regards to the ambiguous status of the region-wide EPA (given the refusal of states such as Nigeria to fully ratify and implement the free trade deal). This relates to the authors’ own fieldwork in Ghana, and Nigeria, which explored the views of business stakeholders involved in cocoa production and processing, as well as the Ghanaian Limited Buying Companies who act as intermediaries between producers and Cocobod.
55. Business stakeholders in Ghana’s import-competing sectors, meanwhile, such as poultry and tomatoes, fear that a regional EPA will perpetuate the dumping of cheap European produce onto local markets. Bagooro documents that cheap poultry imports from the EU are already destroying local livelihoods and worsening conditions of poverty, a situation which would be very difficult to ameliorate under a permanent regional EPA. See Bagooro, West Africa.
56. For reasons of space and remit it is not possible to expand on the interview data in this current article; again please see Langan and Price (forthcoming) for more detail.
57. Asante-Poku and Angelucci, “Analysis of Incentives and Disincentives for Cocoa in Ghana.”
58. Fair Labour Association, Improving Workers’ Lives; Cargill, Improving Livelihoods; Callebaut, The Cocoa Horizons Foundation.
59. Agritrade, Executive.
60. European Commission, Commission Staff Working, 4.
61. ECA and CAOBISCO, Initial Response.
62. Sudwind and Global 2000, Bittersweet Chocolate, 14.
63. Tulane University, 2013–14 Survey, 2.
64. Sudwind and Global 2000, Bittersweet Chocolate, 18.
65. Maconachie and Fortin, “On Ghana’s.”
66. Parry, “Putting Women”; Maconachie et al., Gender.
67. Marston, Women’s Rights, 4.
68. Maconachie and Fortin, “On Ghana’s.”
69. International Cocoa Organisation, World Cocoa.
70. Such largescale agro-processing companies are keen to develop domestic processing capacity to integrate their internal supply chain, shipping and production, reflecting the horizontal and vertical concentration that is increasingly characterising the global cocoa value chain. This has been facilitated by technological innovation and financial incentives. While traditionally high grade beans were exported for processing abroad, technological developments now allow low quality beans to be processed into an exportable value added product at origin, which is then exported for further processing abroad.
71. Haigh, “Carving.”
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Adler, La via.
75. AFSA, What is ASFA.