Zimbabwe’s consolidation as a gatekeeper state

Abstract

Cooper’s gatekeeper state theory provides a powerful way to read recent Zimbabwean politics, but the country also challenges his assumptions about both the elite-led nature of gatekeeping, and deterministic assumptions about its direct emergence from colonialism. Drawing on ordinary Zimbabweans’ perspectives, I make two arguments. First, I show how consolidation of Zimbabwe’s ‘gate’ has been shaped by events and contingent reactions to them since 1980, complicating Cooper’s focus on the immanence of colonial structures. Second, I show how consolidation has been achieved through popular ideas of and engagement with the outside world. This has been done in reaction to the increasing solidity and narrowness of the gate – in the ways Zimbabweans themselves work around it – but also in a shift in the ways Zimbabwean people think about the legitimacy of gatekeeping.

Keywords:

• Zimbabwe
• gatekeeper state
• Frederick Cooper
• legitimacy
• citizens

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Sara Dorman for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article, and others from the original BISA panel on gatekeeping that she organised. Thanks too to the two anonymous reviewers for their many helpful suggestions.

Notes

1. Cooper, Africa since 1940.

2. Dorman, Understanding Zimbabwe.

3. Gallagher, Zimbabwe’s International Relations.

4. Ekeh, “Colonialism and the Two Publics.”

5. Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa.

6. Bayart, The State in Africa.

7. Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works.

8. Cooper, Africa since 1940, 160.

9. Raftopoulos and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe.

10. Interviews were substantially shaped by my identity as a white British woman. At times, this led to tendencies to talk up the benefits of the relationship with Britain, and at others led to direct verbal attacks on me as a representative of one of the countries that was punishing Zimbabwe through sanctions. I have discussed elsewhere the effects of my position in relation to the findings of this project. See Gallagher, “Interviews as Catastrophic Encounters.”

11. At independence in 1980, Cooper argues, the country had more economic options than most, ‘a balance of agricultural, mineral, and industrial possibilities’ (2002, 138). However, this was dissipated in a few years: ‘Zimbabwe’s elite has been Africanized by the kind of crony capitalism typical of gatekeeper states: the state does little to encourage an autonomous, African business class, but uses its own strategic location to provide opportunities to clients. The poor remain poor, and much of Zimbabwe’s population remains in the badly eroded, badly supplied rural areas’ (Ibid.).

12. In some ways, the logics of the gatekeeper state looked similar to other parts of colonised Africa: connections with Britain were strong, and this was reflected in trade patterns throughout the first half of the twentieth century (Mtisi et al. 2009a). The white farmers provided powerful sources of patronage and control through their monopoly over land, employment and the resources of the gate. But despite these ties, gatekeeping did not produce the narrowing effects seen in other parts of Africa. Many white farmers were deeply committed to their new country (Pilossof 2012). Wealth was often not repatriated but reinvested into Rhodesia; the state was developed through the investment made by this increasingly wealthy class. As a result Rhodesia’s infrastructure – its roads, railway, banking system, post office – and the hold of legal-bureaucratic systems, took root in ways not seen in much of the rest of the continent.

13. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Mapping Cultural and Colonial Encounters”; Schmidt, Colonialism and Violence in Zimbabwe.

14. Gallagher, Zimbabwe’s International Relations.

15. After the Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 sanctions and international disapproval led to a burgeoning of Rhodesia’s manufacturing sector (Mtisi et al. 2009b).

16. Muzondidya, “From Buoyancy to Crisis”; Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe.

17. Tendi, “The Origins and Functions of Demonisation.”

18. Mamdani, “Lessons from Zimbabwe.”

19. Tendi, “The Origins and Functions of Demonisation.”

20. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, “Making Sense of Mugabeism.”

21. Tendi, Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe; Chan and Gallagher, Why Mugabe Won.

22. Bayart, “Africa in the World.”

23. Gallagher, “Good State/Bad State.”

24. Chitungwiza resident, 28 August 2011; trade union members, 1 September 2011; Bulawayo resident, 28 May 2012.

25. Mbare resident, 2 September 2011; Chitungwiza resident, 4 September 2011.

26. ZANU-PF supporter, Bulawayo, 30 May 2012.

27. Civil Society activist, Bulawayo, 30 May 2012.

28. Trade union activist, Harare, 31 August 2011.

29. Chitungwiza resident, 28 August 2011.

30. Old Pumula resident, 30 May 2012.

31. Sachikonye, When a State Turns on Its Citizens.

32. Chitungwiza resident, 4 September 2011.

33. Civil society activist, Bulawayo, 12 May 2012.

34. Trade union activist, Bulawayo, 28 May 2012; Old Pumula resident, 30 May 2012; Trade union representative, Harare, 5 September 2011.

35. Chitungwiza resident, 28 August 2011.

36. Civil society activist, Harare, 30 August 2011.

37. Crush and Tevera, Zimbabwe’s Exodus, 3.

38. Trade union activist, Harare, 31 August 2011.

39. Chitungwiza resident, 28 August 2011.

40. Chitungwiza resident, 28 August 2011.

41. Religious leaders, Bulawayo, 29 May 2012.

42. Trade union organiser, Bulawayo, 28 May 2012.

43. The region as a whole has experienced state neglect more deeply and for much longer than the rest of the country. Many of those interviewed pointed out that it has only been in recent years that those living in other parts of the country have begun to experience similar problems. They argue that their experiences, deeper and of longer duration, are now coming to be felt throughout the rest of Zimbabwe.

44. Civil society organiser, Bulawayo, 28 May 2012.

45. Informal workers focus group, Harare, 6 September 2011.

46. Cooper, Africa since 1940, 185.

47. Masunungure and Shumba, Zimbabwe.

48. Despite the rigging and manipulation practised in 2013 by ZANU-PF, much of the analysis views this as not decisive, pointing rather to important shifts in the political affiliations and priorities of Zimbabweans over the GNU period. See work by Booysen (2014), Dube and Makaye (2013), Gallagher (2015b), LeBas (2014), Ncube (2013), Raftopoulos (2013), Southall (2013), Tendi (2013), Zamchiya (2013) and Chan and Gallagher (2017).

49. MDC activists, Bulawayo, 9 November 2013.

50. LeBas, From Protest to Parties.

51. LeBas, “The Perils of Power-sharing.”

52. Gallagher, “The Battle for Zimbabwe.”

53. MDC activist Bulawayo, 9 November 2013.

54. Head teacher, Mashonaland Central, 14 November 2013.

55. ZANU-PF activist, 11 November 2013.

56. Rural residents, Motobo, Matabeleland South, 10 November 2013.

57. NGO employee, Mashonaland Central, 14 November 2013.

58. MDC activists, Bulawayo, 9 November 2013.

59. One suggestion as to why this dramatic shift was so evident in Matabeleland was the idea held by many voters that the MDC – which represented the region and was now in government – was ‘in power’ during the GNU and thus responsible for the continuing problems of the country. In ZANU-PF strongholds, such as Mashonaland Central, there was a stronger tendency to see the MDC as still in opposition (Gallagher 2017).

60. Raftopoulos, “The 2013 Elections in Zimbabwe.”

61. Head of a Development Agency, Mashonaland Central, 14 November 2013.

62. Harare-based businessman, interviewed in Bulawayo, 9 November 2013.

63. Civil society activist, Bulawayo, 11 November 2013.

64. Bulawayo-based civil society activist, interviewed in Harare, 13 November 2013.