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ABSTRACT
International law and politics are made first and foremost by states, either independently or through their exclusive membership in international organisations. Nevertheless, civil society has had access to intergovernmental decision-making arenas for several decades, mostly through NGOs. Based on Article 71 UN Charter, NGOs have been granted observer status at many international organisations to advocate for public interest issues like the protection of human rights or the environment. This public interest paradigm, however, is increasingly being challenged by the affectedness paradigm. The latter refers to the increasing participation of people who are affected by issues subject to international regulation. So far, legal scholars have largely overlooked this shift. To address this research gap, this paper examines how the affectedness paradigm has become institutionalised at different international organisations and proposes a typology of affected persons’ participation. The paper argues that affected-led advocacy has not replaced public-interest advocacy, but that the affectedness paradigm has been institutionalised in at least three different ways: the subordination, parity, and priority models. They can be placed on a scale with the priority model giving the strongest role to affected population groups.
Acknowledgements
For helpful comments and remarks on earlier drafts, I am indebted to two anonymous reviewers and the participants of the conference “Empowering the Most Affected: A New Paradigm in Global Governance and International Law?”, University of Tuebingen (17 −18 November 2017). This contribution has been made possible through funding of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
Notes
1. UN Human Rights Council, Declaration on the Rights of Peasants, Article 27(1).
2. Vandenbogaerde, “Localizing the Human Rights Council.”
3. UN General Assembly, Enhancing the Participation of Indigenous Peoples’.
4. Alvarez, The Impact of International Organizations.
5. Durkee, “International Lobbying Law,” 1753.
6. Ibid., 1754; Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations,” 358.
7. See also UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1996/31, para. 50.
8. Suy, “The Status of Observers”; and Stewart, “Remedying Disregard,” 234.
9. UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1996/31, Part II, para. 20.
10. UN General Assembly, We the peoples, 13.
11. Peters, Koechlin and Zinkernagel, “Non-state Actors,” 5. As Durkee, “Astroturf Activism” showed, however, the requirement of public-interest orientation did not exclude factual influence of private profit-seeking actors.
12. Charnovitz, “Two Centuries of Participation,” 261; and UN System and Civil Society – An Inventory and Analysis of Practices, 3–5.
13. Rajagopal, International Law from below, 258.
14. Durkee, “International Lobbying Law,” 1764–6.
15. See UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1996/31, para. 20.
16. Anderson and Rieff, “Global Civil Society” 26, 37.
17. Marxsen, “Global Democracy,” 738.
18. Anderson, “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines,” 117; and Kingsbury, “First Amendment Liberalism.”
19. Dingwerth and Nanz, “Participation,” 1139.
20. Falk and Strauss, “Global Peoples Assembly”: 214.
21. Peters, “Dual Democracy,” 300; and Maisley, “The International Right of Rights?.”
22. See e.g. Klabbers, “Law-making and Constitutionalism,” 122.
23. Wheatley, “Democracy Beyond the State.”
24. Stewart, “Remedying Disregard”: 224, 228.
25. Peters, “Dual Democracy,” 301.
26. von Bernstorff, “Menschenrechte Und Betroffenenrepräsentation”; Abbott and Gartner, “Reimagining Participation”; Fraundorfer, “Experiments in Global Democracy”; Vandenbogaerde, “Localizing the Human Rights Council”; and Tramontana, “Civil Society Participation.”
27. See Abbott and Gartner, “Reimagining Participation,” 4; von Bernstorff, “Authority Monism in International Organisations,” 111.
28. Constitution of the ILO, Articles 3(1), 4(1).
29. Ibid., Article 12.
30. See Morgan, Non-State Actors, 110 et seq.
31. Miranda, “Indigenous Peoples as International Lawmakers”: 240.
32. See Hasenclever and Narr, “Looking at the Dark Side of the Most-Affectedness Principle”; Peterson, “Indigenous Seats at the UN Table.”
33. Gupta, “Non-State Actors”: 464.
34. UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration, Principle 10.
35. UN Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Section III.
36. Ibid., Chapter 23.3.
37. UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Declaration, chapter I, resolution 1, annex, principle 26 and Gupta, “Non-State Actors”: 473 highlight the “Independent Roles” for each.
38. Report of the Independent Group of Experts on New Mechanisms for Stakeholder Engagement at UNEP, “Final Report,” 4.
39. UN Economic and Social Council, Procedural arrangements for the Commission on Sustainable Development, para 2(d) stipulated the invitation to establish mechanisms of self-organisation for each Major Group already in 1993.
40. See, e.g. United Nations’ Stakeholder Group of Persons with Disabilities, “Terms of Reference,” para. 2.1; United Nations Major Group for Children and Youth, “Processes and Procedures,” Section 2.1.
41. Cf. Peterson, “Indigenous Seats at the UN Table”: 205 referring to “Indigenous-Led Advocacy.”
42. UNAIDS, “The Greater Involvement of People Living with HIV (GIPA),” 1, The NGO HIV/AIDS Code of Practice Project, “Renewing Our Voice,” 17, para. 1.4.
43. The advisory committee of the People with AIDS, The Denver Principles (1983), section 2, para. 2.
44. For more details, see Abbott and Gartner, “Reimagining Participation,” 21.
45. Paris AIDS Summit 1994, Declaration, paras 1, 4.
46. UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1994/24.
47. Ibid., Annex 1.
48. UNAIDS, modus operandi of the PCB, para. 4.
49. UN Economic and Social Council, Decision 1995/223, para. 1.
50. UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1995/223, para. 6.
51. Ibid., ANNEX, para. 2(c).
52. NGO Delegation to the UNAIDS PCB, Terms of Reference, para. 5.
53. UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1995/223, ANNEX, para. 2(f); UNAIDS, modus operandi of the PCB, para. 10.
54. Cf. NGO Delegation to the UNAIDS PCB, Terms of Reference, para. 5.
55. UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1995/223, ANNEX, para. 2(b).
56. UNAIDS, modus operandi of the PCB, para. 11.
57. UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1995/223, ANNEX, para. 2(d).
58. Ibid., ANNEX, para. 2(g).
59. von Bernstorff, “Menschenrechte und Betroffenenrepräsentation”: 1055.
60. See ibid., 1053 et seq.
61. UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Article 32(1)(a).
62. Abbott and Gartner, “Reimagining Participation”: 13 calling this a “Full Constituency Model.”
63. See especially Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guidelines, para. 3.
64. UN General Assembly, Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, para. 33.
65. Ibid., para. 46.
66. The Global Fund, Bylaws, Article 1.
67. The Global Fund, Framework Document, section II.
68. Ibid., Sections III,V.
69. The Global Fund, Bylaws, Article 7.4.
70. The Global Fund, Operating Procedures, para. 1.
71. Communities Delegation of the Board of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Handbook, 8.
72. Ibid., 10.
73. The Global Fund, Bylaws, Article 7.2.
74. Communities Delegation of the Board of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Terms of Reference Communities Delegation Member, section E.i.
75. Communities Delegation of the Board of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Terms of Reference Board Member, section III, para. 11.
76. UN General Assembly, Political Declaration on HIV/ AIDS, paras 15, 20.
77. The Governments of Brazil, France, Chile, Norway and the United Kingdom, Hosting of UNITAID.
78. Fraundorfer, Rethinking Global Democracy in Brazil, 70.
79. Ibid., 64.
80. UNITAID, Executive Board, UNITAID By-Laws, para. 2.5.3.
81. Ibid., para. 2.2.
82. Ibid., para. 2.3.1.
83. Communities Delegation to the UNITAID Board, Delegation Handbook, 12.
84. UNAIDS, Review of NGO/Civil Society participation, para. 7.
85. Except the delegations of Brazil and El Salvador, see UNAIDS, Report of the Twentieth Meeting 2007, 12.
86. See further UNAIDS, “The Governance Handbook,” 41.
87. NGO Delegation to the UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board, Terms of Reference, 8, section M.2.
88. Arctic Council Secretariat, Establishment of the Arctic Council, paras. 2, 3(c).
89. Committee on World Food Security, Reform of the CFS, para. 16.
90. Fraundorfer, Rethinking global democracy in Brazil, 90.
91. de Schutter, “Reform.”
92. McKeon, Food security governance, 108–9.
93. von Bernstorff, “Authority Monism,” 111.
94. Fraundorfer, Rethinking global democracy in Brazil, 91; Brem-Wilson, “Towards Food Sovereignty”: 83.
95. Economic Commission for Europe of the UN Economic and Social Council, Almaty Guidelines, ANNEX, para. 15.
96. UN General Assembly, Political Declaration on HIV/ AIDS, para. 20, 51.
97. Committee on World Food Security, Reform of the CFS, paras. 11, 12.
98. Ibid., para. 16.
99. Committee on World Food Security, Civil Society Mechanism, para. 14.
100. The separation is made explicit in Committee on World Food Security, Reform of the CFS, fn. 3.
101. Committee on World Food Security, Civil Society Mechanism, para. 39.
102. CSM Coordination Committee, “DRAFT Guidelines for Facilitating Common Policy Positions and Messages,” Section 4.
103. Committee on World Food Security, Civil Society Mechanism, para. 33.
104. Ibid., para. 20.
105. See also Duncan, Global food security governance, 103 and von Bernstorff, “Authority Monism,” 112 concerning the CFS architecture.
106. See for a similar sophisticated involvement of peasants in the Human Rights Council Vandenbogaerde, “Localizing the Human Rights Council.”
107. See UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1996/31, para. 50.
108. Ibid., Part. III, paras. 21–26.
109. Hasenclever et al., “Introduction.”
110. See Schramm and Sändig, “Affectedness Alliances”; cf. Vandenbogaerde, “Localizing the Human Rights Council.”
111. Committee on the Rights of the Child, Working Methods for the Participation of Children, Section II, para. 6.
112. See for example UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board, Independent Review 2012, 5.
113. For a similar underlying normative approach, see Stewart, “Remedying Disregard”: 244, 228 (arguing that disregarding the most significantly affected and disadvantaged groups in global governance is unjustified).
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Markus Hasl
Markus Hasl is a research associate at the Collaborative Research Centre 923 ‘Threatened Order – Societies under Stress’ at the University of Tuebingen. Within the Sub-Project ‘F07: Local orders under threat from land grabbing – Global civil society and international law as curse or blessing?’, he is currently working on his doctor of laws which is dedicated to the participation of affected persons in international law.