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ABSTRACT
Academic writing has tended to divide Salafis into three main categories: jihadi, political, and quietist. These categories are commonly distinguished by ideological and methodological differences. Particularly important, it is suggested, are different attitudes to the state, political authority and the use of violence. What happens, though, when state institutions collapse, when there is no state authority or when state authority is contested? In the midst of political upheaval and armed conflict, how do Salafis relate to the state and politics more generally? Developments in Libya between 2011 and 2020 have provided an ideal opportunity to look at these questions. This paper analyses Salafi relations with state institutions and politics more generally in times of turmoil. It does so by focusing on ‘political’ Salafism, represented by leading figures in the former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and ‘quietist’ Salafism, represented by the so-called ‘Madkhali’ Salafis. Based on desk research and numerous interviews with Libyan actors, it unpacks the different strategies deployed by the two groups in dealing with state institutions.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. See, for example, Meijer (Citation2013) ‘Introduction’ in Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, Oxford University Press (p. 8). Meijer later argues (p. 18) that these categories should be seen as a spectrum.
2. Hegghammer (Citation2013) argues that the term ‘Salafism’ is a theological category and gives little information about the political preferences of Salafis. However, the academic categories used to describe different Salafis clearly refer to political behaviour.
3. Those interviewed gave informed written consent to be part of the author’s study.
4. Author interviews and informal discussions with Libyans, 2017–2019.
5. Author interviews with Libyan scholars who lived in Libya through this period, February 2019.
6. Similarly, on Salafis in Yemen, see (Bonnefoy Citation2008).
7. Some of these were not imprisoned during the crackdown in the 1990s, but escaped abroad and were later ‘rendered’ to Libya.
8. Although Sami al-Saadi, the group’s ideologue, had previously denounced democracy as a Western concept.
9. Al-Saadi, al-Sharif and Belhaj were all among the key figures that had led the LIFG recantation.
10. See, for instance, ‘Al-Qaddafi yastakhdam al-mudakhala ad’aia’ al-salafiyya dhid al-thuwar’ [‘Qaddafi uses the intervention of Salafi supporters against the rebels’], video published on Youtube on 15 May 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=34&v=fNl7BzflW0U&feature=emb_title.
11. See, for instance, “Kalima ‘an al-ahdath wa’l-muthaharat wa’l-khuruj ‘ala al-hukam” [‘A word on the events, demonstrations and rebellion against the rulers’], official web page of Sheikh Rabi’ ben Hadi al-Madkhali, published on 19 June 2011, http://www.rabee.net/ar/articles.php?cat=11&id=285.
12. See, for instance, ‘T’alimat yu’atiha ahad al-azlam fi jama’ mulay Muhammad li-shuyukh al-taghiya’ [‘Instructions given by one of the former regime supporters in the Mulay Mohamed mosque to the sheikhs of the tyrant’] (24 February 2011), video published on the Youtube channel ‘Archives of the 17 February revolution’ on 12 May 2013.
13. See Democracy Reporting International (Citation2011) ‘Libya’s Transition. The Constitutional Declaration: A Basis for Democracy?’ Briefing Paper 12, December, https://democracy-reporting.org/de/dri_publications/briefing-paper-22-libyas-constitutional-declaration-a-basis-for-democracy/.
14. See the official web page of the Homeland party (hizb al-watan), http://wattan.ly/about.
15. Al-Shafai, Mohammad (Citation2012), ‘Mu’assis hizb al-umma al-libi li al-sharq al-awsat: lam natawaqa’ taraju’ al-islamiyyin bi hathihi al-sura’ [The founder of the Libyan party Al-Umma to Al-Sharq al-Awsat: we did not expect the Islamists to retreat in such a way”, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 11 July, https://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12279&article=685881#.XXp5QWzYqzw.
16. On al-Saadi’s performance, idem. Belhaj also failed to gain a single party list seat.
17. Prominent former LIFG figures Khaled al-Sharif and Abdelbaset Buhliqa held the positions of, respectively, deputy defence minister and deputy interior minister.
18. The institution of Dar al-Ifta’ had been gradually marginalised and abandoned by Qaddafi after the death of Sheikh Taher al-Zawi, whom he had appointed as Libya’s Grand Mufti in 1969. See NTC decision No. 15/2012, available at https://ssf.gov.ly/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%82%D9%85-15-%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A9-2012-%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A3%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A1-1.pdf.
19. Author interview with a Libyan expert on religious movements, Tunis, November 2018.
20. Idem.
21. Several interlocutors noted that Madkhali preachers in Libya were not very well qualified and should be considered Islamic students (talib al-‘ilm) rather than Islamic scholars (‘alim).
22. Author phone interview with a Libyan scholar, an expert on religious issues, Tunis, November 2018.
23. Certain areas in Libya were known for the prevalence of particular religious trends. For instance, the Madkhali character of Souq al-Jouma could be contrasted with neighbouring Tajoura, the suburb from which Mufti Sadiq al-Ghariani and his family hails. Dar al-Ifta’, despite having some limited influence in Souq al-Jouma, is much more influential in Tajoura. Fewer mosques are used by quietist preachers in Tajoura compared to other districts in Tripoli. Author WhatsApp conversation with a former Interior Ministry employee, November 2018.
24. Author interview with a Libyan judge from Benghazi, Tunis, November 2018. The role of religious figures had also been talked up by Sheikh Majdi Haffala himself in some of his sermons.
25. In March 2015, the HoR appointed Haftar as ‘General Commander of the Armed Forces’ and promoted him to the rank of field marshal. Since then, Haftar has referred to his forces in Arabic as the ‘Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ (LAAF, for ‘Al-quwat al-musalaha al-arabiyya al-libiyya’).
26. See, for instance, an interview of Khaled al-Sharif (then Deputy Minister of Defence) with Al-Nabaa TV, 25 August 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJvZz7_XIwU.
27. See, for instance, Sheikh al-Gharyani’s TV allocations on 5 August 2014 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IMg0RfkjaX4 and 24 August 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYSFfoMsWeo.
28. Author interview with a Libyan research expert on religious movements, Tunis, November 2018.
29. Idem.
30. This was notably done on the official Facebook page of the Special Deterrence Force: https://www.facebook.com/QwtAlradaAlhaast.
31. A Libyan researcher and religious scholar interviewed in Tunis in November 2018 gave an example of the way in which a religious hierarchy linked to preachers in mosques seemed to prevail over the more formal organisational authority. However, most observers interviewed could not provide precise information on the links between religious and military figures.
32. Author interview with a Libyan judge from Benghazi, Tunis, November 2018.
33. See, for instance, BBC News (Citation2017) ‘Libya’s eastern authority freezes women’s travel ban,’ 22 February 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-39053829.
34. See, for instance, Libya Observer (Citation2019) ‘Al-thini yuhtam hayat al-awqaf bi’l-khudhu’ li imla’at kharijiyya’ [‘Al Thinni accuses the Authority for Endowments of subordination to foreign orders’], 24 January, https://ar.libyaobserver.ly/article/3335.
35. Author phone interview with a Libyan observer, May 2021.
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Virginie Collombier
Virginie Collombier is part-time Professor and the scientific coordinator of the Middle East Directions Programme at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. She is responsible for the Libya Initiative, which combines policy-oriented field research, the mentorship of Libya-based junior analysts and support to Libyan home-grown mediation initiatives and policy dialogues. Her main research interests are in social and political dynamics in Libya, with particular emphasis on processes of mediation and reconciliation, former regime constituencies and security issues. In 2017, she co-edited with Olivier Roy Tribes and Global Jihadism, published by Hurst. She speaks Arabic and holds an MA in Political Science from Sciences Po and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Grenoble.