![Sample our Area Studies journals, sign in here to start your access, latest two full volumes FREE to you for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5922/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Area-Studies.jpg"})
Abstract
This article explores how the party-state in China manages to cope with grassroots self-government (jiceng zizhi) in a changing social milieu. Specifically, the party-state resorts to simultaneous deployment of carrots and sticks, dubbed “dual adaptations” in this article, in coping with the leading organizations of grassroots self-government—villagers committee in the rural and residents committee in the urban areas. On the one hand, it attempts to maintain controls over them to prevent them from becoming alternative power centers, given their inherent potential for authoritative decision-making that could defy the party-state. On the other, it seeks to strengthen its own capacities to accommodate domestic changes, meet the mass demands, and shore up its legitimacy by fostering the mass political participation, competition, and problem-solving ability that offsets the state's inadequacies in governance via villagers and residents committees. The degrees to which the dual adaptations attain the party-state's intended goals, however, are asymmetrical in that they vary between rural and urban areas. This article thus discovers dual asymmetries in the adaptations—with one between rural and urban areas, and the other between the effectiveness in achieving the two goals, which helps enrich our understanding of the complexities in China's internal governance.
Disclosure statement
The author reports no conflicts of interest. The author alone is responsible for the content and writing of this article.
Notes on contributor
S. Philip Hsu, is currently Professor and Chair of Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. He obtained his doctoral degree from the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver, USA. He was Secretary-General of the Chinese Association of Political Science (Taiwan, ROC), managing editor of Chinese Political Science Review and a member of the Advisory Committee under Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, ROC. Professor Hsu’s research interests include comparative politics (with particular emphasis on the People’s Republic of China), political economy and international relations (with particular emphasis on Asia-Pacific international security and economic cooperation). His articles have been published in The Pacific Review, Australian Journal of Public Administration, Journal of Contemporary China, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Issues & Studies, etc. He is also a co-editor of 12 edited volumes published in Taiwan, China, and the English-speaking world, such as In Search of China’s Development Model: Beyond the Beijing Consensus (co-edited with Yu-Shan Wu and Suisheng Zhao) (New York: Routledge, 2011), Minzhu, Minzhuhua, and Zhili Jixiao (Democracy, Democratization and Governance Performance) (with Yu Xunda) (Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang University Press, 2011), and Political Challenges and Democratic Institutions: International and Taiwan’s Perspectives (with Chang-Ling Huang) (Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2007).
Notes
1 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 66–68.
2 See, for instance, Li and McElveen, “Debunking Misconceptions about Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” 2014.
3 For instance, nationwide arrests on a single weekend in July 2015 led to the detention of more than one hundred lawyers and human rights activists, and a new wave of the sweeping crackdown emerged in 2016. See Nash Jenkins, “China Arrested More Than 100 Human-Rights Lawyers and Activists Over the Weekend”; Buckley, “China Arrests Rights Lawyer and Her Husband on Subversion Charges.”
4 For assessments of China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy in general and maritime strategy in particular in recent years, see, for instance, Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China,” 54–67; James Holmes, “The Two Words That Explain China’s Assertive Naval Strategy”; and Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?”, 7–48.
5 Saich, “Negotiating the State,” 288–292.
6 Bruce J. Dickson, “Cooptation and Corporatism in China,” 123–139.
7 This article adopts “residents committee” instead of “neighborhood committee” to refer to the grassroots self-government organizations in China’s urban areas, primarily because the former is what has been used in China’s official legal documents.
8 Few analyses written in English on rural democracy have paid adequate attention to the relationship between the VC and VPB. For the handful of analyses as such, see, for example, O’Brien and Han, “Path to Democracy?,” 370–372; Sun et al., “Patterns of Authority and Governance in Rural China?,” 1–22.
9 Yuejin, Dangdai Zhongguo Nongcun Liangwei Guanxi de Weiguan Jiexi yu Hongguan Toushi, 23–24.
10 Yuehua and Shouchun, Nongcun Liangwei Maodun Chansheng de Yuanyin jiqi Duice, 55.
11 Lihui, “Nongcun Jiceng Minzhu de Xianzhuang Wenti yu Zhanwang,” 36.
12 Fan, Zhongguo Jiceng Minzhu Fazhan Baogao 2000–2001, 121–122.
13 Among the 36 interviewed VC cadres in total from Jiangsu in 2002 and 2003, Zhejiang during 2006 through 2009, and from Hubei in 2007 and 2008, 11 of them spoke of the collusion in their conflict with the VPBs during their own tenures, and 29 of them alluded to such realities not directly related to themselves that they knew about.
14 See, for example, Haibo, Guojia Zhili Zhijiaozhong de Cunmin Weiyuanhui, 125–156; Zhenglin, Zhongguo Nongcun Eryuan Quanli Jiegou, 50–67.
15 O’Brien and Han, “Path to Democracy?,” 368–371.
16 Baogang and Youxing, Xunzhao Minzhu yu Quanwei de Pingheng, 280–281.
17 The intervention from township-level officials is often aimed at influencing policy implementation in villages in line with the officials’ will. For the various tactics of interference in order to impose the township authority’s will, see Kennedy, “The Implementation of Village Elections and Tax-for-Fee Reform in Rural Northwest China,” 48–74.
18 Jianwen, Guanyu Nongcun Liangwei Guanxi de Diaocha Baogao, 55–56.
19 Jiugao, Liangpiaozhi Yijiantiao han Yizhisanhua Moshi Tantao, 56.
20 Jing Yuejin, Dangdai Zhongguo Nongcun Liangwei Guanxi, 81–91.
21 Sun, et al., “Patterns of Authority and Governance in Rural China,” 1–22.
22 Fan, Zhongguo Xuanju Zhidu Gaige, 32.
23 Quan, Zhongguo Shequ Jiben Qingkuang Diaocha Baogao, 27.
24 Yi, Shanghai Juwei Daguimo Zhixuan de Shenyi, 2006.
25 Tao et al., Zhongguo Chengshi Jiceng Zhijie Xuanju Yanjiu, 205.
26 Yuanzhu, Zhongguo Shequ Jianshe Gonggong Caizheng Shouzhi de Xianzhuang yu Zhidu Wanshan, A7–A9.
27 Yong, Zhongguo Chengshi Shequ Zizhi, 201–206.
28 The author’s field interviews in the Jianghan District in 2014 and 2015.
29 Yong, Zhongguo Chengshi Shequ Zizhi, 41–52.
30 Field interviews in the Jianghan District in 2007 and 2008.
31 The author’s interviews with three HOCs in Shanghai in 2014.
32 Juan, Chengshi Shequ Yezhu Weiyuanhui Fazhan Yanjiu, 52–53; Shubin, Chengshi Yezhu Weiquan Yundong: Tedian jiqi Yingxiang, 29–30.
33 O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China.
34 The author’s interview in Pudong of Shanghai in 2005.
35 Read, “Inadvertent Political Reform via Private Associations,” 158.
36 O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China, 50–66.
37 For the HOCs’ development and lateral linkage in Beijing, see Wang, et al., “Leadership in China’s Urban Middle Class Protest,” 411–431; Cai and Sheng, “Homeowners' Activism in Beijing: Leaders with Mixed Motivations,” 513–532; Chung, “Pushing the Envelope for Representation and Participation,” 1–20. For the case in Guangzhou, see Yip and Jiang, “Homeowners’ United,” 735–750.
38 Yongshun, “Civil Resistance and Rule of Law in China,” 180–181.
39 Bo, Cong Chongtu dao Zhixu, 92; Juan, Chengshi Shequ Yezhu Weiyuanhui Fazhan Yanjiu, 112–113; Shubin, Chengshi Yezhu Weiquan Yundong: Tedian jiqi Yingxiang, 31; Xiaohua and Tianqing, “Shequ Jianshe zhong de Sanjutou Jiaose Tantao,” 22.
40 Zhenayo et al., Zhongguo Nongcun Cunmin Weiyuanhui Huanjie Xuanju Zhidu, 88.
41 Rong, Cunmin Weiyuanhui Xuanju zhong Cunmin de Zizhushi Canyu, 20.
42 He and Lang, Xunzhao Minzhu yu Quanwei de Pingheng, 210–213.
43 Chen, “Popular Support for Village Self-Government in China,” 865–885.
44 Sun, et al., “Patterns of Authority and Governance in Rural China.”
45 See, for instance, Bray, Social Space and Governance in Urban China, 181–190.
46 Lingang, Shequ Canyu zhong Jumin Canyu de Zhiyue Yinsu Fenxi, 138–139; Yong, Chengshi Shequ Shifou Keneng, 88; Derleth and Koldyk, “The Shequ Experiment: Grassroots Political Reform in Urban China,” 766–767; Yong, Zhixuan: Shi Shehui Ziben Kaifa Haishi Xingzheng Tuixiao Minzhu?, 22–23.
47 Xiaozhang and Ting, Chengshi Jumin de Shequ Canyu Yiyuan, 100–101.
48 Yong and Zhiyu, Xingzhenghua Jincheng Zhong de Chengshi Juweihui Tizhi Bianqian, 5.
49 For instance, in the Yinxing Residents Committee, a trial point in Shanghai, the turnout rate in 2003 was 95.1 percent. See Gui Yong, Zhixuan, 22.
50 Tao et al., Zhongguo Chengshi Jiceng Zhijie Xuanju Yanjiu, 206.
51 Guan and Cai, “Interests and Political Participation in Urban China,” 95–116.
52 See, for instance, Tang and. Parish, Chinese Urban Life under Reform, 35–78.