Selective use of political opportunity: a case of environmental protest in rural China

Abstract

This paper explores the selective and instrumental use of political opportunity in Chinese contentious politics through the study of a rural environmental protest. By considering the transmission of political opportunity through different levels of government, it also analyses the phenomenon of leakage of political opportunity. We argue that political opportunities can be divided into soft and hard types, which are weighted differently by activists. In the protest we examine, the villagers had various political opportunities at their disposal. They used them selectively, preferring the opportunities arising from changes to land policy, which were relatively hard and had a higher level of operability than environmental political opportunities—despite their grievances being largely connected with environmental damage. The hard, land-oriented opportunities, however, went through a process of leakage and then became merely symbolic, due to the local government’s manipulation of policy implementation. However, although they were well aware that the symbolic political opportunities were not genuine, the protesters still acted as if they were real and exploited them instrumentally.

Keywords:

• Environmental protest
• hard political opportunity
• soft political opportunity
• symbolic political opportunity
• (mis)framing

Notes

Disclosure statement

The authors report no conflicts of interest. The authors alone are responsible for the content and writing of this article.

Notes on contributors

Yanhua Deng is a professor in the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Nanjing University, China. Her research centers on contentious politics and environmental sociology. She has published articles in China Journal, China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China, and Modern China.

Jonathan Benney is a lecturer in Chinese Studies in the Schools of Languages, Literatures, Cultures, and Linguistics at Monash University. He received his PhD from the University of Melbourne in 2010. His research concentrates on dispute resolution and political communication in contemporary China.

Notes

1 Tarrow, Power in Movement.

2 McAdam, “Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions,” 27. Furthermore, some scholars believe that the dimensions of political opportunity should also include “the transnational environment and the role of external actors”. See Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders; Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism.

3 See, for example, McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency; Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder; Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion.

4 Gamson and Meyer, “Framing Political Opportunity,” 283; Sawyers and Meyer, “Missed Opportunities”.

5 Kurzman, “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory”; Goodwin et al., “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine”.

6 Cai, Collective Resistance in China.

7 See Xie, “Cong ‘Sifa Dongyuan’ Dao ‘Jietou Kangyi’”. Other research demonstrates that different levels of government pursue their goals in different ways, which might affect the provision of opportunity to activists: see Shi and Cai, “Disaggregating the State”; Shi, “Guanxi Wangluo Yu Dangdai Zhongguo Jiceng Shehui Yundong”.

8 Downs, Inside Bureaucracy; Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy; Cai, Collective Resistance in China, 70.

9 Koopmans also observes that the ‘selection processes’ of movement participants (i.e. their framing strategy and their choice of political opportunities) may ‘evolve’ as a result of contact with factors, such as the influence of the media, which may not engage ‘directly’ with the core concerns of the participants. See Koopmans, “Movements and Media”.

10 This term builds upon the ‘frame analysis’ paradigm developed by Goffman in Frame Analysis.

11 Suh, “How Do Political Opportunities Matter For Social Movements?”

12 Interview, C18, 29 June 2007.

13 Interview, P9, 27 May 2007.

14 Ibid.

15 Huashui Township Government, “Guanyu Yaoqiu Xunsu Jianli Lipei Jizhi Jiejue Zhuxi Gongneng Qu Maodun Jiufen De Baogao” (Report on the necessity to establish timely compensation mechanism for solving conflicts in the Zhuxi Functional Area), 6 July 2004.

16 Diary, V11, 17 November 2004.

17 An Internet post retrieved by the first author.

18 There was also a protest against anticipated pollution in October 2001 in the town, which is discussed in Deng and Yang, “Pollution and Protest in China”.

19 For a discussion of factors which trigger the central government to intervene in protests, and how this contributes to protest success, see Cai, “Power Structure and Regime Resilience”.

20 For more information on this case, see Deng and O’Brien, “Relational Repression in China”.

21 An Internet post retrieved by the first author.

22 One official from Huashui town, when reflecting on the incident, suggested: ‘In 2004, the villagers cleverly used the policies the government was advocating at the time: getting close to the people (qinmin zhengce), “putting people first”, and “scientific development’”.

23 Pan, “Huanjing Baohu Yu Gongzong Canyu”.

24 Li, “Dang Zhuiqiu Jingji Liyi Zaoyu Huanbao Fengbao He Nengyuan Weiji”.

25 Briggs, “China’s Pollution Victims”; van Rooij, “The People vs. Pollution”.

26 Pan, “Huanjing Baohu Yu Gongzong Canyu”.

27 Until the summer of 2007, of the villagers whom the author interviewed, there was only one activist who—because they had undertaken training in ‘methods of public participation and temporary measures for environmental impact assessment’, provided by a Beijing NGO—knew that there was an Environmental Impact Assessment Law.

28 The construction of industrial parks was (and perhaps still is) perceived to be able to improve the reputations and careers of local officials, and consequently all kinds of industrial parks and economic development zones had sprung up everywhere around the year of 2000. In the eastern coastal regions, economic development zones tended to be small and disorganized, and quite a few of these were not really used for development sake. At the same time, because the setup of industrial parks had involved the displacement of many farmers without adequate compensation and assistance with relocation, there were many related mass incidents. According to Chen Xiwen, director of the Central Rural Working Group, in the few years before 2006, mass incidents relating to rural land disputes made up approximately 50% of all rural mass incidents. See Chang, “‘Yi Hao Wenjian Zuo Ban, Chen Xiwen jiedu ‘Xin Nongcun Jianshe Yuannian’”.

29 Interview, P3, 17 July 2007.

30 Lieberthal, “China’s Governing System and its Impact on Environmental Policy Implementation”.

31 Interview, C10, 23 May 2007.

32 From 8 August to 19 September 2003, ten supervision groups were sent to investigate the implementation of the central land policy across China. One investigator found: ‘What appeared to be vigorous internal investigation and rectification processes were actually quite worrisome. In my view, all local governments did this to take advantage of the regulation that conducting self-investigation and self-rectification would result in more lenient penalties, rather than aiming to genuinely improve the local land markets’. See Tang, “Ducha Yinxiang Lu”.

33 Tang, “Ducha Yinxiang Lu”.

34 Interview, C10, 23 May 2007.

35 Sourced from a reflection report on the Huashui incident written by a key county leader.

36 Diary, V11, 9 August 2004.

37 Interview, P3, 11 June 2007.

38 Interview, P1, 8 June 2007.

39 Ibid.

40 Diary, V11, 16 November 2004.

41 One petition letter suggested that after the written decisions of legal penalties were made by the Bureau of Land and Resources, the Zhuxi Chemical Park had not shrunk, but was in fact gradually expanding. More than 100 buildings were constructed in the following two months.

42 Ibid.

43 Diary, V11, 25 August 2004.

44 Diary, V11, 11 August 2004.

45 O’Brien and Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China.

46 Diary, V11, 29 October 2004.

47 Some other factors which contributed to the success of the Huashui environmental protest are described in Deng and O’Brien, “Societies of Senior Citizens and Popular Protest in Rural Zhejiang”; O’Brien and Deng, “Repression Backfires”.

48 From a record of a meeting of cadres in Huashui town on 4 March 2005.

49 Interview, C8, 28 June 2007.

50 Benney, Defending Rights in Contemporary China, 116.

51 Scott, Weapons of the Weak.

52 Kremmel and Pali, “Refugee Protests and Political Agency”. The authors suggest: ‘By acting as if they have the rights that they lack, the refugees actualize their political freedom and equality. Even if the public sphere has been defined through their exclusion, they act’.