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Abstract
Taking Guangdong Province as a case study, this paper examines the ways in which experts engage in China’s local climate governance. The paper first explains that most prominent experts in Guangdong’s climate governance are those who work in semiofficial institutions or universities. The paper then illuminates the policy work of Guangdong experts by scrutinizing their engagement with three national policy pilot programmes promulgated by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC): the low-carbon provincial pilot programme, the emissions inventory, and the emissions trading scheme. Lastly, in order to contextualize the knowledge–policy interface in the Chinese authoritarian context, the paper adopts the notion of the ‘politics of knowledge’ to explain how the political environment and local authorities’ considerations influence the conduct of experts in China’s local climate governance. While the previous literature mainly focuses on the role of experts in policy formulation, this study extends the understanding of the role of experts in climate governance by detailing the contribution of Guangdong experts to practically all of the stages of the policy process, including the capacity building, policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation phases of the policy cycle.
Notes
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments. An earlier draft of this article was presented at the CHESS Workshop 2016 on ‘Local Climate Change Governance & Resource Management in China’, University of Vienna, 19–20 November 2016. The author is grateful for the comments received from the organizers and participants in the workshop. The author also thanks David Kuan-Wei Wu, Chien-Shih Huang, and Olivia Yun-An Dung for their assistance and warm encouragement during the writing of this article.
Disclosure statement
The author reports no conflicts of interest. The author alone is responsible for the content and writing of this article.
Notes on contributor
Liang-Yu Chen, is a PhD student at Leiden University Institute for Area Studies (LIAS), the Netherlands. He received his MA diploma from Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University in 2010. His research interests include climate change and environmental governance, local governance, and public policy theories.
Notes
1 According to its INDC, China committed to the following actions by 2030: (1) to achieve the peaking of its carbon dioxide emissions by around 2030 and to make the best effort to peak its emissions early; (2) to lower its carbon dioxide emissions intensity (emissions per unit of GDP) by 60–65% based on the 2005 level; (3) to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20%; and (4) to increase the forest stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic metres, based on the 2005 level.
2 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, “Xi Jinping Meets with US Secretary of State John Kerry”.
3 Hallding et al., “China’s Climate- and Energy-security Dilemma,” 119–134; Oberheitmann and Sternfeld, “Climate Change in China,” 135–164.
4 Conrad, “China in Copenhagen,” 435–455; Wu, “China’s Pragmatic Tactics in International Climate Change Negotiations,” 778–800.
5 Conrad, “Bureaucratic Land Rush,” 52–64; Tsang and Kolk, “The Evolution of Chinese Policies and Governance Structures on Environment, Energy and Climate,” 180–196; Zang, “From Environment to Energy,” 543–574; and Barbi et al., “Climate Change Challenges and China’s Response,” 324–339.
6 For some exceptions, see Goron and Cassisa, “Regulatory Institutions and Market-Based Climate Policy in China,” 99–120; Lo, “China’s Low-carbon City Initiatives,” 236–244; Qi et al., “Translating a Global Issue into Local Priority,” 379–400; Wang et al., “Developing Low-carbon Cities through Pilots,” S81–S103.
7 Pettenger, The Social Construction of Climate Change; Jasanoff, “Cosmopolitan Knowledge,” 129–143; Wilson Rowe, Russian Climate Politics.
8 Richerzhagen and Scholz, “China’s Capacities for Mitigating Climate Change,” 308–324; Hofem and Heilmann, “Bringing the Low-Carbon Agenda to China,” 199–215; Wübbeke, “China’s Climate Change Expert Community,” 712–731; Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, Climate Change Governance in Chinese Cities.
9 Goldman and Gu, Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market; Zhu and Xue, “Think Tanks in Transitional China,” 452–464.
10 Glaser and Saunders, “Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes,” 597–616; Shambaugh, “China’s International Relations Think Tanks,” 575–596; Tanner, “Changing Window on Changing China,” 559–574; Li, “China’s New Think Tanks,” 1–21.
11 Guangdong’s climate governance is seldom discussed in the English literature. Some exceptions are Teng and Gu, “Climate Change,” 183–194, and the two publications of Francesch-Huidobro and Mai cited in this paper. The author also refers to the policy documents released by the Guangdong officials, for instance the notices, work plans, and the implementation regulations of the climate-related policies. Apart from the interviews, the archives and documents are also sources that can be used to better understand the statements of Chinese authorities.
12 Zhu, “Policy Change and Expert Involvement in China,” 281.
13 Ibid, 283; Zhu, “Bureau Chiefs and Policy Experts in the Chinese Policy Decision-making Process,” 130.
14 Zhu, “Policy Change and Expert Involvement in China,” 284.
15 Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden; Kingdon, Agenda, Alternatives, and Public Policies; Litfin, Ozone Discourse; Lendvai and Stubbs, “Assemblages, Translation, and Intermediaries in South East Europe,” 673–695; Radaelli, “The Role of Knowledge in the Policy Process,” 159–183.
16 Zhu, “Government Advisors or Public Advocates?,” 668–686.
17 Zhu, “Policy Change and Expert Involvement in China,” 283–284.
18 Zhu, Zhengce bian qian zhong de zhuanjia canyu, 4–7.
19 Wübbeke, The Power of Advice.
20 Hofem and Heilmann, “Bringing the Low-carbon Agenda to China,” 199–215.
21 Francesch-Huidobro and Mai, “Climate Advocacy Coalitions in Guangdong, China,” 43–64; Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, Climate Change Governance in Chinese Cities.
22 Wübbeke, The Power of Advice, 9.
23 Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, Climate Change Governance in Chinese Cities, 81.
24 Wübbeke, “China’s Climate Change Expert Community,” 712–731; Francesch-Huidobro and Mai, “Climate Advocacy Coalitions in Guangdong, China,” 43–64.
25 Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, Climate Change Governance in Chinese Cities, 112.
26 Before 2009, the BCG Guangzhou provided grants based on the SPF amounting to a total of £3–4 million (ranging from CN¥30 to 40 million) per annum. Between 2009 and 2013, the grants increased to a total of £5 million (around CN¥50 million) (Interview H).
27 Interview N.
28 Interviews A, C, D, E, G, and K.
29 National Development and Reform Commission, “The Notice of Piloting Low-carbon Provinces and Low-carbon Cities.”
30 Guttman and Song, “Making Central-local Relations Work,” 423.
31 For instance, the policy targets and measures of the transportation sector relate to the jurisdiction of the Guangdong Provincial Department of Transportation, and the policy targets and measures of housing and infrastructure are the responsibility of the Guangdong Provincial Department of Housing and Urban-rural Development.
32 Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, Climate Change Governance in Chinese Cities, 108.
33 Interviews E, G, and K.
34 Lieberthal and Lampton, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, Policy Making in China.
35 China Climate Change Info-Net, “The Launching of Seven Provinces including Guangdong for Pilot of GHG Emissions Inventory”.
36 For instance, cities along China’s east coast often face shortages of energy resources while occupied by large-scale and energy-intensive industries, while cities in China’s west are often resource-rich but underdeveloped. Moreover, cities in China’s northeast are often labelled as ‘old-industrial bases’. Since the energy structure and the key industries differ for each region, the emissions inventory therefore varies.
37 Under the supervision of the NDRC, the research institutions that participated in the compilation of the Guidelines included the Energy Research Institute (ERI), Tsinghua University, the Institute of Atmospheric at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Environment and Sustainable Development in Agriculture at the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the Institute of Forest Ecological Environment and Protection at the Chinese Academy of Forestry, and the Center for Climate Change Impact Research at the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences.
38 Interviews A, G, and K.
39 Interview K.
40 Ibid.
41 Interview G.
42 Zhang et al., “Emissions Trading in China,” 9.
43 Interview N.
44 China Climate Change Info-Net, “Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences”.
45 Interviews D, E, F, G, and K.
46 Research Centre for Climate Change of Guangdong, Guangdong Pilot Emissions Trading Scheme Report (2014–2015), 7.
47 For example, if the amount of emissions emitted by a factory with a coal-fired CHP unit decreases due to an economic recession, it is not the factory’s effort to reduce its emissions; however, according to the ‘grandfathering method’, the allowance for this factory will change accordingly.
48 Wilson Rowe, Russian Climate Politics, 5.
49 Interviews D and G.
50 Interviews C, E, H, and K.
51 Wübbeke, “China’s Climate Change Expert Community,” 712–731; Zhu, “Policy Change and Expert Involvement in China,” 281–302.
52 Interviews G, J, and M.
53 Teng and Gu, “Climate Change,” 183–194; Kostka and Hobbs, “Local Energy Efficiency Policy Implementation in China,” 765–785; Eaton and Kostka, “Authoritarian Environmentalism Undermined?,” 359–380.
54 Interviews A, B, C, D, E, G, and K.
55 Interview G.
56 Kostka and Hobbs, “Local Energy Efficiency Policy Implementation in China,” 765–785; Ran, “Perverse Incentive Structure and Policy Implementation Gap in China’s Local Environmental Politics,” 17–39; Qi and Zhang, “Local Environmental Enforcement Constrained by Central-Local Relations in China,” 204–215.
57 Interviews C and G.
58 Interviews A and G.
59 Interviews C, E, and H.
60 State Council. “The Decision of the State Council on Accelerating the Fostering and Development of Strategic Emerging Industries”.
61 Interviews B, D, and H.
62 Interview H.
63 Ibid.
64 Interviews A, B, C, D, H, and K.
65 Interviews A, B, D, F, G, and H.