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Abstract
Achieving a proper balance between administrative discretion, which promotes efficient and effective governance, and oversight of that discretion to ensure political responsiveness has been a classic and enduring issue in public-administration literature. This study joins the dialogue by examining the question in the context of China, where power is highly concentrated and there are not many checks and balances. By examining administrative discretion in work safety regulation, this study argues that in China’s context, the tension between efficiency and responsiveness is less explicit among the legislature, executive and judiciary powers, but more explicit between central and local powers. In other words, if local bureaucracies have considerable discretionary power, they may use this power to achieve local interests at the expense of national goals. To improve local bureaucracies’ political responsiveness, the Chinese leaders have adopted both legal and managerial measures. On the one hand, administrative discretion has been increasingly curbed through elaborate legislation. On the other hand, management reforms play a crucial role in bringing local leaders’ goals in line with national ones. China’s efforts to balance administrative efficiency and political responsiveness suggest that each country must choose solutions in keeping with its own context and problems.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
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Notes
1 Gaus, White and Dimock, The Frontiers of Public Administration; Waldo, The Administrative State; Kaufman, “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration,” 1057–1075; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,” 243–277; Huber and Shipan, Deliberate Discretion?
2 Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” 197–222.
3 Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion.
4 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,” 243–277; Bawn, “Political Control versus Agency Expertise,” 62–73. Epstein and O’Halloran, “Administrative Procedures, Information and Agency Discretion,” 697–722; Huber and Shipan, Deliberate Discretion?
5 Rosenbloom, “Have an Administrative Rx?” 503–507.
6 Guo, Chinese Politics and Government.
7 Chan, “Judicial Review and Control over Administrative Discretion in the People’s Republic of China,” 135–163; Zhang, “On the Discretion in Applying Administrative Penalty in Work Safety”; Zhang and Gu, “A Study on Regulating the Discretion in Applying Administrative Penalties in Work Safety,” 116–118; Lin, “A Study on the Issue Regarding Administrative Penalties in Work Safety.”
8 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 375.
9 Wilson, “The Study of Administration,” 197–222; Goodnow, Politics and Administration; Gulick and Urwick, Papers on the Science of Administration; Gore, From Red Tape to Results.
10 Gore, From Red Tape to Results.
11 Gulick and Urwick, Papers on the Science of Administration; Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy; Morgan, et al. “What Middle Managers Do in Local Governments,” 359–366.
12 Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion, 8.
13 Kochtcheeva, “Administrative Discretion and Environmental Regulation,” 241–265.
14 Wilson, “The Rise of Bureaucratic State,” 77–103; Beetham and Weir, Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain; Lanffont and Martimort, The Theory of Incentives.
15 Dodd, Congress and the Administrative State; Kochtcheeva, “Administrative Discretion and Environmental Regulation,” 241–265.
16 McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,” 243–277; Macey, “Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies,” 93–110. Bawn, “Political Control versus Agency Expertise,” 62–73.
17 Ferejohn, “The Structure of Agency Decision Process,” 441–461; Lupia and McCubbins, “Learning from Oversight,” 96–125; Wooley, “Conflict among Regulators and the Hypothesis of Congressional Dominance,” 92–114.
18 Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book; Shumavon and Hibbeln, Administrative Discretion and Public Policy Implementation; Wood and Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics; Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft; Huber and McCarty, “Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform,” 481–494.
19 Bryner, Bureaucratic Discretion.
20 Spence, “Agency Policy Making and Political Control,” 199–219.
21 Crandall and Lave, The Scientific Basis of Health and Safety Regulation; Melnick, Regulation and the Courts; Kochtcheeva, “Administrative Discretion and Environmental Regulation,” 241–265.
22 State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS), Yearbook on Work Safety in China, 1999, 2000–2001, 2002.
23 Wang, “Regulating Deaths at Coalmines,” 1–30.
24 SAWS, Yearbook on Work Safety in China, 1979–1999.
25 National People’s Congress, Work Safety Law of People’s Republic of China, 2002, 2009, 2014.
26 Ibid, 2014.
27 SAWS, Yearbook on Work Safety in China, 2003, 2007.
28 Lin, “A Study on the Issues Regarding Administrative Penalties in Work Safety.”
29 Zhang and Gu, “A Study on Regulating the Discretion in Applying Administrative Penalties in Work Safety,” 116–118.
30 Rawski, “What Is Happening to China’s GDP Statistics?” 347–354; Wallace, “Juking the Stats?” 11–29.
31 Landry, Decentralized Authoritarianism in China.
32 Bradbury, “Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety,” 211–224.
33 Jia and Nie, “Decentralization, Collusion, and Coal Mine Deaths,” 105–118.
34 Wang, “Regulating Deaths at Coalmines,” 22.
35 Wright, “The Political Economy of Coal Mine Disasters in China,” 629–646.
36 Chan and Gao, “Death versus GDP!” 355–377.
37 SAWS, Yearbook on Work Safety in China, 2011.
38 Chan and Gao, “Death versus GDP!” 372.
39 Xing and Wang, “A Study on Rational Accountability,” 50.
40 Shi and Xi, “Race to Safety,” 79–95.
41 SAWS, Yearbook on Work Safety in China, various years.
42 On 1 April, a coal mine in Tangshan City of Hebei Province had a water intrusion accident and killed seven people. The mine owner did not report the case. On 3 April, a coal mine in Xuanwei City of Yunnan Province had a gas explosion and six miners died. The case was also covered up. Two weeks later on 15 April, a similar accident occurred in another coal mine in Xuanwei City of Yunnan Province. Twelve people died and three were seriously injured. The authorities concealed four corpses, falsified the records and underreported the fatalities. On 24 April, a water intrusion accident in Shuangyashan City of Heilongjiang Province killed four people and injured two. The case was reported as required. After two days, on 26 April, a gas explosion accident in a coal mine in Jixi City of Heilongjiang Province killed nine people. The coal miners did not report the fatalities, concealed all the corpses, and fled. See SAWS, “The General Office of the Work Safety Commission under the State Council Disclosed Six Coverups, Dishonest Reporting and Delayed-Reporting Cases, Including the 4.26 Guifa Coal Mine Incident in Didao District, Jixi City, Heilongjiang Province.”
43 Fenghuangwang, “Investigation of the Jixi Coal Mine Accident: Local Government and Policemen Are Involved in Falsification of Records.”
44 China Labour Bulletin, “Work Safety.”
45 Ji, “The Principle of Rule of Law and Administrative Discretion.”
46 SAWS, “The Application Regulations on Discretion in Applying Administrative Penalties in Work Safety (Trial Run).”
47 Work Safety Bureau of Jiangsu Province, “Implementation Details on the Discretion in Applying Administrative Penalties in Work Safety in Jiangsu Province.”
48 Central Party and State Council, “Regulations on Local Party and State Leaders’ Responsibilities in Work Safety.”
49 Xinhuawang, “Promulgation of Regulations on Local Party and State Leaders’ Responsibilities in Work Safety.”
50 Wang, “Regulating Deaths at Coalmines,” 1–30; Lin, “A Study on the Issues Regarding Administrative Penalties in Work Safety.”
51 Huber and McCarty, “Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform,” 481–494.
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Jie Gao
Jie Gao is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. Her research interests focus on performance management, cadre and talent management, work safety regulation, and environmental governance in Chinese local government.