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Abstract
This paper sheds light on the issue of political representation in an authoritarian context, taking China as a case study. In the academic literature, the concept of political representation is primarily related to mechanisms of representation in a democratic setting, used in a rather technical or normative sense and concerned with institutionalized representation in legislatures and parliaments, with a strong focus on elections by which citizens express their political will. The conviction prevails that only persons elected in a competitive electoral procedure can be conceived as legitimate representatives. Widely lacking in the scholarly literature are approaches which explain the nature of political representation in a non-democratic setting. To date, patterns of formal and informal representation in an authoritarian context constitute a ‘black hole’ in the literature on representation. This article tries to answer two research questions: (1) How does representation in an authoritarian system work? (2) What can we conclude from the Chinese case with regard to representation in an authoritarian setting? The article first conceptualizes representation in an authoritarian setting. Second, it examines which mechanisms of representation and representative claims exist in China. Third, it distinguishes between five mechanisms of political representation: formal, informal, symbolic, traditional and digital. It is argued that informal patterns of representation are crucial since formal ones are more strictly controlled. A new and specific role is played by ‘digital representation’: a vigorous form of representation via the cyberspace, spawning new and innovative modes of formal, informal and symbolic political representation. In the conclusions, the author considers what his findings regarding the Chinese case mean for the concept of representation in authoritarian states. He also explains why representation in an autocratic context can produce political output and exhibit legitimacy among the represented.
Notes
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 In his definition of representation, Max Weber did not even mention the issue of election but referred to two principal points: acceptance that a representative (Vertreter) is acting in the name of a specific group and that his representative claim is conceived by the group as legitimate. See Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 217.
2 Tlemcani, Electoral Authoritarianism.
3 Economist, “The National People's Congress.”
4 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism.
5 Geddes, “Stages of Development in Authoritarian Regimes,” 149.
6 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 17.
7 Geddes, “What do we know about Democratization after Twenty Years,” 115–144.
8 Thus, I agree with Francis Fukuyama”s argument that regarding nondemocratic systems, comparative politics cannot provide a sufficient framework for analysis; see Fukuyuma, “The patterns of history,” 17/18.
9 Evans, “Development as Institutional Change,” 30.
10 Przeworski, “Parties, States, and Economic Reforms in the Soviet Union and China,” 49–86.
11 Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritative Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” 1279.
12 Geddes, “What do we know about Democratization after Twenty Years,” 115–144.
Similarly, Hadenius and Teorell, “Authoritarian Regimes, 1972–2003.”
13 Rehfeld, “Towards a General Theory of Political Representation.”1. Golosov notes accordingly that “authoritarian institutions do matter”. See Golosov, “Proportional Representation and Authoritarianism,” 84.
14 Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, 64.
15 Rehfeld, “Towards a General Theory of Political Representation,” 5.
16 Latour, Science in Action, 72.
17 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 8.
18 Ibid., 209.
19 Saward, “The Representative Claim,” 302.
20 Ibid., 305.
21 21. Audience refers to a group of people who acknowledge or reject representatives. An audience differs from the group of people being represented. See Budde, “Formen der Repräsentation und ihre Legitimation,” 65.
22 Saward, “The Representative Claim,” 303.
23 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 106.
24 Schwartz, “Representation as Agency and the Pork Barrel Paradox,” 3–21, which raises the question whether the principal-agent model is compatible with our context. Golosov writes: “This model applies to situations in which there is a hierarchical relationship between two actors, one of whom (the agent) is expected to act on behalf of the other (the principal). The two actors have different interests and asymmetric information, with the agent having an informational advantage over the principal; hence the problem of ensuring that the agent is acting in the best interests of the principal rather than in the agent”s own interests. In authoritarian [settings, the authors]…the goal of the principal…is the maximization of political control.” See Golosov, “Proportional Representation and Authoritarianism,” 84.
25 Budde, “Formen der Repräsentation und ihre Legitimation,” 16–17; Bird, “The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies,” 425–465.
26 Sintomer, “The Meanings of Political Representation,” 13–34.
27 Pitkin, see note 17 above, 60–143.
28 Hobbes, Leviathan oder Stoff, Form und Gewalt eines kirchlichen und bürgerlichen Staates. An interpretation of Hobbes’ theory: Runciman, “Hobbes Theory of Representation,” 15–34.
29 Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, 205, 214.
30 Ibid., 212; Hofmann, Repräsentation, 22.
31 Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 24–36.
32 Barber, Strong Democracy, 145–146.
33 Wang, “Daibiaoxing duanlie yu “hou zhengdang zhengzhi,” 70–79.
34 Saich, “Political Representation”, 109.
35 Ibid., 109–117.
36 Truex, Making Autocracy Work; Manion, Information for Autocrats; O”Brien, Reform Without Liberalization; Wang, Cards of a Party Regime; Wang, “Playing by the Rules,” 870–885; Manion, “Authoritarian Parochialism,” 311–338.
37 Sheng, “Authoritarian Co-optation, the Territorial Dimension,” 71–93.
38 Chen and Xu, “From Resistance to Advocacy,” 649–667.
39 Crooks, On the Politics of Representation: HIV/AIDS and Development in China.
40 Ross, “Does Taxation Lead to Representation?” 229–249; Brautigam et al., Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries.
41 Gehlbach, Representation THROUGH TAXATION, 61; Zhang, “A Fiscal Sociological Theory of Authoritarian Resilience,” 42.
42 Brautigam, “Introduction: Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries,” 2.
43 Bernstein and Lü, “Taxation Without Representation,” 742–763.
44 Ye, “Representation Without Taxation,” 1111–1127.
45 Zhang, see note 41 above, 42.
46 Ibid., 43.
47 Ibid., 46.
48 Dincecco and Wang, “Violent Conflict and Political Development Over the Long Run,” 341–358.
49 Jing, “Introduction. The Road to Collaborative Governance in China,” 1.
50 Leib and He, The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China; Fishkin et al., “Deliberative Democracy in an Unlikely Place,” 435–444; He and Warren, “Authoritarian Deliberation,” 276-279; Tang and Dryzek, “Introduction: The Continuing Search for Deliberation and Participation in China.” 109–114; Tang, “Development and Prospects of Deliberative Democracy in China,” 115–132; He, “Reconciling Deliberation and Representation,” 35–50; Tan, Minzhu shenyi yu zhengzhi hefaxing; He, Xieshang minzhu: lilun, fangfa he Shijian.
51 51 He and Warren, see note 50 above, 271.
52 Professor Lin Muhua argued at a conference at Renmin University in June 2016 that in China the Western concept of “participatory budgeting” (as in Wenling or Yanqin) had actually been rather unsuccessful.
53 Tang and Dryzek, see note 50 above, 110–111. Due to the specific political setting in China, they classify it, however, as “authoritarian deliberation”.
54 For a long time former Indonesian dictator Suharto argued in a similar vein that “consultative democracy” was a “typical Indonesian form of democracy”. After his removal, nobody raised this argument again.
55 This classification, however, seems to be questionable. He does not provide any clues as to the conditions under which such a development might happen. His argument apparently faces the same problem of “monocropping” (Peter Evans), i.e. describing Chinese political institutions from a “Western” vantage point. See Keane, When Trees Fall, Monkeys Scatter. See also a critical review of this book by He, “Should We Abandon the Term “Authoritarianism” Regarding Contemporary China?” 498–500.
56 Charles Tilly points out that specifically social movements “center on sustained challenges to authorities in the name of populations otherwise lacking direct representation”; see Tilly, Stories, Identities, and Political Change, 53.
57 Hatherell, “Repertoires of Representation and an Application to Indonesia”s Jokowi,” 439.
58 Manion, see note 36 above, 151.
59 Heberer and Schubert, “Weapons of the Rich," 471–503.
60 Ibid.
61 Saward, see note 19 above, 306.
62 Heberer, “The Chinese Developmental State 3.0 and the Resilience of Authoritarianism,” 611–632.
63 Manion, see note 36 above, 2–4.
64 See note 59 above.
65 Ibid.
66 Saward, see note 19 above, 306.
67 Truex, see note 36 above, 177.
68 Manion, see note 36 above; O”Brien, “Agents and Remonstrators,” 359–380; Kamo and Takeuchi, “Representation and Local People”s Congresses in China,” 41–60.
69 Fukui, “On the Significance of Informal Politics,” 3.
70 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 136; Scott, Weapons of the Weak; Scott, “Everyday Forms of Resistance,” 33–62.
71 More on such behavior of entrepreneurs, see note 59 above.
72 Shils, Center and Periphery, 127–134 and 256–275. On the interrelationship between charisma and institution-building, see Eisenstadt, Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building.
73 Shils, see note 72 above, 267.
74 Interview, party secretary, county X in Shaanxi Province, 26 August 2011.
75 Weber, “Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland,” 401.
76 I”ll be brief on this since this issue will be discussed in detail in the conference paper by Heberer/Shpakovskaya (Connective Representation in the Cyberspace: The Case of China”s Entrepreneurs). See also Heberer and Shpakovskaya, “The Digital Turn in Political Representation in China.”
77 See the various contributions in deLisle et al., The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China.
78 Chen et al., “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness,” 383–400.
79 Karlsson, Covering Distance. Essays on Representation and Political Communication.
80 Ekdale et al., “Why Blog? (Then and Now),” 219.
81 Pitkin, see note 17 above, 61.
82 Street, “Celebrity Politicians,” 447; Thompson, The Media and Modernity.
83 Xiaotian, “Wangluo yijian daibiao renshi tongzhan gongzuo jizhi yanjiu,” 42–44; Ji, “Wangluo ‘yijian lingxiu’ tongzhan gongzuo tanxi,” 23–28.
84 Wallis, Technomobility in China, 5–6.
85 Say and Castells, “From Media Politics to Networked Politics.” Siapera called this “connected autonomy”; see: “The Political Subject of Blogs,” 59.
86 Gandhi and Przeworski, see note 11 above, 1279–1301.
87 Wright, “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain?”, 322–343.
88 Jowitt, “Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes,” 69–96.
89 Friedgut, Political Participation in the USSR, 182–185.
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Thomas Heberer
Thomas Heberer is a Senior Professor of Chinese Politics and Society at the University Duisburg-Essen in Germany.