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Abstract
In theory, representation is the primary function of the people’s congresses. In practice, under China’s party-state system, the ruling party imposes specific governance tasks on the congresses with the effect that the representative function of the People’s Congress System has largely given way to its governance functions. The uneven practice of these functions has left the System facing a serious representation deficit. Based on a careful analysis of historical archives and findings from interviews and observations, this paper examines the causes and repercussions of the imbalanced functions of the People’s Congress System. By proposing a Monitoring and Adaptation Model, we adopt a historical perspective to reexamine the interplay between the people’s congresses and the ruling party, arguing that the imbalanced functions of the People’s Congress System result from the interplay between Party monitoring and the corresponding adaptations of the people’s congresses. The Party, to bolster its governing performance, has introduced an array of institutional arrangements to have the people’s congresses fulfill specific governance tasks. However, the people’s congresses have gained a measure of autonomy thanks to their organizational growth and institutionalization, changes to the makeup of deputies, and significant efforts by certain leaders since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Although they are expected to take on the governance functions assigned by the ruling party, the people’s congresses thus enjoy greater leeway to carry out their functions selectively with an eye to improving their standing and relevance in China’s political system. Ironically, the fact that the people’s congresses prioritize their governance functions and that the overall performance of the party-state system gains consistent improvement may have warded off a potential representation crisis as the weak representativeness of the People’s Congress System would otherwise predict. Abbreviations: PCS: The People's Congress System; CPC: The Communist Party of China; The “M&A model”: The Monitoring and Adaptation Model; NPC: National People's Congress; LPCs: Local People's Congresses; CPPCC: The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for the insightful comments of Thomas Heberer, Anna Shpakovskaya and two anonymous referees. Any faults in this article belong to the authors.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Manin, The Principles of Representative Government.
2 Kupchan, “The Democratic Malaise,” 62–67; Fukuyama, “The Decay of American Political Institutions.”
3 Dingjian, zhongguo renda zhidu, 85.
4 In his speech to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the National People’s Congress, Xi Jinping reiterated that the People’s Congress is an important component of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics and a fundamental political institution that underpins the Chinese state governance system and governance capability. See Xi Jinping, “zai qingzhu quanguo renmin.”
5 The Central Committee of CPC, “zhuanfa zhonggong quanguo.”
6 The “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues regarding Upholding and Improving the Socialist System with Chinese Characteristics and Modernizing China’s System and Capacity for Governance”
7 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 17. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy also offers a similar definition on “political representation.” Accessed August 15, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/political-representation/.
8 Weiss, “Governance, Good Governance,” 795–814.
9 Jinsong, “quanguo renda changweihui.”
10 Yuejin, “daibiao lilun yu zhongguo.”
11 Cho, “From ‘Rubber Stamps’ to ‘Iron Stamps’”; Tanner, The Politics of Lawmaking.
12 Daying et al., Bijiao Lifa Zhidu.
13 Cho, “From ‘Rubber Stamps’ to ‘Iron Stamps’.”
14 O’Brien, “Chinese People’s Congress”; Peerenboom, China’s Long March.
15 Solinger, “The Fifth NPC.”
16 O’Brien, “Agents and Remonstrators.”
17 Junzhi, “Zhongguo Renda Zhidu.”
18 Xuedong, “Difang Renda Jianduquan.”
19 Shaoheng, “Lun Renda Daibiao.”
20 Leming and Junzhi, “Shui Daibiao Yu Daibiao.”
21 Some researchers have noticed the changing roles of People’s Deputies, who do not satisfy in passively fulfilling their duties or only taking on the role as “agents for the state”, but actively solicit public opinions, supervise the work of the government and offer policy suggestions. See, O’Brein, “Agents and Remonstrators”; Manion, “Authoritarian Parochialism.”
22 Manion, “Authoritarian Parochialism.”
23 Truex, Making Autocracy Work.
24 Changdong, “Reexamining the Electoral Connection.”
25 O’Brien, “Local People’s Congresses.”
26 See note 23 above.
27 See note 22 above.
28 See note 24 above.
29 See note 22 above.
30 Marx, The Civil War in France, 126.
31 Lenin, Themed Articles of Lenin, 252.
32 Zedong and Zedong wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong’s Works], 265.
33 Biwu and Biwu xuanji [Selected works of Dong Biwu], 314.
34 The Secretariat of the First NPC. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo, 81.
35 Chongde, “Difang Renda Changweihui de sheli jiqi bianqian.”
36 Zheng and Xiangqing, Renmin Daibiao Dahui, 126.
37 Xiaoping, Dang He Guojia, 320–343.
38 NPC Research Office. “Quanguo Renda Changweihui.”
39 Xuedong, “Difang Zuzhifa Xiugai,” 89.
40 Zhen, Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin, 456.
41 Bangguo, “Jianchi Zhongguo Tese.”
42 Zemin, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, 114.
43 Jinping, “Zai Qingzhu Quanguo Renmin.”
44 Zhanshu, “Jiaqiang Lilun Wuzhuang Zengqiang.”
45 Baoxu, Ruiyi Jinqu De Xianji, 55.
46 The top two complaints from our interviewees included a lack of enthusiasm among local Party committees about the work of the LPCs and a lack of promotion and development opportunities for the officials working in them.
47 Deyin, “Zuohao Renda Gongzuo.”
48 Xiaoyang, “Lifa Yao Ji Haokan.”
49 According to the Law of the People's Republic of China on Supervision by the Standing Committees of the People's Congresses at All Levels, the People’s Congresses can exercise their supervisory power in eight ways: listening to and reviewing work reports; reviewing and approving plans and budgets; reviewing laws and regulations; checking and inspecting the implementation of laws; dealing with appeals, accusations and reports from citizens; inquiring and questioning; investigating certain issues; and unseating and removing officials.
50 Zhizhong, “Jiandu Yu Zhichi Bingzhong.”
51 Yuejun, “Xingwei Zhidu Jiegou Sanwei,” 54–67.
52 Ying, “Lun Woguo Renda Daibiao,” 163–173.
53 Leming and Junzhi, “Shui Daibiao Yu Daibiao Shui.”
54 Bojun, “Renda Daibiao Bushe Gongzuoshi.”
55 See Pye, “The Legitimacy Crisis,” 135; Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Xuedong Yang
Yang Xuedong is a senior researcher at the Institute of Party History and Literature (IPHL).
Jian Yan
Yan Jian is a research fellow at IPHL.