Abstract
The truncated decision-making of China’s public policy process will inevitably lead to palpable bargaining during implementation. However, there are few concerns and researches at present focus on bargaining intensity between government and social actors. Therefore, the Credibility Thesis is introduced to the policy process in this paper, and the differences of credibility perceived by the public, grassroots government and intermediate government are supposed to reflect the bargaining intensity among them. Based on the adjustability of policy targets and credibility differences, policy implementation is divided into eight types to explain diverse situations more systemically and effectively during policy implementation. Besides, taking prohibition of open burning of crop straw policy (POBSP) as an example, this paper measures the changes of credibility at three points of time during policy implementation and analyzes the bargaining situation among farmers and multi-level governments. The case study proves the applicability of the theoretical framework of the policy implementation based on credibility thesis. It can show the feedback procedure and mechanism of policy implementation, and provide a new perspective for the policy analysis and improving policy performance.
Acknowledgments
We would like to show our great appreciation to Prof. Peter Ho, who puts forward the credibility thesis, for his comments, suggestion, and any other help.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Whittaker et al., “Compressed Development,” 439–467.
2 Lasswell, The Decision Process; Sabatier and Weible, Theories of the Policy Process; Baumgartner and Jones, “Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems,” 1044–1074; Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics.
3 Lindblom, “The Science of “Muddling Through,” 79–88; Zhou et al., “A Behavioral Model of ‘Muddling Through’ in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” 120–147.
4 Zhu, “Government Advisors or Public Advocates?,” 668–686; Zhao, “Conflicts of Values in Policymaking,” 41–52; Ma, “The Rise of Social Accountability in China,” 111–121; Cai, “Power Structure and Regime Resilience,” 411–432.
5 Chan and Rosenbloom, “Four Challenges to Accountability in Contemporary Public Administration,” 11S–33S; Cai and Zhu, “Disciplining Local Officials in China,” 98–119; Hsu, “In Search of Public Accountability,” S40–S50; Ma, “The Rise of Social Accountability in China,” 111–121.
6 Xue and Zhao, “Adaptive Reform and Limitations of the Public Policy Process in the Course of Transition,” 45–67; Xue and Zhao, “Truncated Decision Making and Deliberative Implementation,” 1–29.
7 Zhou and Lian, “Bureaucratic Bargaining in the Chinese Government,” 80–96; Zhou and Lian, “Modes of Governance in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” 69–93; Feng, “Policy Implement Cost and Occurring Mechanism of Bargaining among the Chinese Governmental Hierarchy,” 340–324; Chen et al., “Making a Competitive Selection or a Compromise?,” 59–72; Tang and Chen, “Motivation, Incentive and Information,” 76–81; Ding and Ding, “A Case Analysis of the Distorted Policy-Implementation Game and Its Effects,” 804–809.
8 Ho, “In Defense of Endogenous, Spontaneously Ordered Development,” 1087–1118; Ho, “The ‘Credibility Thesis’ and Its Application to Property Rights,” 13–27; Ho, “An Endogenous Theory of Property Rights,” 1121–1144; Ho, “Reprint of ‘Institutional Function Versus Form,” 845–853.
9 Ho, “The ‘Credibility Thesis’ and Its Application to Property Rights,” 13–27.
10 Ho, “An Endogenous Theory of Property Rights,” 1121–1144.
11 Ho, “Myths of Tenure Security and Titling,” 352–364; Ho, “Empty Institutions, Non-Credibility and Pastoralism,” 1145–1176; Ho, “Who Owns China’s Housing?,” 66–77; Davy, “After Form,” 854–862.
12 Fan et al., “Institutional Credibility Measurement Based on Structure of Transaction Costs,” 212–225.
13 Zhao and Karlis, “Local Perceptions of Grassland Degradation in China,” 1206–1223.
14 Fold et al., “Grounding Institutions Through Informal Practice,” 922–931.
15 Zhang, “The Credibility of Slums,” 876–890; Li and Ho, “Formalizing Informal Homes, a Bad Idea,” 891–901; Jesper, “Whose Urban Development?,” 942–951.
16 Sharlene and Hermans, “Institutional Function and Urbanization in Bangladesh,” 932–941; Nor-Hisham and Ho, “A Conditional Trinity as ‘No-Go’ Against Non-Credible Development?,” 1177–1205.
17 Lin, Demystifying the Chinese Economy, 1–20.
18 Mertha, “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0’,” 995–1012.
19 Duckett, 2006. The Entrepreneurial State in China, 3–14; Pei, China’s Trapped Transition, 33–44; Yu and Gao, “The Behavioral Logic and Institutional Basis of Local Developmental Government,” 95–112 + 206–207; Zhao et al., “Local Government Role Prototype, Interest Choice and Behavioral Differences,” 90–106.
20 Zhu, “An Analysis on the Policy Implementation Behavior of Local Governments,” 40–46.
21 O’Brien and Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” 167–186; Lin, “Research on the Implementation Mechanism of Environment Policy,” 102–110; Chen and Xue, “Soft Implementation Constraint’ and Political Gaming in China’s Nuclear Power Puzzles,” 147–160.
22 See note 6 above.
23 Zhou and Lian, “Modes of Governance in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” 69–93; Zhou, “Collusion Among Local Governments,” 1–21 + 243.
24 Gong, Theoretical Study on the Implementation of Government Reform Policy.
25 Matland, “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature,” 145–174.
26 Hu and Cui, “Implementation of Ambiguous Policy,” 145–174.
27 Waldo, The Administrative State.
28 He and Kong, “Chinese Experience in Public Policy Implementation,” 61–79 + 220–221.
29 He and Kong, “Political Potential Energy in the Implementation of Chinese Public Policy,” 4–25 + 204.
30 See note 6 above.
31 Susan and Michael, “Policy, Bargaining and Structure in Implementation Theory,” 219–240; Rice, “Street-Level Bureaucrats and the Welfare State,” 1038–1062.
32 See note 25 above.
33 Moulton and Sandfort, “The Strategic Action Field Framework for Policy Implementation Research,” 144–126.
34 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies; Fowler, “Problems, Politics, and Policy Streams in Policy Implementation,” 403–418.
35 See note 8 above.
36 Ho, “In Defense of Endogenous, Spontaneously Ordered Development,” 1087–1118; Ho, “Empty Institutions, Non-Credibility and Pastoralism,” 1145–1176.
37 Tirole, “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies,” 181–214; Tirole, “The Internal Organization of Government,” 1–29.
38 Zhou, and Lian, “Modes of Governance in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” 69–93.
39 Ho, “In Defense of Endogenous, Spontaneously Ordered Development,” 1087–1118.
40 Xue and Zhao, “Adaptive Reform and Limitations of the Public Policy Process in the Course of Transition,” 45–67.
41 Ai, “An Organizational Study of the Inspecting-Responding Process,” 68–87.
42 O’Brien and Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” 167–186; Zhou and Lian, “Modes of Governance in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” 69–93; Zhou, “Collusion Among Local Governments,” 1–21 + 243.
43 Chai et al., “The Impasse of Grazing-Ban Policy,” 93–98; Fan et al., “Evaluation of Public Value Performance of Ecological Construction Projects,” 86–93; Nie and Fan, “Public Value Analysis and Performance Evaluation of Ecological Governance Policy,” 110–119.
44 See note 12 above.
45 Xu, Metrology Geography, 226–253.
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Shengyue Fan
Shengyue Fan is a professor at the School of Economics, Minzu University of China, Beijing, China. His research interests include the policy process, regional sustainable development and ecological economy. Email: [email protected]
Tianyu Zhang
Tianyu Zhang is a Ph.D. in Economy at Minzu University of China. His research interests include institutional efficiency analysis. Tel.: +8615560855550. Email: [email protected]
Mengyao Li
Mengyao Li is an MD at the School of Economics, Minzu University of China, Beijing, China. Her research interests include the policy process. Tel.: +8618511613123. Email: [email protected]