The career characteristics of China’s prefectural environmental protection bureau heads with implication for the environmental governance

Abstract

As the direct responsible cadre in China’s local environmental management, the role of environmental protection bureau head (EPBH) is both critical and embarrassing. However, the profile of this group of cadres is largely unknown. This paper makes the first attempt to delineate China’s prefectural EPBHs and find several distinct features. First, although advocated by the central authority, “be younger” has not been realized in the appointment of EPBH. On the contrary, older candidates have been more favored in recent years. Second, EPBH is primarily a political actor rather than professional actor. However, they have been bearing increasing political pressure due to professional task. Third, county governments and other prefectural departments are the most important sources of EPBH, while for general environmental officials, it is very hard to be promoted as EPBH. Fourth, the promotion chance of EPBH is relatively high and most of them have been promoted to county governments and other prefectural departments. Last, the number of EPBHs removed because of dereliction has increased notably, but only a small fraction was sanctioned for poor and fraud environmental supervision. Finally, corresponding suggestions are proposed to optimize the selection, appointment, and management of EPBH.

Keywords:

• Environmental protection bureau head
• environmental governance
• career path
• China
• leader characteristics

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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Additional information

Funding

The research was funded by National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant number: 71704126].

Notes on contributors

Lei Liu

Lei Liu is a professor at the School of Public Administration, Sichuan University. He has been a Jean-Monnet fellow at European University Institute and a visiting scholar at the Ostrom Workshop of Indiana University. His research interests mainly focus on environmental policy and governance in China.

Lixu Tang

Lixu Tang is a master candidate at the School of Public Administration, Sichuan University, with a research focus on public policy.

Rui Liu

Rui Liu is an associate professor at the School of Public Administration, Sichuan University.

Mingyue Li

Mingyue Li is a master candidate at the School of Public Administration, Sichuan University, with a research focus on public policy.