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Abstract
This paper addresses the impact of formal and institutionalized public participation on local environmental enforcement in contemporary China. I gathered 14 years (2000–2014) worth of public participation data (e.g. letters, office visits, local NPC and CPPCC proposals) from official sources (e.g. Chinese Environmental Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics) and developed a quantitative model to explain how different channels of institutionalized public participation influence processed environmental violation cases. My findings show that institutionalized public participation, in particular, petition-oriented office visits has an impact on facilitating China’s local environmental enforcement due to its potential risks to political stability. This is evidenced by the relationship between office visits and the increased number of environmental penalties. I also found that institutionalized public participation, such as petitioning, functions as leverage against the government apart from as a platform for policy feedback.
Acknowledgments
The author hereby acknowledges suggestions from Professor Jing Zhan Vivian on improving this paper, assistance from Professor. Junyan Jiang with data collection and analysis, and helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper from panelists of the 76th Annual Conference of the Mid-West Political Science Association (MPSA), the 7th Chinese Public Management Scholar Seminar, and two anonymous reviewers. Any errors that remain are the author’s own.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 See Morton and Wu, “Policy Case Study: The Environment,” in Politics in China: An Introduction.
2 See details of international and grassroots ENGOs in Zhang and Barr, Green Politics in China: Environmental Governance and State-Society Relations; Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China.” For recent developments in community-building by Chinese NGOs and their relationships with the state, see Hasmath and Hsu, “A Community of Practice for Chinese NGOs”; Farid and Song, “Public Trust as a Driver of State-Grassroots NGO Collaboration in China;” Gao, “The Power of the Square: Public Spaces and Popular Mobilization after the Wenchuan Earthquake.
3 See State Bureau of Environmental Protection, “Huan jing bao hu xin fang guan li ban fa.” Retrieved from: http://fgcx.bjcourt.gov.cn:4601/law?fn=chl227s064.txt&dbt=chl; State Bureau of Environmental Protection, “Huan jing xin fang ban fa (1997).” Retrieved from: http://fgcx.bjcourt.gov.cn:4601/law?fn=chl088s056.txt; State Administration of Environmental Protection, “Huan jing xin fang ban fa (2006).” Retrieved from: https://www.mee.gov.cn/gkml/zj/jl/200910/t20091022_171839.htm.
4 Details of Huan jing bao hu gong zhong can yu ban fa is available on the official website of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) of the People’s Republic of China. The full text can be retrieved from the official website of MEE: http://www.mee.gov.cn/gkml/hbb/bl/201507/t20150720_306928.htm.
5 The MEP was renamed the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) after the institutional reform of 2018. Its power was extended to numerous fields including management of underground water, marine environmental protection, and climate change and emission reductions. See Xinhua Agency, “Guan yu guo wu yuan ji gou gai ge fang an de shuo ming.” The full text could be retrieved from the Xinhua Net: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018lh/2018-03/14/c_1122533011.htm.
6 See Beeson, “The Coming of Environmental Authoritarianism;” Gilley, “Authoritarian Environmentalism and China's Response to Climate Change”; Ahlers and Shen, “Breathe Easy? Local Nuances of Authoritarian Environmentalism in China's Battle against Air Pollution;” Chen and Lees, “The New, Green, Urbanization in China: Between Authoritarian Environmentalism and Decentralization.”
7 See Spaargaren and Mol, “Sociology, Environment, and Modernity: Ecological Modernization as a Theory of Social Change;” Lang and Xu, “Anti-Incinerator Campaigns and the Evolution of Protest Politics in China”; Moore, “Modernisation, Authoritarianism, and the Environment: The Politics of China's South-North Water Transfer Project.”
8 See Putnam, Making Democracy Work.
9 See Domínguez, “The Perfect Dictatorship? Comparing Authoritarian Rule in South Korea and in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico,” in The Park Chung Hee Era; Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager, “Beyond Comparative Anecdotalism: Lessons on Civil Society and Participation from São Paulo, Brazil.”
10 See Levisky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War; Kubicek, “Variations on a Corporatist Theme: Interest Associations in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia.”
11 Ibid.
12 See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies; Tsai and Xu, “Outspoken Insiders: Political Connections and Citizen Participation in Authoritarian China.”
13 See He and Warren, “Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in Chinese Political Development.”
14 See Zhu and Cao, “Decision-Making and Risk Sources: Key to Source Governance for Social Stability.”
15 See Kubicek, “Variations on a Corporatist Theme: Interest Associations in Post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia.”
16 Ibid.
17 See Hrebrenar, McBeth, and Morgan, “Interests and Lobbying in Lithuania: A Spectrum of Development.”
18 See Martin and Ligeti, “Hungary,” in Lobbying in Europe: Public Affairs and the Lobbying Industry in 28 EU Countries; Labanino et al., “Explaining the Formation Rates of Post-Communist Interest Organizations: Density Dependence and Political Opportunity Structure.”
19 See note 15 above; Bitonti, Harris, and Mariotti, “Lobbying and Public Affairs in Europe: Some Comparative Remarks,” in Lobbying in Europe: Public Affairs and the Lobbying Industry in 28 EU Countries.
20 See note 15 above; See note 17 above; Krasovsky, “‘The Lobbying Strategy Is to Keep Excise as Low as Possible’ – Tobacco Industry Excise Taxation Policy in Ukraine.”
21 See note 13 above.
22 See Xie, “Environmental Governance and Public Participation in Rural China.” Although this article does not touch on village elections, there is no denying that village elections work as an effective institution that holds grassroots cadres accountable and enhances villagers’ happiness. See also Lin et al., “The effect of political participation and village support on farmers happiness.” For details on the effect of public hearings/evaluation forums in China, see also Balla and Xie, “Consultation as Policymaking Innovation: Comparing Government Transparency and Public Participation in China and the United States”; Shen and Ahlers, “Local Environmental Governance Innovation in China: Staging ‘Triangular Dialogues’ for Industrial Air Pollution Control”; Zhang and Liao, “The Active Participation in a Community Transformation Project in China: Constructing New Forums for Expert-Citizen Interaction.”
23 See Gao and Long, “On the Petition System in China”; Chen, Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China.
24 See Li, Liu, and Li, “Getting Their Voices Heard: Three Cases of Public Participation in Environmental Protection in China.”
25 See Su and Meng, “Selective Responsiveness: Online Public Demands and Government Responsiveness in Authoritarian China.”
26 See for details the State Council of People’s Republic of China, “Xin fang tiao li,” which is available on http://lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=56635.
27 See Gao and Long, “On the Petition System in China.”
28 Ibid.
29 See Cai, “Local Governments and the Suppression of Popular Resistance in China”; See note 28 above.
30 See Huang, “Ti gao di fang ren da dai biao yi an zhi liang de tan tao: yi H sheng ren da dai biao ti jiao yi an wei li.”
31 See Yang, “Cong yi an jian yi tou shi ren da dai biao de jie gou bi li”; Yu, “Bounded Articulation: An Analysis of CPPCC Proposals, 2008–12.”
32 See Yu, “Bounded Articulation: An Analysis of CPPCC Proposals, 2008–12.”
33 See note 25 above.
34 See Yang, “Cong yi an jian yi tou shi ren da dai biao de jie gou bi li”; Chen, “From Economic Elites to Political Elites: Private Entrepreneurs in the People's Political Consultative Conference”; Chen and Dickson, Allies of the State: China's Private Entrepreneurs and Democratic Change.
35 See note 28 above.
36 See Truex, “Consultative Authoritarianism and Its Limits.”
37 Details about the difference in LPC’s and NPC’s legislative power can be found in the Zhong hua ren min gong he guo li fa fa (The Legislation Law of People’s Republic of China).
38 See note 13 above.
39 See, for example, Froissart, “From Outsiders to Insiders: The Rise of China ENGOs as New Experts in the Law-Making Process and the Building of a Technocratic Representation”; Liu and De Jong, “The Institutional Causes of Environmental Protests in China: A Perspective from Common Pool Resource Management”; Deng and Benney, “Selective Use of Political Opportunity: A Case of Environmental Protest in Rural China”; Dang, “How Culture Shapes Environmental Public Participation: Case Studies of China, the Netherlands, and Italy.”
40 See note 1 above.
41 See Lo and Tang, Institutions, Regulatory Styles, Society and Environmental Governance in China.
42 See Li et al., “Nonprofit Policy Advocacy under Authoritarianism”; Dai and Spires, “Advocacy in an Authoritarian State: How Grassroots Environmental NGOs Influence Local Governments in China.”
43 See note 32 above.
44 See Zhan and Tang, “Political Opportunities, Resource Constraints, and Policy Advocacy of Environmental NGOs in China.”
45 See Liu, “Advocacy Channels and Political Resource Dependence in Authoritarianism: Nongovernmental Organizations and Environmental Policies in China”; Farid and Song, “Public Trust as a Driver of State-Grassroots NGO Collaboration in China.”
46 See Liu, “Advocacy Channels and Political Resource Dependence in Authoritarianism: Nongovernmental Organizations and Environmental Policies in China.”
47 See Lang and Xu, “Anti-Incinerator Campaigns and the Evolution of Protest Politics in China”; Zhang and Yang, “Jin shi nian lai wo guo huan jing qun ti xing shi jian de te zheng jian xi.”
48 Ibid.
49 See Zhang and Yang, “Jin shi nian lai wo guo huan jing qun ti xing shi jian de te zheng jian xi”; Peng et al., “Explaining Chronic Non-compliance of Polluting Firms in Guangzhou,” which has its full text available on the Research Gate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328526802_Chronic_Non-compliance_and_Ineffective_Enforcement_in_Guangzhou.
50 For example, see note 32 above.
51 See note 15 above.
52 See Fazekas and Tóth, “From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework with Empirical Applications from Hungary.”
53 See Ong, “Thugs and Outsourcing of State Repression in China”; Zhan, “Natural Resources, Local Governance and Social Instability: A Comparison of Two Counties in China.”
54 See Ong, “Thugs and Outsourcing of State Repression in China.”
55 See note 54 above; Zhou, "Zhong guo di fang guan yuan de jin sheng jin biao sai mo shi yan jiu."
56 See Chen, “From Economic Elites to Political Elites: Private Entrepreneurs in the People's Political Consultative Conference.”
57 See Chen, Social Protest and Contentious Authoritarianism in China.
58 Ibid.
59 See note 30 above.
60 See note 32 above.
61 See Chen and Dickson, Allies of the State: China's Private Entrepreneurs and Democratic Change.
62 See Truex, Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China.
63 See Teets, “Let Many Civil Societies Bloom: The Rise of Consultative Authoritarianism in China”; See note 62 above.
64 Ibid.
65 See note 56 above.
66 See Xie and Van Der Heijdan, “Environmental Movements and Political Opportunities: The Case of China.”
67 See Sagild and Ahlers, “Honorary Intermediaries? The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences in Theory and Practice.”
68 See note 56 above.
69 See Guang and Su, “Collective Petition and Local State Responses in Rural China,” in Handbook of Protest and Resistance in China,
70 See Wu, Xu, and Zhang, “The Impacts of Governmental Performance Assessment Policy and Citizen Participation on Improving Environmental Performance across Chinese Provinces.”
71 For the raw data on province-level public participation and environmental governance, see the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Chinese Environmental Yearbook of 2001–15. For the raw data of provincial development except foreign investment and the number of Internet users, see the National Bureau of Statistics, the China City Statistical Yearbook of 2001–15. For the raw data on province-level foreign investment and residents’ access to the Internet, please refer to the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics: http://www.stats.gov.cn.
72 Telephone interview, a district EPB of Xi’An, 3 February 2020.
73 See note 69 above; See note 28 above.
74 See Fu, Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A Comparison of Asian Communist Regimes, “Access to Justice in China: Potentials, Limits, and Alternatives”; Gao and Long, “On the Petition System in China.”
75 See Zhang and Yang, “Jin shi nian lai wo guo huan jing qun ti xing shi jian de te zheng jian xi.”
76 See Li, Xu, and He, “Has the Centralized Environmental Governance Worked in China?,” which has its full text available on the Environment for Development: http://www.efdinitiative.org/research/publications/publications-repository/has-the-centralized-environmentalgovernance-regime-worked-in-china.
77 See note 57 above; See note 66 above; See note 56 above.
78 See note 12 above; See note 62 above.
79 A qualitative examination of EIAs, such as studying cases where EIA results make impacts on stalling controversial industrial projects, is recommended to show interactions and bargaining strategies among different stakeholders.