Racial Gerrymandering of Municipal Borders: Direct Democracy, Participatory Democracy, and Voting Rights in the United States

Abstract

As cities expand their jurisdictional borders via the process of municipal annexation, they sometimes leave low-income and minority enclaves perpetually excluded on the urban fringe, a process known as municipal underbounding. Despite a number of small-scale studies documenting the gerrymandering of municipal borders, robust empirical evidence of its extent is limited and little is known about the institutional factors that facilitate or stymie efforts to underbound poor and minority communities. In this article, a metropolitan area matching design is used to measure the effect of state annexation laws and federal protection of voting rights under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act on municipal underbounding between 1990 and 2010 in the United States. The analysis finds that laws that facilitate participation by city residents in annexation decisions lead to the underbounding of black neighborhoods, whereas those that provide third-party oversight of annexation decisions or expand opportunities for participation by residents living on the fringe lead to the inclusion of black neighborhoods. There is little evidence that such patterns of underbounding are driven by economic or fiscal considerations. In light of the 2013 invalidation by the Supreme Court of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, there is likely a nascent return to racial gerrymandering of municipal borders occurring in the South, particularly in states where city residents are granted some measure of influence over annexation. The results suggest the need for renewed attention to local government boundary changes and their role in facilitating and exacerbating racial discrimination.

当城市透过行政区合併来扩张管辖边界时, 经常将低收入与少数族裔飞地彻底排除在城市边缘——一个称为 “行政区划限囿” 的过程。尽管若干小规模的研究记载了行政边界的操弄, 此一现象之程度的强健经验证据仍然有限, 而促进或阻碍将贫穷及少数族裔社群排除于行政区之外的尝试之制度因素, 则仍鲜为人知。本文运用一个大都会地区的配对设计, 评估州的合併法和联邦选举法案第五节对于选举权的保护, 对美国 1990 年至 2010 年间行政区划限囿的影响。研究分析发现, 促进市民参与合併决策的法律, 导致了对黑人邻里进行行政区划限囿; 而对合併决策提供第三方监督, 抑或将参与扩张至边缘地区的居民, 则导致了将黑人邻里纳入其中。鲜少证据显示, 此般的行政区划限囿是由经济或财政考量所驱动。有鉴于 2013 年最高法院对于选举权法第四节的废止, 行政边界的种族选区操弄, 晚近很可能在南方捲土重来, 特别是在城市居民被赋予若干影响合併的手段的州之中。研究结果指出, 必须重新关注地方政府边界的改变, 及其在助长与恶化种族歧视中所扮演的角色。

A medida que las ciudades extienden sus límites jurisdiccionales a través del proceso de anexión municipal, a veces dejan en la periferia urbana enclaves de minorías de bajos ingresos marginados a perpetuidad, proceso conocido como exclusión de los límites municipales [underbounding]. A pesar de un número de estudios a pequeña escala que documentan la manipulación de circunscripciones electorales [gerrymandering] en zonas limítrofes municipales, una evidencia empírica robusta de su extensión es limitada y poco se sabe de los factores institucionales que facilitan u obstruyen los esfuerzos para la exclusión cartográfica de las comunidades pobres y de minorías. En este artículo se usa un diseño que corresponda con el área metropolitana para medir el efecto de leyes estatales de anexión y la protección federal de los derechos electorales, bajo la Sección 5 de la Ley de Derechos Electorales sobre exclusión municipal en los Estados Unidos, entre 1990 y 2010. El análisis encuentra que las leyes que facilitan la participación de los residentes de la ciudad en decisiones sobre anexión conducen a la exclusión municipal de los barrios negros, en tanto que aquellas que permiten la supervisión de las decisiones de anexión por terceros, o que amplían las oportunidades de participación a residentes que viven en la periferia, llevan a la inclusión de los barrios negros. Hay muy poca evidencia de que tales patrones de underbounding sean determinados por consideraciones económicas o fiscales. A la luz de la invalidación de 2013 por la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Sección 4 de la Ley de Derechos Electorales, parece estar dándose en el Sur un naciente regreso al gerrymandering racial en los límites municipales, en particular en los estados donde a los residentes urbanos se les está concediendo algún grado de influencia sobre la anexión. Los resultados sugieren la necesidad de una atención renovada a los cambios de límites por el gobierno local y al papel que éste cumple en facilitar y exacerbar la discriminación racial.

Key Words:

• direct democracy
• municipal annexation
• participatory democracy
• racial discrimination
• voting rights

关键词：:

• 直接民主
• 行政区合併
• 参与式民主
• 种族歧视
• 选举权

Palabras clave:

• democracia directa
• anexión municipal
• democracia participativa
• discriminación racial
• derechos electorales

Notes

1. This included all cities in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia, as well as cities in selected counties across Florida, Michigan, New York, and North Carolina. See https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 (accessed 10 August 2017).

2. To test this assumption, I examined variation in the minority share of the population in 1990 and population growth between 1990 and 2010 at the county level in the CBSA groups studied here. In total, 46 percent, 71 percent, and 93 percent of the variance in population growth, the share of blacks, and the share of Hispanics, respectively, exists between metropolitan groups. In the models presented here, these and other unobserved group-invariant factors are held constant through the use of CBSA group fixed effects.

3. This can be found by adding the three coefficients: −0.26 + 0.27 + 0.19 = 0.20. Thus, in states with both laws the share of blacks in annexed census blocks is 20 percentage points higher than in states with neither law.

4. To do so, Model 4 was replicated after interacting measures of per capita tax revenue or per capita expenditures on redistributive services (hospitals, schools, housing, and welfare) with referenda and petition rights. None of the models showed any indication that resistance to or the pursuit of annexation was driven by preferences for differing tax and expenditure policies.

5. I appreciate comments from an anonymous reviewer regarding this possibility. To test this, I reran Models 1 through 4 from Table 6 after including measures of the per capita number of cities and special (utility and transportation) districts in each county in 1990 and 1992, respectively, as well as measures of changes in these variables between 1990 and 2010 and 1992 and 2002, respectively. The results were largely inconclusive and did not change the broader conclusions of the study. The only notable finding was that in counties with higher per capita shares of special districts in 1992, blacks made up a smaller percentage of residents in annexed census blocks. This appears to contradict the argument that the need for increased service provision drives the underbounding of black neighborhoods; indeed, if it did, one would expect that in counties where cities are the primary service providers (i.e., where special districts are relatively scarce), the annexation of minorities would be less likely. The reverse appears to be the case.

6. This can be observed by examining the coefficients, including the interaction term, in tandem: −0.16 + −0.12 + 0.19 = 0.10. Thus, in states with both referenda and public hearings, the share of blacks in annexed blocks is 10 percentage points higher than in states with neither form of citizen participation.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Noah J. Durst

NOAH J. DURST is Assistant Professor in the Urban and Regional Planning Program at the School of Planning, Design and Construction, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48823. E-mail: [email protected]. His research interests include municipal annexation, housing, land use regulation, and urban informality.