Nihon no Gensiryoku Gaiko [Japan’s nuclear diplomacy: a resource-poor country’s 70 years of struggle]

The objective of Prof. Takeda’s new book is to describe the history of the Japanese peaceful use of nuclear energy. Although many other books with the same objective have been published since the meltdown of Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, his book is distinctive because of two perspectives; the focus on Japanese diplomacy and comprehensiveness covering not only the history of peaceful use but the related history such as disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In Japan, the most important book in this field has been Yoshioka’s work¹. As the main focus of Yoshioka was understanding the Japanese domestic structure for developing of nuclear energy, Takeda’s book is another pillar of this field.

In the introduction, Takeda gives a brief history of the discovery of nuclear energy and explains technical terms such as nuclear reactors and nuclear materials. With these explanations, even readers who are not familiar with the topic of peaceful use can read this book without difficulty.

Chapter 1 outlines the Japanese history related to nuclear energy up to 1954, including the massive impact of the Lucky Dragon incident. This incident made Japan a three-time victim of nuclear weapons, and Japanese citizens began to feel anxious about nuclear energy itself. Japanese congressmen such as Yasuhiro Nakasone, future Japanese prime minister, planned to overwhelm those negative attitudes through cooperation with the U.S. This idea resulted in a bilateral agreement to the preliminary research of nuclear energy in 1955, and this agreement was expanded to operate a nuclear power reactor in 1958. As Takeda points out, this agreement established Japanese principles for developing nuclear energy; importing advanced technology and rushing for being a major state of peaceful use.

In chapter 2, Takeda describes that the French nuclear experiments in 1960 and the Chinese experiments in 1964 made the U.S. increasingly concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, Japan was forced to consider whether Japan should participate in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Takeda suggests that Japan finally decided to be an original signatory for several reasons in 1970. First, Japan succeeded in inserting a provision about holding review conferences every 5 years. Second, Japan also succeeded to revise the bilateral agreement of 1958 to enable Japan to import more nuclear fuel. Third, the U.S. assured Japan about a so-called “nuclear umbrella.”

The first half of chapter 3 covers the Japanese process of NPT ratification. According to Takeda, after clarifying a safeguarding procedure required by the NPT would not be an obstacle for the peaceful use, the Japanese government decided to ratify the NPT in 1976. In addition, Takeda mentions that even by the incident of the Japanese nuclear-powered ship “Mutsu,” which led some Japanese people to establish public movements against nuclear power plants, Japan never changed its goal of becoming a major state of peaceful use. In pursuit of this goal, Japan sought cooperation with other countries. It is very interesting to the reviewer that while Japan made the U.S. angry by trying to find another supplier of enriched uranium, Japan succeeded in cooperating with European states in plans for the reprocessing of used fuel. The second half of this chapter notes that India’s experiment in 1974 intensified the U.S. concern about the proliferation, and the U.S. began to establish an export control regime. Takeda mentions that Japan was allowed to join this regime as a supplier group although Japan had not exported yet, so it was able to escape the tightening control and maintain her goal to be a major state of peaceful use.

Chapter 4 deals with the 1970s and early 1980s, and it is the most valuable part of the book, as this chapter is based on the author’s main research interests. According to him, because Carter administration was worried about the delay in enhancing the international regime of export control, his administration shifted to establish a new unilateral security control related to plutonium. As a country which has tried to establish fuel cycle, Japan objected against this project and began to persuade the U.S. to give up. According to Takeda, Japan had very little negotiation power due to the provision of the bilateral agreement of 1968. This was because the reprocessing of the used fuel, which was allowed by this agreement, required approval from the U.S. in every individual instance. However, after long and persistent negotiation, Japan finally succeed in persuading the U.S. to back the multinational policy.

Chapter 5 covers two main topics: incidents in nuclear power plants in the late 1970s to 80s and the revision of the U.S.-Japan bilateral agreement in 1987. First, Takeda mentions that while the Three Miles incident in 1979 and the Chernobyl incident in 1986 caused a global anti-nuclear movement, it did not happen in Japan; then he points out that although Japan had tried to establish the fuel cycle, various technical tasks remained to be solved. Even in this situation, Takeda explains that Japan first exported her own nuclear industry to China in 1986. Last, Takeda evaluates the revision of the bilateral treaty, suggesting that the most important point of this revision was to enable Japan to reprocess used fuel without the U.S. approval every time.

Chapter 6 covers the period from the end of the Cold War to the first years of the 21^st century. Takeda shows how Japan made various efforts toward disarmament and non-proliferation. Among these efforts, the most interesting point to the reviewer was that Japan offered Iran to reprocess its used fuel in Japan to prevent Iran from secretly developing nuclear weapons. While Japan made such efforts, Takeda also points out that the international community has become increasingly concerned about massive Japanese storage of plutonium; Japan has been trying to ease such concerns through various measures. Moreover, this chapter refers to a “nuclear renaissance,” the special demands of the nuclear industry in the first few years of the 2000s. In such an environment, Japan established a policy in 2006 to increase the ratio of nuclear energy as a general source of energy to 50% by 2030.

In Chapter 7, Takeda explains that Japan has still regarded nuclear energy as a vital source of energy and kept the goal to be a major state of peaceful use even after the meltdown of Fukushima. However, Takeda also notes that China and Russia have emerged as rivals of exporting nuclear industry and that specific domestic situations in Japan that each actor has veto power has remained as an obstacle for developing the nuclear industry.

The final chapter summarizes the history, and the author suggests that Japan, as a non-nuclear-weapon state and a major state of peaceful use, can make remarkable contributions to non-proliferation and disarmaments. Then the author points out the fact that the bilateral agreement between Japan and the U.S. turned to automatic extension in 2018; he hopes that this will contribute further developing this bilateral relationship.

As clearly shown thus far, this book is quite comprehensive and covers various topics. However, the reviewer feels that it is a little bit too lengthy and thinks limiting the focus would be more helpful to the reader. The reviewer also believes that the definition of “nuclear diplomacy” should be more detailed. The author defines this term as diplomacy to promote peaceful use. However, the reviewer understands that this term also includes diplomacy by taking advantage of the capability of peaceful use. The author limits the definition to the former meaning; however, this term is also attached to the latter meaning in this book. For example, on page 270, the author describes that “the characteristic of Japanese nuclear diplomacy is to contribute to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by using experience and technological advancements related to the peaceful use.” To the reviewer, this ambiguous definition poses some fundamental questions; why does Japan stick to the peaceful use? Moreover, what is the relationship between the Japanese nuclear diplomacy and diplomacy in other fields?

In addition to the above questions, the subtitle of this book is also ambiguous. The reviewer did not understand what diplomatic struggle Japan has experienced. Certainly, the chapter dealing with the 1970s and 1980s discusses the Japanese struggle and strenuous negotiation with the U.S. However, in other chapters, domestic efforts of establishing fuel cycle have been described as struggle (e.g., page 177). Thus, the reviewer thinks that Takeda should have made diplomatic struggles in other periods more explicit, as this book focuses on diplomacy.

However, these negative points, such as its lengthiness and ambiguousness are minor overall. As Takeda aims to shed light on history itself, it can be said that those are inevitable side effects. Rather, this book, including vast information and covering long periods, offers the correct and essential knowledge about the topics which each reader wants to know. This is exactly Takeda’s intention, and therefore I recommend this book for everyone.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Shingo Tanaka

Shingo Tanaka is an associate professor at Osaka University of Economics and Law. His research interest is the diplomatic history of the U.S. and Japan regarding nuclear energy.

Notes

This article is a revised version based on the original work in Japanese, S.Tanaka, “Takeda Yu Cho ‘Nihon no Genshiryoku Gaiko: Shigensyokoku no Kuto’”, Kokusai Anzenhoshou, Vol.46, no.4 (2019): 84–87.

¹ Yoshioka, Genshiryoku no Shakaishi.