Reisenki Nikkan Anzenhosho Kankei No Keisei [Formation of the Japan-South Korea security relationship during the Cold War]

¹ In recent years, many excellent studies² have been published on the history of international relations in East Asia centering on the Korean Peninsula during the transformative Cold War period in the early 1970s. These studies primarily focus on how changes in the international environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula, such as power politics between major powers, including “the Sino-American rapprochement,” affected Japan-South Korea relations and other regional relations.

The main purpose of this book is “to clarify how Japan and South Korea sought a cooperative security relationship from the late 1960s through the mid-1970s, a period characterized by a transition in the world order” (page 4). Kyungwon Choi focuses on “how Japan and South Korea built a cooperative security relationship despite their competing political interests, and what kind of political processes underwent actual transformation” (page 5), based on primary historical sources (diplomatic papers) from the US, Japan, and South Korea.

Following the “security crisis” created by North Korea’s military provocations, especially the January 1968 attack on the South Korean president, Japan-South Korea relations evolved to establish a form of “security and economic cooperation” that “characterized the nature of crisis response and security cooperation between Japan and South Korea” (page 13). Following the “security crisis” brought about by the fall of Saigon in 1975, the question of “how both countries could cooperate to keep peace on the Korean Peninsula” (page 233) was raised in the context of the bilateral security relationship formed in the late 1960s. Eventually, the relationship underwent qualitative changes.

This book investigates the formation of and qualitative changes to the Japan-South Korea security relationship from 1968 to 1975. The contents from Chapter 1 to Chapter 5 are as follows:

Chapter 1 (1968) reveals how the new threat of “indirect invasions” (page 19) by North Korea, and South Korea’s request for cooperation with Japan prompted Japan and South Korea to lay the foundation for a pattern of “security and economic cooperation” to “identify areas where cooperation could be achieved” (page 54).

In Chapter 2 (1969), it is revealed how the security debate over the functions of the US military bases in Okinawa was integrated into the “Korea clause” through policy adjustments. Prior to the return of Okinawa, security-related friction between Japan and South Korea arose due to their differences in situational perceptions and security measures.

Japan recognized that the role of the US military bases in Okinawa had declined. However, due to its ongoing security crisis, South Korea emphasized the role of the Okinawa bases in East Asia and hoped that their functions would be maintained even after the return of Okinawa. Both Japan and South Korea continued their diplomatic efforts, but they ended up being affected by policy adjustments by the opposing US. As a result, the “Korea clause” was established as “a product of compromise between the demands for security and appeals toward the easing of tensions” (page 90).

In Chapter 3 (1970–73), it is shown that following the reduction of US troops in South Korea, the latter asked Japan to cooperate on a defense development project called “Four Projects: heavy machinery, specialized steel alloys, cast iron, and copper smelters.” The transformation process realized through negotiations is depicted. Initially, Japan was reluctant to cooperate on defense issues, but between the US troop reduction and South Korea’s appeal for economic support, the Japanese government identified a form of cooperation that was acceptable to their country, where military cooperation was not possible. It has been argued that the Japanese and South Korean security cooperation has achieved high importance, in line with the South Korean government’s “Big Five Heavy Industries Project.”

Due to the transformation in the East Asian Cold War order owing to the US-China rapprochement, both Japan and South Korea were able to distance themselves from Cold War diplomacy. They began to swing between political and diplomatic positions that included demands for security and appeals toward the easing of tensions. As a result of these adjustments to their relationship, the Japan-South Korea economic cooperation has come to be regarded as important from the viewpoint of Japan contributing to South Korea’s victory in the “systematic competition” between the North and the South (Chapter 4 [1971–73]).

When Saigon fell in 1975, Japan and South Korea responded with a different sense of crisis. South Korea prepared for North Korea to start a war with China’s consent, while Japan viewed the situation as a temporary one, and carried on with its existing diplomatic policy that sought to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Japan tried to contribute to the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula by opening up a path for peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, including proposing direct negotiations between the US and North Korea. In addition to the existing security cooperation, Japanese and South Korean cooperation over peaceful coexistence was regarded as important, and a qualitative change was seen. The book states that it was “a more difficult task requiring meticulous reconciliation of interests” (page 233) (Chapter 5 [1974–75]).

I would like to appreciate the book’s superb depiction of the evolution of the security relationship between Japan and South Korea even as it considers the influence of the US. While existing research has analyzed the Japan-South Korea security relationship within the Japan-South Korea-US trilateral framework based on the US military’s commitment, this book “does not simply focus on the aspects stipulated by the US, but on the contrary, focuses on the aspect of the division of labor between Japan and South Korea” (pages 7–8). Additionally, this book rejects the simple argument of prior studies that the decline in the US presence led to the cooperation between Japan and South Korea by demonstrating cooperation as well as conflict between them.

Cha did present a theoretical framework of the US-Japan-South Korea relationship during the same time period³ , but this book further elucidates the actual state of Japan-South Korea relations. While Cha has pointed out in Chapter 3 of his book that Japan and South Korea had started talks on common security issues, and that Japan directed unprecedented aid and investment into the South Korean economy, this book was able to clarify those details.

This book details the development of relations between Japan and South Korea since the normalization of diplomatic relations between them (1965), a topic that has not yet been sufficiently studied. It also clarifies that Japan and South Korea’s “security and economic cooperation” implies that Japan will contribute to South Korea’s victory in the “systematic competition” between the North and the South, and to the resultant qualitative changes.

However, some issues remain. First, if Japan and South Korea’s relationship and policies before the time period covered by this book (1968–75) had been touched upon in any way, it would have been possible to paint a clearer picture of the changes to the bilateral relationship and policies that were triggered by the “security crisis.” For example, the first time that South Korea showed public opposition to the return of Okinawa was after 1952, when the Treaty of San Francisco took effect.⁴ South Korea had already recognized that the US military bases in Okinawa were important for its defense. What are the changes that might have taken place with regards to South Korea’s policy on the Okinawa issue after the 1968 “security crisis”?

While the negotiation process and conflict between Japan and South Korea are clearly depicted, it was difficult to understand the overall mechanism by which the two countries determined their policies. Of course, disagreements within each ministry regarding individual issues were written about; however, how did the two countries decide on their overall foreign policies? Unlike the case of the U.S. diplomatic documents, there are restrictions on accessing primary historical documents in Japan and South Korea. As such, this could be an issue for the entire academic world.

Finally, Cha refers to direct exchanges between Japanese and South Korean defense officials during the same period⁵ , but those exchanges were not touched upon in this book. I await future empirical research on how Japanese and South Korean security-related exchanges progressed following diplomatic negotiations.

These points do not lower my evaluation of the book. The book’s subject of research not only covers Japan-South Korea relations between 1968 and 1975, but also gives suggestions regarding the future of relations between these two countries.

Notes

¹ This book review is a revised version based on the original work in Japanese, H.Matsuda, “Choi Kyungwon cho ‘Reisenki Nikkan Anzenhosho Kankei no Keisei ’ ”, Ajia Kenkyu, Vol.61, no.1 (2015): 78 –80.

² Lee, “Mikan No Heiwa.” etc.

³ Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism.

⁴ Kobayashi, “Shinhakken Kankoku Gaikomonjo Ga Abaku ‘Kaku Mitsuyaku,’ No Shinso.”

⁵ See note 2 above.